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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the factors that contribute to the bail decision-making 
process in English and Canadian courts. Despite the fact that bail contributes to 
rising prison remand populations, influences the lives of legally innocent 
defendants, and is central to assessments of human rights, very little is known 
about this process. England and Canada were ideal jurisdictions with which to 
explore this issue as that their similar bail laws and divergent practices related 
to pre-trial custody reflected different patterns of bail decision-making. This 
research took place when Canada’s prison remand rates had been increasing 
over several decades and England had one of the lowest prison remand rates in 
the Western world. 
 
The objectives of the study were to identify the factors that contribute to bail 
decision-making, investigate how they converged and diverged between 
jurisdictions, understand the impact of the decision-making at the local level, 
and explore how the findings contribute to an understanding of the bail decision-
making process in a wider context. 
 
It is argued that court culture is central to understanding bail decision-making 
but that it is shaped by broader views that are specific to the criminal justice 
processes in England and Canada. These views relate to values that developed 
in each jurisdiction as a result of the evolution of criminal justice ideology and 
guiding philosophies over time. The influence of these informal factors on the 
bail decision-making process were facilitated by the discretion afforded to court 
actors in their application of formal laws and policies, which enabled them to 
balance multiple competing principles whilst, in the main, remaining within the 
prescribed legal framework. This suggests that the factors contributing to bail 
decision-making are nuanced, varied, and interdependent and, as such, should 
not be examined individually but rather in terms of their interactive effects. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Bail has been called the ‘Cinderella’ of the criminal justice system (Hucklesby & 
Sarre, 2009). Despite the fact that it contributes to rising prison remand 
populations, has a considerable impact on the lives of legally innocent 
defendants, and is central to assessments of human rights and the presumption 
of innocence, it has received minimal academic and political attention 
worldwide. There has been a recent surge of interest, however, as a result of 
increases in many jurisdictions’ prison remand populations (Walmsley, 2017). 
The bail decision-making process, which dictates whether defendants are held 
in custody or released on bail into the community, has a major influence on the 
number of remand prisoners. These individuals make up the portion of the 
prison population that has not been released and are instead detained in 
custody awaiting the conclusion of their criminal proceedings. Outside of 
England and Wales,1 where the size of this group has remained relatively stable 
(Ministry of Justice, 2017c), most common law jurisdictions have seen 
significant increases in their remand populations in recent years (Walmsley, 
2017). In Canada, the remand prison population rate has tripled in the last four 
decades (Statistics Canada, 2017a). Given the repercussions associated with 
these trends, it is crucial to develop a better understanding of how they came to 
be. 
 
This thesis examines the factors that contribute to the bail decision-making 
process in English and Canadian courts. The research took place between 
2015 and 2016, a time when increases in Canada’s remand population had 
contributed to what was largely considered a ‘broken bail system’ (Webster, 
2015), and England had maintained one of the lowest remand rates of all 
common law jurisdictions (Walmsley, 2017). By comparing two jurisdictions with 
different remand population trends, additional light can be shed on the factors 
underlying the use of bail that may contribute to divergent patterns of bail 
                                            
1 For ease hereafter, the jurisdiction of ‘England and Wales’ will be referred to exclusively as 
England. This is because the research undertaken in this study took place in this part of the 
jurisdiction.  
  
2 
decision-making. The objectives of this study were twofold. First, the research 
sought to identify the factors that contribute to the bail decision-making process 
and to examine how these factors converged and diverged in English and 
Canadian courts. Second, it aimed to understand the implications of these 
contributing factors in terms of their influence in England and Canada, 
specifically, as well as explore how they furthered an understanding of the use 
of bail in a wider context.  
 
The contribution of the thesis 
 
It is critical to develop a better understanding of the bail decision-making 
process given its substantial consequences, many of which relate to its impact 
on the size of a jurisdiction’s prison remand population. While decisions made in 
bail court cannot completely explain increases in this population,2 they provide 
considerable insight into potential contributing factors at one stage of the 
process. The individual and institutional costs of housing large numbers of 
remand prisoners are significant. Prisoners held in remand experience high 
levels of stress (Player, Roberts, Jacobson, Hough, & Robottom, 2010), risk the 
loss of employment (Trotter, 2010), and often endure harsher prison conditions 
relative to sentenced prisoners (Canadian Civil Liberties Association, 2014; HM 
Inspectorate of Prisons, 2012). Furthermore, they are more likely to be 
convicted of an offence and sentenced to imprisonment (Bottomley, 1970; 
Friedland, 1965), face problems defending themselves (Bottomley, 1970; 
Friedland, 1965; Trotter, 2010) and experience increased pressure to plead 
guilty despite having potentially valid defences (Bottomley, 1970; Manns, 2005). 
A large prison remand population also puts pressure on criminal justice 
institutions which must devote considerable resources to house these prisoners 
and deal with the increased complexities associated with their management 
(Office of Auditor General of Ontario, 2008).  
 
Bail decisions also have important human rights implications given that 
defendants are considered innocent until proven guilty in both the Canadian and 
                                            
2 Decisions made outside of the bail process can also be expected to influence the size of the 
remand population. For example, the police decision to detain defendants in custody and the 
length of time accused persons spend in custody following a decision on bail would also have 
an impact. 
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English legal systems (Bottomley, 1970; Friedland, 2012; Player et al., 2010). 
Determinations of bail that restrict defendants’ freedom can raise concerns 
related to the right to liberty and procedural fairness. Human rights law 
prescribes that unconvicted individuals should only be detained with good 
cause and in limited circumstances (see, for example, the European Convention 
on Human Rights, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). When restraint in the use 
of remand custody is not exercised, the extent to which human rights standards 
are being adhered to becomes questionable and the central principle of the 
presumption of innocence can become strained (Webster, 2007).  
 
Given the consequences associated with bail decision-making, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that significant concerns have been raised about this process. In 
Canada, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau outlined in his 2015 Mandate Letter to 
the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, Jodie Wilson-Raybould, 
that she and her colleagues should conduct a full justice review, in which bail 
was expected to be a central focus (Trudeau, 2015). This directive was largely a 
result of mounting concerns surrounding the rising prison remand population 
and inadequate use of discretion in the bail decision-making process (Re-
inventing Criminal Justice, 2012; Steering Committee on Justice Efficiencies, 
2006; Webster, 2015). In England, the 2010 green paper Breaking the Cycle: 
Effective Punishment, Rehabilitation and Sentencing of Offenders argued that 
the way that prison was used for remand had to be rethought given that custody 
was being used in too many cases in which defendants would ultimately never 
receive a custodial sentence (Ministry of Justice, 2010a). The paucity of recent 
and comprehensive research on how bail decisions are made is a major 
obstacle to the achievement of these objectives.  
 
While there has been a growing number of studies seeking to explain bail 
practices in Canada in recent years, most of this research is restricted to 
observational data and does not include the perspective of the decision-makers 
(see Myers, 2009, 2015, 2017; Webster, 2011).3 Gaining an understanding of 
their perspectives is critical in order to understand the context in which they 
                                            
3 Two notable exceptions are the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (2014) and John Howard 
Society (2013), which both use interviews and observations/file review.  
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make the decisions viewed during court observations. Although there is some 
research investigating explanations for bail practices in England, it is either out-
dated as a result of taking place prior to the introduction of several key pieces of 
legislation that have impacted the bail process, including the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 and the Legal, Aid, Sentencing and Punishment Act 2012 (see, for 
example, Doherty & East, 1985; Hucklesby, 1996, 1997a, 1997b; Hucklesby & 
Marshall, 2000; Morgan & Henderson, 1998), or limited in scope in that it 
focuses on specific laws (Hucklesby, Eastwood, Seddon, & Spriggs, 2007) and 
programmes (Hucklesby, 2011b) or uses simulated case studies (Dhami, 
2010). 4  This demonstrates the need for additional research that is both 
comprehensive and that can offer insight into current practices surrounding bail 
in both these jurisdictions.  
 
The value of a comparative approach 
 
A comprehensive assessment could potentially be accomplished through 
research that uses legal systems in more than one country as a basis of 
comparison. While some research has compared bail decision-making in 
multiple legal and procedural contexts within the same country (see Canadian 
Civil Liberties Association, 2014; King, Bamford, & Sarre, 2009), these studies 
still examine the process within the same overarching national context. In fact, 
only one study to date is known to have compared bail decision-making in 
multiple legal jurisdictions on an international scale (see Fair Trials, 2016). 
Expanding upon this research is important given that comparative approaches 
could be key to developing a comprehensive understanding of the criminal 
process and its components. This is because they allow the findings to be freed 
from the context of their own systems, enabling a broader understanding of the 
process to take place (Zweigert & Kotz, 1998). By examining the operation of 
similar processes in different environments, the individual influence of each 
contributing factor becomes clearer as it is easier to view them separately from 
the contexts in which they developed. In addition, the comparison acts as a 
mechanism with which to identify taken for granted normative assumptions, 
widening the scope for increased understanding and potential reform. When 
                                            
4 One notable exception is Cape and Smith (2016). 
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examining the attitudes and practices in more than one jurisdiction, we avoid 
taking for granted the subjectivity of values embedded in a specific legal culture 
that may have been assumed to be universal truths (Nelken, 2010). As such, 
developing a greater understanding of one system in relation to another enables 
a novel and more wide-ranging understanding of the bail decision-making 
process to take place. 
 
England and Canada are ideal jurisdictions in which to conduct comparative 
analyses of bail decision-making given their shared legal historical foundations 
and adherence to similar international human rights instruments, but marked 
difference in their use of remand custody. This is useful from a comparative 
standpoint as Nelken (2010) has argued that the more relevant constants 
between the jurisdictions, the more surprising and instructive the finding of 
difference can be. In essence, this type of comparison makes it easier to tease 
out the differences that do exist between two similar locations that may be 
contributing to differing bail practices. Ultimately, England and Canada are 
expected to offer insight into considerably different models of bail decision-
making. As such, this comparison between them enables a wide-ranging 
understanding of the process that could not be achieved through a single 
jurisdiction study. 
 
The development of the thesis 
 
The extent to which examining bail decision-making in England and Canada 
compares ‘like with like’ (Nelken, 2010) is made clear through an examination of 
their legislative and policy histories related to bail. The basis of both England 
and Canada’s bail laws rests on a presumption in favour of bail in which 
defendants are to be released into the community unless the state can 
demonstrate that there is a legitimate reason to remove this right. Both the Bail 
Act 1976 in England and the Bail Reform Act 1972 in Canada were put in place 
when due process concerns that emphasized the rights of suspects and 
defendants were of primary importance in the criminal justice rhetoric 
(Hucklesby, 2009; Trotter, 2010). However, in both England and Canada this 
principle has been eroded by a number of amendments that restrict the right to 
bail (Hucklesby, 2009; Trotter, 2010). This is reflective of a broader shift in both 
  
6 
criminal justice systems away from due process values towards those of crime 
control. The overarching rhetoric related to criminal justice was also similar 
between jurisdictions in other capacities. Indeed, there was a movement 
towards ‘tough on crime’ approaches to crime that put public safety and the 
victim at the forefront (Newburn, 2007; Webster & Doob, 2015) and a growing 
preoccupation with managerialism that was exemplified by attempts to improve 
efficiency (De Lint, 1998; Raine & Willson, 1993, 1997) and manage risk 
(Ericson & Haggerty, 1997; Feeley & Simon, 1992; Garland, 2001; Hannah-
Moffat, 1999).  
 
Despite these similarities, there are substantially different trends in the use of 
remand across England and Canada. Over the last three decades, the remand 
population rate has nearly tripled in Canada, currently comprising 37% of the 
total adult prison population (Statistics Canada, 2017a, 2017b), while it has 
remained relatively stable in England, constituting 11% of the total prison 
population (Ministry of Justice, 2017c). When the similarities in the law, policy, 
and overarching rhetoric related to criminal justice are considered alongside the 
differences in the use of remand, it seems unlikely that these factors can be 
solely responsible for the bail decision-making processes. The existing research 
and national statistics substantiate this supposition, suggesting that, while 
factors related to the nature and volume of cases entering the courts and the 
law and policy surrounding them can offer some insight into the bail practices in 
each jurisdiction, they fail to present a complete picture (Hucklesby, 2009; 
Webster, Doob, & Myers, 2009).  
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that research has begun to point to the importance of 
informal factors in explaining each jurisdiction’s use of bail (Hucklesby, 1997a, 
2009, Myers, 2009, 2015, 2017; Webster et al., 2009). Explanations for bail 
decision-making that centre on informal factors are based on broader literature 
that sees the organisation of the administration of criminal justice as a system of 
action in which individual actors make decisions based on cooperation, 
exchange, and adaptation (Blumberg, 1967a; Cole, 1970; Eisenstein & Jacob, 
1977; Feeley, 1973; Skolnick, 1967). This research emphasises informal 
concerns over formal rules and defined roles when searching for explanations 
related to the behaviour of criminal justice actors (Feeley, 1973). It has been 
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argued that the adherence to informal ‘rules of the game’ has resulted in the 
formation of individual ‘court cultures’ in which norms develop in each court 
location and are mediated through the decision-making of the courtroom 
workgroup (Cammiss, 2007; Church, 1982; Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; 
Hucklesby, 1997a; Lipetz, 1980; Myers, 2015; Webster et al., 2009; Young, 
2013).  
 
Court culture alone cannot explain bail practices, however, because it does not 
exist in a vacuum but rather emerges in relation to the overarching context 
(Church, 1985; Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; Young, 2013). Examining it without 
taking this into account offers only a limited understanding of the bail decision-
making process. Indeed, the courtroom workgroup can be expected to be 
influenced by contextual factors that shape the functioning of the criminal 
process in its entirety. For example, research has demonstrated that bail 
decision-making is, in part, shaped by a broader culture of risk aversion in 
Canada (Myers, 2017; Webster, 2015; Webster et al., 2009), and concerns 
surrounding prison overcrowding in England (Hucklesby, 2009). However, given 
these studies have only been conducted from single jurisdiction perspectives, 
and thus do not examine behaviour outside of this overarching context, the full 
impact of these types of broader factors is unclear.   
 
Given that existing research suggests neither law, policy, and case factors nor 
informal factors related to court culture can independently account for the 
factors that contribute to the bail decision-making process, this study takes a 
more comprehensive examination of this process. Specifically, it takes a 
theoretical approach consistent with McConville and his colleagues (1991), who 
assert that developing an understanding of the criminal process (and in this 
case bail process) should consider formal rules, rhetoric, and the behaviour of 
criminal justice actors. As such, this thesis assesses the differences in two 
jurisdictions in terms of formal factors related to law and policy as well as 
informal factors related to both court culture and the views surrounding the 
broader criminal process that shapes it.  
 
This study sought to examine the factors that impact bail decision-making 
through a multiple-case study of two lower courts, one of which was located in 
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Canada and the other in England. During the course of the study, 43 days of 
observation took place, resulting in 485 observations, and 28 interviews were 
conducted with criminal justice actors. The scope of the study was limited to two 
courts to ensure rich data was collected and the perspectives of court actors as 
well as the context in which they worked could be fully taken into account. This 
is consistent with other studies examining summary court procedures, many of 
which focused on both interview and observational data in seeking to 
understand court procedures (Cammiss, 2007; Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association, 2014; Hucklesby, 1996, 1997a, 1997b; Leverick & Duff, 2002). In 
addition, the study focuses on the adult court process only and examines the 
period from which the defendant enters the court process to the point at which 
the initial decision is made as to whether they are remanded in custody or on 
bail. While the other stages of the bail process (i.e. police custody decisions, 
bail reviews) were discussed for context when appropriate, they were not 
examined directly in order to focus the research.  
 
Overview 
 
This thesis argues that court culture is central to explaining the bail decision-
making process but that this culture is, in part, shaped by views surrounding the 
broader criminal process in each jurisdiction. These views are not unique to the 
bail process, but rather relate to wider ideas about the values that should shape 
the criminal process and the means by which it should operate. The influence of 
these informal factors on bail decision-making is facilitated by the flexibility 
provided by formal laws and policies, which afford court actors broad scope for 
discretion in their application. This flexibility is a product of the competing 
principles contained in the overarching criminal justice rhetoric, which are used 
and balanced against one another by court actors when applying the law. 
Ultimately, this suggests that the factors contributing to the bail decision-making 
process are nuanced, varied and interdependent and, as such, should not be 
examined individually but rather in terms of their interactive effects.  
 
Chapter One and Two provide the background for the study and set the scene 
for the research. In Chapter One, the similarities in the development of the laws 
and policies related to bail and the overarching criminal justice rhetoric in 
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England and Canada are outlined. It also sets out the theoretical framework for 
the research, asserting that rules, rhetoric, and the behaviour of criminal justice 
actors should be examined in order to understand the operation of the bail 
process. Chapter Two builds on this review by highlighting that, despite these 
similarities, the two jurisdictions have experienced divergent trends in their use 
of remand. Possible explanations for these trends are examined and ultimately 
arguments are put forward about the value of a comprehensive approach. 
 
Chapter Three describes the methods employed in the study and justifies their 
application for the purposes of the current research. The aims and objectives of 
the research are detailed, the research design and methods explained, and the 
analysis process described.  
 
Chapter Four analyses the role of court actors in terms of their influence on the 
bail outcomes in the courts at which the research was carried out. The decision-
making of the defence, prosecution, and the court are examined in turn. It 
assesses the extent to which their decision-making was rooted in informal 
processes compared to adversarial attitudes and behaviours. It also considers 
whether the court actors tended to agree with one another and how this 
influenced the bail outcomes in each jurisdiction. This chapter highlights the 
impact of courtroom incentives and how they interplay with broader values 
surrounding managerialist conceptions of efficiency and risk in shaping the level 
of collegiality between court actors.     
 
Chapter Five examines the defendant and case characteristics used to 
construct the cases in the English and Canadian courts. It considers which 
exceptions to bail are typically used to support the characteristics presented 
and how these characteristics are aggravated and mitigated by court actors. 
The chapter illustrates that information is presented according to routine 
procedures but that it is also shaped by concerns surrounding victims and 
public safety in both courts, as well as ‘therapeutic justice’ principles in Canada.  
 
Chapter Six examines the influence of attitudes towards case processing times 
in both jurisdictions. It compares and contrasts the extent to which the bail 
process was viewed as a summary procedure and discusses how this impacts 
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the informal practices in each court. Practices related to case processing time 
are considered alongside broader attitudes towards efficiency in both 
jurisdictions. Finally, the implications of the study are discussed in the 
Conclusions and recommendations based on the findings presented.  
  
11 
Chapter One: 
 
The Rules and Rhetoric Surrounding Bail in England and Canada: A 
Historical Analysis 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Given that the Canadian law of bail has its roots in the English legal tradition, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the two bail systems share similar characteristics. These 
similarities are not, however, exclusive to the origins of the legislation. Rather, the 
bail laws in each jurisdiction have developed in a strikingly similar fashion over time 
(Hucklesby & Sarre, 2009). In both England and Canada, individuals charged with 
criminal offences have enjoyed a presumption in favour of bail since the 1970s. 
This principle asserts that, subject to certain exceptions, defendants should 
generally be released into the community while they await future court 
appearances. The foundations of the bail laws are thus heavily focused on due 
process values, prioritising the rights of defendants and their liberty. However, this 
right has been eroded by changes to the law in both jurisdictions which has 
progressively placed restrictions on accused persons’ right to bail in an effort to 
repress potential future offending (Hucklesby, 2009; Player et al., 2010; Trotter, 
2010; Webster et al., 2009). As such, crime control values have become 
increasingly important in shaping the law on bail.  
 
These developments occurred within a wider context of shifting criminal justice 
rhetoric in both jurisdictions. Specifically, ‘tough on crime’ approaches began to 
dominate the prevailing ideology surrounding criminal justice in the 1970s, 
accelerating in the early 1990s in England (Newburn, 2007) and the mid 2000s in 
Canada (Webster & Doob, 2015). Central to this approach was the idea that the 
rights of defendants must be set against those of the public and victims (Sanders, 
Young, & Burton, 2010; Webster, 2015). In addition, the rise of managerialism 
resulted in an increased focus on efficiency and a preoccupation with risk 
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management (Bottoms, 1995; Feeley & Simon, 1992; Raine & Willson, 1997). 
These themes came to shape broader criminal laws and policies as well as those 
related to bail in both jurisdictions. It is argued that, while these factors are 
important to understanding bail decision-making, in line with McConville and his 
colleagues (1991), they can only offer a partial explanation of the process.  
 
This chapter examines the role of the law, policy, and overarching rhetoric as a first 
step in understanding the factors contributing to the bail decision-making process. 
It performs this task by situating the research in the legislative and policy 
developments related to bail and the prevailing criminal justice ideology over the 
last half-century. It will trace the legal and policy history related to bail since the 
implementation of the legislation that forms the basis of each jurisdiction’s current 
bail laws in the 1970s, demonstrating a shift from due process values to those 
centred on crime control. It will then outline wider developments in the rhetoric 
shaping criminal justice during this period, namely the rise of ‘tough on crime’ and 
managerialist ideologies. This discussion will ultimately highlight the substantial 
similarities in these developments across both jurisdictions. Finally, the theoretical 
framework of the study will be outlined, asserting that in line with McConville and 
his colleagues (1991), the behaviour of criminal justice actors must also be taken 
into account in an examination of the bail decision-making process.  Before this 
discussion commences, however, the function of bail within the wider criminal 
process will be addressed.  
 
Situating bail within the wider criminal process 
 
The bail process determines whether defendants will be held in custody or 
released into the community pending trial. According to Trotter (2010):  
 
…[bail is] generally understood worldwide to refer to the mechanism by 
which individuals are released pending the determination of criminal 
proceedings in trial and appellate courts (p. 1). 
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Bail can be understood as one sub-process (among multiple others) making up the 
larger criminal justice process. Developing an understanding of the bail process 
thus necessitates an examination of how it fits into the wider criminal justice 
process as well as the criminal justice system as a whole.  
 
The criminal process forms part of the criminal justice system, which includes a 
number of agencies and institutions (e.g. police, prosecutors, defence, judges, 
probation, etc.), the criminal law, and the sentencing system (Ashworth & 
Redmayne, 2010). The criminal process, specifically, determines how individuals 
are dealt with in the criminal justice system. Packer (1964) describes the criminal 
process as: 
 
 …a.compendious term that stands for all the complexes of activity that 
operate to bring the substantive law of crime to bear (or to avoid bringing it 
to bear) on persons who are suspected of having committed crime (p. 2).  
 
It therefore describes the decisions and procedures whereby the system deals with 
potential suspects and defendants as well as encompasses the relationships 
between other components of the criminal justice system, such as actors, 
institutions, and substantive laws (Ashworth & Redmayne, 2010). The criminal 
process covers a range of decisions, from the initial investigation of suspects to the 
challenge of convictions or acquittals through appeal (Ashworth & Redmayne, 
2010).  
 
While some of the components of the criminal process can be long, drawn out and 
subject to numerous checks and balances (e.g. serious trials), there are also a 
number of summary procedures that take effect faster than other methods. These 
summary procedures make up what has traditionally been referred to as ‘summary 
justice’, encompassing court proceedings that are carried out rapidly and with the 
omission of certain formalities as required by the common law (Morgan, 2008).5 
                                            
5 Morgan (2008) explained that this was a traditional way of understanding the meaning of 
‘summary justice’ and that it has also been used more recently, in England, to discuss the 
processes that occur within the magistrates’ court. For the sake of a meaningful comparison with 
Canada, the traditional understanding of the concept it employed here.  
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The bail process has historically been included within the ambit of summary justice 
in both England and Canada (Ashworth & Redmayne, 2010; Webster, 2015) as it is 
employed to quickly determine the pre-trial status of defendants (Webster et al., 
2009).  
 
Like other components of the criminal process, bail is framed by both bail 
legislation and, in England and Canada, the common law, and operates on the 
basis of decisions by actors working in the criminal justice system such as the 
police, prosecution, defence, and judicial officials. Although, compared to other 
processes bail operates on a relatively informal basis, it is nonetheless significant 
as it impacts individual liberty, a principle that is fundamental to free and 
democratic societies. 
 
While the bail process represents only a portion of the criminal process, it should 
not be analysed without regard for the other components. This is because, as 
McConville and his colleagues (1991) argue, the criminal process is not a set of 
discrete stages but a process that overlaps in important ways. Indeed, the criminal 
process has an overall effect that is larger than the sum of its parts. The values 
underpinning one component often (but not always) influence the others. This 
means that attempts to explain one aspect of the process (in this case bail) should 
not be undertaken in a vacuum, but rather in the context of a much broader 
criminal process. As such, the following sections provide a history of the law and 
policy related to bail in England and Canada and then place it in the context of the 
broader, evolving rhetoric shaping criminal justice. 
 
A history of bail in England and Canada 
 
In order to explain the bail decision-making process, it is first necessary to examine 
the laws and policies that frame these decisions. Bail laws and policies in England 
and Canada have undergone considerable changes in the last half-century. 
Specifically, there has been a shift from the prioritisation of defendants’ rights and 
the protection of their liberty to the idea that these rights should be restricted in a 
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growing number of circumstances. This section will demonstrate that these 
movements developed in a remarkably similar fashion across both jurisdictions and 
outline the values that shape bail law and policy as a result of these changes.  
 
The foundation of the contemporary bail process 
 
Prior to the introduction of the Bail Act 1976 in England and the Bail Reform Act 
1972 in Canada, the granting of bail was almost entirely left to the discretion of the 
judiciary (Bottomley, 1968; Trotter, 2010). These Acts both provided a legislative 
framework for bail decision-making that was previously absent from the law. 
Although they have evolved as a result of various amendments, these Acts 
generally continue to form the basis of English and Canadian bail legislation.  
 
Human rights foundation 
 
Both Acts were introduced at a time when the human rights of suspects and 
defendants (Hucklesby, 2009; Trotter, 2010) were given primary importance in the 
criminal justice rhetoric. They were preceded by research in the 1960s and early 
1970s that questioned the fairness of each respective bail system (see, for 
example, Bottomley, 1968; Canadian Committee on Corrections, 1969; Friedland, 
1965). For instance, in Canada, Friedland (1965) conducted an influential study 
that focused on bail procedures in the Toronto magistrates’ courts. He asserted 
that many detained accused persons’ attendance in court could be secured using 
less intrusive means, that requiring security in advance as a condition of release 
raised serious concerns surrounding the fairness of the criminal justice system, 
and that pre-trial custody should be used less often given the harmful impact it had 
on accused persons. In addition, the Canadian Committee on Corrections (1969; 
commonly referred to as the ‘Ouimet report’) recommended sweeping changes to 
the bail system which included expanding the powers of the police to permit the 
release of more accused persons and requiring the state to justify the detention of 
individuals rather than having accused persons bear the burden. In England, 
Bottomley (1968) argued that principles for granting bail in England should be 
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clarified. He found that decisions to grant or deny bail as well as the justifications 
for such decisions were inconsistent across courts. Many of the recommendations 
contained in these reports were reflected in the Bail Act 1976 and the Bail Reform 
Act 1972, forming the basis of a new ‘enlightened’ era in the history of bail law 
(Trotter, 2010) 
 
The guiding philosophies of both the Bail Reform Act 1972 and the Bail Act 1976 
are underscored by themes related to the presumption of innocence. In Canada, 
the amendments to the Criminal Code that were introduced by the Bail Reform Act 
1972 shift the former presumption of detention to a presumption of release (Myers, 
2009). The new legislation specifies that bail decisions are to be governed by the 
underlying presumption that, unless the Crown can justify otherwise, accused 
persons should be released into the community pending their next court 
appearance (Criminal Code, 1985, s. 515(1)).6 In England, Section 4 of the Bail Act 
1976 declares a general right to bail, usually referred to as ‘the presumption in 
favour of bail’, to most categories of defendants7 who are brought before the court. 
This principle suggests that, unless specific exceptions apply, accused persons 
should be granted bail.  
 
The rights enshrined in the Bail Act 1976 and the Bail Reform Act 1972 are 
intended to protect legally innocent individuals from being remanded in custody 
unless there are exceptional circumstances that suggest their detention is 
warranted. In other words, accused persons are, in the main, entitled to their 
liberty. Both England and Canada have demonstrated their commitment to this 
principle by promising to comply with the standards set out in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). This international human rights 
treaty was established by the United Nations and commits its parties to respect the 
civil and political rights of individuals. Together, the ICCPR, the International 
                                            
6 Section 515(1) does not apply to those serious offences listed in s. 469 (e.g. treason, piracy, 
murder), which must be heard by a Superior Court Judge. In these cases the accused must prove 
why he or she should be released. 
7 Section 4(2) and Section 4(7) of the Bail Act 1976 specify that the general right to bail does not 
apply to convicted persons (unless they are awaiting a report), fugitive offenders, or persons 
charged with treason (who must appear before a judge of the High Court or a Secretary of State).  
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights make up the International Bill of Human Rights 
(Rodley & Pollard, 2009). Canada acceded to the ICCPR on May 19, 1976, while 
the United Kingdom signed the treaty on September 16, 1968 and ratified it on May 
20, 1976. Under Article 9, Paragraph One of the ICCPR, “everyone has the right to 
liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or 
detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedure as are established by law.” In order to uphold this 
basic human right, both countries must ensure that accused persons are only 
remanded in custody when their detention can be justified for lawful reasons. 
 
Although the individual right to liberty is protected by the ICCPR in both England 
and Canada, it is generally the national and regional systems for human rights that 
are referred to if a violation is suspected. Specifically, the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (hereafter called ‘the Charter’) in Canada and the European Convention 
on Human Rights (hereafter called ‘the Convention’) in England. In Canada, the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter are entrenched within the country’s 
constitution. Prior to the implementation of the Charter in 1982, Canada’s 
constitutional system was similar to that in England, which is based on common 
law. In comparison, the current individual-rights-based model depends on a system 
of checks and balances in which the judiciary has the authority to verify whether 
laws and state conduct are in accordance with the Charter (Manikis, 2012). The 
right to bail is guaranteed under s. 11(e) of the Charter, which promises that ‘any 
person charged with an offence has the right … not to be denied reasonable bail 
without just cause.’ If a law is found to be unconstitutional under the Charter, the 
courts have the power to strike down the law at the Supreme Court level (Manikis, 
2012). However, s. 33 of the Charter, the ‘notwithstanding clause’, allows 
Parliament to maintain a law despite its incompatibility with the Charter. In this 
situation the overridden rule must be reviewed after five years.  
 
Rights and freedoms are administered slightly differently in England. The 
Convention is an international treaty intended to protect human rights and 
freedoms in Europe. It was ratified by the United Kingdom in March 1951 and 
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came into force in September 1953 (Emmerson et al., 2012). The Convention 
broke new ground in international law in the sense that it adopted a principle of 
collective enforcement. This requires states to submit to a form of external scrutiny 
that encroaches on national sovereignty. Upon the introduction of the Convention, 
the protection of human rights was made a shared responsibility of all Council of 
Europe member states (Emmerson et al., 2012). 
 
The right to apply for bail in England is governed by Articles 5(3) and 5(4) of the 
Convention and is also related to the article addressing the presumption of 
innocence in Article 6(2). Article 5(3) states: 
 
Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or 
other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be 
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release 
may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 
 
After exhausting domestic remedies, individuals who believe their rights have been 
violated under the Convention are entitled to seek remedy from the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. The decisions handed down by the 
Court have historically had a substantial impact on England’s bail laws (see, for 
example, Caballero v. United Kingdom (2000)) and also influence individual court 
decisions (Emmerson et al., 2012).  
 
The rights and freedoms articulated in the Convention have been given further 
effect in the United Kingdom through the implementation of the Human Rights Act 
1998 (HRA). This legislation enables individuals to enforce their rights directly in 
UK courts instead of taking a case to the European Court of Human Rights 
(Emmerson, Ashworth, & Macdonald, 2012). Section 6 of the HRA specifies that it 
is unlawful for a public authority (including the courts) to act in a manner that is 
incompatible with the Convention unless they are required to do so by the terms of 
primary legislation. This means that Convention rights take priority over the rules of 
common law or equity and most subordinate legislation (Emmerson et al., 2012). In 
circumstances in which it is impossible to resolve a Convention right and a 
provision of primary legislation, a higher court may grant a ‘formal declaration of 
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incompatibility.’ At this point, Parliament may amend the legislation if there are 
‘compelling reasons to do so’ (Emmerson et al., 2012).  
 
In sum, the bail legislation in England and Canada is grounded in empirical 
research and human rights laws. While human rights are administered slightly 
differently across jurisdictions, the bail laws are nonetheless framed by similar 
principles related to the presumption of innocence, liberty, and procedural fairness. 
Furthermore, these rights are ensured by mechanisms at both the domestic and 
international level. 
 
Exceptions to the right to bail 
 
It is generally accepted in both England and Canada that there are certain 
situations in which the right to bail is inapplicable. Both jurisdictions outline 
circumstances in which bail can be denied. In Canada, specific criteria exist that 
allow a defendant to be detained pending trial. Section 515(10) of the Criminal 
Code provides: 
 
(10) For the purposes of this section, the detention of an accused in custody 
is justified only on one or more of the following grounds: 
 
(a) where the detention is necessary to ensure his or her attendance in court 
in order to be dealt with according to law; 
 
(b) where the detention is necessary for the protection or safety of the 
public, including any victim of or witness to the offence, or any person under 
the age of 18 years, having regard to all the circumstances including any 
substantial likelihood that the accused will, if released from custody, commit 
a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice; and 
 
(c) if the detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration 
of justice, having regard to all the circumstances, including 
(i) the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case, 
(ii) the gravity of the offence, 
(iii) the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, 
including whether a firearm was used, and 
(iv) the fact that the accused is liable, on conviction, for a potentially 
lengthy term of imprisonment or, in the case of an offence that involves, 
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or whose subject-matter is, a firearm, a minimum punishment of 
imprisonment for a term of three years or more. 
 
In England, the circumstances in which bail can be denied are slightly different for 
imprisonable indictable offences, imprisonable summary offences, and non-
imprisonable offences (Bail Act 1976, Schedule 1, Part 1, 1A, and 2). Specifically, 
the grounds for refusing bail are wider for defendants charged with imprisonable 
indictable offences than summary imprisonable offences and non-imprisonable 
offences. Paragraphs 2 to 6 of Part 1, Schedule 1 of the Bail Act 1976 list a 
number of exceptions to the right to bail,8 but the main provisions are located in 
Paragraph 2 (Ashworth & Redmayne, 2010). This provision provides: 
 
2 The defendant need not be granted bail if the court is satisfied that 
there are substantial grounds for believing that the defendant, if released on 
bail (whether subject to conditions or not) would— 
 
(a) fail to surrender to custody, or 
 
(b) commit an offence while on bail, or 
 
(c) interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, 
whether in relation to himself or any other person. 
 
In the case of summary imprisonable offences and non-imprisonable offences, the 
grounds for refusing bail are more limited (Bail Act 1976, Schedule 1, Part 1A and 
2). In the case of summary imprisonable offences (and criminal damage below 
£5,000), in the main, bail cannot be denied unless the defendant previously 
exhibited similar behaviour (i.e. previous fail to surrender, on bail at the time of the 
alleged offence, the court is satisfied of a breach of bail or fail to surrender).9 In the 
                                            
8 The additional exceptions to bail are as follows: The defendant is likely to cause physical or 
mental injury to an associated person (or fear of the same), the defendant was on bail on the date 
of the offence, for the defendant’s own protection, the defendant is already in custody, because 
there is insufficient information for the court to make a remand decision, the defendant has failed to 
surrender or breached bail in connection with the present proceedings, the defendant tested 
positive for Class A drugs and refused assessment, or because it would be impracticable to 
complete a report or inquiry if the defendant is not in custody (Bail Act 1976, Schedule 1, Part 1, 
Paragraphs 3 to 7). 
9 Defendants charged with imprisonable summary offences may also be detained if the defendant is 
likely to cause physical or mental injury to an associated person (or fear of the same), for the 
defendant’s own protection, due to the fact that the defendant is already in custody, because there 
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case of non-imprisonable offences, only convicted offenders can be remanded in 
custody if they previously exhibited similar behaviour (i.e. previous fail to surrender 
or the court is satisfied of a breach of bail or fail to surrender).10  
 
Given that these criteria substantiate the detention of legally innocent accused 
persons, it is perhaps unsurprising that they are commonly addressed in cases 
involving the Charter and the Convention. For example, in R. v. Hall (2002), the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that granting the broad discretion to deny bail for 
‘any just cause’ in relation to the (former) s. 515(10)(c) criteria - which authorized 
detention when it was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of 
justice - violated the presumption of innocence and s. 11(e) of the Charter. 
Following this decision, this phrase was removed from the law and the criterion 
was revised. In England, the European Court of Human Rights has advised that, in 
considering whether an accused person might commit a further offence on bail 
under Schedule 1, Paragraph 1, s. 2(b), it cannot be automatically assumed there 
is a risk of alleged re-offence based solely on an accused person’s record. Rather, 
the court should consider whether the previous convictions are comparable, either 
in nature or seriousness, to the relevant charges against the accused (See Clooth 
v. Belgium (1992), para. 40; Lyubimenko v. Russia (2009), para. 74). 
 
While the exceptions to the right to bail in England differ from those in Canada in 
terms of their breadth and application to different offences, the main exceptions still 
permit the detention of the defendant under similar circumstances. Central to this 
assessment is considering the risk of the defendant failing to attend court, 
committing an offence, or interfering with the proceedings. The most notable 
differences between the main exceptions lie in the explicit reference to public 
safety in terms of future offending and the consideration of public confidence in 
Canada.  
                                                                                                                                     
is insufficient information for the court to make a remand decision, or the defendant tested positive 
for Class A drugs and refused assessment (Bail Act 1976, Schedule 1, Part 1A, Paragraphs 4 to 9).  
10 Defendants charged with non-imprisonable offences (convicted or unconvicted) may also be 
detained if they are deemed likely to cause physical or mental injury to an associated person (or 
fear of the same), for the defendant’s own protection, or due to the fact that the defendant is already 
in custody (Bail Act 1976, Schedule 1, Part 2, Paragraphs 3 to 6). 
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Bail Procedures 
 
The English and Canadian criminal justice systems permit both the police and the 
courts to make bail decisions, albeit at different stages of the process. The 
administration of the Canadian bail system may vary between the provinces and 
territories as a result of the structure of the government. Specifically, criminal laws 
are created by the federal government but enforced by the provinces and territories 
(Manikis, 2012). As a result, the type of police force who is responsible for bail is 
dependent on the jurisdiction. 11  In the case that a specific jurisdiction has a 
municipal police force, bail would fall under their mandate. If there is no municipal 
police force, provincial policing services would have responsibility (Goff, 2017). If 
the police detain an accused in Canada, the case would proceed to provincial 
court, the first court most people encounter in the criminal justice system12 (Goff, 
2017). Provincial Crown attorneys represent the state in these proceedings whilst 
the accused is represented by private counsel, a state-funded duty counsel, or 
legal aid counsel (Trotter, 2010). The right to legal counsel at the bail stage is 
recognized in R. v. Chan (2000). Matters in provincial court are presided over by a 
justice of the peace or a provincial court judge. Unlike judges, justices of the peace 
are not legally trained. The determination of which type of justice makes the bail 
decision is dependent on local practices and resources (Trotter, 2010).  
 
In England, the ‘local police’ forces are the agencies responsible for the majority of 
policing (Sanders et al., 2010). While additional ‘special police forces’ have 
particular responsibilities throughout the jurisdiction, they are not typically involved 
in the bail process. As of July 2017, there were 43 local police forces spread 
throughout England and Wales which fell under the authority of the Home Office 
(Hargreaves, Husband, & Linehan, 2017). While police forces are given some level 
of autonomy in executing their duties they are still subject to national requirements. 
The police make the initial decision as to whether to release or detain an accused 
                                            
11 In Canada, each province or territory is responsible for developing its own municipal and 
provincial policing services. For example, a provincial government might decide that all cities that 
reach a certain population size will maintain a police service and the remainder of the province will 
be under the jurisdiction of the provincial police (Goff, 2017).  
12 Offences listed under s. 469 and s. 522 of the Criminal Code are an exception to this rule as they 
must be heard by a Superior Court judge.  
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person. In the event that the police choose to detain an individual, the case would 
be passed onto the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), whose responsibilities 
include making representations to the court about bail at magistrates’ court 
(Ashworth & Redmayne, 2010). Accused persons are entitled to representation at 
this stage under the Convention, which mandates that individuals have the right to 
legal assistance before being deprived of liberty, especially before trial (Emmerson 
et al., 2012). Indeed, English law contains multiple provisions ensuring access to 
legal advice in the event of arrest, detention, and any custodial remand (Ashworth 
& Redmayne, 2010). The court is presided over by either part-time magistrates, 
sitting on a bench of two or three, or a District judge, who sits alone. Unlike District 
judges, magistrates do not require legal training. However, a legal advisor is 
available to assist the panel at all times. Although magistrates are traditionally the 
judicial officers who preside over bail proceedings, it has become increasingly 
common for District judges to sit in magistrates’ court (Sanders et al., 2010).  
 
The decision to detain a defendant in custody in both England and Canada 
therefore, in the main, begins with the police and then ultimately results in a 
decision by the court. Further, a prosecutor represents the state while the 
defendant is legally entitled to representation. The powers held by actors at each 
stage is, however, slightly different across jurisdictions. These differences will be 
outlined below. 
 
Police Powers 
 
Prior to the introduction of the Bail Reform Act 1972 in Canada, decisions 
regarding bail were largely the responsibility of the judiciary. A police officer could 
appear before a justice for the purpose of obtaining a warrant for an individual’s 
arrest or a to have a summons issued, which compels the accused person to 
attend court at a specified time. Alternatively, the police could arrest accused 
persons without a warrant and could bring them before the court for the purposes 
of a bail decision shortly thereafter (Trotter, 2010). Although these options are still 
available to police officers under the Bail Reform Act 1972, their powers have been 
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expanded considerably to allow for the release of accused persons without prior 
judicial authorization. 
 
Under s. 496 of the Canadian Criminal Code, an officer who encounters an 
accused person in the community has the option to issue an ‘appearance notice’ in 
lieu of arrest. This type of release requires the accused person to appear in court 
and, under some circumstances, to attend a police station for fingerprinting or 
photographs. In the event that a police officer wishes to maintain custody of the 
accused person, s. 498 provides that an “officer in charge or another peace 
officer” 13  can subsequently release them on a ‘promise to appear’ or a 
‘recognizance’. Like an appearance notice, a promise to appear compels the 
accused person to attend court at a specific time. A ‘recognizance’ acknowledges 
an indebtedness to the Crown which is defeasible upon the fulfilment of certain 
conditions. Unlike the promise to appear, a recognizance is accompanied by the 
threat of financial loss.  
 
In 1994, Parliament afforded police officers in Canada with the ability to attach 
conditions to promises to appear and recognizances (Trotter, 2010). When 
conditions are imposed, the accused is said to be ‘entering into a undertaking’. 
These provisions, contained in s. 499(2) and 503(2.1) of the Canadian Criminal 
Code, permit specific terms. Specifically, police can order accused persons to 
remain within a specific jurisdiction, to notify the police of changes to address, 
employment or occupation, and to abstain from communication with a specific 
person. The Criminal Law Improvement Act 1997 added terms that direct accused 
persons to abstain from possessing a firearm and to abstain from the consumption 
of alcohol or drugs. This Act also permits police to order that an accused person 
“comply with any other condition specified in the undertaking that the peace officer 
or officer in charge considers necessary to ensure the safety and security of any 
victim of or witness to the offence” (Criminal Code, s. 503(2.1)(h)). If none of the 
                                            
13 According to s. 493 of the Criminal Code, an ‘officer in charge’ means “the officer for the time 
being in command of the police force responsible for the lock-up or other place to which an accused 
is taken after arrest or a peace officer designated by him for the purposes of this Part who is in 
charge of that place at the time an accused is taken to that place to be detained in custody.” 
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release mechanisms are deemed appropriate by the police, they must ensure the 
accused person is taken before a justice within 24 hours (or as soon as possible) 
to receive a determination of bail (Criminal Code, 1985, s. 503). 
 
In England, police have the power to remand persons who have not yet been 
charged (‘pre-charge bail’) as well as persons whom have been charged and are 
awaiting their first court appearance (‘post-charge bail’; Ashworth and Redmayne, 
2010). Police generally use pre-charge bail in situations where there is not enough 
evidence to proceed or when additional guidance is required from the CPS. Under 
s. 38(a) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), individuals are to be 
released unless their detention can be justified under specific circumstances. 
Specifically, situations in which a name or address cannot be ascertained, there is 
a likelihood the accused person will fail to appear in court, there is a risk of 
interference with the administration of justice or the investigation, or if it is for their 
own protection. Further, in the case of imprisonable offences, bail may be denied 
by the police if the commission of an offence is likely, and in non-imprisonable 
offences, if there is a risk of injury to another or loss or damage to property.  
 
The English police are afforded some of the same discretion that the courts are 
entitled to with regard to imposing conditions under s. 3 of the Bail Act 1976. 
However, they do not have the same powers and are still limited, to some extent, in 
the types of conditions they can impose. Section 3(a) of the Bail Act 1976 states 
that, unlike courts, police are unable to impose conditions of residence at bail 
hostels, electronic-monitoring, conditions necessary for the preparation for a report 
for sentencing purposes, a medical report in murder cases, or a requirement to 
attend an interview with an advocate or litigator. Although police have had the 
power to attach conditions to bails following a charge since 1994, the power to 
impose conditions prior to charge was not instated until the enactment of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Corre & Wolchover, 2004). The most common 
conditions imposed by the police are requirements not to contact victims or 
witnesses, requirements to keep away from named places, requirements to report 
to the police, requirements to reside at a specific place, and curfews (Bucke & 
Brown, 1997).  
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An examination of police powers has demonstrated that the police in England and 
Canada have been afforded an increasing amount of power to impose conditions 
on accused persons since the introduction of their respective bail Acts. In England, 
these powers have expanded further than in Canada as the police can impose 
conditions on ‘pre-charge’ bail in addition to ‘post-charge’ bail. While these 
changes have increased the control police have over accused persons in the 
community, they also enable them alternatives to custody at the arrest stage.  
 
Court Powers 
 
If the police detain a defendant in either England or Canada, they subsequently 
appear in court in order for the issue of bail to be addressed.  
 
In Canada, the courts are directed to use a ‘ladder’ approach to the bail decision-
making process. Specifically, each possible form of release should be considered 
and deemed inappropriate until the court reaches the least onerous form of release 
that would be suitable in the circumstances (Trotter, 2010). This approach is 
consistent with s. 11(e) of the Charter, which entitles accused persons in Canada 
to “reasonable bail.”14 Section 515(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code states that 
defendants are to be released an on an undertaking without conditions unless the 
Crown can show cause as to why a more restrictive form of release is necessary. 
This form of release simply obliges the accused to appear in court at a specific 
time and place. 
 
A Canadian court is able to increase the restrictiveness of an undertaking through 
the imposition of conditions. This form of release requires terms to be attached to 
the bail in addition to the obligation to attend court (Criminal Code, 1985, s. 
515(2)(a)). If an undertaking is deemed inappropriate, a court can also order that a 
defendant enter into a ‘recognizance’ (Criminal Code, 1985, s. 515(2)(b)). This 
order differs from an undertaking in that it is accompanied by a financial penalty if 
                                            
14 The Supreme Court decision of R. v. Pearson (1992) clarified that “reasonable bail” relates to the 
terms of bail. 
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the terms are not followed. Recognizances can become more onerous through the 
imposition of conditions, the attachment of a surety, or the requirement to provide a 
deposit. In Canada, sureties guarantee that defendants will remain faithful to their 
bail conditions by agreeing to offer to pay a sum of money if the defendant does 
not comply (Trotter, 2010). Sureties - who are often family members or friends of 
the accused - effectively agree to police accused persons in the community by 
monitoring their actions, ensuring they abide by the conditions of their release, and 
making sure they attend court when they are required to do so (Myers, 2009).  
 
The nature of the conditions that can be attached to an undertaking or a 
recognizance are outlined in s. 515(4) to (4.3) in the Canadian Criminal Code. 
These conditions are almost identical to the aforementioned conditions employed 
by the police, but include a provision under s. 515(4)(p) that states that an accused 
person must “comply with such other reasonable conditions specified in the order 
as the justice considers desirable.” Some examples of conditions imposed 
pursuant to this section include curfews, house arrest, control of drugs and/or 
alcohol consumption (e.g. a prohibition from entering premised licenced to sell 
alcohol), driving prohibitions, medical treatment, a requirement to possess bail 
papers, and a requirement to ‘keep the peace and be of good behaviour’ (Trotter, 
2010).  
 
Failure to comply with the conditions imposed upon release in Canada may result 
in arrest and detention (Criminal Code, 1985, s. 524) or a failure to comply charge 
under s. 145(3) or 145(5.1) of the Criminal Code. In the event that a new charge is 
laid, the Crown attorney may choose to have all previous bail orders cancelled and 
either oppose release on the new charges or tailor the conditions to address the 
new alleged offence(s). Under these circumstances, the onus is on the accused to 
show cause why detention is not justified. Failure to comply with bail conditions 
may also result in the accused person and, if applicable, his or her surety, being at 
risk of forfeiture proceedings.  
 
In England, there are several alternatives to consider at the court stage: a release 
on unconditional bail, a release on conditional bail, or a remand in custody 
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(Ashworth & Redmayne, 2010). The Bail Act 1976 specifies that the courts should 
have regard for several considerations when deciding whether or not to refuse bail. 
Specifically, the nature and seriousness of the offence; the character, antecedents 
and associations of the defendant; the defendant’s record in relation to bail; and 
except in the case of a defendant whose case has been adjourned pending 
inquiries or a report, the strength of the evidence of his or her having committed 
the offence. In addition, the court is afforded the ability to consider any other factor 
which appears to be relevant (Bail Act 1976, Schedule 1, Part 1, Paragraph 9).15  
 
The European Court of Human Rights has offered some assistance in the 
interpretation of these considerations in England. For example, the court has 
warned against the generalized assumption that the seriousness of a charge 
increases the risk of non-appearance. Although this consideration is deemed 
important, the Court has continuously asserted that it cannot be viewed as an 
independent ground for the refusal of bail (Emmerson et al., 2012; see, for 
example, Lyubimenko v. Russia (2009); Yagci and Sargin v. Turkey (1995)). 
 
The English court is also afforded a significant amount of discretion in relation to 
bail conditions. The power to attach conditions to release orders was introduced by 
s. 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967. The aim was to reduce the number of 
defendants in custody by allowing the court the option to restrict their liberty without 
resorting to detention (Corre & Wolchover, 2004). Section 3(6) of the Bail Act 
currently empowers courts to impose requirements as it appears necessary: a) to 
secure that defendant surrenders to custody, b) to secure that defendants do not 
commit an offence on bail, c) to secure that defendants do not interfere with 
witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, and d) for the defendant’s 
own protection.  
 
The statute does not define categories of bail conditions in England, allowing the 
court flexibility to individualize their decisions according to the case (Corre & 
Wolchover, 2004). Some conditions which are commonly imposed under s. 3(6) 
                                            
15 These considerations relate specifically to imprisonable offences. 
  
29 
include reporting to a police station, surrendering a passport and not leaving the 
country, residing at a particular address, keeping a certain distance away from a 
specific address, abstaining from interfering with witnesses, and abiding by a 
curfew (Corre & Wolchover, 2004). In some cases, curfews may be accompanied 
by electronic monitoring. This option was introduced on a permanent basis in 
September 2005 (Hucklesby, 2011a). The imposition of electronic monitoring 
allows the court to verify whether accused persons are abiding by their curfews 
through an electronic tagging system.  
 
The English courts are able to impose further restrictions on a bailed accused 
person through the use of sureties and securities. Both of these conditions involve 
financial promises which are made to the court in order to secure a defendant’s 
attendance at future appearances. In England, a security (Bail Act, 1976, s. 3(5)) is 
a sum of money or money’s worth that must be deposited as a pre-condition to an 
accused person’s release, while a surety (Bail Act 1976, s. 3(4)) is an individual 
responsible for surrendering an accused person to custody, being liable to forfeit a 
sum of money if he or she does not comply. Sureties do not have to offer the 
money upfront, but must prove that they have it available should the accused 
person abscond. The responsibility of sureties is much narrower in England than in 
Canada, where they are also responsible for ensuring accused persons comply 
with their conditions. Despite the fact that sureties and securities are still available 
to be imposed under the Bail Act 1976, there is evidence to suggest they are rarely 
applied in practice (Hucklesby, 2011a). 
 
If an accused person fails to comply with the conditions of their bail in England, 
they may be arrested by the police (Bail Act, 1976, Section 7(3)). However, unlike 
in Canada breaching a bail condition is not regarded as an offence in this 
jurisdiction. As such, no further charges are laid under these circumstances. 
However, the court does have the authority to change the conditions of bail or 
remand the defendant in custody. In contrast, failing to surrender is considered an 
offence and may result in the prosecution of the accused person under s. 6 of the 
Bail Act 1976.  
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The courts in England and Canada can thus only remand an accused person in 
custody if they follow a series of checks and balances prior to doing so. In addition, 
they are offered considerable discretion as to the nature of the conditions they may 
impose if they choose to release them. Their powers extend beyond those of the 
police, enabling them to impose more onerous restrictions on accused persons.  
 
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that the foundations of the English 
and Canadian bail processes have multiple similarities. They are founded in 
international and domestic human rights principles, follow similar procedures, and 
afford police and courts comparable powers. While the legislation has manifested 
itself slightly differently between jurisdictions, both systems contain safeguards at 
multiple levels to prevent the arbitrary detention of accused persons thus protecting 
their right to liberty. 
 
The eroding right to bail 
 
In both the Canadian and English bail systems, the emphasis placed on the 
presumption of bail clearly demonstrates that defendants are to be released into 
the community unless the state can demonstrate that there is a reason to remove 
this right. However, in both jurisdictions this principle has been eroded by a number 
of amendments that have restricted the right to bail. In the years since the 
introduction of the Bail Act 1976 and the Bail Reform Act 1972, amendments have 
increasingly been introduced under the auspices of public safety as opposed to the 
protection of defendants’ rights.  
 
Changes to the bail legislation in Canada indicate an increasing tendency to 
restrict defendants’ right to bail. In this jurisdiction, there has been a growing trend 
towards the use of ‘reverse onus’ provisions that place the responsibility on the 
defendant, rather than the Crown, to justify why he or she should be released on 
bail (Webster et al., 2009). Provisions like this are ‘slowly eroding years of 
legislative and jurisprudential change sparked by the Bail Reform Act in the 1970s’ 
(Trotter, 2010, p. 14).   
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The stream of provisions in Canada began in the mid 1970s, when the Criminal 
Amendment Act 1975 reversed the onus in cases when an indictable offence was 
alleged to have been committed while the accused was at large awaiting trial for 
another indictable offence, when the accused was charged with an indictable 
offence and was not a resident of Canada, and when the accused was charged 
with drug trafficking (importing or exporting). It was also in the 1970s that a reverse 
onus provision was put in place for defendants who are charged with failing to 
comply with a court order (Webster et al., 2009).  
 
Several decades later, in 1997 and 2001, two acts 16  created reverse onus 
provisions for several offences associated with organized crime. These 
amendments were closely followed by reverse onus provisions related to criminal 
gang activity and terrorism in 2001, under the Anti-Terrorism Act. Finally, in 2008 a 
package of reverse onus provisions related to firearm offences came into force 
under the Tackling Violent Crime Act. These amendments more than doubled the 
number of reverse onus provisions in the Criminal Code. Although it is arguable to 
what extent these provisions changed the practical application of the laws in the 
courts (see Webster et al., 2009), they clearly represent a gradual shift in the 
attitudes towards bail in Canada.  
 
In England, ‘the use of bail was causing increasing disquiet’ by the late 1980s 
‘which has continued and arguably increased ever since’ (Hucklesby, 2009, p. 3). 
These negative attitudes were often associated with complaints from the media 
and political spheres following an occasion in which a defendant committed an 
offence while on bail (see, for example, Hickley, 2009). At the same time, the 
climate of the criminal justice system was shifting to a reduced emphasis on the 
rights of defendants and a greater focus on the protection of the public and the 
rights of victims. This ultimately resulted in a shift in attitudes away from granting 
bail (Hucklesby, 2009). It is perhaps unsurprising that the change in climate 
                                            
16 These acts include an Act to amend the Criminal Code (criminal organizations) and to amend 
other Acts in consequence 1997 and an Act to amend the Criminal Code (organized crime and law 
enforcement) and to make consequential amendments to other Acts 2001. 
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precipitated a number of amendments to the law that reflected crime control 
values.  
 
The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 introduced a change in legislation 
that substantially restricts the right to bail for defendants accused of serious 
offences (e.g. murder, manslaughter, and rape) who have previous convictions for 
similar offences. Initially, these individuals were to be excluded from being granted 
bail completely. However, following some discussion surrounding the compatibility 
of the law with the right to liberty enshrined in the Convention, the legislation was 
amended by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 to require the court to grant reasons 
in such cases if ‘there are exceptional circumstances which justify it’. Several years 
later, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 reversed the presumption of bail for defendants 
who are before the court for committing an indictable offence or offence triable 
either way and were on bail in criminal proceedings on the date of the alleged 
offence, unless the court believes there is no significant risk of an offence being 
committed on bail in the future. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 also amended the 
bail legislation as it pertains to defendants accused of Class A drug use. Under the 
new legislation, defendants who test positive for these types of drugs need not be 
granted bail if the offence is drug related and he or she does not agree to undergo 
assessment and/or treatment for drug dependency.  
 
There have, however, been more recent changes to the legislation in England that 
did not conform with the trend of restricting defendants’ right to bail. Specifically, 
the changes under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 
2012 (LASPO) instruct magistrates to conduct a ‘no real prospect’ test, ensuring 
defendants are released on bail if they would be unlikely to receive a custodial 
sentence (Ministry of Justice, 2014b). While these amendments prioritise the liberty 
of defendants in that they suggest they should not be unnecessarily remanded in 
custody, they were also implemented at a time when prison overcrowding was a 
major concern and cuts to funding were being made across the criminal justice 
system (Garside & Silvestri, 2013). Indeed, the Green Paper preceding the Act - 
Breaking the Cycle: Effective Punishment, Rehabilitation and Sentencing of 
Offenders – explicitly states that the reforms proposed in the paper were intended 
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to reduce spending (Ministry of Justice, 2010a). As such, this amendment is likely 
to signal the importance of values related to cost savings and efficiency as 
opposed to signal a reform exclusively rooted in concerns for the rights of 
defendants.  
 
Both England and Canada have introduced reforms that are clearly intended to 
curtail defendants’ right to liberty by increasing the number of restrictions that can 
be placed on their right to bail. This suggests that, irrespective of geographical and 
political separation, the two jurisdictions are both moving away from the 
‘enlightened’ approach that prioritised the rights of defendants and which formed 
the foundation of their bail laws.  
 
From due process to crime control 
 
The aforementioned changes that took place in relation to the bail law and policy in 
England and Canada were reflective of a broader shift in rhetoric in many western 
criminal justice systems from the prioritisation of ‘due process’ values to those of 
‘crime control’ (Packer, 1968; Sanders et al., 2010). Specifically, this shift 
represents a movement away from the prioritisation of the rights of suspects 
towards the repression of criminal activity. However, the previous discussion 
demonstrated that, rather than displacing the initial due process laws, these crime 
control laws have resulted in the emergence of multiple, sometimes competing 
values, within the same legal and policy framework. 
 
Packer (1968) developed the due process and crime control models of the criminal 
process as a way to identify the value choices that underlie the operation of the 
process. Although he has since been widely criticised for his approach (see 
Ashworth & Redmayne, 2010; Feeley, 1992; Macdonald, 2003; McBarnet, 1981; 
Roach, 1999; Smith, 1997), there is no doubt that he set the stage for much of the 
resulting debate as to which models best reflect the reality of the criminal justice 
process. These models describe two extremes on opposite ends of a spectrum. As 
such, they can be understood as ‘ideal types’ that are to be used as explanatory 
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tools rather than representations of reality. Each model is comprised of specific 
values that are intended to apply to various portions (or the entirety) of the criminal 
justice process.  
 
Crime Control 
 
The most important function to be performed by the crime control model is the 
repression of criminal conduct. In this way, the criminal process is used a 
guarantor of social freedom through the maintenance of order. There is also an 
important emphasis on the efficiency with which suspects move through the 
process. The nature of this efficiency is rooted in the resource to case 
management ratio. Specifically, the model would be operating successfully if it 
produced a high rate of apprehensions and convictions in the context of heavy 
caseloads and limited resources. Given that there is a premium on case 
processing speed and finality, informal procedures and uniform processes are 
essential to its success. ‘Ceremonious rituals’ (i.e. formal procedures) that clutter 
the process and do not advance the case are thus highly undesirable.  In this way 
it is likened to an assembly line in which cases move through the process quickly 
and in a uniform manner. 
 
Ideally cases will conclude at an early stage by removing suspects that are unlikely 
to be offenders and convicting the rest. Guilty pleas are the ideal mechanism for 
truncating procedures. This assumes that the ‘probably innocent’ are screened out 
early and the ‘probably guilty’ can pass quickly through the remaining stages of the 
process. For this reason, the crime control model involves the ‘presumption of 
guilt’. Once it is determined that there is enough evidence of guilt all subsequent 
activity directed towards the defendants is based on the idea they are guilty. It 
follows that there is a high level of confidence in the police and prosecution in 
terms of the informal fact-finding that takes place in the early stages of the process. 
The assumption of guilt inherent to this model assures the dominant goal of 
repressing crime through highly summary processes without any great loss of 
efficiency.  
  
35 
Due Process 
 
While the crime control model is compared to an assembly line, Packer (1968) 
likens the due process model to an obstacle course. Each stage is designed to 
present impediments to carrying the defendant further along the process. This is 
because the due process model rejects the reliability of informal fact finding 
processes as they are not indicative of factual guilt. It insists instead on formal, 
adjudicative, adversarial fact finding processes in which the public guilt of the 
accused is determined by an impartial tribunal in a transparent fashion. Reliability 
is valued over efficiency since the model insists on the prevention and elimination 
of mistakes to the greatest extent possible. Since the process must be subjected to 
controls and safeguards, it is prevented from operating at maximum efficiency.  
 
The values underpinning the due process model are centred on the primacy of the 
individual and the complimentary concept of the limitation of official power. As 
such, the aim of the process is as much to protect the factually innocent as it is to 
convict the factually guilty. It also values equality and asserts that there is no equal 
justice when individuals are disadvantaged on the basis of the volume of money 
they possess.   
 
Despite the wide use of Packer’s models, they have also been the subject of much 
criticism (Ashworth & Redmayne, 2010; Feeley, 1992; Macdonald, 2003; 
McBarnet, 1981; Roach, 1999; Smith, 1997). Generally speaking, these criticisms 
concern the meaning or purpose of the models, the purportedly dichotomous 
nature they present, or the suggestion that they are overly selective and omit 
important values inherent to the criminal justice process.  
 
First, commentators have expressed concerns about the meaning or aims of 
Packer’s models. For instance, Smith (1997) has suggested that due process is not 
a goal in of itself. He argues that ‘the crime control model is concerned with the 
fundamental goal of the criminal justice system, whereas the due process model is 
concerned with setting limits to the pursuit of that goal’ (p. 335). Ashworth and 
Redmayne (2010) made a similar argument related to the purpose of the models, 
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suggesting that the relationship between them is unclear. They suggest that 
reconstructing crime control as the central purpose with the pursuit of due process 
being qualified or assigning due process and crime control to be two main 
objectives would solve the problem of the aim of the due process model.  
 
Feeley (1992) has proposed additional concerns surrounding the dichotomous 
nature of Packer’s models, claiming that the criminal process itself often amounts 
to ‘punishment’ for unconvicted defendants and as such the due process model 
compromises the very rights it attempts to protect. McBarnet (1981) has similarly 
rejected this dichotomy, arguing that ‘due process is for crime control’ (p. 31), 
referring to the tendency of the government to use due process rhetoric to 
camouflage crime control oriented practice.  
 
Finally, some commentators have suggested that Packer’s models are overly 
selective and do not account for important (more contemporary) values (Ashworth 
& Redmayne, 2010; Roach, 1999). Roach (1999) has argued that they do not 
adequately account for the role of the victim and Ashworth and Redmayne (2010) 
argue that Packer does not address the importance of resource management and 
overlooks issues such as targets, performance, and other bureaucratic goals.  
 
Despite some of the issues surrounding Packer’s models, they continue to be 
largely influential in criminal justice process research (see Hucklesby, 2013; King, 
1981; Macdonald, 2003; Sanders et al., 2010). In addition, many of the criticisms 
can be understood to be mischaracterizations of the models. For instance, Sanders 
and his colleages (2010) argue that many of the criticisms derive from a 
misunderstanding of the difference between values and goals and that when the 
models are understood to encompass values rather than aims, issues surrounding 
their meaning become irrelevant. Since both models see law enforcement to be 
desirable because of its crime prevention effects and agree that there should be 
some limits on the power of the government, they simply represent different points 
of view as to what those limits should be. As such, when the models are 
understood as values and the limits of their scope acknowledged, they remain a 
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useful tool for understanding the operation of the criminal justice process 
(Hucklesby, 2013; Sanders et al., 2010).  
 
Taking into account the limitations of Packer’s model, this thesis will conceptualise 
due process and crime control as values with which to examine the operation of 
the bail process rather than employ them as normative models. This is because it 
is not the intention of this research to test the validity of these process models, but 
rather to construct a comprehensive picture of the bail process and to use these 
values - in part - to frame this picture. It is argued that normative models which 
seek to explain the operation of the criminal justice process using one overarching 
goal (see, for example, Ashworth & Redmayne, 2010; Sanders et al., 2010) are 
unlikely to capture the complex, competing, and often intersecting values that are 
inherent to the process. As such, the thesis will not seek to understand the extent 
to which each jurisdiction’s bail process ‘fits’ each model, but rather will assess 
how they frame different aspects of the process and the ways in which they interact 
and overlap with other values in doing so.  
 
This research takes a similar approach to King (1981), who has argued that 
approaching the explanation of the operation of the criminal justice process from 
one viewpoint cannot offer a complete understanding of the phenomenon in 
question. He suggests that the mere fact that one theory is able to account for 
some aspects of a specific phenomenon does not bring the researcher any closer 
to the truth in any absolute sense (King, 1981). When it is looked at from different 
viewpoints, however, a more realistic account is possible. Accepting the presence 
of multiple aims and values allows for the incorporation of other perspectives that 
may not fit neatly within the proposed framework. This type of approach is thus 
likely to have both theoretical and practical implications in terms of policy and law 
reform.  
 
 
 
  
38 
Summary 
 
This section has highlighted the similarities in the evolution of the English and 
Canadian bail legislation by outlining a movement from due process values to 
those centred on crime control. Specifically, two systems one founded in human 
principles related to the right to liberty and the presumption of innocence have 
been eroded by numerous reforms that have restricted the right to bail in an effort 
to repress crime. This provides the beginning of a useful framework with which to 
conceptualise an understanding of the bail process. However, an analysis of the 
due process and crime control models suggests that they should be 
conceptualised as values rather than aims and, as such, the two bail systems 
should not be thought to embody one model or the other.  Rather, additional 
underlying values should be taken into account in order to provide a more realistic 
framework for analysis. Given that bail is not an insular process, it must be framed 
in the context of wider ideologies shaping the criminal process. As such, the 
following section evaluates wider criminal justice rhetoric in order to further 
illustrate the perspectives shaping the evolution of the bail process.   
 
Criminal justice rhetoric in a wider context 
 
The shift in attitudes in the bail law and policy in England and Canada took place at 
the same time as a wider change in the rhetoric shaping the broader criminal 
process. This change has been argued to be rooted in social transformations 
brought about by the advent of ‘late modernity’ (Garland, 2001) or ‘neoliberalism’ 
(Bell, 2011). This period is characterised by economic, technological, and social 
changes beginning in the 1950s that led to widespread insecurity, fuelling demands 
for increased protection against multiple forms of risk, including crime (Garland, 
2001). Further, under neoliberal principles, the role of the state shifted from a 
provider of public services to that of a facilitator of market solutions, resulting in the 
adoption of multiple private sector principles (Bell, 2011). This section will outline 
the dominant themes in criminal justice that have emerged from these social and 
economic changes, namely ‘tough on crime’ rhetoric and the rise of managerialism. 
It will demonstrate that, although they manifested themselves slightly differently, 
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they resulted in the emergence of broadly similar criminal justice rhetoric across 
both jurisdictions.  
 
‘Tough on crime’ rhetoric and the rise of the victim 
 
There has been a rise in ‘tough on crime’ rhetoric that many have argued 
culminated in a ‘punitive turn’ in many western nations (Garland, 2001; Newburn, 
2007; Pratt, 2000, 2002; Tonry, 2006; Webster & Doob, 2007). This refers to a 
hardening in the response towards criminal behaviour and an increased use of 
punishment and, in particular, imprisonment. Underpinning this trend is intolerance 
for crime and criminals and demands for ‘emotive and ostentatious’ forms of 
punishment (Pratt, 2000, 2002). Importantly, this trend has persisted despite 
widespread decreases in crime rates since about the 1990s (Newburn, 2007; 
Webster & Doob, 2007). While the extent to which this has been applied in practice 
has been debated (Matthews, 2005; Webster & Doob, 2007), it has widely been 
argued to have influenced the rhetoric surrounding criminal justice on an 
international scale (Garland, 2001; Newburn, 2007; Pratt, 2000; Tonry, 2006). As 
such, it has perhaps unsurprising that attitudes associated with this trend have 
impacted elements of criminal justice rules and rhetoric beyond punishment.17 
Indeed, this approach also involves restricting the rights of suspects and potential 
suspects through reforms such as the widening of police powers and the 
criminalisation of visible forms of ‘deviant’ behaviour (Bell, 2011). Although this has 
been experienced in Canada and England differently in terms of extent and timing 
(Garland, 2001; Newburn, 2007; O’Malley & Meyer, 2005; Webster & Doob, 2007), 
the subsequent discussion suggests that both jurisdictions have experienced its 
effects.  
 
In both Canada and England, the punitive turn was preceded by a period in the 
1960s and 1970s that was predominantly marked by a liberal reformist agenda in 
which academic lawyers and sociologists liaised with civil liberties groups and 
                                            
17 Punitive attitudes have also been linked to other aspects of criminal justice including, but not 
limited to, policing and out of court disposals (see, for example, Bell, 2011; Garland, 2001).  
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lawyers to press for changes in the criminal justice process (King, 1981; Trotter, 
2010). These reforms centred on making the system fairer, protecting individual 
rights, and restraining police power (King, 1981). Although repressive attitudes 
towards criminal justice were still present to some extent (O’Malley & Meyer, 
2005), a defining feature of this period was the idea that there should be ‘balance’ 
between effectiveness and humanity and order and liberty, so that crime was 
approached in a way that was ‘civilised’. Policy-makers were thus expected to 
‘manage’ populist concerns surrounding crime rather than to accede to them and a 
high value was placed on information provided by ‘experts’ (Loader & Sparks, 
2011).  
 
In both jurisdictions, this period directly preceded the introduction of the 
‘enlightened’ bail legislation discussed in the previous section in addition to broader 
criminal justice reforms targeted at the rights of suspects and offenders. For 
instance, it preceded the introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the 
first part of the Constitution Act, 1982, in Canada. This entrenched the rights of 
Canadian citizens into the constitution, guaranteeing the rights and freedoms for 
suspects and offenders that were deemed necessary in a free and democratic 
society. In England, the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (the Philips 
Commission) was set up as a result of wrongful convictions in the murder of 
Maxwell Confait, recommending a better balance between the rights of suspects 
and the powers of the police (Philips Commission, 1981). This eventually led to 
PACE 1984, providing a framework for the operation of police powers and 
suspects’ rights, and the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, which removed the 
prosecutorial function of the police in an attempt to alleviate bias in the court 
process.  
 
Following the developments in the 1960s and 1970s, a ‘law and order’ approach to 
crime increasingly became the prevailing ideology (Gelsthorpe, 2013; Newburn, 
2007; Webster & Doob, 2007). Rather than leaving criminal justice in the hands of 
experts, civil servants, and professional practitioners, the issue became 
increasingly high profile, making up political platforms during elections, policy 
statements, and legislative programmes (Gelsthorpe, 2013). Politicians put forward 
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‘tough on crime’ reforms, attempting to win votes by competing to determine which 
party was strictest on law and order (Newburn, 2007; Webster & Doob, 2007). This 
represents ‘penal populism’, referring to the tendency to tap into public opinions to 
strengthen the moral consensus against crime in order to satisfy the electorate 
(Bottoms, 1995). The movement from the liberal era to that of one characterised by 
punitiveness occurred alongside the evolution of more crime control oriented bail 
legislation discussed in the previous section.  
 
While some punitive attitudes emerged in Canada during this time period, a more 
‘balanced’ approach to criminal justice remained the guiding mentality until 
relatively recently (O’Malley & Meyer, 2005; Webster & Doob, 2015). For instance, 
a package of mandatory minimum penalties were introduced in the mid 1990s that 
removed the discretion from the judiciary and put minimum penalties in place for 
offenders convicted of serious violent crimes and those that involved firearms 
(Webster & Doob, 2007). Shortly thereafter, a procedure was put in place that 
reduced the period of parole ineligibility for offenders convicted of murder after 
public outcry at the potential release of one of Canada’s most notorious serial 
killers (Webster & Doob, 2007). However, these trends were mediated to some 
extent by an overarching liberal philosophy that valued rehabilitation and focused 
on the social causes of offending (O’Malley & Meyer, 2005; Webster & Doob, 
2007). It was not until 2006, when the Conservative government came into power, 
that a more dramatic shift towards punitiveness was witnessed.  At this point, the 
government reduced their reliance on research and experts and undertook a less 
balanced approach to ‘tough on crime’ rhetoric (Webster & Doob, 2015). The 
former liberal approach was labelled an ‘out of touch ideology that makes 
apologies for criminals’ (Conservative Party of Canada, 2011). In the 2006 and 
2008 elections all three major national political parties adopted ‘tough on crime’ 
platforms. In the late 2000s a series of legislation was introduced that took a ‘law 
and order’ approach. For instance, the Safe Streets and Communities Act in 2012 
restricted the availability of pardons and implemented additional mandatory 
minimum penalties for drug offences (Barnett et al., 2012).  
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In England, punitive trends were visible from about the mid 1970s, but a decisive 
shift occurred in the early 1990s when both the Conservatives and the Labour took 
‘tough on crime’ approaches in their election manifestos (Newburn, 2007). The 
appointment of home secretary Michael Howard in 1993 marked an explicit 
rejection of any notion that imprisonment should be limited and the embrace of the 
idea that the use of custodial sentencing should be increased (Newburn, 2007). 
‘Tough on crime’ approaches were also visible in relation to the criminal process. 
For instance, in 1993, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (the Runciman 
Commission) put forward recommendations that were largely viewed to favour the 
interests of police and prosecution more than suspects (Young & Sanders, 1994). 
Following this, similar trends were observed in legislation such as the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994, Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Criminal Justice 
Act 2003, and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. Many of these acts 
bestowed new powers upon the police and limited safeguards that had been put in 
place on behalf of suspects (Sanders et al., 2010). 
 
The move towards ‘law and order’ resulted in a mentality centred on the idea that 
public safety and the interests of victims should be given greater weight relative to 
civil liberties and the rights of suspects and offenders (Sanders et al., 2010; 
Webster, 2015). In this way, punitive trends based on crime control approaches are 
justified through claims that they increase the rights of victims (Garland, 2001; 
Roach, 1999). As such, the rhetoric increasingly suggests that due process rights 
must be tempered to ensure the safety of victims and the public. For instance, in a 
review of PACE undertaken in 1997, the Minister for Police and Security in 
England, Tony McNulty, stated the following in reference to safeguards put in place 
for individuals who encounter the criminal justice system: 
 
…there are bureaucratic processes and over-complicated procedures in the 
application of these safeguards which do not serve the best interests of the 
police, or the criminal justice system or, importantly, those of the victim 
(Home Office, 2007, p. 2).  
 
The idea the rights of victims and those of defendants and offenders must be pitted 
against each other also gained traction in Canada under the Conservative 
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government. For example, in 2013 the Increasing Offenders’ Accountability for 
Victims Act increased the surcharge that offenders must pay to victims’ services 
and removed judges’ ability to waive these fees (Dupuis, 2013). When asked how 
indigent offenders might pay these fines, the Minister of Justice, Peter MacKay, 
provided the following response: 
 
Two or three hundred dollars? Really? Disproportionate? Out of step? Cruel 
and unusual punishment? What about the victim that in some cases has to 
pay hundreds if not thousands of dollars as a result of being an innocent in 
the system who becomes a victim. ... [S]ometimes [offenders] might even 
have to, God forbid, sell a bit of property to pay and make compensation to 
their victims (Seymour, 2013). 
 
In both England and Canada, the proliferation of this dichotomy created an ‘us 
versus them’ mentality and provided a basis for the punitive rhetoric and rules 
enacted by the respective governments. This relates to the application of bail in 
both England and Canada, where legislation aimed at curbing the rights of 
defendants – such as the reverse onus provisions and increasing restrictions on 
the right to bail discussed in the previous section - are often invoked using rhetoric 
surrounding public safety and victims’ rights (Hucklesby & Marshall, 2000; 
Webster, 2015).  
 
The rise of managerialism  
 
Another growing conceptual development that occurred during the aforementioned 
evolution of the current bail laws was the rise of what many refer to as  
‘managerialism’ or ‘new public management’ (Bottoms, 1995; Feeley & Simon, 
1992; Gelsthorpe, 2013; Hucklesby, 2013; Raine & Willson, 1997; Sanders et al., 
2010). Emerging in the 1980s, this is a guiding principle of the criminal process that 
borrows techniques from the private sector and espouses a culture of cost 
efficiency and service effectiveness. It is underpinned by the idea that the criminal 
process (and other public services) should provide ‘value for money’ in the same 
way as the private sector (Raine & Willson, 1993). As such, the three principles of 
managerialism – economy, efficiency and effectiveness – became critical in public 
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sector officials’ consideration of criminal justice policy (Hucklesby, 2013; Sanders 
et al., 2010). Managerialist ideology has been argued to be a reaction to the 
criminal justice system in the 1970s, which was thought to be spend thrift, 
idiosyncratic, and unaccountable (Raine & Willson, 1997). Although there has been 
much more research tying managerialism to criminal justice rhetoric in England 
(see Gelsthorpe, 2013; Hucklesby, 2013; Raine & Willson, 1993, 1997; Sanders et 
al., 2010) than in Canada (see De Lint, 1998), principles underlying this concept 
can be found, to some extent, in both jurisdictions.  
 
There have been managerialist initiatives in both England and Canada over the 
last few decades that have sought to improve the efficiency of the criminal process 
through a variety of means. In Canada, representatives from the federal, provincial 
and territorial government meet with academics, practitioners, and other experts 
annually at the ‘National Criminal Justice Symposium’ to discuss systemic issues 
facing the criminal justice system, much of which focuses on efficiency, and 
performance measurements (Criminal Justice in Canada, 2009; Re-inventing 
Criminal Justice, 2012). This includes presentations by various committees, 
including the ‘FPT (federal, provincial, territorial) Working Group on Criminal 
Procedure’, who were organised to examine ways to expedite the criminal process, 
and discussions of national initiatives, such as the ‘Justice Effectiveness’ initiative, 
in which all the provinces and territories looked at ways to reduce unproductive 
court appearances and delays (Criminal Justice in Canada, 2009). Provincial 
programmes have also been established, such as the Ministry of the Attorney 
General’s (MAG) ‘Justice on Target’ initiative in Ontario, in which an expert panel 
of criminal justice practitioners was created to determine how to increase court 
efficiency in the criminal justice system (Ministry of the Attorney General, 2010). 
MAG also set up the ‘Up Front Justice Project’, which sought to make the early 
stages of court more effective (Criminal Justice in Canada, 2009).  
 
In England, a consistent stream of reports and initiatives reflecting managerialist 
ideals has been introduced in the last few decades. These include, but are not 
limited to, first, the Narey Report (1997), which recommended changes aimed at 
speeding up case processing and increasing early case resolutions. While not all 
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recommendations were implemented, it did result in the introduction of several 
changes, such as early administrative hearings (see Chapter Two) and the 
allocation of CPS staff to police stations. In addition, the ‘Simple, Speedy, 
Summary Justice’ initiative resulted in reforms aimed at increasing efficiency 
(Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2006), including additional use of out of 
court disposals. Following this, the ‘Swift and Sure Justice’ White Paper, published 
in 2012, aimed to ensure low-level, straightforward cases are dealt with promptly 
and efficiently (Ministry of Justice, 2012). Finally, the Leveson Report (2015) 
suggested reforms aimed at streamlining the disposal of criminal cases in order to 
reduce cost and to evaluate proposed cuts to legal aid.  
 
Part of the attempts to improve efficiency in both England and Canada has 
involved proposals that would increase the scope of the lower courts and preserve 
only the most serious cases for the higher courts (Cammiss, 2007; Delbigio, 2006). 
In Canada, this involved the ‘hybridisation’ of several serious offences, enabling 
the less serious cases involving these offences to be heard in provincial rather than 
superior courts (Delbigio, 2006). In England, a number of proposed reforms (e.g. 
Criminal Justice Act 2003, Narey Report (1997), the Mode of Trial Bills of 1999 and 
2000) demonstrated a desire to remove the defence’s right to elect to trial by jury, 
thus reducing the use of the Crown Court and increasing the scope of the 
magistrates’ courts (Cammiss, 2007).  
 
Managerialist attempts to increase the efficiency of the criminal justice system can 
be found in relation to bail in both England and Canada. In Canada, the 
aforementioned ‘Justice on Target’ initiative targets bail, in particular, attempting to 
reduce the number of appearances required to obtain a bail decision (Bail Experts 
Table, 2014). In addition, as was mentioned in the previous section, LASPO was 
introduced in England, in part, to reduce overcrowding in prisons and cut costs 
(Ministry of Justice, 2010a) 
 
Another development in England and Canada that has been tied to managerialist 
principles is the rise of risk based strategies to control and prevent crime 
(Braithwaite, 2000; Feeley & Simon, 1992; Garland, 2001). This relates to what 
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Bottoms (1995) argues is the ‘aggregative’ tendency of modern managerialism. In 
explaining this tendency, he turns to Feeley and Simon (1992), who have argued 
that there is a paradigm shift taking place in the criminal process. Specifically, they 
assert that the ‘New Penology’ is actuarial in nature and is concerned with 
techniques for identifying, classifying, and managing groups according to their level 
of dangerousness. Offenders are thus ‘aggregates’ and individuals become a unit 
within a framework of policy in which the aim is to control rather than eliminate 
crime (Feeley & Simon, 1992). This is associated with a broader and growing 
tendency within our society to become preoccupied with the future and also with 
safety (Giddens, 1999). This ‘Risk Society’ anticipates problems that are 
threatening but have not yet happened. The elusive yet menacing nature of risk 
creates uncertainty, anxiety, and fear which we attempt to reduce through ‘risk 
management.’ This involves trying to control the future, or more specifically, 
unwanted outcomes (Beck, 1992). 
 
This trend has translated into the promotion of a wide range of programmes in 
England and Canada that aim to prevent crime and manage risk. In Canada, 
Hannah-Moffat (1999) has argued that actuarial techniques are used to assess 
prisoner’s risks, redefining needs as risk factors. In addition, Ericson and Haggerty 
(1997) suggest that the police have shifted their focus from order maintenance, 
defined in terms of moral deviance, to risk management, which defines problems in 
utilitarian terms of danger. Similar trends have been found in England, where the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 created a long list of civil behaviour orders, aimed at 
controlling behaviour through non-criminal mechanisms. Further, there has been a 
growing emphasis on deterring and preventing crime through the monitoring and 
manipulation of situations and populations deemed, in the aggregate, crimogenic 
(Sanders et al., 2010). This includes the use of CCTV, improved home security 
devices, and street lighting.  
 
Feeley and Simon (1992) argue that this ‘actuarial justice’ has had an impact on 
the function of pre-trial detention, in particular, as rather than predicting the 
appearance of the defendant at trial, decision makers are now concerned with 
predicting dangerousness. What was once a process directed at protecting the 
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rights of defendants has given way to an administrative strategy. In England, 
attempts to predict dangerousness during the bail process are reflected in the 
aforementioned preoccupation with ‘bail bandits’ and the changes to legislation 
focused on preventing potential offences committed on bail (Hucklesby & Marshall, 
2000). In Canada, similar legislative attempts were made to tackle dangerousness 
through the implementation of reverse onus provisions in cases involving 
particularly ‘risky’ offences, such as those involving a firearm (Webster et al., 
2009). 
 
Summary 
 
This section has demonstrated that, in addition to a shift from due process to crime 
control values, there were also similarities in the rhetoric shaping the wider criminal 
justice system in both England and Canada. Indeed, ‘tough on crime’ approaches 
to crime and managerialist principles related to efficiency and risk have impacted 
both the prevailing ideologies as well as the laws and policies shaping both 
criminal justice systems. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that these 
wider ideologies have, at least to some extent, impacted the formal rules framing 
both bail processes. As such, the laws and policies related to bail in England and 
Canada were developed in, and shaped by, similar criminal justice rhetoric. 
 
Rules, rhetoric, or reality? 
 
Given the parallels in the legislative and policy developments and overarching 
rhetoric shaping the bail process in England and Canada, one might assume that 
the actual practice of bail is similar across the jurisdictions. This projection would 
rest on the assumption that aforementioned rules and rhetoric offer a sufficient 
explanation for the operation of the criminal process and its components. This 
assumption would, however, fail to take into account the well-documented gap 
between the ‘law in books’ and the ‘law in action’. Indeed, a considerable amount 
of research has been devoted to exploring this difference, ultimately finding that 
there is a gap between the law as it is written and the way in which it is applied in 
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practice (see Packer, 1968; King, 1981; McBarnet, 1981; McConville, Sanders and 
Leng, 1991).  
 
While it is generally acknowledged that a gap between the law and practice does 
exist (Ashworth & Redmayne, 2010; Hucklesby, 1996; King, 1981; McConville et 
al., 1991; Packer, 1968; Sanders et al., 2010), there is some debate as to why it 
exists, and consequently, how to best understand the operation of the criminal 
process and its sub-processes (McBarnet, 1981; McConville et al., 1991; 
McConville, Sanders, & Leng, 1997; Smith, 1997). Part of this debate centres on 
the relationship between ‘rules, rhetoric and reality’ and which of these factors best 
explains how the process functions (McBarnet, 1981; McConville et al., 1991). The 
research examines to what extent the government rhetoric related to criminal 
justice is consistent with both the law itself as well as the behaviour of the actors in 
practice. As such, it offers guidance as to how the current research should be 
framed. 
 
Most researchers have advised against interactionist approaches which dismiss 
the role of the law and focus exclusively on the behaviour of the actors (King, 1981; 
McBarnet, 1981; McConville et al., 1991). McBarnet (1981) argues that these 
approaches falsely assume the laws are sufficient and that the problem is simply 
that the actors subvert, negate or abuse them. As such, the ‘law in books’ are 
taken as read and remain unexplored. In the case of this research, this would be 
akin to exclusively focusing on cultural explanations without taking into account the 
legal context underlying them. In contrast, it is advised that the main focus of 
analysis should be on the law and the way it is drafted. McBarnet (1981) argues 
that this is because the government elite supports a liberal rhetoric but does not 
incorporate this rhetoric into the drafting of the law. Police and prosecutors can 
thus use their wide discretionary powers to apply the law in a manner that is 
contrary to the liberal government rhetoric and more in line with a law and order 
approach.  
 
While this position effectively captures the misleading way in which government 
rhetoric can disguise the actual content of the law (King, 1981; McConville et al., 
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1997; Sanders et al., 2010) its analysis of the law itself is simplistic and it does not 
fully account for the multiple values found within the rhetoric and the law or the role 
of criminal justice actors during the process. 18 In contrast, while McConville and 
his colleagues (1991) agree that the role of the law is an important component of 
the analysis of the criminal process, they take a more nuanced, and it is argued 
comprehensive, approach to the debate. Rather than suggesting that the 
disjuncture between rhetoric and reality reflects somewhat of a conspiracy on the 
part of the government, they argue that government rhetoric and the laws they draft 
contain conflicting principles. In the case of bail, this was demonstrated in the 
previous discussion, which suggested that defendants’ right to bail was furthered 
by the presumption in favour of bail but at the same time limited in specific 
circumstances as a result of concerns over public safety. Consequently, the law 
does not set the standard of legality from which criminal justice actors deviate, but 
instead, according to McConville and his colleagues (1991), they act autonomously 
and simply use the appropriate principle to justify their behaviour or, in some 
cases, simply act illegally. Further, they suggest that even if the actors were 
exploiting intentionally vague laws as McBarnet (1981) argues, the fact that they 
were motivated to act against liberal government rhetoric is a valid enough 
justification to examine both their behaviour as well as the law that shapes it.  
 
McConville and his colleagues (1991) address the importance of the law and the 
overarching rhetoric without neglecting the role of criminal justice actors in 
explaining the operation of the criminal process. In line with this approach, it is 
argued that the theoretical framework used to explain the operation of the bail 
process should encompass the decisions-making of the criminal justice actors 
involved in the process as well the laws and rhetoric that may or may not shape 
their behaviour. 
 
 
 
                                            
18 Elsewhere, McBarnet's (1981) analysis has been referred to as ‘crude’ (see Sanders et al., 2010). 
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Conclusion 
 
Through an examination of the development of bail laws and policies and the wider 
criminal justice rhetoric that has shaped it, this chapter has demonstrated the 
remarkable similarities between the two jurisdictions. Specifically, the bail laws in 
England and Canada are based on due process values and the presumption of 
innocence, yet legislation is consistently introduced that is centred on crime 
control, ultimately intending to curtail this right. Further, rhetoric associated with 
‘tough on crime’ approaches to crime and the rise of managerialism - in particular, 
a greater focus on efficiency and risk - also shape the overarching climate in which 
these laws and policies have developed. If the law, policy, and rhetoric discussed 
in this chapter could in of themselves explain the bail decision-making process, 
one might limit their examination to the preceding factors. However, in line with 
McConville and his colleagues (1991), it is argued that the ‘reality’ of the process 
must also be examined. As such, the following chapter turns to the decision-
making of court actors in establishing a framework for the current research. 
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Chapter Two: 
 
The ‘Remand Problem’: An Investigation of the ‘Reality’ of the use of 
Remand in England and Canada 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Despite the similarities in law, policy, and rhetoric discussed in the previous 
chapter, bail practices are considerably different in England and Canada. This 
can be broadly determined through an examination of trends in each 
jurisdiction’s prison remand population – the portion of the prison population 
who have not been released and are, instead, detained in custody awaiting 
either a bail decision or the conclusion of their criminal proceedings. While 
Canada’s remand population rate has more than tripled in the last four decades 
(Statistics Canada, 2017a), England’s has remained relatively stable (Home 
Office, 1984; Ministry of Justice, 2016b). The trend in England is particularly 
striking when one considers that many other common law jurisdictions, such as 
New Zealand, Scotland, and Australia, have also seen increases in their 
remand populations in recent years (Player et al., 2010). 
 
This chapter will explore the drivers that contribute to these trends and illustrate 
that no laws, polices, or case factors can fully account for the diversions in 
rates. This demonstrates that one must turn to informal factors related to the 
behaviour of court actors in an effort to explain bail decision-making. Indeed, 
previous research suggests that ‘court culture’, as mediated through the 
decisions of the courtroom workgroup, has a considerable impact on the bail 
decision-making process in England and Canada (Hucklesby, 1997a; Myers, 
2009, 2015; Webster, 2009). It is argued, however, that explanations related to 
court culture cannot alone explain bail practices given they cannot be entirely 
separated from views about the broader criminal process in which they 
emerged (see Church, 1985; Young, 2013).  
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the use of remand custody in England and 
Canada and to assess potential explanations for the bail decision-making that 
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has contributed to their respective remand population trends. First, the use of 
remand custody in England and Canada will be described through a detailed 
examination of their remand population trends. Second, explanations related to 
the volume of cases entering remand custody and the length of time they spend 
in custody will be examined in an effort to better understand the trends in each 
jurisdiction. Finally, the extent to which informal factors can offer an explanation 
will be explored through an examination of ‘court culture’ and its influence on 
the bail decision-making process.   
 
The use of remand custody in England and Canada 
 
The following review of the prison statistics outlines the use of remand custody 
in England and Canada with a view of shedding light on the bail practices in 
each jurisdiction. The nature of the bail practices in each jurisdiction can be 
broadly assessed through an examination of their remand trends. Although 
changes to the remand population are not entirely caused by decisions made 
during the bail process,19 they provide considerable insight into the broad trends 
shaping the use of bail in each jurisdiction (see, for example, Hucklesby, 2009; 
Player et al., 2010; Webster et al., 2009).  
 
In order to understand the use of remand custody in England and Canada, one 
must first be aware of differences in their prison systems. Indeed, the 
jurisdictions manage their prison populations differently. In Canada, prisons are 
a shared responsibility between the federal and provincial territorial 
governments. The provincial and territorial governments administer non-
custodial sentences, remand custody, and sentences less than two years while 
the federal government is responsible for penitentiaries – housing prisoners with 
custodial sentences of two years or more – and parole decisions for federal 
prisoners. It is therefore the provincial and territorial institutions that take 
responsibility for all remand prisoners. In England, while the vast majority of 
prisons and prisoners are managed by the central government, a growing 
                                            
19 Decisions made outside of the bail process can also be expected to influence the size of the 
remand population. For example, the length of time accused persons spend in custody following 
a decision on bail would also have an impact. 
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number of private prisons have been established since the early 1990s. 
Remand prisoners are housed in both types of institutions. 
 
Both countries measure the flow of prisoners within prisons in two ways. First, 
the prison population is measured with ‘count’ data, referring to the number of 
individuals that are housed in custody on any given day. Second, ‘reception’ 
data20 accounts for the number of prisoners entering custody in a specific period 
of time. While count data will only account for each prisoner once, reception 
data may count the same prisoner multiple times if her or she is moving in and 
out of prison in the selected time period (e.g. for multiple court appearances or 
to change the institution in which they are housed). In England, however, there 
is also ‘first reception’ data in which only the first entry to the institution is 
counted. Imprisonment rates represent jurisdictions’ prison populations (in 
counts), taking into account their national populations. This section will examine 
trends in the English and Canadian prison populations in order to better 
understand how the use of remand differs in each jurisdiction.  
 
In the preceding two to three decades, England and Canada have exhibited 
much different trends in their use of imprisonment (Newburn, 2007; Webster et 
al., 2009). Figures 2.1 and 2.2 provide an overview of these trends, presenting 
the total prison population rates, sentenced population rates, and remand 
population rates for both jurisdictions from the 1970s to the present. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows that Canada’s imprisonment rate has remained relatively 
stable over the last four decades. According to Webster and Doob (2007), this 
is largely due to their ability to counter punitive laws and policies with other 
moderating forces related to their history, culture, and structure of their 
government. Although there has been some fluctuation, the adult 21 
imprisonment rate in Canada in 2016 is fairly similar to that in the late 1970s.  
 
                                            
20 In England, this measure is referred to as ‘receptions’ compared to ‘admissions’ in Canada. 
For the sake of consistency, the English terminology will be used. 
21 The youth prison population is not included in the imprisonment rate because data was not 
available prior to the late 1990s. 
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Figure 2.1 - Components of total (federal and provincial) adult prison 
population in Canada (rates* per 100,000 population) 
Source: (Statistics Canada, 2017a, 2017b) 
*Rates calculated using Statistic Canada’s CANSIM table 051-0001: Estimates of Population by 
age group. 
**Note that no prison data was available in Alberta in 2013. The sharp decline that year is thus 
most likely a result of statistical unavailability as opposed to actual trends.  
 
Figure 2.2 - Components of the prison population* in England and Wales 
(rates** per 100,000 population) 
**Due to the availability of data, rates from 1971 to 1984 and 2010 to 2016 do not include police 
cells. Further, 1971 to 1984 represents annual averages while 1985 to 2016 is represented by 
June 30th counts.   
**Rates were calculated with population estimates from Office for National Statistics, National 
Records of Scotland, Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. 
Source: (Home Office, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1992, 1995, 2004, Ministry of Justice, 2017c, 2010b, 
2011, 2013, 2014c) 
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The adult imprisonment rate in Canada remained stable, only moving from 112 
per 100,000 population in 1992/199322 to 111 per 100,000 in 2015/2016 
(Statistics Canada, 2017a, 2017b). However, it is important to note that the 
adult imprisonment rate in Canada has risen slightly in recent years, which is 
potentially related to the ‘tough on crime’ agenda put forward by the 
Conservative government which came into power in 2006 (see Chapter One). 
 
In contrast, England is currently one of the highest incarcerators in Western 
Europe (Walmsley, 2017). This is largely explained by the impact of the 
‘punitive turn’ in the 1990s, discussed in the previous chapter (Newburn, 2007). 
As Figure 2.2 demonstrates, prior to this point, the imprisonment rate fluctuated 
but stayed relatively stable. Following the introduction of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1993, however, the imprisonment rate increased significantly, rising from 87 
per 100,000 population in 1993 (Home Office, 2004) to 146 per 100,000 
population in 2016 (Ministry of Justice, 2016b). 
 
Both Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 illustrate that when the components of each 
jurisdiction’s prison population are examined separately, a different picture is 
presented. In Canada, although the overall imprisonment rate has remained 
stable, the profile of adults entering custody has changed considerably. Figure 
2.1 demonstrates that the remand population has been increasing at the same 
time that the sentenced population has been decreasing. Indeed, the sentenced 
population fluctuated from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, at which point it 
began to decline, decreasing from 93 per 100,000 adult population in 
1992/1993 to 68 per 100,000 adult population in 2015/2016 (Statistics Canada, 
2017a, 2017b). In comparison, the remand population rose from the late 1970s 
to the early 1990s, increasing steadily from 13 per 100,000 in 1978/1979, to 19 
per 100,000 population in 1996/1997, then rising more markedly to reach to 41 
per 100,000 population in 2015/2016 (Statistics Canada, 2017a).  
 
Canada has seen a substantial rise in the percentage of its total prison 
population that is constituted by remand prisoners. Table 2.1 shows the number 
of prisoners in federal and provincial/territorial institutions, disaggregated into  
                                            
22 Statistics Canada reports crime data by the fiscal year, providing two years for its annual 
figure. 
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Table 2.1 - Canada: Adult population in custody, federal, provincial and 
territorial institutions, 2000-2016 
 Total in 
Custody 
(Fed. And 
Prov.) 
Total in 
Sentenced 
Custody 
Total in 
Remand 
Custody 
% in Custody 
on Remand 
1992/1993 31,709 26,477 5,111 16% 
1993/1994 32,804 27,574 5,130 16% 
1994/1995 33,760 28,265 5,327 16% 
1995/1996 33,806 28,317 5,266 16% 
1996/1997 33,722 27,720 5,734 17% 
1997/1998 32,715 26,333 6,109 19% 
1998/1999 32,391 25,647 6,491 20% 
1999/2000 31,451 24,277 6,661 21% 
2000/2001 31,374 23,557 7,401 24% 
2001/2002 31,802 23,540 7,944 25% 
2002/2003 32,197 23,157 8,704 27% 
2003/2004 31,733 22,231 9,174 29% 
2004/2005 32,111 22,124 9,656 30% 
2005/2006 33,391 22,191 10,908 33% 
2006/2007 35,435 22,966 12,169 34% 
2007/2008 36,411 23,103 12,973 36% 
2008/2009 37,153 23,274 13,548 36% 
2009/2010 37,316 23,254 13,739 37% 
2010/2011 38,202 24,680 13,086 34% 
2011/2012 39,087 25,403 13,369 34% 
2012/2013 39,678 25,621 13,739 35% 
2013/2014 36,845 25,029 11,494 31% 
2014/2015 39,623 25,531 13,650 34% 
2015/2016 40,147 24,833 14,899 37% 
*The sentenced and remand figures do not add up to the total in custody figures because some 
provincial prisoners do not meet either criteria. Other statuses include, but are not limited to, 
offenders who are being held in provincial/territorial correctional institutions for lock-ups, parole 
violations or suspensions, immigration holds, and those who are temporarily detained without 
warrants of any type. 
**All prisoners in federal custody were considered sentenced for the purposes of the 
calculations. 
***Note that no prison data was available in Alberta in 2013. The decline that year is thus most 
likely a result of statistical unavailability as opposed to actual trends. 
Source: (Statistics Canada, 2017a, 2017b). 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
sentenced and remand prisoners, from 1992/1993 to the present. It 
demonstrates that remand prisoners made up only 16% of the 
provincial/territorial and federal prison population in 1992/1993 compared to 
37% in 2015/2016 (Statistics Canada, 2017a, 2017b). Since all remand 
prisoners are held in provincial/territorial custody in Canada, it is these 
institutions that must face the institutional burden associated with their rising 
numbers. When the total number of provincial/territorial institutions are 
examined separately from the federal institutions, for instance, the full impact of 
the current trend is highlighted. Figure 2.3 illustrates changes to the prison 
population in provincial/territorial institutions only. It shows that the remand 
population surpassed the sentenced population during the early part of the 21st 
century. By 2016, the remand population continued to outnumber the sentenced 
population, comprising 59% of the provincial/territorial prison population 
(Statistics Canada, 2017a).  
 
Figure 2.3 - Components of adult provincial and territorial prison 
populations in Canada (rates* per 100, 000 population)   
*Rates calculated using Statistics Canada’s CANSIM table 051-0001 (Estimates of Population 
by age group. 
**Note that no prison data was available in Alberta in 2013. The decline that year is thus most 
likely a result of statistical unavailability as opposed to actual trends. 
Source: (Statistics Canada, 2017a). 
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Figure 2.4 illustrates the percentage of each province’s22 prison population that 
is occupied by remand prisoners. This ranges from as low as 19% in Prince 
Edward Island to as high as 68% in Alberta (Statistics Canada, 2017a). The 
provinces are listed in ascending order, with the national total inserted 
accordingly, to illustrate which provinces fall above and below the national total. 
While there is variability in the percentage of the prison population that remand 
prisoners occupied in 2016, it is clear that all of the provinces have experienced 
an increase in this percentage since 1992. 
 
Figure 2.4 - Percentage of total provincial prison population constituted 
by remand prisoners in each province (1992/1993 and 2015/2016) 
Source: (Statistics Canada, 2017a). 
 
Although England is regarded to be more ‘punitive’ in terms of its use of prison 
generally (Newburn, 2007; Webster & Doob, 2007), this jurisdiction has 
maintained a relatively stable remand population rate (see Figure 2.2). In fact, 
the rise in its prison population can almost entirely be accounted for by 
increases in the sentenced population, which doubled in size from a rate of 65 
per 100,000 population in 1993 to 127 per 100,000 population in 2016 (Home 
Office, 2004; Ministry of Justice, 2016b). 
 
                                            
22 The Canadian territories – Nunavut, Northwest Territories, and Yukon – were not included in 
the provincial comparisons as they occupy a very small proportion of the total population and 
exhibit much different crime patterns than the rest of the country (Webster et al., 2009). As 
such, they are only included when data is presented for the entire country. 
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Although the remand rate in England increased steadily from the early 1970s to 
the late 1980s, it has fluctuated, but remained mostly stable since that point. 
There has been some evidence of a downwards trend in the last few years, as 
the remand rate decreased from 25 per 100,000 population in 2008 to 16 per 
100,000 population in 2016 (Ministry of Justice, 2010b, 2016b). Until the most  
 
Table 2.2 - England: Population in custody as of 30th of June, 2000-2016 
 
 Total 
Prison Pop. 
Sentenced 
Population 
Remand Population % of 
Prison 
Pop. in 
Remand 
 
Untried 
 
Convicted 
Unsentenced 
 
Total 
1993 44,246 33,046 7,857 2,775 10,632 24% 
1994 48,929 35,773 9,256 3,277 12,533 26% 
1995 51,084 39,379 7,950 3,106 11,056 22% 
1996 55,256 43,055 8,432 3,136 11,568 21% 
1997 61,467 48,805 8,563 3,542 12,105 20% 
1998 65,727 52,269 8,358 4,545 12,903 20% 
1999 64,529 51,392 7,932 4,657 12,589 20% 
2000 65,194 53,180 7,219 4,214 11,433 18% 
2001 66,403 54,212 6,801 4,260 11,061 17% 
2002 71,218 57,306 7,877 5,204 13,081 18% 
2003 73,657 59,439 7,896 5,177 13,073 18% 
2004 74,488 60,976 7,716 4,779 12,495 17% 
2005 76,190 62,257 8,084 4,780 12,864 17% 
2006 77,982 63,493 8,064 5,003 13,067 17% 
2007 79,734 65,601 8,387 4,457 12,844 16% 
2008 83,194 68,234 8,750 4,690 13,440 16% 
2009 83,454 68,488 8,933 4,523 13,456 16% 
2010 85,002 71,000 8,487 4,517 13,004 15% 
2011 85,374 71,964 8,299 4,165 12,464 15% 
2012 86,048 73,562 7,671 3,653 11,324 13% 
2013 83,842 71,233 7,755 3,231 10,986 13% 
2014 85,509 71,481 8,618 3,579 12,197 14% 
2015 86,193 72,659 8,271 3,514 11,785 14% 
2016 85,134 74,316 6,278 3,010 9,288 11% 
*Includes those held in police cells. 
Sources: (Home Office, 1995, 2004, Ministry of Justice, 2010b, 2011, 2013, 2014c, 2017c) 
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recent year, this decline is largely a result of a decrease in the number of 
convicted unsentenced remand prisoners (see Table 2.2).  
 
The combination of an increasing sentenced population and a stable remand 
population has resulted in an English prison population constituted by a 
decreasing percentage of remand prisoners over time. Table 2.2 demonstrates 
this gradual shift, presenting the actual number of prisoners in custody, 
disaggregated into types of prisoners, from 1993 to the present. It shows that 
24% of the total prison population was made up of remand prisoners in 1993, 
compared to only 11% in 2016 (Home Office, 2004; Ministry of Justice, 2016b). 
 
Summary 
 
This section demonstrated that there are considerable differences in the use of 
remand across England and Canada. Despite similarities in their legislative and 
policy developments and overarching rhetoric (see Chapter One), England’s 
remand population has remained relatively stable at the same time that 
Canada’s has been rising. Given that remand rates are, to a large extent, 
dictated by bail decision-making practices in each jurisdiction, the disparity in 
these trends indicates that these practices are considerably different across the 
two jurisdictions. An explanation as to why their remand population trends have 
taken such different directions could therefore shed light on the factors that 
contribute to the bail decision-making process more broadly. As such, potential 
explanations for this discrepancy will be further explored in the subsequent 
section.  
 
Explaining remand population trends in England and Canada 
 
There are several potential explanations for the disparity in the remand 
populations outlined above. These explanations can be expected to relate to the 
two main drivers of the remand population: the volume of cases entering 
remand custody and the length of time they spend there (Hucklesby, 2009; 
Webster et al., 2009). This section draws on the existing research and statistical 
data related to courts in England and Canada in order to examine whether 
changes in laws, policies, or case factors (i.e. nature of charges) surrounding 
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these drivers can sufficiently explain the use of remand in each jurisdiction. 
Ultimately it will illustrate that, while none of these factors can fully explain the 
use of remand, they are nonetheless important in presenting a complete picture 
of the bail decision-making process.  
 
The number of defendants entering remand custody 
 
The number of defendants entering remand custody is impacted by the number 
of cases being processed through the court system, the number defendants 
detained by the police23, and the number of defendants remanded in custody by 
the courts. These contributing factors will be examined in both jurisdictions in 
order to gain a better understand of their influence on the use of remand in 
England and Canada.  
 
Canada 
 
An examination of the number of defendants entering remand custody in 
Canada is complex for two reasons. First, there is a considerable amount of 
variability in the trends across provinces and territories given that each 
jurisdiction manages its own prison population. Second, the official statistics in 
relation to court decision-making is limited at best. Although national data will be 
presented when possible, much of this analysis will be focused on Ontario. This 
is because this province has experienced the ‘remand problem’ to a greater 
extent than most of the other provinces (see Figure 2.4) and thus presents a 
contrast to England’s remand population.  There is also a rich source of data in 
this province as a result of a number of empirical studies conducted with 
province wide data over the last decade. Finally, Ontario will be the site of data 
collection for this study.  
 
Unlike in England, changes in the number of defendants entering the court has 
not been linked to changes in law or policy in Canadian research (see Doob, 
                                            
23 As discussed in the previous chapter, this decision must sometimes be approved by the CPS 
in England and the Crown attorney in selected provinces in Canada. 
62 
 
Sprott, & Webster, 2017; Webster, 2009; Webster, Sprott, Doob, & Mitchell, 
2016). Rather, the (limited) existing research has examined the nature of the 
cases entering the system and its impact on caseload, the police, and the court. 
 
Compared to England, the number of defendants entering remand custody in 
Canada is difficult to determine. Canada does not record ‘first reception’ data 
and thus double counts prisoners who re-enter custody following their initial 
reception. For this reason, it is not a true measure of how many individuals have 
been remanded in custody. Despite its shortcomings, however, it does provide 
a general idea of potential trends in the number of defendants entering remand 
custody over time.  
 
It would seem there might have been a rise and then a fall in defendants 
entering remand custody in Canada since 2000. In 2000/2001, a total of 
110,387 defendants were admitted to remand custody, peaking at 155,808 in 
2007/2008, and then declining again to 119,625 in 2015/2016. This represents 
a decline of 23% in the last eight years. The same trend is observed in Ontario, 
where there were 52,179 receptions to remand in 2000/2001, climbing to 
66,558 in 2007/2008 and then decreasing to 46,874 in 2015/2016, a decline of 
30% in the last eight years (Statistics Canada, 2017c). 
 
Caseload. The number of adult criminal cases entering the court system 
has increased steadily and then decreased suddenly in Canada as well as in 
Ontario in the last decade. In Canada, the number of cases rose from 382,322 
in 2005/200624 to hit a peak of 410,051 in 2009/2010, and finally fell to 328,028 
in 2014/2015 (Statistics Canada, 2017d). In Ontario, the number of adult 
criminal cases increased over approximately the same period as the rest of the 
country, beginning at 147,807 in 2005/2006, peaking at 161,355 in 2010/2011 
and declining to falling to 123,072 in 2014/2015 (Statistics Canada, 2017d). 
This fluctuation in the number of cases entering the courts is likely to impact the 
number of defendants entering remand custody as the volume of bail decisions 
that must be made will mirror the flow of cases.  
 
                                            
24 Data was not available for caseload before this point. 
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Importantly, these changes occurred alongside a consistent fall in crime 
generally, as well as violent crime, in particular (Webster et al., 2016). This 
suggests that caseload changes independently from crime rates and that the 
volume of defendants entering the courts (and thus remand custody) is unlikely 
to be influenced significantly by crime surges or drops. 
 
Police. The total number of cases entering the court system in Canada is 
less influential on the remand population than the number of cases that begin 
the court process in bail court. The volume of these cases is largely dictated by 
police decision-making. Unlike in England, the Canadian Criminal Code dictates 
that any form of release, including those imposed by police, remain in effect 
(unless they are reviewed or revoked) until the end of trial or sentencing. For 
this reason, defendants who receive bail from police prior to the court process 
enter a different ‘stream’ and their bail status is not readdressed unless there is 
an explicit reason to do so. As such, the police decision has a more direct 
impact in Canada, particularly when the police choose to release them. Those 
who are detained, however, still begin the court process in bail court in order for 
a justice of the peace to determine whether they should be remanded in 
custody or released on bail. 
 
Doob (2012) has investigated court statistics in Ontario to determine the 
number of cases that enter the court system by way of the bail process. Using 
province-wide court data, he found that the percentage of cases that began the 
court process in bail court rose from just fewer than 40% in 2001 to about 50% 
in 2007. However, as of 2017, this proportion declined again as 41% of adult 
criminal cases started the court process in bail court (Doob et al., 2017). While 
this proportion has fluctuated, and appears to currently be on a downward 
trend, this still indicates that police were detaining almost half of defendants in 
custody prior to the commencement of the court process as opposed to 
releasing them on bail or diverting them in some other manner. This is 
especially striking when considering that, in England, only 10% of defendants 
were detained by the police who started their proceedings in magistrates’ court 
(see Table 2.3). 
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It has been argued that the nature of the cases entering the adult criminal court 
system could be expected to have some impact on the police decision to detain 
a defendant. For instance, defendants have been shown to be more likely to 
start their court lives in bail court when they have charges involving violence or 
administration of justice violations (Doob, 2013; Webster, 2009). This has been 
demonstrated in the prison statistics, which suggest that defendants charged 
with these two types of offences occupied the largest proportion of remand 
receptions. Indeed, in 2008/200925 26% of receptions to remand in Canada 
were for administration of justice offences and 24% were for violent offences 
(Porter & Calverley, 2011). Indeed, police appear to be more likely to detain 
defendants who have committed a violent crime or have violated a court order.  
 
It has been suggested that the previous increase in the proportion of defendants 
detained by the police cannot be attributed to a surge in violent crime, given that 
the level of violent crime was decreasing during this time period, but that it 
might be explained by a rise in administration of justice offences (Webster, 
2009). There has been an increase in the number of cases containing at least 
one administration of justice offence in recent years (Webster et al., 2016). 
Among all adults charged in Canada, administration of justice offences 
accounted for 11% of adults charged (as the most serious charge) in 1998 and 
by 2014 they accounted for 22%. Doob (2012) showed that this has been an 
on-going trend since the 1980s, since when the rate at which people have been 
charged with ‘bail violation/failure to comply’ and ‘failure to comply with court 
orders’ started to increase dramatically.  
 
The rise in administration of justice offences may be expected to have an 
impact on the proportion of defendants detained by police since they could 
signal defendants’ inability to comply with bail conditions. In addition, once 
defendants are charged with an administration of justice offence, they are put in 
a reverse onus position in which they must demonstrate why they should be 
released to the court and might have a more difficult time being granted bail. 
However, the recent drop in the number of defendants detained in custody by 
the police occurred alongside a continued rise in the number of administration 
                                            
25 This was the last data available as these statistics are not provided regularly.  
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of justice offences. This suggests that, while these charges may be contributing 
to the large number of defendants detained by the police generally, they are not 
driving changes in this trend to such an extent that they directly mirror 
fluctuations in police use of custody. As such, while it may be that the 
criminalisation of failure to comply partially contributes to the police decision to 
detain, this factor cannot be said to be the only contributing factor behind their 
use of remand custody. 
 
Courts. Despite the significant percentage of defendants starting the 
court process in bail court, courts do not appear to be remanding a large 
percentage of defendants in custody. Webster and her colleagues (2009) found 
that the percentage of cases in which defendants were remanded in custody by 
justices of the peace in Ontario showed little change between 2001 and 2007, 
reducing from 13% to 12.3% during this time period. Similarly, in an 
observational study of bail decision-making, the Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association (2014) found that 10% of the cases across their Ontario sample 
resulted in a remand in custody.  
 
In sum, this research suggests that the number of defendants entering remand 
custody is not the primary driver of Canada’s remand population growth. 
Indeed, the number of defendants entering remand custody has fluctuated but 
has been (roughly) decreasing in recent years. This is potentially a reflection of 
a drop in caseload and, in Ontario, a (slight) drop in the number of defendants 
detained by the police. It is unlikely that the court has impacted Ontario’s fall in 
receptions, as they have remanded defendants in custody at a low and stable 
level over the last few decades. It is unclear what is influencing the decision-
making underlying these trends as there were had been no recent notable laws 
or policies targeting this driver when the research was conducted and neither 
the crime rate nor the nature of cases entering the system mirrors the trends.  
England 
 
Unlike in Canada, there have been a number of changes to the law and policy 
in recent years in England that that have directly targeted the number of cases 
entering the court system generally, as well as the number of cases that start 
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the court process in custody, specifically. As such, research has examined the 
volume of defendants entering the court system in relation to these initiatives 
(see Hucklesby, 2009). The number of defendants who are entering remand 
custody is reflected in trends surrounding first receptions to prison in England. 
Unlike ‘regular’ reception data, first reception data gives an indication of the 
number of new prisoners who enter remand custody. Since those who move in 
and out of prison multiple times in the same time period are not double counted, 
this is a better reflection of the volume of defendants entering remand custody. 
 
An examination of first receptions in England over time suggests that the 
number of defendants entering remand custody is declining, but that the primary 
driver for this decline are reductions in the convicted unsentenced population. 
Figure 2.5 shows that the number of first receptions into custody for untried 
prisoners fell 22% from 200326 to 2015 (n = 58,459 to 45,677) while the number 
of first receptions for convicted unsentenced prisoners fell 77% in the same time 
period (n = 25,899 to 6,031). The decline in convicted unsentenced prisoners 
occurred steadily while the decline in untried prisoners occurred most 
significantly in the last four years (see Figure 2.5; Ministry of Justice, 2016c). 
 
Figure 2.5 - First receptions for untried and convicted unsentenced 
remand prisoners, 2003 to 2015* 
 
Source: (Ministry of Justice, 2016c) 
*Data was unavailable for 2010. Further, 2015 was the most recently available figures due to a 
change in statistical calculations, rendering 2016 incomparable to previous years. 
                                            
26 First reception data was not available for the untried and convicted unsentenced population 
separately prior to 2003. 
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Caseload. The decline in the number of defendants entering remand 
custody may be partially explained by a fall in the number of cases being 
processed in the court system (i.e. ‘caseload’). Indeed, fewer individuals 
appearing in court provides fewer opportunities to use remand custody. The 
number of defendants proceeded against in magistrates’ courts was relatively 
stable from the mid 1990s to the mid 2000s, but has been decreasing steadily 
ever since. Between 2004 and 2016, this number fell from slightly more than 2 
million to slightly less than 1.5 million (Ministry of Justice, 2007, 2017b). There 
has been a more recent, but similar decrease in caseload in the Crown Court, 
where the number of defendants tried fell from 105,000 in 2010 to 80,000 in 
2016 (Ministry of Justice, 2017b). It is notable that, throughout this period, 
crime, including violent crime, has been steadily declining (Office for National 
Statistics, 2017). 
 
The decline in caseload might be partially explained by the government’s 
initiative to increase the number of offences ‘brought to justice’ (Ministry of 
Justice, 2014a) as well as a recent trend to use informal resolutions as opposed 
to formal charges.  
 
The introduction or reform of several out of court disposals offer police 
alternatives to the court process when they are dealing with some cases. For 
example, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 enabled police officers to attach 
conditions to cautions (i.e. formal warnings given by police). In addition, Penalty 
Notices for Disorder (PNDs), introduced by the Criminal Justice & Police Act 
2001, allow on-the-spot fines for minor offences (North Yorkshire Police, 2013). 
Finally, cannabis warnings, introduced in 2005, are formal warnings that police 
may issue for the possession of cannabis (Ministry of Justice, 2016a). 
 
The use of out of court disposals increased considerably in the mid 2000s, but 
has been in decline since 2007 (Ministry of Justice, 2016a). However, their use 
has largely been displaced by the use of informal resolutions (i.e. street level 
restorative justice and community resolutions), which were used increasingly by 
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police starting in 2008 (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2012).27 Although out 
of court disposals and informal resolutions may have contributed to the decline 
in caseload, it is unlikely they have had more than a marginal impact on the 
remand population. This is because police would generally use these strategies 
in relation to minor offenders, who would be unlikely to be remanded in custody 
if they were to appear in court. As such, it is unlikely they had a major impact on 
the remand population.  
 
Police. The police may impact the number of defendants entering 
remand custody through their decision to detain28 or release defendants prior to 
their first court appearance. Following this decision, police make 
recommendations to the CPS as to whether they believe defendants should be 
released on bail. Although the CPS theoretically reviews the file independently, 
research has revealed a high concordance rate between police and CPS 
decisions (Phillips & Brown, 1998). Further, police suggestions have an indirect 
impact on the court, as there is also a high concordance rate between CPS 
recommendations and court decisions (Morgan & Henderson, 1998).  
 
It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that defendants who are released on bail by 
the police are unlikely to be remanded in custody by the courts and defendants 
who appear in court from police custody are at a greater risk of receiving a 
remand in custody (Morgan & Henderson, 1998). This may be because when 
defendants appear in court from custody it is likely to signal to the other court 
practitioners that the police felt as though they should be detained, potentially 
resulting in them agreeing with this decision. Further, their relatively recent 
power to attach conditions to bail orders may dissuade the magistrate and CPS 
                                            
27 The use of community resolutions was not available in the national statistics until 2015. While 
there was a decline between 2015 and 2016, it is not clear whether this was indicative of a 
longstanding trend. 
28 Although ‘remand’ refers to the portion of the prison population who is either untried or 
convicted and unsentenced in both jurisdictions, it is used slightly differently when it is used to 
discuss the action of compelling defendants to enter custody. In England, a defendant can only 
be ‘remanded in custody’ or ‘remanded on bail’ by the courts. Police would be said to ‘detain’ 
defendants prior to their court appearance or ‘release’ them on bail. In Canada, the expression 
‘remanded in custody’ is not typically used to describe the action of holding someone in custody 
or releasing them on bail. Rather, both the police and the courts are usually said to ‘detain’ 
defendants in remand custody, custodial remand or either ‘pre-sentence’ or ‘pre-trial’ detention 
– all of which refer to the same concept. For the purposes of consistency, the English 
terminology will be employed.  
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from remanding defendants in custody as it would necessitate a change of such 
an order in court.  
 
Table 2.3 presents the number and percentage of defendants appearing in 
magistrates’ court from 1996 to 2016 according to how they were directed to 
appear by the police. It demonstrates that the number of defendants who were 
arrested and held in custody by police increased sharply in the late 2000s and 
then decreased in the last few years. Indeed, the number of defendants 
detained by police increased from 110,000 in 2007 to 201,000 in 2011, then fell 
back to 154,000 by 2016. These two opposing trends occurred despite a 
consistent fall in the overall number of defendants appearing in court (Ministry 
of Justice, 2007, 2017b). This also occurred alongside a consistent decrease in 
the number of defendants who were arrested and bailed, resulting in an 
increase in the percentage of defendants who were detained in custody by 
police and a decrease in the percentage who were released on bail (See Table 
2.3).  
 
After 2011, however, the percentage of defendants detained in custody 
stabilised, the percentage released on bail declined, and the percentage of 
defendants who received summons started rising. In 2016, 10% (n = 154,000) 
of defendants appearing in magistrates’ court were detained by police, 22% (n = 
340,000) received bail, and 68% (n = 1,027,000) were summonsed. The 
changes in the proportionate use of police detention, bail and summons that 
began in the late 2000s occurred after more than a decade of relative stability. 
Indeed, in 1996, only 5% (n = 105,000) of defendants were detained by police, 
36% (n = 765,000) received bail, and 59% (n = 1,231) received summons 
(Ministry of Justice, 2007, 2017b). 
 
The increased use of detention by police beginning in 2007 seems inconsistent 
with the general downward trend in the use of remand in England. It is 
especially surprising given some changes in police powers in recent years. For 
instance, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 introduced ‘statutory charging’ which 
shifted charging decisions from the police to the CPS in all but the most minor 
cases. This was expected to reduce the number of suspects charged as well as 
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the use of police detention since the CPS would, in theory, ensure weak cases 
were not charged and that the charges matched the seriousness of the offence 
(Hucklesby, 2009). Although its implementation between 2004 and 2006 was 
followed by a brief fall in the use of police detention, the number of defendants 
detained by police subsequently rose sharply (see Table 2.3), suggesting its 
long-term impact on detention decisions was minimal.  
 
Table 2.3 - England: Number and percentage of defendants appearing in 
magistrates' courts by how police directed them to appear, 1996* to 2016 
 Defendants 
Summoned 
 
Defendants 
Arrested and 
Bailed 
 
Defendants 
Arrested and 
Held in Custody 
 
Total Defendants 
 
‘000 % ‘000 % ‘000 % ‘000 % 
1996 1,231 59 765 36 107 5 2,102 100 
1997 1,124 55 786 39 122 6 2,031 100 
1998 1,183 55 808 38 143 7 2,134 100 
1999 1,113 54 810 39 143 7 2,066 100 
2000 1,167 56 774 37 142 7 2,082 100 
2001 1,101 54 803 40 128 6 2,032 100 
2002 1,154 54 846 40 141 7 2,141 100 
2003 1,215 55 851 38 153 7 2,219 100 
2004 1,313 59 768 35 135 6 2,215 100 
2005 1,205 59 719 35 135 7 2,060 100 
2006 1,102 57 698 36 123 6 1,923 100 
2007 1,049 56 705 38 110 6 1,864 100 
2008 971 56 633 36 131 8 1,736 100 
2009 1,020 57 586 33 179 10 1,784 100 
2010 961 55 579 33 194 11 1,734 100 
2011 948 55 583 34 201 12 1,732 100 
2012 923 57 500 31 184 12 1,607 100 
2013 895 60 432 29 175 12 1,503 100 
2014 948 62 411 27 170 11 1,529 100 
2015 1,010 65 386 25 159 10 1,555 100 
2016 1,027 68 340 22 154 10 1,520 100 
Source: (Ministry of Justice, 2007, 2017b) 
*The date was limited to 1996 due to data unavailability. 
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The Criminal Justice Act 2003 also expanded police powers by enabling them 
to impose bail conditions prior to charge, conceivably in cases where the CPS 
was reviewing the file to determine if a charge was appropriate and in order for 
police to make further inquiries. This responsibility might have been expected to 
increase police use of bail and reduce their use of detention as it would 
increase their control over defendants should they be released into the 
community. Indeed, (Hucklesby, 2011a) found this to be consequence of giving 
police the power to attach conditions to post-charge bail in 1994. However, like 
with statutory charging, the impact of this provision appears negligible when one 
considers the increase in the use of detention that followed.  
 
It is possible this increased use of police detention occurred as a result of newly 
introduced alternatives to custody in the mid 2000s, such as electronic 
monitoring and the resurgence of bail support schemes, which only the court 
have the power to impose (see ‘Courts’ section that follows). Indeed, it is 
conceivable that police detained more defendants following their 
implementation of these new bail options with the aim of increasing the chances 
that individuals who they perceive to be high-risk receive these conditions if 
they are remanded on bail by the courts. However, if this the case, this 
tendency has since come to an end as following the rise in detention from 2007 
to 2011, there appears to be a shift generally from the use of bail and detention 
to the use of summons. This may be a result of the budget cuts that have been 
taking place since the coalition government came into power in 2010 (Garside & 
Ford, 2016). As issuing a summons involves compelling the attendance of the 
defendant in court through post rather than going through an arrest, it requires 
fewer resources and is potentially a more attractive option for police operating 
under restricted budgets.  
 
Courts. The courts impact the number of people entering remand 
custody through their decision to remand a defendant on bail or in custody while 
they await the remainder of their court proceedings. Although the police and 
CPS can influence this decision through recommendations, it is ultimately the 
court that has the final say in relation to bail. Table 2.4 illustrates the number 
and percentage of remanded defendants appearing in magistrates’ court by the 
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type of remand imposed by the court. The number of defendants remanded on 
bail and the number of defendants remanded in custody fluctuated from the late 
1990s to the early 2000s and then fell beginning in the mid 2000s. The decline 
in both groups is indicative of an overall drop in the number of cases entering 
the courts over this same time period. The proportionate use of bail compared 
to remand custody, however, remained largely stable from the late 1990s until 
2011. Indeed, 12% (n = 67,000) of defendants were remanded in custody in 
both 1996 and 2012 (n = 56,000; (Ministry of Justice, 2007, 2017b). While it 
appears as though this proportion has increased since then, in reality, a 
different method of calculating these figures began in 2012 that reduced the 
number of unknown cases and thus potentially contributed to the changing 
figures. While these proportions should not be compared to previous years as a 
result of this issue, it is still clear that they have maintained relative stability in 
recent years (see Table 2.4).   
 
The court’s decision to remand a defendant on bail or in custody may be 
impacted by pre-trial initiatives. These have been established in the recent past, 
providing magistrates with options other than custody at the bail stage. One of 
these initiatives includes electronically monitored curfew conditions. This 
involves fitting defendants with an electronic tag in order to monitor their curfew 
while they are on bail. They were introduced on a permanent basis in 2005, 
enabling defendants to be released on bail under stricter supervision than was 
previously available. Their implementation was intended to increase the courts’ 
confidence in curfew orders and alleviate previous concerns related to 
enforceability and the impact that physical curfew checks had on police 
workloads (Hucklesby, 2011a). The use of electronically monitored curfews has 
increased substantially since their inception and they are now used extensively 
in the remand process (Hucklesby, 2011a).  
  
Several years after the implementation of electronic monitoring the government 
introduced a time served credit for defendants who received a custodial 
sentence following being subjected to these curfew conditions (Ministry of 
Justice, 2008a). Hucklesby (2009) suggests that this legislative change 
indicates the government’s intention for this practice to be used as an 
alternative to remand custody. However, it is unclear whether electronic 
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monitoring has been used for this purpose or whether its use has simply 
increased the number of defendants subjected to this condition that would 
otherwise not have been remanded in custody (i.e. ‘net widening’).  
 
Table 2.4 - England: Number and percentage of remanded defendants 
appearing in magistrates' courts by type of remand, 1996* to 2016 
 
Remanded on Bail Remanded in Custody Total Remanded 
‘000 % ‘000 % ‘000 % 
1996 509 88 67 12 576 100 
1997 510 86 82 14 592 100 
1998 552 85 98 15 650 100 
1999 541 85 98 15 639 100 
2000 505 86 84 14 589 100 
2001 523 87 78 13 601 100 
2002 510 86 82 14 592 100 
2003 521 87 76 13 597 100 
2004 546 89 67 11 613 100 
2005 505 90 59 10 564 100 
2006 480 90 55 10 535 100 
2007 467 90 52 10 519 100 
2008 479 87 70 13 549 100 
2009 .. .. .. .. .. 100 
2010 .. .. .. .. .. 100 
2011 404 88 56 12 460 100 
2012** 353 84 66 16 419 100 
2013 334 82 71 18 405 100 
2014 330 83 68 17 399 100 
2015 310 83 63 17 374 100 
2016 265 82 57 18 322 100 
Source: (Ministry of Justice, 2007, 2017b). 
*The data was limited to 1996 due to data unavailability. 
**After 2012 a new estimation method was used by the Ministry of Justice that reduced the 
number of unknown cases. This may explain the change from 2011 onward in the proportion of 
remands.  
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An evaluation of a pilot project in 2000 suggests that electronic monitoring was 
used as an alternative to remand custody in about half of the cases studied, 
whereas the other half would have received bail in any event (Airs, Elliot, & 
Conrad, 2000). As such, it is likely that electronic monitoring curfew conditions 
have had some impact on court decision-making with respect to bail decisions.  
 
Another pre-trial initiative introduced in recent years is Restriction on Bail. This 
initiative was introduced by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and was later 
amended by the Drugs Act 2005. It seeks to tackle the problem of drug related 
offending by requiring defendants to attend drug assessments and treatment 
instead of being remanded in custody (Hucklesby, 2011a). However, Hucklesby 
(2009) advises that the targeted defendants would be unlikely to be remanded 
in custody even if they were committing crimes persistently or on bail. Since 
these defendants would most likely not have been remanded in custody prior to 
the initiative, it is unlikely Restriction on Bail has had a significant impact on the 
number of defendants entering remand custody. 
 
Finally, bail support schemes have existed since the late 1980s but there was 
no national requirement for such services to be provided until recently 
(Hucklesby, 2011a). Although they vary according to region, they generally 
include elements such as reporting requirements, contact with bail support 
workers, residence requirements and/or accommodation provisions, and social 
support in relation to issues such as employment, finance, education, and family 
issues (Cavadino & Gibson, 1993). Whereas in the past some support schemes 
were used on a voluntary basis, more recently they have been used as an 
explicit condition of bail.  
 
In 2007, the introduction of the Bail Accommodation and Support Scheme 
(BASS) marked the first time in which there was national coverage of a bail 
support provision for adults. This program subsumed the former Effective Bail 
Scheme (EBS) in 2010, which had been operating in one region for a few years 
prior (Hucklesby, 2011a). Although there is no information regarding the 
effectiveness of the BASS, Hucklesby (2011a) found evidence to support that 
some defendants supervised on EBS were likely to have been remanded in 
custody had they not become involved with the scheme. However, she also 
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found evidence that EBS was sometimes used for defendants who would not 
otherwise have been remanded in custody. As with electronic monitoring, it is 
likely that bail support schemes have had some success in diverting defendants 
from remand custody but that their use may have resulted in some net-widening 
in the process.    
 
Given that the most significant decline in the remand population comes from the 
convicted unsentenced population, it is unlikely that the aforementioned pre-trial 
initiatives have been the primary drivers of reducing the number of defendants 
entering remand custody. Indeed, pre-trial initiatives would only be expected to 
supposed that the decline in the convicted unsentenced population can be 
attributed to the rising use of ‘fast delivery pre-sentence reports’ (PSRs), which 
are more likely to be delivered the same day, alleviating the need to delay the 
sentencing decision. However, although the use of these reports has been 
rising steadily (Ministry of Justice, 2017c) the most recently available statistics 
suggest that standard delivery PSRs were still more likely to be used for 
remand prisoners, specifically (Ministry of Justice, 2010b). Consequently, it is 
unclear whether they were instrumental in decreasing the convicted 
unsentenced population.  
 
One might also have expected the change brought about by LASPO to have 
made an impact over magistrates’ bail decisions. As was discussed in the 
previous chapter, this legislation instructs magistrates to conduct a ‘no real 
prospect’ test, ensuring defendants are released on bail if they would be 
unlikely to receive a custodial sentence (Ministry of Justice, 2014b). Although 
this legislative change corresponds with a fall in the number of defendants 
remanded in custody by the courts from 2012 to 2016, the proportion of 
defendants who were remanded in custody compared to bailed remained 
relatively stable. This suggests the courts were no more likely to release 
defendants on bail following the legislative changes. As such, the decline likely 
reflects a drop in caseload as opposed to a change brought about by the law. 
This may be because courts already took the likelihood that a defendant would 
receive a custodial sentence into consideration prior to its implementation.  
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This discussion suggests that there has been a decline in the volume of 
defendants entering remand custody in England and Wales in recent years and 
that this this is likely to have contributed to the fall in the remand population. 
This has been driven by a fall in caseload as well as facilitated by stability in the 
proportion of defendants detained by the police in recent years and those 
remanded in custody by the courts across a longer period of time. However, the 
legislation and policy changes that accompanied these trends do not appear to 
have had a major impact on any of these contributing factors. While they offer 
some insight into potential reasons for this change, they cannot alone explain 
the remand population trends.   
 
Time spent on remand 
 
The length of time that defendants spend in remand custody awaiting a 
determination of bail,29  a trial, or sentencing, can be expected to have a 
significant impact on the remand population. Indeed, prisoners spending lengthy 
periods of time in remand custody consistently appear in the prison population 
count. While neither jurisdiction consistently reports data concerning the length 
of time defendants spend in remand custody, examining the length of the time 
required to complete cases generally produces a rough estimate as to how long 
they might spend in custody and thus to what extent this driving factor 
contributes to remand population trends.  
 
Canada.  
 
Given that the remand population (in counts) has been increasing (see Figure 
2.1) at the same time that the receptions to remand have been decreasing (see 
‘The Number of Defendants Entering Remand Custody’), this suggests that it is 
not the volume of remand prisoners that has been driving changes to the 
remand population in Canada but rather the time they spend in custody awaiting 
trial or sentencing (Webster et al., 2009). Relative to England, Canada is 
                                            
29 In some cases, particularly in Canada, the bail decision is not made on the first court 
appearance. In these situations defendants would be remanded in custody until they are 
(potentially) released on bail. 
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experiencing major difficulties in relation to their criminal court case processing 
times. The statistics suggest that the greatest change is clearly observed in the 
shortest and longest categories of case processing times. Indeed, the 
percentage of cases completed in one day has decreased from 16% to 10% 
from 2000/2001 to 2014/2015 while those that take longer than a year have 
increased by from 12% to 17% (Statistics Canada, 2017e). 
 
The median time with which it takes cases to be processed through the courts 
varies according to province and territory. Table 2.5 demonstrates that Ontario, 
for instance, had one of the highest case processing times in 2005, but has 
since reduced its median number by 16 days. In comparison, the median 
number of days required to complete cases in Quebec has increased by 57 
days in the same time period. Across all the provinces and territories there has 
been a three day decline in the median number of days from first appearance to 
last appearance from 2005/2006 to 2014/2015. This decline, however, should 
be considered relative to England. The recent decrease does not appear to be 
as substantial when one considers that the median number of days from first 
appearance to last appearance is 121 days in Canada (Statistics Canada, 
2017f) compared to a mean of 29 days in England (Ministry of Justice, 2017a).  
 
Not only are case processing times an area of concern in Canada, but also the 
number of court appearances required to complete a case. Indeed, the number 
of court appearances in a case is consistently argued to impact case processing 
times (Doob, 2013; Webster et al., 2009). Although national data are not 
available, the most recent data available suggests that the average number of 
court appearances required to complete a case in Ontario increased from 4.3 in 
1992 to 9.2 in 2007, and then declined to stand at 8.5 in 2012 (Doob, 2012; 
Webster et al., 2009). In addition, there is evidence to suggest that the bail 
process itself is taking longer than it did in the past in Ontario. The 
determination of bail was established, on average, in just over four court 
appearances in 2001 compared to almost six in 2007 (Webster et al., 2009). In 
2013/14, 37% of cases required three or more appearances to complete the bail 
process (Doob et al., 2017).  
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Table 2.5 - Canada: Median number of days from first court appearance to last court appearance in adult criminal 
court cases in each province, 2005 -2015 
 
2005/ 
2006 
2006/ 
2007 
2007/ 
2008 
2008/ 
2009 
2009/ 
2010 
2010/ 
2011 
2011/ 
2012 
2012/ 
2013 
2013/ 
2014 
2014/ 
2015 
Change in 
Days (2005 – 
2015) 
Ontario 120 120 120 119 113 106 94 93 99 104 -16 
Saskatchewan 91 92 98 98 71 77 72 78 73 77 -14 
Alberta 120 120 128 121 126 122 117 121 127 107 -13 
British 
Columbia 111 109 109 104 99 113 127 120 113 105 -6 
CANADA 124 125 125 125 120 119 117 120 127 121 -3 
Prince 
Edward Island 33 30 32 34 29 29 29 35 40 47 +14 
Newfoundland 113 120 120 118 113 129 118 113 148 143 +30 
Manitoba 121 132 140 154 142 141 158 160 162 151 +30 
New 
Brunswick 74 79 78 85 78 75 78 94 105 106 +32 
Nova Scotia 125 122 120 127 136 141 150 158 155 163 +38 
Quebec 182 183 175 183 184 190 205 215 237 239 +57 
Source: (Statistics Canada, 2017f)
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These lengthy case processing times persist despite numerous initiatives to 
increase the efficiency of Canada’s courts. Many of these initiatives are 
discussed in Chapter One. In addition, several provinces have made attempts 
to increase court efficiency. For instance, some jurisdictions have increased 
court resources by hiring additional prosecutors, paralegals, and clerical staff 
(Government of Saskatchewan, 2010) and the use of video conferencing for 
routine hearings to expedite cases has also been adopted by several provinces 
(Government of Alberta, 2007; Government of Ontario, 2010; Government of 
Saskatchewan, 2010; Provincial Court of Manitoba, 2005).  
 
In fact, the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General has declared that the 
current case processing times are unacceptable (Ministry of the Attorney 
General, 2010). As a result of these concerns, the aforementioned ‘Justice on 
Target’ initiative (see Chapter One) was created in June 2008. The Ministry of 
the Attorney General aimed to reduce the average number of days and court 
appearances required to complete a criminal case in Ontario by 30% over a 
four-year period. This initiative did not, however, meet its target (Ministry of the 
Attorney General, 2010).  
 
Finally, the implementation of Bill C-25 in 2010 eliminated a convention allowing 
judges to give offenders a two-for-one credit at sentencing for the time that they 
spent in pre-trial custody for those cases in which a custodial sanction was 
handed down. For every day that an offender spent in remand, two days were 
subtracted from his or her intended sentence. The Canadian government 
expressed concerns that this convention encouraged defence counsel and their 
clients to purposely extend court proceedings in order to accumulate more time 
in remand and thus additional credit at sentencing (Library of Parliament, 2009). 
It is unclear to what extent this legislation impacted case processing times, as 
the nature of the problem was uncertain at the outset. Indeed, there is no 
empirical evidence to support the government’s claim that defence lawyers 
were delaying proceedings prior to the implementation of the Bill. The reform 
has since been deemed unconstitutional and struck down by the Supreme 
Court (Harris, 2016). 
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This discussion suggests that, unlike the volume of defendants entering 
custody, the length of time they spend in custody has a major influence on the 
remand population in Canada. While case processing times have declined in 
Canada as well as Ontario, these decreases are marginal when one compares 
the current averages to those in England. These lengthy case processing times 
may, in part, reflect the numerous appearances required to complete both the 
court process, generally, and the bail process specifically. Although there have 
been multiple laws and policies that have targeted case processing times in 
recent years, they at most achieved marginal decreases. As such, remand 
population trends do not appear to be heavily influenced by formal initiatives 
aimed at the length of time defendants spend in custody.  
 
England 
 
In England, the average number of days between the first court listing to the 
completion of the case has been steadily decreasing in magistrates’ courts. The 
average number of days required to complete the cases fell from 33 days in 
2002 to 18 days in 2016 for all offences and 54 days to 28 days for indictable 
and triable either way offences (Ministry of Justice, 2008b, 2017a). However, 
the average waiting times between committal and trial30 in the Crown court has 
increased over the last decade. Defendants spent an average of 14.3 weeks 
awaiting trial in 2000 compared to 20.8 weeks in 2016 (Ministry of Justice, 
2017a). It is notable, however, that the vast majority of defendants in England 
complete their proceedings in magistrates’ court (Ashworth & Redmayne, 
2010). 
 
The government has introduced several initiatives over the last decade that 
make it clear that increasing the efficiency of the courts is an important objective 
in England. Many of these initiatives are discussed in Chapter One. Indeed, the 
‘Simple, Speedy, Summary Justice’ initiative (Department for Constitutional 
Affairs, 2006) was introduced in the mid 2000s followed by the ‘Swift and Sure 
Justice’ White Paper in 2012 (Ministry of Justice, 2012). Furthermore, both the 
                                            
30 Information regarding the waiting time between committal and conviction and sentence is not 
available in the Crown Court.  
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Narey Report (1997) and the Leveson Report (2015) suggested changes be 
made to increase the efficiency of the court system. One of such reforms was 
the introduction of Early Administrative Hearings, which enable single 
magistrates or Justices’ clerks to address legal aid applications and make 
remand decisions at the first appearance (Hucklesby, 2009). Clearly, reforms in 
this jurisdiction consistently centred on managerialist attempts to increase the 
efficiency of the courts.   
 
The government has also sought to reduce case processing times through the 
encouragement of early guilty pleas. First, this is facilitated through the 
imposition of reduced sentences for early guilty pleas. This practice is intended 
to encourage defendants to plead guilty at the earliest possible stage, saving 
the court time and money, in exchange for a reduction in their sentence 
(Lipscombe & Beard, 2013). The Criminal Justice Act 2003 instructs the court to 
take both the stage in the proceedings at which the offender plead guilty as well 
as the circumstances in which the guilty plea was provided into account at 
sentencing. The Sentencing Guidelines Council (2007) advises that a sliding 
scale of reductions ranging from one third (where the guilty plea was entered at 
the first reasonable opportunity) to one tenth (where the plea is entered after a 
trial has begun) is appropriate. Another manner in which early guilty pleas are 
encouraged is through Early Guilty Plea Schemes, introduced in Crown Courts 
starting in 2012 and refined by Leveson Report. These schemes aim to identify 
cases where a defendant is likely to plead guilty and to expedite them through 
an early guilty plea hearing (Castle, 2012).  
 
Finally, the amount of time defendants spend in remand custody is controlled to 
some extent through Custody Time Limits. These were introduced in the mid 
1980s, setting maximum periods that defendants can spend in custody at 
different stages of the court process (Hucklesby, 2009). If the time limit is 
exceeded, the defendant must be released from custody and bailed by the 
courts. Anecdotal evidence suggests that prosecutors operate with them in 
mind, rarely exceeding them. However, if an extension is requested, it is usually 
granted (Samuels, 1997). Hucklesby (2009) suggests that because these time 
limits were set generously, it is possible that the prosecution will work to the 
maximum, increasing the time beyond that which is required in some cases.  
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Case processing times in England are both declining and, relative to Canada, 
short in length. This can be expected to have a major impact on reducing the 
length of time defendants spend in custody and, consequently, the size of the 
remand population. The numerous initiatives that have targeted them appear to 
have had some impact on the decreases in recent years. As such, it would 
appear that, in some contexts, laws and policies could influence remand 
population trends.  
 
Summary 
 
The preceding review of both the statistics and law and policy initiatives in each 
jurisdiction has revealed that explanations for the remand population trends in 
England and Canada are complex and varied. In Canada, it is difficult to 
determine how many defendants are entering remand custody due to 
deficiencies in the data. However, it would appear as though there may have 
been a decrease in recent years. While police detain a large proportion of 
defendants in custody in this jurisdiction relative to England, their use of remand 
cannot fully be explained by the types of cases entering the system. Rather, it 
would seem that the primary driver for increases in the remand population in 
Canada is the time defendants spend in custody awaiting the conclusion of their 
criminal proceedings. Although there has been a small decline in case 
processing times across the jurisdiction in recent years, this is not applicable to 
all of the provinces and the decrease is marginal. Indeed, the average case 
processing times in Canada, despite being in decline, are still much longer than 
those in England. This suggests that, while the number of defendants entering 
the court system in custody appears to be decreasing, the substantial length of 
time they spend there is having a considerable impact on rising remand rates.  
 
In England, the decline in the remand population can be, in part, explained both 
by a fall in the number of defendants entering remand custody and a reduction 
in the length of time that they spend in the court process. Indeed, the number of 
defendants entering remand custody has declined in the last decade, largely 
due to a considerable drop in the number of cases entering the courts. In 
addition, the proportion of defendants that both the police and the court have 
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remanded in custody has remained relatively stable in recent years. Finally, the 
time required to process defendants in magistrates’ courts has declined since 
the beginning of the 21st century, suggesting defendants may be spending less 
time waiting for the conclusion of their proceedings in remand custody.  
 
It appears that, with the exception of strategies aimed at decreasing case 
processing times in England, laws, policies, and case factors have had only a 
marginal impact on the use of remand custody in both jurisdictions. Specifically, 
despite various initiatives, the remand rate in England has remained stable 
while Canada’s has increased considerably. It is notable, however, that, in the 
main, laws and polices demonstrated a minimal impact on remand population 
trends in both directions. As such, it seems reasonable to turn to more informal 
processes in attempts to better understand the factors that influence bail 
decision-making.  
 
Informal factors influencing bail decision-making 
 
Over the last half-century a growing number of studies have moved away from 
explaining the behaviour of criminal justice actors exclusively in relation to the 
laws and policies that guide them and have instead emphasised the importance 
of informal factors on the decision-making process (Blumberg, 1967b; 
Cammiss, 2007; Church, 1982; Feeley, 1973; Hucklesby, 1997a; King, 1981; 
McConville et al., 1991; Myers, 2009; Skolnick, 1967; Webster et al., 2009). 
They examine what is sometimes termed ‘court culture’, referring to the informal 
practices, norms and expectations shared by court practitioners within a court 
system (Church, 1982). Previous research suggests that norms develop within 
each court location in line with their individual court culture (Church, 1982, 
1985) and that these norms are mediated through the decision-making of the 
courtroom workgroup (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; Young, 2013).  
 
Although formal rules continue to frame the decision-making of court actors, 
their influence is argued to act alongside a multitude of other factors. Feeley 
(1973) suggests that formal laws and policies are only one set of factors 
shaping and controlling the decision-making of the workgroup as they are more 
likely to prioritise informal ‘rules of the game’ within their respective courts as 
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well as their own individual or sub-group (i.e. defence, prosecution, judicial) 
goals. Since court actors all have their own individual incentives and objectives, 
relying on formal laws to explain their behaviour often masks the differences 
between them and ignores the fragmented nature of the court (Feeley, 1983). 
Furthermore, since the law provides leeway in defining the behaviour of court 
actors (Feeley, 1973; McConville et al., 1991), it can be interpreted and applied 
according to the discretion of the court actors in line with their individual and 
shared interests.  
 
These decisions are made within the context of the courtroom workgroup. 
Indeed, Eisenstein and Jacob (1977) have argued that the court is akin to an 
organisation in which courtroom work is a group activity. The organisation of the 
administration of criminal justice is thus viewed as a system of action primarily 
based on cooperation, exchange, and adaptation (Feeley, 1973). In this system, 
individuals can mutually benefit by cooperating with other members of the 
workgroup (Blumberg, 1967a; Skolnick, 1967). This is both because is enables 
them to develop mutually agreed upon ‘work crimes’ (i.e. shortcuts, deviations, 
outright rule violations) designed to manage heavy workloads (Blumberg, 
1967a) and, in the long term, creates an elaborate exchange system of mutually 
advantageous benefits with other court actors (Skolnick, 1967). This 
cooperation has been argued to displace the conflict inherent to traditional 
adversarial relationships in order to enhance the smooth functioning of the court 
(Skolnick, 1967). 
 
Over time, these mutually agreed upon decisions can be expected to result in 
the formation of norms and the development of information practices. This 
creates a ‘local legal culture’ (also referred to as ‘court culture’) in which 
practitioner norms govern case handling and participant behaviour in each court 
(Church, 1982, 1985). Court culture has been used to explain differences in the 
use of bail (Hucklesby, 1997a; Myers, 2015), as well as decision-making related 
to other court processes such as sentencing (Rumgay, 1995), mode of trial 
(Cammiss, 2007), and case processing times (Church, 1978; Mahoney, 1988). 
Indeed, court culture can be expected to impact the decision-making of bail 
court actors, which in turn influences the number of accused persons remanded 
in custody and the length of time they spend awaiting a bail decision. 
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Court culture has, firstly, been shown to influence bail decision-making that will 
ultimately contribute to the length of time defendants spend in custody awaiting 
a bail decision. For instance, Myers (2009) conducted 148 days of bail court 
observation in eight different courts in Ontario. She noted that, according to 
Canada’s bail laws, accused persons should be released on bail without 
conditions, a monetary component or a surety unless the Crown can prove that 
a more onerous type of release is warranted. However, her observations 
revealed that sureties have become the norm rather than the exception in most 
courts. Indeed, in seven out of the eight courts examined, a surety was required 
in over 60% of cases in which the Crown consented to the release of the 
accused. In cases in which the Crown contested the accused’s release, an even 
higher proportion of cases required a surety. Myers (2009) argued that this 
reliance on sureties was the product of a culture of defensiveness whereby 
court practitioners outsource control of accused persons on bail to private 
controllers, relieving much of the risk to their reputation. She asserted that this 
practice could increase the number of appearances required to complete the 
bail process since adjournments are often requested for the purpose of securing 
appropriate sureties or accommodating their schedules.  
 
Further, Webster (2009) demonstrated that informal practices related to the use 
of video remand is also associated with longer case processing times in bail 
court. Video remand equipment electronically connects courtrooms remand 
centres in order to avoid the need to physically bring inmates to court. In her 
case study of one Ontario court, Webster (2009) discovered that defence 
counsel commonly use video remand as a ‘long-term holding tank’ for accused 
persons in the bail process. On any given day, an average of 82% of cases in 
this court were adjourned to another day. Further, cases that involved at least 
one video remand appearance took an average of 5.6 appearances to complete 
the bail process, compared to only 1.7 appearances for those with no video 
appearances. Webster (2009) concluded that this practice is indicative of a 
‘culture of adjournments’ in which there are generalized expectations that 
adjournments are inevitable, acceptable and even desirable. 
 
Finally, Leverick and Duff (2002) examined the impact of informal relationships 
and working agreements on case processing times in four Sheriff courts in 
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Scotland between 1999 and 2001. They discovered that judge-led cultures, in 
which Sheriffs questioned adjournment requests aggressively, resulted in a 
lower rate of adjournments than co-operative cultures, where adjournments 
were informally agreed upon between prosecution and defence and rarely 
opposed by Sheriffs. Thus, the culture of shared values and expectations that 
were developed in each court were shown to impact case processing times.  
 
Culture can, secondly, impact the number of people detained in custody through 
its influence on the decision-making of court practitioners. For instance, 
Hucklesby (1997a) found that variations in the use of bail in three South Wales 
Magistrates’ courts could be explained by the culture of the court. Specifically, 
court practitioners developed expectations as to whether accused persons 
would be granted or denied bail based on the reputation of the court. These 
expectations were subsequently reflected in the working practices of court 
practitioners. For instance, the CPS would not apply for custodial remands and 
defence solicitors would advise their clients not to make bail applications based 
on their assumptions as to whether they would be successful. Although the bail 
decision was theoretically made by the magistrate, in practice it reflected the 
work group’s shared norms, based on the reputation of the court as lenient or 
harsh. 
 
Judicial decision makers also have discretion over the number of people that 
will be admitted into remand through norms that develop in relation to their use 
of bail conditions. Indeed, conditions of various levels of restrictiveness can be 
attached to bail instead of placing defendants in custody. Research from 
England shows that conditions have been used increasingly in this jurisdiction. 
In fact, up to half of defendants were shown to be remanded on conditional bail 
(Hucklesby, 2002). Dhami (2004) demonstrated that when magistrates are 
instructed to make hypothetical bail decisions, 45% grant unconditional bail, 
45% grant conditional bail, and 10% remand defendants in custody. In practice, 
however, only a small number of conditions are actually imposed. For instance, 
magistrates often impose conditions related to residence, curfews, reporting to 
police, or banning defendants from places and from contact with other 
individuals (Hucklesby, 1994b). Dhami (2004) found that residence was the 
most frequent condition imposed, while reporting and no contact were also 
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common. Magistrates were reluctant to use curfews, boundaries, or sureties in 
this study. The mean number of conditions imposed was 1.58 in the 
hypothetical trials. 
 
Studies reveal that conditions are used much differently in Canada. Myers 
(2009) showed that, across eight courts, over 90% of cases in which the crown 
consented to a release and virtually all of the cases in which the Crown 
contested a release required conditions to be attached to the defendant’s 
release. Further, at least half of the cases appearing in all eight courts required 
the defendant to adhere to more than five conditions when the Crown 
consented to the release of the defendant. This percentage was even higher for 
cases in which the Crown contested the release of the defendant.  The 
imposition of multiple, often stringent, bail conditions may cause defendants to 
be ‘set up to fail’, ultimately resulting in failure to comply charges. Sprott and 
Myers (2011) found evidence to support this assertion, finding that youth who 
were subject to a bail order for long periods of time and had numerous bail 
conditions were most likely to accumulate new charges of failing to comply. The 
overuse of conditions can be detrimental to a defendant’s remand status. If they 
find the conditions overly restrictive and breach their bail orders, this could 
result in failure to comply offences. Since cases involving these offences are 
more likely to result in a bail hearing (Doob, 2012; Webster et al., 2009), it could 
be that they may impact the number of defendants admitted to custodial 
remand.  
 
Clearly, court culture can have a substantial impact on bail decision-making 
processes. In fact, the limited research that has sought to explain the use of 
remand in England and Canada has consistently pointed to the importance of 
culture in attempts to explain remand population trends (Hucklesby, 2009; 
Webster, 2009). However, research suggests that culture is, in part, formed by 
the broader context in which it emerges (Church, 1985; Young, 2013). While 
court actors make decisions based on incentives, norms, and mutually accepted 
practices, these are not the only informal factors shaping their decision-making. 
For instance, Eisenstein  and Jacob (1977) suggest that the decisions of the 
workgroup are influenced not only by immediate concerns surrounding the 
norms within their particular court but also by what they term the ‘task 
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environment’. This includes factors such as outside criminal justice institutions 
(i.e. police, prisons, appellate courts) and the political environment. Further 
Church (1985) has acknowledged that court norms grow and change based on 
political, economic, and social variables within the setting in which the court is 
located.  
 
Given the importance of context, one would expect bail court culture to be 
influenced by broader views surrounding criminal justice specific to the system 
in which it emerges. Indeed, as Chapter One argued, bail is simply one 
component of a much wider criminal process and, consequently, values that 
shape that wider process can also be expected to influence attitudes towards 
bail. There has been some research to suggest that bail court culture is 
influenced by these wider views. For instance, Webster (2009) suggests that 
court culture in Canada is shaped by a risk averse mentality that has permeated 
the entire criminal justice system. A preoccupation with managing potential risks 
posed by defendants has resulted in criminal justice actors passing decisions 
onto someone else later in the process (i.e. police to prosecutors, prosecutors 
to justices of the peace/judges) or simply avoiding making them at all. Further, 
Hucklesby (2009) has argued that bail court culture in England is influenced by 
broader concerns about prison overcrowding. This is a consequence of the rise 
in the overall prison population and, thus, the cost of housing so many 
prisoners. Both of these broader views can be tied to managerialist rhetoric 
discussed in Chapter One, which centres on cutting criminal justice costs and 
managing perceived or actual risks posed by defendants and offenders. This 
research suggests that this rhetoric interacts with the informal behaviour of the 
courtroom workgroup to contribute to bail decision-making.  
 
While the studies by Webster (2009)  and Hucklesby (2009) have provided a 
more nuanced explanation as to how informal factors influence the bail 
decision-making process, they are limited by their inability to look beyond the 
jurisdictions in which the research took place. Indeed, understanding the 
influence of broader views is challenging when all court actors are working 
within the same system, and are thus subject to the same influences. This 
perhaps contributes to Young's (2013) assertion that current research 
surrounding the courtroom workgroup fails to establish how norms are 
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developed, entrenched, challenged or modified. It is argued that examining 
court culture in the context of the broader views shaping the criminal process, 
through a comparative lens, would move beyond a narrow understanding of 
court culture’s influence on bail decision-making.  
 
In sum, while the examination of court culture shows some promise in 
contributing to an understanding of the bail decision-making process, it still 
presents an incomplete explanation of the behaviour of court actors without an 
understanding of the context in which it developed. This suggests that, in order 
to adequately understand the factors that influence bail practices, a more 
holistic approach is required. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Taken together with Chapter One, this chapter has demonstrated that, despite 
striking similarities in the laws, policies, and rhetoric shaping bail practices, the 
use of remand has developed in a divergent fashion in England and Canada. 
This suggests that these factors cannot fully explain patterns of bail decision-
making in the two jurisdictions. This was further illustrated through an 
examination of the previous research and statistics surrounding the use of 
remand, which showed that these trends could only partially be explained by 
laws, policies, and case factors. While court culture was shown to shed some 
light on potential informal explanations for these trends, its full impact cannot be 
understood without taking into account the views shaping the broader criminal 
process. In order to facilitate such an examination, this thesis will compare bail 
practices in two jurisdictions, examining the factors that explain the bail 
decision-making process through an analysis of the bail practices in England 
and Canada.  
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Chapter Three: 
 
Methodology 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will outline the methodology adopted for the study and describe the 
nature of the analysis undertaken. First, the aims and objectives of the research 
are stated. Next, the relevant research paradigm and the value of a comparative 
approach in achieving these aims and objectives are discussed. The third 
section argues that a ‘multiple-case study’ is an appropriate research design 
and subsequently describes the basis for selecting each ‘case’ (i.e. court) and 
outlines the access issues surrounding the process. In the fourth section, the 
research context is examined through a description of the day-to-day operations 
of both court locations. The fifth section discusses the value of a mixed methods 
approach and presents the sources used to obtain the data. This includes both 
court observations and semi-structured interviews with court practitioners. The 
sixth section addresses the manner in which ethical issues were approached. 
Finally, the data analysis process is presented, including descriptive statistical 
procedures as well as quantitative and qualitative content analysis.  
 
Aims and objectives 
 
The aim of this research was to better understand the factors that contribute to 
bail decision-making in English and Canadian courts. Specifically the study had 
the following objectives: 
1) Identify the factors that contribute to bail court decision-making in 
England and Canada.  
2) Analyse the extent to which these factors converge and diverge in 
each jurisdiction.  
3) Understand and compare the impact of bail decision-making patterns 
in each jurisdiction at the local level. 
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4) Examine how these findings contribute to a greater understanding of 
the bail decision-making process in a wider context.  
 
First, it was assumed that court actors (i.e. judicial officials, prosecutors, 
defence lawyers, and legal advisers) make decisions related to bail based on 
specific factors (e.g. law, policy, the circumstances of the case, the background 
of the offender, the culture of the court, broader views about the criminal justice 
process). The nature of those factors as well as the extent of their influence 
were determined by examining the behaviour of court actors and their 
explanations for these behaviours. Second, the research intended to describe 
how and to what extent those contributing factors were similar or different 
across jurisdictions. This was accomplished by investigating the patterns of 
behaviour and attitudes of court actors in England and Canada. Third, the 
emerging patterns in bail decision-making were examined in relation to the 
overall functioning of each court. For instance, the relationship between 
decision-making practices and factors such as case processing and case 
outcomes were explored at the local level. Fourth, the wider implications of 
these findings were determined by examining those patterns at the theoretical 
level. Specifically, the implications for developing an understanding of the 
process in a broader context were explored.  
 
Interpretive framework  
 
Certain philosophical assumptions were embedded within the interpretive 
framework of this research and their interplay frames the theoretical approach. 
This section will outline the research paradigm that shaped the process of the 
research and describe the extent to which the principles of comparative law 
informed the conduct of inquiry. 
 
Research paradigm 
 
The ‘paradigm’ or ‘worldview’ adopted in the study is a set of beliefs that guides 
the methodological approach (Creswell, 2007). This study took an integrated 
approach to the research, focusing on broad social structures and the effects of 
law and policy, but also examining the consequence of this behaviour on 
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criminal justice actors. This approach is in line with McConville and his 
colleagues (1991) and Henry (1983), who integrate micro and macro 
approaches through a combination of structuralism and interactionist 
interpretations of the justice system.  
 
Structuralists emphasise the importance of socio-economic structures and legal 
bureaucratic rules, focusing on the senior officials and ‘state elite’ who mediate 
between those structures and rules (McConville et al., 1991). Interactionists, on 
the other hand, are concerned with the meaning individuals attribute to their 
environment (including the actions of others) and the action they take on the 
basis of this imputed meaning (Bryman, 2004). Interactionism is thus focused 
on the behaviour of individuals and the variables that intervene between how 
institutions should work and how they do work. 
 
In this study, the behaviour of court actors was examined and the meanings 
these actors attributed to the bail process was explored, but this was examined 
in the context of the formal laws and policies related to bail that structured their 
decisions. This approach recognised the dialectical relationship between 
structure and behaviour and their interdependence in the context of the bail 
decision-making process.  
 
Comparative approach 
 
The principles associated with comparative law were also used as a framework 
with which to structure the methodology of the study. Specifically, a ‘traditional’ 
form of comparative law was employed in which it is conceived primarily as a 
method (Nelken, 2007; Samuel, 2013). The traditional approach is often 
referred to as the ‘functional’ method of comparative law (Zweigert & Kotz, 
1998) and its focus is discovering which legal system – or in this case, which 
bail system - fulfils certain legal demands (Jansen, 2006). Proponents of the 
traditional approach seek to use comparative law for primarily instrumental 
purposes and are interested in comparing legal rules and institutions for 
practical purposes related to adjudication and law reform (Orucu, 2004). They 
often attempt to learn from other systems how to improve their own and seek to 
borrow an institution, practice, technique or idea in order to reach this objective 
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(Nelken, 2010). In this instance, the functional method was used to develop a 
better understanding of the bail decision-making process. Specifically, it was 
used to examine the impact of different decision-making practices across two 
jurisdictions. This type of approach had both practical and theoretical benefits, 
which are outlined below. 
 
From a practical standpoint, it was anticipated that policy-makers aiming to 
reform their bail systems could use the knowledge gained in this process to 
inform laws, policies, or practices. This could be achieved by gaining a better 
understanding of actions that have been shown to achieve desired objectives in 
other legal systems. For instance, jurisdictions with rising remand rates could 
gain a better understanding of procedures used in jurisdictions with decreasing 
or stable remand rates in efforts to reduce their prison remand population.  It 
was anticipated that framing the study in terms of the functional method would 
result in findings that could be used to inform ‘policy transfer’ between Canada 
and England. According to Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), policy transfer is: 
 
…the process by which knowledge about policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or 
present) is used in the development of policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system (p. 5).  
 
While effective ‘hard’ forms of policy transfer - in terms large-scale importation 
of policy goals, content and instruments – are rather rare, there has been 
evidence of successful ‘soft’ policy transfer, primarily at the level of policy ideas, 
symbols, and labels (Jones & Newburn, 2007). As such, while wide scale 
importation of specific bail laws and policies might not be feasible, more 
malleable ideas such as those related to the incentives of court actors and 
informal practices could potentially be exchanged.  
 
The comparative approach also has theoretical benefits. While previous studies 
that have investigated bail decision-making have provided valuable insight into 
this topic in specific jurisdictions, a comparative approach would fill gaps in the 
research by offering a broader understanding of the subject. Zweigert and Kotz 
(1998) suggest that approaches that focus on one jurisdiction only offer legal 
solutions to practical problems ‘on their own terms’ and argue that solutions 
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should be freed from the context of their own system in order for an assessment 
to take place. In this case, research that examines bail decision-making in one 
jurisdiction may not fully appreciate the impact of the wider context in which it is 
taking place. Indeed, trying to determine the influence of a specific policy or 
aspect of the government’s rhetoric is difficult when it is common to every court 
and every court actor being studied. Only by examining similar behaviours in an 
environment without these factors could their influence be fully understood. In 
this way, a comparative approach could clarify the individual differences in the 
impact of the law, rhetoric, and the behaviour of court actors.  
 
Comparative approaches may also widen the scope with which specific 
problems can be understood. This is because there may be factors that are 
bypassed when seeking explanations for a process if they are taken for granted 
to be the norm. For instance, instead of assuming actors are not adhering to 
‘due process’ or ‘crime control’ values, one might ask whether these principles 
are conceptualised differently across jurisdictions and how this impacts 
decisions. These broader questions can be answered by removing oneself from 
the confines of single jurisdiction studies and examining them in a comparative 
context (Zweigert & Kotz, 1998).  
 
Ultimately, it is projected that this type of approach will achieve what Samuel 
(2013) sees as a fundamental component of comparative research: the 
acquisition of new knowledge through the process of comparison. One must be 
able to draw conclusions from the comparison that could not otherwise be 
drawn had the two objects been analysed separately. It is anticipated that a 
comparative approach to understanding bail decision-making will expand on 
and overcome many of the obstacles involved with single jurisdiction studies 
through the acquisition of this new knowledge.  
 
Research design 
 
This section will describe the type of case study design employed in this study 
and discuss the advantages of its use as well as some challenges. It will also 
outline how and why each ‘case’ was selected and describe the access issues 
surrounding this process. 
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Multiple-case study 
 
The comparative analysis was employed using a ‘multiple-case study’ design. 
Case study research is an approach in which “the investigator explores a 
bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, 
through detailed in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of 
information ... and reports a case description and case-based themes” 
(Creswell, 2007, p. 73). In this instance, each case was represented by a 
criminal court in which bail decisions were made. In accordance with Yin (2014), 
the cases were selected on the basis that they would produce contrasting 
results for an anticipatable reason. In this case, the remand rates observed in 
each jurisdiction as well as the culture surrounding bail (see Chapter One and 
Two) suggested there might be different models of bail decision-making, and 
potentially contrasting perspectives.  
 
The most obvious advantage of using a case study design is that it provides 
extremely rich, detailed, and in-depth information (Berg, 2009). This was 
particularly appropriate for the current study as it enabled a comprehensive 
understanding of the bail decision-making process from a variety of 
perspectives. This level of depth is advantageous when one is undertaking a 
study in comparative law since proponents of the functional method advise that 
researchers must account for both legal and social factors when they are 
comparing systems (Zweigert & Kotz, 1998). This level of detail was obtained 
by studying both the actual manner in which decisions were made as well as 
the context of these decisions as explained by a variety of different court actors.  
 
In order to produce a rigorous, systematic research design, several challenges 
with case study research were addressed. For instance, Berg (2009) asserts 
the importance of objectivity when conducting a case study. He advises that 
researchers ensure they avoid bias with the ultimate goal being that others 
could repeat the research. This enhances the reliability of the results. The study 
addressed this concern by applying methods systematically. For instance, the 
observation schedule standardised the categories of information gathered 
during court observations both across cases and jurisdictions. Further, although 
the interview schedule allowed tangential discussions, it maintained a 
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consistent structure that allowed for the same categories of data to be collected 
between participants. 
 
Another common criticism of case study research is that the findings are difficult 
to generalise to other cases beyond the study (Berg, 2009; Yin, 2014). In other 
words, they lack external validity. However, Yin (2014) argues that although the 
findings cannot be generalised to populations in a statistical sense, they can be 
generalised theoretically. He refers to this process as ‘analytic generalisation’ 
and argues that it provides an opportunity to shed empirical light about 
theoretical concepts or principles. The generalisation is posed at a conceptual 
level higher than that of the specific case. As such, findings from a case study 
can have implications well beyond similar cases and can extend to a host of 
other disparate situations. In relation to this study, the findings may not explain 
how all bail decisions are made, but it could suggest explanations for how other 
bail decisions are likely to be made in other courts.  
 
Site selection  
 
The ‘cases’ in this study (i.e. the two criminal court sites) were selected 
because of several factors. This included the legal jurisdictions they were 
located in, the level of court they were associated with, and the geographical 
areas in which they were located.  
 
The sites were located in England and Canada, whose legal systems have 
similar historical foundations. These jurisdictions share a common-law tradition 
and adhere to similar international human rights instruments. In addition, both 
jurisdictions have comparable bail laws and have imposed restrictions on the 
law related to bail in recent years (see Chapter One). This means the sites were 
ideal subjects for a comparative approach. Indeed, studies in comparative law 
often borrow from those in politics and include ‘most-similar’ designs (Hague, 
Harrop, & Breslin, 1998). In this type of design, similar jurisdictions are selected 
on the basis that the more similar the units being compared, the easier it will be 
to isolate the factors responsible for the differences. England and Canada were 
selected on the basis that their legal systems, generally, and bail laws, 
specifically, were alike, yet there are differences in their prison remand 
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populations. A most-similar design was appropriate in these circumstances as 
the study aimed to identify factors which contributed to bail decision-making that 
were potentially associated with the jurisdictions’ disparate use of remand 
custody.  
 
The similarities between the bail laws in each jurisdiction as well as the extent 
to which they evolved harmoniously provided a convincing argument that the 
research compared ‘like with like.’ Nelken (2010) asserts that the more relevant 
constants between the jurisdictions, the more surprising and instructive the 
finding of difference can be. For instance, the finding of significant differences in 
bail-decision making in two jurisdictions with similar bail laws could be 
particularly useful in understanding which factors influence bail decision-making 
beyond their respective legal frameworks.  
 
Just as the jurisdictions being compared should share similarities, so should the 
institutions within them. In this case, the sites involved a magistrates’ court in 
England and an Ontario Court of Justice in Canada. The functionalist approach 
to comparative law dictates that comparatists must seek out institutions that 
have the same role, or more specifically, those that are functionally comparable 
or solve the same problem (Orucu, 2007). This introduces the concept of 
‘functional equivalence’, which asserts that an institution in one jurisdiction must 
perform an equivalent function to the jurisdiction it is being compared with 
(Orucu, 2007). In other words, both institutions must attempt to solve the same 
universal problem (Zweigert & Kotz, 1998). In this instance, the problem that 
both legal systems faced was determining which defendants should be detained 
in custody and which defendants should be released into the community during 
the court process as well as which, if any, conditions should be imposed on 
those released.  
 
It is important to note that, although the courts selected in each jurisdiction 
served the same function, they had different court structures in relation to bail. 
Specifically, although the police made the initial decision to detain or release a 
defendant upon arrest in both jurisdictions, they subsequently appeared in court 
in slightly different manners. The Criminal Code of Canada dictates that any 
form of release, including those imposed by police, remain in effect (unless they 
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are reviewed or revoked) until the end of trial or sentencing. For this reason, 
defendants who received bail from police prior to the court process entered a 
different ‘stream’ and their bail status was not readdressed unless there was an 
explicit reason to do so. At the site selected, those who were detained by the 
police began the court process in ‘bail court’ in order for a justice of peace to 
determine whether they should be remanded in custody or released on bail. 
Those who were released by the police appeared in ‘set-date court’ to decide 
upon the purpose of their next court date.  
 
At the site selected in England, defendants could appear in ‘remand court’ on 
their first appearance regardless of what the initial police decision was 
regarding bail. Although the court theoretically makes the final bail decision in 
all first appearances, in reality it would be rare for magistrates or District Judges 
to detain a defendant who had been previously released by the police (see 
Chapter Two). This means that in practice the police had a comparable amount 
of power in England than they did in Canada, in that their decision to release a 
defendant on bail was typically not challenged by the courts. Consequently, the 
police could be thought to have a significant role in both jurisdictions’ bail 
procedures, albeit in slightly different capacities. 
 
Although police were important to the bail decision-making process, they were 
excluded from the study for two reasons. First, they were not part of the 
courtroom workgroup and, as such, were not part of the informal dynamic that 
was central to the focus of the study. Second, the addition of another group of 
criminal justice actors in an already wide-ranging study was impracticable in 
terms of time restraints and could have disrupted the completion of the project.  
 
Despite the aforementioned structural differences, the courts in each jurisdiction 
had bail procedures that served essentially the same purpose. In both England 
and Canada, the primary purpose of the court (in relation to bail) was to 
determine the liberty of the defendant. Both the magistrates’ court and the 
Ontario Court of Justice dealt with the vast majority of defendants on their first 
appearance and made the initial judicial decision as to whether they should be 
held in custody pending trial or released into the community.  
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In addition to serving similar functions, the courts selected in each jurisdiction 
shared similar demographics. This was to ensure the institutions were 
meaningfully comparable. Courts were selected from both jurisdictions that 
were located in major cities with relatively large populations. In Canada, the 
court was one of six Ontario Courts of Justice in a city of a population of 2.7 
million. In England, the court was the only magistrates’ court located in a city of 
a population of 750 thousand. Unfortunately, the number of cases proceeded 
against at these court was not publically available. However, both of these 
courts were located in urban areas that are financial, cultural, and commercial 
centres. The courts were located in Southern Ontario, Canada, and Northern 
England.31  
 
Although it cannot be claimed that these courts were exactly alike, they shared 
enough elements in common that they could reasonably be considered 
‘functionally equivalent.’ Indeed, despite their differences, the fact that they 
served the same function made them suitable for comparison.  
 
Obtaining access 
 
Despite the fact that the public right to view proceedings make courts one of the 
most open arenas of the criminal justice process, gaining access to all aspects 
of this process proved to be a challenging endeavour. Baldwin (2007) has 
commented that court research outside of observation can often be met with 
extreme difficulty and that judges, lawyers, and other court personnel often 
prove to be resistant to social research. While this was not found to be the case 
in relation to all of the actors and agencies, the following discussion will 
illustrate that it was certainly relevant to much of the access process in Canada.   
 
In Canada, permission to observe court proceedings was granted by the 
Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG). This was achieved by contacting MAG 
generally through a general information request, at which point the request was 
forwarded to senior government officials in the Court Services Division. A formal 
approval was provided at the regional level, at which point the researcher was 
                                            
31 The details provided about the courts were limited intentionally in order to preserve their 
anonymity. 
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put in contact with local court staff. These staff facilitated access to the court on 
the ground and made court personnel aware of the researcher’s presence.  
 
Interviews with both state-funded duty counsel and private defence counsel 
were sought in order to gain a wide breadth of perspectives. The supervisor of 
Criminal Duty Counsel at the Canadian court site was contacted directly after 
the researcher was put in touch with them through the court staff facilitating 
observations. The supervisor agreed to participate, at which point they notified 
staff of the study and asked for volunteers. The voluntary nature of participation 
likely had some impact on the sample that was eventually used in the study. 
This is discussed in relation to sampling later in the chapter. Several permanent 
duty counsel and one per diem duty counsel subsequently volunteered. Private 
defence counsel were contacted on an individual basis through publically 
obtained emails after they were identified in the court observations. In every 
occasion in which the defence counsel were contacted they agreed to 
participate.  
 
Access to the Crown attorney’s office and Judicial Office proved to be more 
difficult. The Local Administrative justice of the peace at the Canadian site was 
approached through court staff about the possibility of conducting interviews 
with Justices of the Peace. The request was forwarded to the Office of the Chief 
Justice, at which point it was denied. Attempts were also made to contact the 
Deputy Crown Attorney at the same site through court staff without success. 
Although an attempt was made to obtain access through a general information 
request at a higher level, this request was not responded to until the researcher 
had to leave the jurisdiction to commence the research at the English site. As a 
result, neither Crown attorneys nor Justices of the Peace were represented in 
the sample. 
 
These processes illustrate the significant challenges associated with gaining 
access to both Crown attorneys and Justices of the Peace in Canada. In both 
cases, the individuals could not approve access without deferring to their 
superiors. Since they were both employed by the Ontario government - a large 
organisation with multiple hierarchal levels - multiple steps were required to 
reach the individual responsible for making the decision. This process required 
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a considerable amount of time and, ultimately, was unsuccessful in both cases. 
The request was complicated by the fact that neither Crown attorneys nor the 
judiciary has a formal research application procedure.  
 
These challenges were not unique to this particular study. The perspective of 
both judicial officials as well as Crown attorneys is notably absent from the 
available literature related to bail in Canada (see Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association, 2014; Doob, 2013; John Howard Society, 2013; Myers, 2009; 
Webster, 2009). Rather, these studies tend to use statistical data, document 
analysis, or court observation as sources of information. In cases where 
interviews were conducted (e.g. Canadian Civil Liberties Association, 2014) the 
participants were limited to government representatives, defence counsel, and 
representatives of bail related programmes (e.g. Bail Supervision Program, First 
Nations court workers).  
 
Given their important roles in the process, the inability to obtain the 
perspectives of Crown attorneys and justices of the peace was a considerable 
limitation both to this study and to bail research in this jurisdiction more 
generally. This meant their views could not directly be compared to the defence 
counsel. It was, however, still possible to examine patterns of their behaviour 
through the court observations and by using policy documents, such as the 
official Crown guidelines.  
 
In England, a request was made centrally through a formal application process 
with the Judicial Office for access to interviews with District Judges and 
magistrates and through Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunal Service (HMCTS) 
for court observations and interviews with legal advisers. This application was 
accepted in both instances and the researcher was put in touch with local court 
personnel, who recruited interview participants on a voluntary basis and 
facilitated court observations on the ground. While both institutions required a 
review of the thesis prior to submission, no changes were requested that altered 
the arguments presented in a meaningful way. Permission to interview the CPS 
was requested through the regional Chief Crown Prosecutor, who was 
contacted directly through academic contacts and who approved the application 
and recruited CPS lawyers and staff on a voluntary basis. As was the case in 
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Canada, defence solicitors were contacted on an individual basis through 
publically available emails after being identified in court. While several of the 
solicitors did not respond or agreed and subsequently did not follow through, it 
was still possible to obtain interviews with the sought out number of participants. 
The process contained substantially fewer obstacles in terms of ultimate 
approval in England, largely as a result of the formal channels with which 
access could be obtained.  
Research context 
 
In order to put the research findings into context, the basic functioning of both 
the English and Canadian court sites are outlined below. 
 
Canada 
 
The Ontario Court of Justice that served as the site of study in Canada had a 
total of 10 adult criminal courts, two of which were ‘bail courts’ which dealt 
almost exclusively with cases in which defendants had been detained by the 
police and had to appear in front of a justice of the peace to determine whether 
they would be released on bail.32 One of these bail courts served the only 
correctional facility that housed female defendants in the city as well as males 
who were arrested in one police division. The other court dealt with males 
coming from all other police divisions that reported to this particular court 
location. It was common for the courts to assist each other by hearing the 
other’s cases in the event that none of their cases were ready to proceed. They 
were also often assisted by other courtrooms that were presided over by either 
justices of the peace or Judges. The structure of the bail courts meant that this 
court location dealt with the vast majority of females across the urban area in 
which it was located. This resulted in the observations including a larger number 
of females than might be expected in another court location. Indeed, females 
comprised 35% of the sample (n=83) relative to 11% (n=25) in England. Since 
females are sometimes dealt with differently than males in the bail process 
(Hannah-Moffat, 1999), this was taken into account during the analysis. 
However, none of the analyses diverted from the literature in a manner 
                                            
32 In some cases, ‘slow’ courts will assist more busy courts. As such, occasionally the bail courts 
will assist with other matters that are not related to bail. 
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suggesting that this had a substantial impact on the findings. It should 
nonetheless be taken into account when interpreting the findings.  
 
Both bail courts were presided over by a justice of the peace. In addition, one 
Crown attorney would act as the prosecutor each day and generally two duty 
counsel would represent defendants who did not have private counsel. These 
practitioners stayed in the court they were assigned to for the entirety of the 
day. In addition, private defence counsel would appear at various times of the 
day when they were representing a defendant appearing in the bail court. Each 
court was also assigned several court officers who were responsible for 
maintaining order as well as bringing the defendants back and forth from the 
cells. Finally, a court clerk assisted the justice of the peace with administrative 
duties and a court reporter was responsible for recording the proceedings. As 
such, each day the court would be comprised by different court actors making 
up a specific courtroom ‘workgroup’ that depended on who was assigned to the 
court and who was representing the defendants who appeared. Although the 
exact makeup of the workgroup generally differed, the same individuals would 
often appear repetitively in different combinations. The combination of actors 
did, however, change enough on a day-to-day basis that no specific individuals 
were overrepresented in the observations. 
  
England 
 
The magistrates’ court that served as the site of study in England contained 12 
adult criminal courts, two of which regularly dealt with bail decisions (remand 
court). Unlike in Canada, other matters were dealt with alongside bail decisions, 
including pleas, applications by solicitors, or sentences. It were these courts 
that generally housed the ‘overnights’ – individuals who were recently arrested 
and were detained in custody by the police. On Mondays, three courts housed 
overnights to accommodate the influx of defendants arrested over the weekend. 
On this day all domestic violence offences appeared in one court and all other 
defendants were spread over an additional two courts. As was the case in 
Canada, courts would often take cases from each other in the event that there 
was nothing ready to proceed and another court required assistance.   
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The remand court that regularly dealt with bail decisions was either presided 
over by a District Judge or two to three magistrates. The observations were 
almost evenly split between these two types of judicial officials, with 57% 
(n=126) being presided over by a District Judge and 43% (n=96) being presided 
over by magistrates. A representative from the CPS acted as a prosecutor each 
day and, in the main, private defence solicitors represented defendants. In 
cases where defendants did not have a solicitor, they were typically represented 
by the duty solicitor scheduled to assist that day.  Each court contained one 
legal adviser, who assisted the magistrates presiding over the proceedings, and 
an usher, who organised the appearances of the defendants. When a District 
Judge was in attendance, occasionally a court associate was used in lieu of a 
legal adviser as they did not require the same level of legal assistance. As was 
the case in Canada, this resulted in the formation of a particular workgroup on 
any given day, but not one that was consistent enough that specific individuals 
were overrepresented.  
 
Data sources 
 
This section describes the sources of information that produced the data for the 
study. It will outline the advantages of using a mixed methods approach and 
then examine each source – observations and interviews – in turn.  
 
As is characteristic of case study research, the data was comprised of multiple 
sources of evidence (Berg, 2009; Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2014). Specifically, court 
observations, interviews, and, to a limited extent, court lists (see below) were 
used in the study. This approach has been demonstrated to be an ideal way 
with which to approach court research. For instance, Lipetz (1980) has asserted 
that “a methodological mix is desirable for understanding the operations and 
outcomes in many courts” (p. 59). Previous studies that have examined the 
lower courts in England and Canada have tended to use a mixture of data 
sources, including interviews, observations, analysis of records, and 
questionnaires (Canadian Civil Liberties Association, 2014; Cape & Smith, 
2016; Hucklesby, 1997a; Webster, 2009).   
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An advantage of this approach is its association with triangulation. This is when 
the results of an investigation employing a method associated with one 
research strategy are cross-checked against the results of a method associated 
with the other research strategy (Bryman, 2004). This increases the validity of 
the research as the findings are mutually corroborated from multiple sources. In 
this case, by examining the factors that contribute to bail decision-making from 
the observer’s perspective in court as well as through interviews with court 
practitioners, it increases the likelihood that these factors will be identified and 
that when they are, that they will be understood in a comprehensive manner. 
Indeed, factors that are observed in court across multiple cases that are then 
corroborated by court practitioners in multiple interviews can be thought to have 
a strong influence on the bail decision-making process.   
 
This approach is also ideal in that, in addition to using multiple sources of 
evidence, a mixed methods approach could be undertaken in which both 
qualitative and quantitative data was collected. Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and 
Turner (2007) provide the following definition for mixed methods research: 
 
Mixed methods research is the type of research in which a researcher or 
team of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative 
research approaches (e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, 
data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the purposes of 
breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration (p. 123).  
 
This type of research is beneficial when one data source is insufficient (Creswell 
& Clark, 2011). For instance, qualitative data provides a detailed understanding 
of a problem by studying a few individuals and exploring their perspectives in 
great depth. By contrast, quantitative data provides a more general 
understanding of a problem by examining a larger number of people and 
assessing a smaller number of variables. Each method provides a different 
perspective and contains its own limitations. While qualitative data contains 
depth, it is often difficult to generalize beyond the small number of participants 
involved in the study. Quantitative data can enhance knowledge about many 
individuals, but at the expense of a full understanding of any one individual. As 
such, the limitations of one method can be offset by the strengths of the other. A 
combination of both quantitative and qualitative data provides a more complete 
understanding of the research problem than either approach by itself (Creswell 
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& Clark, 2011). The nature of the benefits of each individual approach is 
discussed below. 
 
Court observations 
 
The first source of data consisted of ‘structured observation’ of court 
proceedings. This involved the systematic observation of behaviour in terms of 
a schedule of categories that was devised prior to the commencement of data 
collection (Bryman, 2004). As per Bryman (2004), the rules encompassed in the 
schedule of categories were designed to inform the observer what they should 
look for and how to observe the behaviour. The goal was to obtain both 
quantitative data that could be aggregated following data collection as well as 
qualitative insights into the decision-making process as it is explained in open 
court. This method primarily served to compare actual behaviour related to bail 
decision-making in each jurisdiction. 
 
The observations were important to the study in terms of both the findings they 
produced and the practical benefits they served. First, the observations allowed 
for the identification of patterns and case outcomes that would not have been 
possible through the use of interviews alone. For instance, they demonstrated 
how many defendants were remanded in custody or on bail in each jurisdiction 
and what type of release was imposed upon them when they were released on 
bail. The observation data also reflected the decision-making of a larger group 
of practitioners than was available through the interviews. In particular, it 
enabled a better understanding of the dynamic between the court actors and 
thus shed light on informal practices and relationships. This is consistent with 
Baldwin (2007), who argued that observations have made a significant 
contribution to the “understanding of the influence of ‘court culture’ on decision-
making and the importance of examining the relationships that exist between 
the various court actors” (p. 382). Although the observations lacked the context 
obtained through the interviews, it provided a general idea of what actually went 
on in court on a day-to-day basis. 
The observations also benefited the study on a practical level. For instance, the 
researcher was able to identify defence counsel who frequented the court and 
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was subsequently able to contact them to request an interview. This ensured 
that those that were interviewed had a comprehensive view of the court at the 
time of the research. It also informed the researcher in terms of etiquette, 
terminology, and informal practices. This allowed her to fit into the court 
‘community’, enhancing her credibility and better allowing her to probe during 
the interviews.  
 
 An observation schedule was developed that allowed the researcher to record 
detailed information about each case involving a bail decision. It was designed 
based on a combination of a review of the literature and informal observations 
of court proceedings in each jurisdiction. Although the observation schedules 
differ slightly for English and Canadian data collection, they were designed 
specifically to measure the same concepts while accounting for jurisdictional 
differences. For example, changes were made to account for different uses of 
terminology as well as general court procedures. Details related to the nature of 
the case (e.g. alleged offence and defendant characteristics), the position of the 
prosecution and defence (e.g. remand on bail or in custody), the information 
provided by all court practitioners (e.g. factors used to support position, 
conditions suggested/imposed), and the outcome of the hearing (e.g. remanded 
in custody, remanded on conditional versus unconditional bail, adjourned) were 
recorded. See Appendix A.  
 
The observation schedule allowed for the collection of both quantitative and 
qualitative data. For instance, defendant characteristics, case characteristics, 
basic positions (i.e. remand in custody or on bail), forms of release (e.g. 
conditional or unconditional bail, release with or without a surety) and the 
conditions imposed were recorded on the schedule prior to data collection and 
were indicated by circling the appropriate selection. In addition, the information 
provided by the court practitioners regarding the offence details as well as their 
explanations for their positions were recorded freehand and categorised 
following the proceedings. This approach changed slightly after the 
observations commenced as a result of the unforeseen practicalities of 
conducting this type of research. While it was initially the intention of the 
researcher to categorise the qualitative information provided by the practitioners 
in pre-established categories during the proceedings, this proved to be too 
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challenging an undertaking given how quickly the information was conveyed. As 
a result, the researcher switched to an approach in which the information was 
recorded freehand in a separate notebook and later analysed using the 
approach detailed in the Analysis section below. This permitted the collection of 
more detail and thus more accurate collection of information.  
 
The researcher sat in one court for the entirety of each day of data collection 
and completed one observation schedule/notebook entry for each case in which 
the defendant appeared in custody, unconvicted, for the purposes of their first 
bail decision (for the matters that brought them to court). This approach was 
taken for the purposes of making the findings between the two jurisdictions 
comparable. As was discussed in relation to the site selection, only defendants 
who were detained by the police and were appearing in custody for the 
purposes of a bail decision attended the Canadian bail court. None of these 
defendants had pled or been found guilty as it was not the Canadian practice for 
those defendants to appear in bail court. Further, after their first bail decision in 
the Ontario Court of Justice the case would have to be appealed and moved to 
Superior Court if bail was to be reconsidered. As such, the sample collected in 
this jurisdiction contained only in-custody, unconvicted defendants whose first 
determination of bail by the court had not yet been made.  
 
In England, the wider use of remand court meant that out-of-custody defendants 
also appeared who, in theory, required a determination of bail by the court. In 
reality, these defendants were almost always released (see Site Selection 
section). Some defendants also appeared who had already pled or been found 
guilty and were receiving a bail decision in a convicted unsentenced capacity. 
Further, some defendants were appearing in custody for a second bail hearing, 
as defendants were able to have another determination of bail in magistrates’ 
courts in England after their first decision. In order to render the findings 
comparable with Canada, those appearing out of custody, in a convicted 
unsentenced capacity, or for the purposes of a second bail decision were not 
included in the study.  
 
This approach ensured that the cases were comparable both between and 
within jurisdictions. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the 
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aforementioned groups in England, in addition to being incomparable to 
Canadian defendants, for both legal and practical reasons, are not comparable 
to each other (Cape & Smith, 2016; Doherty & East, 1985; Hucklesby, 1997b; 
Morgan & Henderson, 1998). These differences are well documented in 
previous research and thus were not the focus of the current study. Ultimately, 
eliminating these defendants (and offenders) from the study in England ensured 
it was methodologically sound and that the comparative aspect remained of 
primary importance.  
 
In both jurisdictions, the researcher alternated the days of observation between 
the courts in which bail decisions were made. In Canada, observations were 
conducted one to two days a week, alternating between the two bail courts, for 
a total of 15 days between January 2015 and March 2015. The objective was to 
reach 100 appearances in each jurisdiction. However, since a high proportion of 
appearances were adjourned and thus did not result in bail decisions, producing 
limited data, it was decided to continue to conduct observations. Ultimately, a 
total of 236 cases were observed, 69 of which resulted in unconvicted bail 
decisions.33 In England, observations were conducted one to three days a week 
for a total of 28 days between November 2015 and April 2016. As was the case 
in Canada, the researcher alternated between the three remand courts. A total 
of 222 cases were observed, 100 of which resulted in unconvicted bail 
decisions.34 Watching each court on a regular basis facilitated the identification 
of trends, while spreading the research out over several months minimised the 
possibility that the data was influenced by seasonal variations in offence 
patterns (Herbert, 2004). 
 
While some have projected that the presence of an observer in the research 
setting can impact the behaviour of those observed (Yin, 2014), this was not 
found to have an observable impact in this study. This is potentially because, 
despite the court actors being informed of the researcher’s presence, in many 
                                            
33 In the remaining 167 cases, defendants were adjourned, traversed to other courts or (very 
rarely) the prosecution withdrew their cases. Since information was still provided in relation to 
bail, they were discussed to some extent during the analyses, but not in relation to the bail 
outcome.  
34 In the remaining 122 cases, defendants pled guilty before the bail decision (rendering them 
convicted unsentenced defendants and making the bail outcome irrelevant) or the case was 
resolved. As above, they were discussed in the analyses but not in relation to the bail outcome. 
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cases she was assumed to be a surety in Canada – where she sat in the public 
gallery – and a member of probation in England - where she sat in one of the 
main desks.  
 
Interviews 
 
The interview process will be subsequently explored by outlining the sampling 
method, describing the participants who agreed to be interviewed, and 
discussing the interview process itself.  
 
Sampling 
 
Efforts were made to obtain as many perspectives as possible so that the bail 
decision-making process was understood comprehensively. It was anticipated 
that interviews would be conducted with the following court actors in both 
locations: judicial officers (magistrates/District Judges in England, justices of the 
peace in Canada), prosecutors (CPS in England, Crown attorneys in Canada), 
defence lawyers (defence solicitors in England, defence/duty counsel in 
Canada), and legal advisers (England only). The achievement of the study’s 
objectives required an understanding of a broad range of perspectives in order 
to examine how the ‘court culture’ as mediated by the courtroom workgroup 
impacted the decision-making process.  As such, representatives of each group 
of court actors involved in the court decision-making process were approached 
in both jurisdictions. Court clerks were not contacted in Canada because, unlike 
legal advisers in England, they are not legally trained and serve an 
administrative rather than advisory function. 
 
Interview participants were selected using a combination of purposeful and 
convenience sampling. A convenience sample is one that is simply available to 
the researcher by virtue of its accessibility (Bryman, 2004). In the cases in 
which access was granted centrally or by a supervisor, the sample consisted of 
participants that volunteered through their respective gatekeeper. For instance, 
duty counsel in Canada as well as legal advisers, District Judges, magistrates, 
and CPS in England volunteered to one of their superiors, who allowed the 
interview to take place.  
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In both jurisdictions, defence counsel were selected in a purposeful manner. 
Purposeful sampling means that researchers intentionally select participants 
who have experienced the central phenomenon or the key concept being 
explored in the study (Creswell & Clark, 2011). In both locations, defence 
counsel were observed participating in bail decision-making at each respective 
court and were subsequently requested to participate in the study based on 
their experience.  
 
While these sampling methods have been argued to be limited in terms of their 
generalisability to the larger population (Bryman, 2004), they are nonetheless 
commonly used in court research as a result of the difficulty obtaining 
participants (Baldwin, 2007).  As such, they provided the researcher with 
perspectives that would otherwise have been unavailable. Furthermore, the 
limitation was countered to some extent through triangulation with the court 
observations, by comparing findings with existing research, and by obtaining a 
diversity of views through gathering a range of different court actors.  
 
Participants  
 
In Canada, a total of 8 interviews were conducted with defence counsel. Three 
of these defence counsel worked as duty counsel at the court where the study 
took place, two worked in private practice but sometimes worked as a duty 
counsel at the court, and two worked exclusively in private practice but also had 
experience working at the court.  As was noted previously, justices of the peace 
and Crown attorneys were not included in the interviews as a result of access 
issues.  
 
In England, a total of 20 interviews were conducted with court actors. This 
included three District Judges, four magistrates, two legal advisers, one court 
associate, three prosecutors, two assistant prosecutors, and five defence 
solicitors. All of the defence solicitors worked privately. It is notable that the two 
assistant prosecutors interviewed in England did not have the same authority as 
full prosecutors. As such, they largely acted at the direction of prosecutors, who 
gave directions prior to the proceedings. Their slightly different role was 
considered in relation to the findings throughout the analysis.   
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Interview Process 
 
The interviews complemented the information obtained in the court 
observations by presenting context as well as revealing the values and attitudes 
of court practitioners. Interview questions were asked in a semi-structured 
manner. This means that the questions were predetermined and asked in a 
systematic way, but the interviewers were permitted (in fact, expected) to probe 
far beyond the answers to their prepared standardized questions (Berg, 2009). 
This format was expected to produce data that was rich in detail, while still 
ensuring some degree of consistency across participants. Compared to more 
rigid forms of structured interviewing and questionnaires, the semi-structured 
interview has a greater emphasis on the court practitioner’s point of view. This 
approach encouraged the interviewee to move away from the central topic, 
allowing the researcher to gain insight as to what the interviewee sees as 
relevant and important. Since the researcher could depart from the interview 
schedule and ask questions based on the information received, is was possible 
to gain important knowledge that was relevant but that may not have 
corresponded directly to the structured questions (Bryman, 2004).  
 
The interview schedules were designed slightly differently according to the role 
of the participant. This was to elicit the same content while accounting for 
differences between the roles of the court practitioners and the jurisdictions in 
which they practice. In total, five different interview schedules were created (see 
Appendix B). There was one version for Canadian defence and duty counsel 
and four versions for English District Judges/magistrates, legal advisers, CPS, 
and defence solicitors, respectively. In some instances, the interviews were 
shortened at the request of the organization approving the interviews. As a 
result, some participants were not asked about specific concepts. Given the 
interviews were semi-structured, however, themes based on the questions that 
were removed were typically covered inadvertently through more informal 
discussions arising from the other questions. When possible, these interview 
schedules were piloted before official data collection commenced. This was 
possible with Canadian defence counsel and English magistrates. All 
participants were asked about issues such as the impact of law and policy on 
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their decisions, the utility of information presented in court, the decision to 
impose conditions, and informal processes unique to each location.  
 
The interviews took place in a variety of locations at the convenience of the 
participants. This included interview rooms in the court, the offices of the actors, 
and occasionally public spaces such as coffee houses. The interviews lasted 
from 25 minutes to 1 hour and 48 minutes in length. 
 
The use of interviews was instrumental to the study as it provided context and 
explanations related to the bail decision-making process that would not have 
been available through the observations alone. While the observations 
illustrated the reasons provided by practitioners in open court, the interviews 
explained the basis for these decisions and demonstrated some of the 
processes that occurred outside of the courtroom. For instance, in many cases 
the prosecution and defence discussed the case prior to the court appearance 
and this discussion was reflected in their subsequent submissions. However, it 
would be unclear to the researcher that this discussion took place and how it 
had impacted the process. It was also likely that values, attitudes, and even 
policies impacting their decision-making would not be reflected in the 
observations in many instances. Consequently, this qualitative data puts the 
‘meat on the bones’ of the ‘dry’ quantitative research (Creswell & Clark, 2011).  
 
While the contextual information obtained during this process was important to 
the study, it was necessary to consider it in relation to the limitations associated 
with qualitative interviews. Specifically, it is common to encounter challenges 
eliciting full and relevant information, communicating effectively with unfamiliar 
populations, and obtaining ‘truthful’ responses during semi-structured 
interviewing. Taking these limitations into account facilitated the collection of 
more useful and comprehensive information as well as contributed to more 
careful consideration of the findings.  First, it was important to acknowledge that 
the information obtained could be limited since asking questions from a 
predetermined schedule - as is the practice with semi-structured interviews - 
might hinder the ability for full discussion and restrict the details provided 
(Bryman, 2004). It may also be that certain participants are sensitive to the 
interview process and uncomfortable providing answers (Berg, 2009). In order 
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to facilitate more fulsome discussion, the researcher anticipated and planned 
potential probing questions, encouraging participants to elaborate on their 
answers, and started the interview with ‘throw away questions’ in the form of 
unthreatening, demographic questions intended to ‘cool out the subject’ and 
make them more comfortable (see Berg, 2009). These strategies were found to 
elicit information from the participants and aid in rapport building during the 
interviews.  
 
Second, participants can belong to groups that engage in particular practices or 
use specific terminology unfamiliar to the researcher (Berg, 2009). This may 
cause misunderstandings between the interviewer and interviewee and lead to 
unintended information being conveyed or understood. This was especially 
relevant in the current study given that precise legal terminology was utilised by 
the participants and this terminology varied across the two jurisdictions (e.g. 
‘remanded in custody’ in England vs. ‘detained in custody’ in Canada). In order 
to minimise the impact of this issue, court observations were conducted prior to 
the interviews in both England and Canada so that the ‘world’ of the participants 
were better understood (Berg, 2009). Demonstrating knowledge of this world 
enabled rapport building and conveyed the messages that the researcher was 
an ‘insider’ rather than an ‘outsider.’ Indeed, participants often provided more 
detailed, nuanced answers once they knew the researcher had a 
comprehensive understanding of their working environment.  
 
Third, participants might convey information that is untruthful or 
unrepresentative of other views. They may, for instance, withhold the truth or 
even lie for reasons related to social desirability (Bryman, 2004). This involves 
altering or restricting answers after reflection as to how one might be perceived. 
For example, it may be that defence counsel would not wish to admit that they 
prioritise their own finances over their commitment to their clients or that judges 
would not want to convey political leanings that may affect their decisions. In 
other cases it may be that the information conveyed by participants is, 
unbeknownst to them, not representative of other court actors’ views by virtue of 
their own personal opinions or biases. Both of these issues were alleviated, to 
some extent, by triangulating the information with the court observations (when 
possible) in order to evaluate its robustness and by interviewing numerous and 
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diverse participants to determine the difference between unique perspectives 
and enduring trends. However, in terms of representativeness, it is notable that, 
as Bryman (2004) has argued, some differences may be attributed to ‘true 
variation’ rather than inconsistencies and thus extend rather than hinder the 
researcher’s knowledge of a subject. For example, in the current research it 
was often informative to know when participants unanimously agreed on an 
issue (e.g. are prosecutors too harsh?) compared to when they had varying 
opinions. These differences in opinion, in and of themselves, helped to better 
understand the bail process. As was the case with all of the aforementioned 
limitations related to interviewing, these issues could be minimised, but not 
always eradicated through specific research strategies. As a result, they were 
taken into account throughout the analysis.  
 
Court lists 
 
In both jurisdictions, it was the intention of the researcher to supplement the 
information contained in the observation schedules with information provided to 
the researcher by the courts. In Canada, this information consisted of a 
‘completed docket’ for each day that the researcher attended court. This was a 
record of every defendant that appeared in court on that day as well as their 
dates of birth, the offences they were charged with, the dates of the allegations, 
and the specific file each offence pertained to. The docket also included the 
names of the Justices of the Peace and the Crown attornies that were assigned 
to the court. In England, the researcher was provided with the ‘extracts of the 
court register’, which related to the cases observed on the days that court was 
attended. These included a record of the defendants who appeared each day, 
their dates of birth and information about the offences with which they they were 
charged. 
  
While the original intention was primarily to use these documents (hereafter 
called ‘court lists’) in order to obtain information about the specific allegations, 
which were not always clearly outlined in the proceedings, it was eventually 
decided that the cases would be described in terms of broad categories that 
were discussed in open court instead (e.g. presence of violence, presence of an 
administration of justice offence). This was decided for two reasons. First, the 
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specific offences were not always comparable across the jurisdictions and as 
such referring to them as though they were equivalents would be misleading. 
Second, it was not clear whether all the court actors were privy to the 
information contained in the court lists. As such, it was determined that 
discussing outcomes (e.g. remanded in custody) in relation to information that 
was not known to the actors would fail to accurately reflect their decision-
making. Since the primary aim of the study was to understand the factors that 
contributed to the decision-making, it was decided that only information 
discussed openly, and thus was definitely known to all actors, would be 
examined. As such, while the information from the court lists was collected, it 
was of limited practical use to the research. 
 
Ethics 
 
The project adhered to the ethical standards laid out by the University of Leeds 
research ethics policy. A copy of the ethics approval can be found in Appendix 
C. 
 
These standards were adhered to by, first, ensuring the relevant participants 
provided informed consent for their involvement in the study. This meant that 
they voluntarily confirmed their willingness to participate. Interview participants 
were provided with an information sheet and an informed consent form. The 
information sheet was provided to participants prior to their decision to 
participate so that they could make an informed decision as to whether or not 
they would like to do an interview while the informed consent form was provided 
to participants directly before the interview to reiterate the information they read 
in the information sheet. They were told they could refuse to answer questions 
and/or withdraw from the study anytime during or following the interview, 
provided no more than one month had elapsed. 
 
The individuals examined during the court observations did not provide 
informed consent. This is because court procedures are for public viewing in 
both England and Canada and thus the researcher’s presence is no different 
from any other public observer. As such, no informed consent is required. 
However, to ensure the court was aware and approving of the researcher’s 
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presence, they were informed as a matter of etiquette in Canada (where no 
formal access procedures exist) and as a matter of necessity in England (where 
access must be granted for research activities). In sensitive cases in which the 
public was not permitted, observers were informed by the court. Under these 
rare circumstances, the researcher left the court and no observation was 
conducted. 
 
Although the ethical standards permit researchers to observe court without 
obtaining informed consent, there were still ethical considerations raised in the 
context of court observations. This is because, despite the fact that the 
individuals were present in a public setting, they were still in challenging 
circumstances (particularly the defendants and victims) and were not aware 
they were being observed in a research context. Some researchers have raised 
concerns that this could be characterised as an invasion of privacy under the 
colour of scientific research (Berg, 2009). For this reason, in line with guidance 
from the the British Psychological Study (2010), particular account was taken of 
local cultural values and the possibility of intruding on the privacy of individuals 
who, even while in a normally public space, may not know they are being 
observed.  
 
To ensure the privacy of interviewed and observed individuals was preserved, 
careful steps were taken to ensure the information collected remained both 
anonymous and confidential. In relation to both the interviews and the court 
observations, neither the participants nor the location of the courts were 
identified in the thesis.  In order to ensure the anonymity of those involved, only 
broad position titles (e.g. magistrate) and the general location of the court (e.g. 
Northern England) were mentioned. In addition, careful consideration was taken 
not to provide any details that could inadvertently identify an individual. For 
example, individual demographics (e.g. sex, age) were not revealed and no 
specific details about the cases were mentioned. If an observed bail 
appearance was described in the thesis, for instance, the circumstances of the 
alleged offence and characteristics of those involved were never discussed in 
detail (e.g. ‘a 65 year old male living in a specific neighbourhood committed 
assault bodily harm on the 9th of November’). Rather, vague details were used 
to describe an incident (e.g. ‘an older defendant living in an affluent 
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neighbourhood committed assault late in the year’). This ensured individuals 
could not be identified in the research. Further, all data was kept confidential 
unless something was said that reflected significant malpractice or might cause 
harm to others. This was, however, never an issue during the course of the 
research.  
 
Finally, measures were put in place to ensure that both paper and electronic 
files were securely stored in line with University of Leeds guidelines. This meant 
that all paper-based documents containing personal or case-specific data (i.e. 
consent forms, observation schedules) were stored in a separate locked cabinet 
in a restricted access room. All electronic files containing personal data (i.e. 
participant contact information, recordings of interviews) were uploaded and 
stored securely on the university server. Once recordings of interviews were 
transferred to the university system, they were removed from the encrypted 
recording device. Interview transcripts had identifiers removed, aliases were 
created, and they were stored on the University system. Furthermore, the 
observation schedules were labelled with numerical labels and entered into the 
database using these numbers as identifiers. 
 
Analysis 
 
The subsequent section will outline how quantitative and qualitative analyses 
were undertaken in relation to both court observation and interview data. 
 
Quantitative 
 
The first step of the analysis was conducted in accordance with Yin (2014), who 
argues the importance of analysing each individual case separately prior to 
conducting any form of cross-case analysis. Consequently, the court 
observations were analysed using descriptive statistics for the English and 
Canadian data separately. The objective was to provide an overview of the 
defendants and cases that appeared and to describe the way in which they 
proceeded through the court in each jurisdiction. 
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The observation schedule included predetermined categories in anticipation of 
the quantitative analysis (see Appendix A). These data were entered into a 
statistical database (SPSS) systematically and aggregated using basic 
descriptive statistics (i.e. frequencies, descriptives). The analyses were limited 
to simple operations as a result of the small sample size in both jurisdictions 
and because the variables were primarily categorical in nature.    
 
The analyses produced findings related to descriptions of the defendants 
entering the court (e.g. type of legal representation), the nature of the cases 
(e.g. nature of alleged offences), the positions of the prosecution and defence 
(e.g. remand in custody or on bail, release with or without supervision), and the 
outcome of the cases (e.g. remand in custody or on bail, adjourned). These 
findings served to illustrate the types of defendants and cases entering the bail 
process in each jurisdiction and how cases were typically dealt with.  
 
Qualitative 
 
Following the quantitative analyses of court observations, qualitative analyses 
were undertaken on both the court observations collected in the notebooks and 
interview transcripts. This involved the use of content analysis, which was 
primarily qualitative in nature. Content analysis is a “careful, systematic 
examination and interpretation of a particular body of material in an effort to 
identify patterns, themes, biases, and meanings” (Berg, 2009, p. 338). The 
purpose of this analysis was to identify the factors that contributed to bail 
decision-making in each jurisdiction. 
 
In this instance, a ‘directed content analysis’ was conducted. This form of 
content analysis uses existing theory or research to help focus the coding 
process (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). A deductive strategy was undertaken in 
which theory was used to guide the analysis by pointing to contextual conditions 
to be described and explanations to be examined (Yin, 2014). In this case, 
categories of information were established through a combination of informal 
court observations in both jurisdictions and a review of the relevant legislation 
and literature. This included categories related to the role of the court actors, 
defendant and case characteristics, and attitudes towards case processing. 
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Following the creation of categories, the coding process commenced using 
methodological literature as a guide, in which a similar procedure was 
suggested among multiple sources (Berg, 2009; Creswell, 2007; Hsieh & 
Shannon, 2005). First, the text (i.e. the freehand court observation data and 
interview transcripts) was read openly and all information pertaining to the 
research question (i.e. which factors contribute to bail decision making) was 
identified. This process is often referred to as ‘open coding’ (Berg, 2009). 
Specifically, each piece of information that relates to the original question is 
provided a ‘code’. Second, all information pertaining to the predetermined 
categories were grouped into said categories (or codes) and any data that could 
not be grouped this way was given a new code. These new codes were thus 
developed inductively in the sense that they emerged from the data itself as 
opposed to from predetermined categories (Yin, 2014). As such, the analysis 
included a combination of both inductive and deductive strategies. This second 
step is often referred to as ‘axial coding’, and involves intensive coding around 
specific categories (Berg, 2009). Third, systematic (objective) criteria were 
established for sorting data into the various categories and the categories and 
selection criteria were revised, if necessary, until the categories were 
satisfactory. This entire process can be regarded as a ‘data analysis spiral’ in 
which the steps are not distinct but, rather, are interrelated and often go on 
simultaneously (Creswell, 2007). 
 
Following the preceding steps, entries in the categories pertaining to defendant 
and case characteristics were counted. This was to ascertain the extent to 
which these characteristics were discussed in court with a view of determining 
their importance (see Chapter Five). Although there has been some criticism 
that this type of quantitative analysis is contrary to a qualitative approach, 
Creswell (2007) argues that it is advantageous in determining how often codes 
appear in the data, thus providing an indicator of frequency of occurrence. As 
per, Berg (2007) after it was organised, the literal meaning of the words in the 
text were examined. This strategy allowed for a demonstration of magnitude 
within each category. 
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Ultimately, the analysis process resulted in an organised coding frame sorted 
into categories that represented the various factors that influenced bail decision-
making.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This study aimed to better understand the factors that contributed to bail 
decision-making in English and Canadian courts. It took an integrated approach 
to the research, employing both structuralist and interactionist interpretations of 
criminal justice that were informed by the principles of comparative law. A 
review of the methodological and court research suggested that a multiple-case 
study design was most appropriate and the courts were selected based on legal 
jurisdictions, level of court, geographical areas, and access afforded. The 
limitations surrounding access and research context were acknowledged and 
taken into account during the analysis. In order to accomplish the aim of the 
study, a mixed methods approach was taken in which both court observations 
and interviews were conducted and quantitative and qualitative data was 
collected. Finally, the data was analysed using a combination of descriptive 
statistical analysis and content analysis. The findings that resulted are 
discussed in the subsequent three sections. 
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Chapter Four: 
 
Consensus or conflict? Examining the Role of Court Actors and Their 
Influence on Bail Outcomes 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the role of court actors in terms of their influence on the 
bail outcomes in the English and Canadian courts. Specifically, it examines how 
and to what extent they contributed to the decision to remand defendants in 
custody or on bail. While the police were not studied directly, their decision-
making was examined in the context of its influence on the court actors. In 
addition, the decision-making of the prosecution, defence, and the court were all 
analysed in relation to their respective impact on defendants’ movement 
through the bail process. The decision-making of each group of court actors 
was examined from the period from which the defendant entered the court 
process to the point at which the initial decision was made as to whether they 
were remanded in custody or on bail. 
 
Despite the formal adversarial structure of both the English and Canadian 
criminal justice system, the decision-making of court actors has consistently 
been shown to operate informally through a process of ‘negotiated justice’ 
(Baldwin & McConville, 1977; Hucklesby, 1996). This has led many to assert 
that the adversarial nature of the criminal justice system has been replaced by 
one of compromise (Alschuler, 1968; Blumberg, 1967a). It has been argued 
that, amidst this negotiation process, court actors make decisions in line with 
the informal norms that shape the culture of the court, which is mediated 
through the decision-making of the courtroom workgroup (Church, 1982; 
Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; Hucklesby, 1997a; Webster et al., 2009) and that an 
important goal of the workgroup is to minimise conflict by maintaining group 
cohesion (Cole, 1970; Lipetz, 1980, 1984; Rumgay, 1995).  
 
The extent to which the decision-making of the court actors reflected informal 
and cooperative behaviour was explored through an examination of their 
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influence at various stages of the bail decision-making process. This was 
achieved by comparing court actors’ perceptions and explanations of their 
behaviour in the interviews to the court observations, which demonstrated how 
their decision-making operated in practice. Consideration was given to the 
extent to which the court actors made decisions outside of open court, whether 
they typically agreed with each other and how this impacted the bail outcomes 
in each jurisdiction. 
 
This chapter will demonstrate that the vast majority of bail decision-making was 
done informally and through a process of negotiation outside of open court. This 
is consistent with previous research that has examined the behaviour of court 
actors during the bail process (Hucklesby, 1996, 1997b). However, it extends 
these findings, arguing that the nature of these negotiations depended on the 
extent to which court actors agreed with one another and whether they worked 
together to achieve their individual and mutual objectives. Their level of 
agreement was dictated by whether court actors were satisfied with the cases 
the police detained, the extent to which the incentives and goals of the 
prosecution and defence converged or diverged, and the degree to which court 
actors adopted adversarial roles when they appeared before the court.  
 
It was concluded that not all decision-making was marked by cooperation and 
that court actors often exercised their adversarial roles untraditionally – outside 
of open court - in circumstances in which they did not agree with each other. 
This was especially the case in Canada, where the culture was primarily shaped 
by conflict. In comparison, court actors in England tended to follow the 
consensus model that is more characteristic of previous bail research 
(Hucklesby, 1996, 1997b; Myers, 2015). The differences between the 
jurisdictions resulted in a much higher rate of agreement in relation to the 
release/detain decision in England than in Canada, and ultimately a larger 
proportion of remands in custody. 
 
This chapter begins by comparing bail laws as they exist in theory (‘law in 
books’) to the way they have been shown to exist in practice (‘law in action’). 
This is followed by an overview of the bail outcomes in both England and 
Canada in terms of the proportion of defendants remanded in custody and on 
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bail. The extent to which the police influenced the decision-making process in 
relation to their construction of the in custody population is then explored. The 
negotiation process that took place between the prosecution and defence in 
each jurisdiction is examined and how they worked together discussed. Finally, 
the extent to which the court ‘rubber stamped’ (i.e. automatically agreed with) 
previous decisions is analysed through an examination of their role in 
uncontested appearances and contested hearings.  
 
The law in books vs. the law in action 
 
This section will compare how formal law and legal principles suggest court 
actors should make decisions during the bail process with how research has 
demonstrated they do make decisions. This discussion sets the context for the 
findings that follow. 
 
 In legal rhetoric, prosecution and defence are portrayed as two combatants 
competing to ‘win’ an argument on behalf of the state or the defendant. This is 
because the formal structure of the criminal justice systems in England and 
Canada is adversarial (McConville et al., 1991). The defence and prosecution 
present two different sides of an argument before an impartial judicial official or 
jury. Each side states their case to the best of their ability within certain ethical 
parameters and, ultimately, the judicial official or jury determines who is the 
victor. This is often perceived to resemble a ‘battleground’ in which two 
opposing sides dispute different sides of an argument in open court.  
 
In both England and Canada, the responsibility, in the main, lies on the 
prosecution to demonstrate why defendants should be remanded in custody or 
released with bail conditions. There are notably some exceptions in the form of 
specific reverse onus offences in Canada, where the onus lies on the defence, 
and specific offences and situations in England in which bail is restricted (see 
Chapter One). However, defendants in both jurisdictions enjoy a presumption in 
favour of bail and, as such, should be released without restrictions unless the 
prosecution can demonstrate why a more onerous option is necessary. In 
Canada, the Criminal Code dictates that the prosecution adhere to a ‘ladder’ 
principle where the least onerous form of release must be considered and 
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deemed inappropriate before a more restrictive option is taken (Trotter, 2010). 
In England, the Bail Act 1976 similarly specifies that defendants be released on 
bail without conditions unless it can be proven why a more onerous form of 
release is necessary.  
 
Given the adversarial structure of the criminal justice system and the nature of 
the laws related to bail, one might expect to see a battle between the 
prosecution and defence in open court in most bail cases. The prosecution 
would theoretically be the actor making out the case for custody or restricted 
bail and the defence would be safeguarding clients from undue restrictions on 
their liberty.  
 
In reality, however, as Chapter One demonstrated, research has consistently 
shown that there is a considerable gap between what the ‘law in books’ suggest 
and what the ‘law in action’ actually looks like (Hucklesby, 1997a; King, 1981; 
McBarnet, 1981; McConville et al., 1997; Myers, 2009). Rather than an open 
adversarial process, much of the decision-making occurs through ‘negotiated 
justice’ (Baldwin & McConville, 1977; Hucklesby, 1996) whereby court actors 
make decisions in private with judicial officials arbitrating in a minority of 
circumstances. As such, it has been argued that the ‘real’ remand decision 
makers are the police (through their recommendations to the prosecution), 
prosecution, and defence (Hucklesby, 1997b). It has also been asserted that 
although the law has been shown to affect and guide their behaviour (McBarnet, 
1981; McConville et al., 1997), it typically forms only one consideration among 
many and is perhaps not the most important factor in the decision-making 
process (Feeley, 1973). Rather, it is argued that the decisions of court actors 
are largely shaped by court culture, which is mediated through the working 
relationships of the courtroom workgroup (Hucklesby, 1997a). The priority of 
their negotiations is thus to reach a consensus which will satisfy individual and 
shared interests (Hucklesby, 1996). These negotiations are based on what Cole 
(1970) has called ‘exchange relationships’ in which criminal justice actors share 
a common territorial field (i.e. the court) and collaborate for different ends.  
 
This has led some scholars to suggest we have witnessed the ‘twilight of the 
adversary process’ (Blumberg, 1967a) or the decline of the adversary system 
126 
 
(Alschuler, 1968). Others, however, question the simplicity of such assertions 
(Church, 1985), and suggest that the attitudes of court actors can be influenced 
both by court culture and adversarial principles. For instance, Church (1985) 
has argued that adversarialism does not always take on its traditional form, 
highlighting that conflict can exist within negotiation procedures and thus formal 
procedures, such as trials (or in this case bail hearings), need not exist to 
demonstrate that court actors are influenced by their adversarial roles. Other 
scholars have argued that the current concept of the courtroom workgroup (and 
thus its impact on court culture) has not been fully explored and that the current 
superficial use of this concept has over-emphasised the primacy of consensus 
models of behaviour (Young, 2013). As Young, (2013) explains: 
 
… how misleading it can be to imply that all workgroups are obsessed by 
speedy case disposition, or are based on complete consensus as to 
appropriate goals. In practice, some workgroups may be as much 
shaped by conflict as by cooperation, and the form that 'justice' takes 
may depend on who has the most power within the on-going flow of 
interactions, itself subject to the influence of a web of relationships and 
factors reaching well beyond the court. 
 
Young (2013) and Church (1985) point to the need to move away from 
assumptions that all court cultures are based on consensus and explore the 
more nuanced dynamics that work within the courtroom workgroup. Indeed, it 
may be that tension exists between the aforementioned notions of attitudinal 
agreement and the formal adversarial relationship between court actors and 
that the extent to which these factors are balanced depends on the specific 
circumstances. For instance, Church (1985) found patterns of adversarial 
disagreement on issues related to the substantive outcome of the case (e.g. 
appropriateness of plea negotiations, sentencing) whereas the consensus 
associated with cultural explanations was more prominent on matters of 
procedure (e.g. disposition time). This subsequent analysis builds on these 
findings, examining whether the balance between conflict and consensus 
shifted between the two jurisdictions and how this ultimately impacted the bail 
outcomes. 
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Bail outcomes in England and Canada 
 
Before examining the development of the bail decision-making process in each 
court, this section will present the outcomes of such decisions. These outcomes 
provide a partial picture as to the proportion of defendants remanded in custody 
in both courts and the attrition that occurred between the police decision to 
detain the defendants, the prosecution and defence position as to whether they 
should remain in custody, and the court’s ultimate decision as to whether they 
will be remanded in custody or on bail. As such, they offer a broad idea as to 
the level of agreement between court actors in each jurisdiction. 
 
 A preliminary examination of the bail outcomes suggests some striking 
differences between the remand decisions made in the English and Canadian 
courts. Indeed, only 12% (n=8) of bail decisions resulted in custody in Canada 
compared to 40% (n=40) in England (see Table 4.1).  
 
Table 4.1 - Bail outcomes in the English and Canadian court 
 ENGLAND CANADA 
 % N % N 
 
Bail 
 
 
60% 
 
60 
 
88% 
 
61 
Custody 40% 40 12% 8  
Total  100% 100 100% 69  
 
A total of 222 cases were observed in England, 100 of which involved 
unconvicted bail decisions for defendants appearing in custody.35 Of these 
cases, 60% (n=60) resulted in bail and 40% (n=40) resulted in a remand in 
custody. This proportion of remands in custody is much higher than the national 
percentage – 18% of all defendants who were proceeded against in 
magistrates’ court (who were remanded by magistrates) were remanded in 
custody in 2016 (Ministry of Justice, 2017b). However, the difference between 
                                            
35 In the remaining 122 cases, defendants pled guilty before the bail decision (rendering them 
convicted unsentenced defendants and making the bail outcome irrelevant) or the case was 
resolved. Since this Chapter focuses on outcomes, they were not the primary focus of the 
analyses. 
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the present results and the national statistics is foreseeable when one considers 
that the latter relate to defendants who appear both in and out of custody. 
Previous research has demonstrated that defendants would be unlikely to be 
remanded in custody if they entered the court process out-of-custody (Burrows, 
Henderson, & Morgan, 1994; Hucklesby, 1997b), thus explaining the lower 
proportions when this group is included. 
 
When studies involving the same population of defendants are examined, the 
results are much more in line with the current findings. For instance, Cape and 
Smith (2016) found slightly more than a third of in-custody defendants were 
remanded in custody across both court observations (37%, n=24) and CPS 
case files (40%, n=30). These proportions are also similar to an earlier study 
conducted in the 1990s, which reported that 40% (n=613) of defendants held by 
the police were subsequently remanded in custody by the police (Morgan & 
Henderson, 1998).  
 
While 236 cases were observed in the Canadian bail court, less than a third of 
those cases resulted in an actual bail decision.36 As such, Table 4.1 shows the 
results of 69 bail decisions observed during this period. Only 12% (n=8) of 
these cases resulted in a remand in custody. Relatively speaking, the decision 
to hold defendants in custody pending trial was made rarely in this court. 
Although national statistics are unavailable in Canada, this finding is consistent 
with the most recently available research. A study by Webster and her 
colleagues (2009) found the proportion of bail cases (i.e. those cases that 
started the court process with the defendant in-custody) which were formally 
detained in Ontario was 12% in 2007, decreasing only slightly from 13% in 
2001. In addition, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (2014) found  that 
10% of the cases (n=89) across their Ontario sample resulted in a remand in 
custody, notably less than the average across all five provinces observed, 
which was 24% (n=63).  
 
                                            
36 In the remaining 167 cases, defendants were adjourned, traversed to other courts or (very 
rarely) the prosecution withdrew their cases. As above, they were not the focus of the current 
analyses.  
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These results cannot be said to represent the jurisdictions as a whole given the 
small sample sizes. In addition, research consistently points to variability across 
courts based on unique local court cultures (Hucklesby, 1997; Webster, Sprott, 
Doob, & Mitchell, 2016). However, the findings do suggest that remand 
decisions are broadly in line with the averages in both jurisdictions. 
 
Examining these figures in aggregate form, however, masks important details 
as to how each court actor contributed to the outcomes. Indeed, the courts 
showed different patterns of agreement as the defendants moved through the 
bail process from the detention by the police to the decision to remand in 
custody or on bail by the court. Of the 69 defendants detained by the police in 
Canada, the prosecution opposed bail in 21 cases (30%) and the court 
remanded the defendant in custody in 8 cases (12%). Of the 100 cases 
detained by the police in England, the prosecution opposed bail in 51 cases 
(51%) and the court remanded the defendant in custody in 40 cases (40%). 
Clearly, a much higher rate of attrition was observed in Canada, where far fewer 
defendants were remanded in custody relative to those who entered the court 
detained by the police. The subsequent sections will shed light on how these 
figures were determined by the decision-making of the police, prosecution, 
defence, and the court. 
 
The police: The production of the in-custody population and its influence 
on court actors 
 
Although the police were not included in the observation and interview process 
and their behaviour cannot be commented on directly, their decisions are 
important to examine in the context of their influence on the court actors’ 
decision-making. They exert this influence in two main ways (Hucklesby, 
1997b). First, they advise the prosecution by providing information about the 
case and offering recommendations to the prosecution (Burrows et al., 1994). 
Given that previous research has questioned the independence of the 
prosecution from the police (Baldwin & Bedward, 1991; Sanders et al., 2010), it 
is likely this has a substantial impact on the decision-making of the prosecution. 
However, since these recommendations are filtered by the prosecution in open 
court, it was not possible to adequately examine their influence in this study. As 
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such, this study examines the second way in which the police influence court 
actors, through their role in constructing the in-custody population.  
 
As the initial ‘gatekeepers’ of the criminal justice system, the police make the 
initial decision as to who will appear in court out of custody and who will appear 
in custody to receive a determination of bail. This not only dictates the nature of 
the workload of the court, but it has also been argued to send an indirect signal 
to the court actors about the police viewpoint on bail (Hucklesby, 1997b). 
Specifically, since the police have the power to impose most conditions, they 
would only theoretically detain those defendants they believed should receive 
strict conditions that they could not impose or remands in custody. As such, the 
fact that the police held a defendant in custody might affect the court actors’ 
perception of their level of risk. 
 
This section will demonstrate that the extent to which court actors approved of 
the police use of custody had a major impact on their decision-making. 
Generally speaking, defendants detained by the police were perceived to be 
bail risks, suggesting that, consistent with previous research (Bottomley, 1970; 
Burrows et al., 1994; Hucklesby, 1997b), the police’s release/detain decision 
influenced the views of court actors. However, the nature of this impact varied 
between jurisdictions. In Canada, where the police were perceived to overuse 
custody, their influence on court actors was more tempered than in England, 
where court actors were more approving of police detention practices. This 
suggests that, similar to the findings of Hucklesby (1997a, 1997b), police 
decision-making does, to some extent influence the decisions of court actors. 
However, court actors nonetheless form their positions on bail based on their 
perceptions as to how appropriate they view police decision-making.  
 
Influence of police use of custody on the decision-making of court actors 
 
The findings suggest that the police decision to hold a defendant in custody, to 
some extent, influenced the decision-making of the court actors. This is 
consistent with previous research (Bottomley, 1970; Burrows et al., 1994; 
Hucklesby, 1997b), which found a relationship between the police 
release/detain position and the eventual court remand decision. More 
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specifically, these studies determined that defendants who were detained in 
custody by the police were unlikely to be released without some form of 
restriction on their liberty. Interviews with the defence in both England and 
Canada revealed that there was a perception that defendants who were 
detained by the police did not enter the court process with a ‘blank slate’ in 
relation to bail. Rather, their risk level was deemed higher as a result of the 
police decision. A duty counsel in Canada explained their concerns surrounding 
the impact of the police detention on the prosecution: 
 
… just because the police detain them, doesn’t mean they need to have 
a surety once they show up at our court. I think that’s where I see the 
biggest gap, is not just that maybe the police shouldn’t have held them 
necessarily, but that once they’ve been brought here they’re not released 
on an undertaking, or they’re not released on an own bail [i.e. their own 
recognizance], generally. So that’s kind of where there’s this huge gap 
between once the police hold you suddenly it’s like ‘okay well now we 
think you’re a huge risk to society’ (LN 323, Canada, DC 002). 
 
In this case, it was argued that if the police held defendants in custody it was 
likely they would be released from court on restrictive conditions. In other 
words, the case was not reviewed objectively, but was instead assumed to 
involve a heightened level of risk by virtue of the fact that the police opted to 
detain the defendant. This argument is consistent with Hucklesby's (1997b) 
projection, which suggests that when police are able to impose conditions, their 
decision to forgo this power and opt for detention sends an indirect signal to 
court actors that more severe restrictions on the defendant’s liberty are 
necessary. It is notable that this duty counsel, and several others, did not 
suggest that police detention would inevitably result in a custody position, but 
that the prosecution would suggest onerous conditions in the form of a surety. 
As such, the police decision was viewed to heighten the perceived risk of the 
defendant rather than dictate the remand decision. Although restrictions in 
access (see Chapter Three) meant the perceptions of the prosecution and the 
court were unclear in in this jurisdiction, the views of the defence did appear to 
be supported by the observations. Of the 69 defendants detained by the police 
that received bail decisions, 64 (93%) were either released on conditional bail or 
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remanded in custody 37  As such, despite the bail law dictating that an 
undertaking without conditions should be the norm, it was highly unlikely 
defendants would be released from court without restrictions.  
 
Perceptions as to the influence of the police detention decision were more 
mixed in England. Take for instance, the view of one magistrate in England, 
who was asked whether the police decision influenced their decision:  
 
If the police are bringing people to court for the first time, they’re either 
coming in on police bail or they’re in custody to the police. In terms of our 
decision-making, I don’t think the police decision about bail is necessarily 
taken into account, because, in a way, you’re starting afresh in the court 
and the responsibility for bail is going to be either the DJ or the 
magistrates. Obviously if they turn up in custody, you think, why? (LN 63, 
England, MAG 017). 
 
While this magistrate claimed that they do not take the decision of the police 
into account, they did concede that they would consider why they were 
detained. As such, it may be that the police use of detention does not dictate 
the court’s position regarding a remand in custody, but rather their view of their 
risk level more broadly. This is borne out in the observations, which, as was the 
case in Canada, revealed that defendants detained by the police were rarely 
released with unconditional bail. Of the 100 defendants detained in custody by 
the police, 93 (93%) were either released on conditional bail or remanded in 
custody. As such, like in Canada, it is conceivable that the detention by the 
police heightened the perceived risk of the defendants without dictating a 
remand in custody. One assistant prosecutor in England acknowledged the 
wide use of conditions in these cases when they were asked whether they 
would suggest detained defendants receive unconditional bail, claiming that “I 
very rarely go from a custody to nothing, really” (LN 250, England, AP 25). This 
assistant prosecutor, like several others, suggested they would be reluctant to 
suggest the release of a defendant in custody without any conditions. This 
practice appears to stem from an idea that the police would generally not detain 
a defendant without a viable reason. For instance, one magistrate in England 
commented that “generally speaking, when people do appear in custody for 
                                            
37 In an additional 4 (6%) cases the defendant was released on bail but it was unclear whether 
they had conditions imposed. As such, only one defendant was known to be released on 
unconditional bail. 
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what you might say are trivial offences, there’s always a reason why they’re in 
custody…” (LN 106, England, MAG 015). This was the same attitude taken by 
many court actors; the suggestion being that even if detained defendants 
should not be remanded in custody, it was unlikely they should be released 
without any restrictions.  
 
There is, however, a limitation in relation to these findings. For the 
methodological reasons discussed in Chapter Three, the in custody cases were 
not compared with cases in which the police released the defendants on bail 
and they appeared in court out of custody.38 As such, it is unclear to what extent 
conditions were imposed on those appearing out of custody.  
 
While it was rare that defendants in either England or Canada were released 
from court without restrictions after being held in custody by the police, the 
extent to which they were remanded in custody differed between jurisdictions. 
Specifically, court actors in England took custody positions more often than their 
counterparts in Canada. Table 4.2 demonstrates that, of the 69 cases detained 
by the police in Canada, the prosecution suggested a remand in custody in 21 
(30%) cases while the court took the same position in 8 cases (12%). By 
contrast, of the 100 cases detained by the police in England, the prosecution 
suggested a remand in custody in 51 (51%) cases while the court took the 
same position in 40 cases (40%). As such, police detentions in England were 
much more likely to result in both custody positions by the prosecution and 
remands in custody by the court than they were in Canada.  
 
This suggests that, while defendants in both jurisdictions were subjected to 
restrictions on their liberty following police detention, those in England were 
much more likely to be remanded in custody. Court actors were thus more likely 
to mitigate the police detention decision in Canada through the use of bail 
conditions than they were in England, where remand custody was used more 
often. The subsequent section will demonstrate that this disjuncture is likely to 
                                            
38 Note that a comparison between in custody and out of custody cases can only be made in 
England in this context. This is because, by law, the Court in Canada does not review the bail 
decisions of the police in out of custody cases unless a bail review is requested by the defence 
or prosecution (see Chapter Three). Since these two types of case do not go through the same 
decision-making process, a comparison between them would not be methodologically sound.  
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be rooted in differences in the use of custody by the police in England and 
Canada and, consequently, the extent to which court actors agreed with their 
decisions  
 
Table 4.2 - Defendants held in custody by the police according to the bail 
position of the prosecution and the remand decision of the court 
 CANADA ENGLAND 
 Prosecution 
Position 
Court 
Decision 
Prosecution 
Position 
Court 
Decision 
 N % N % N % N % 
Bail 
 
48  70% 61 88% 26 26% 60 60% 
Custody 
 
21 30% 8 12% 51 51% 40 40% 
No Position 
 
0 -- 0 -- 23 23% 0 -- 
Total 69 100% 69 100% 100 100% 100 100% 
 
Police use of custody 
 
While the police detention decision was found to influence court actors, the 
extent of this influence depended on their views on their use of custody. 
Previous research suggests that the police rely on custody more in Canada 
than they do in England (see Chapter Two). Although there is limited research 
on their use of bail in Canada, there is some indication that close to half of the 
cases in Ontario begin the court process in custody (Doob, 2012; Doob et al., 
2017), coinciding with calls from charities (Canadian Civil Liberties Association, 
2014; John Howard Society, 2013) and the government (Re-inventing Criminal 
Justice, 2012; Steering Committee on Justice Efficiencies, 2006) to improve the 
police’s exercise of discretion in order to curtail their use of custody. By 
contrast, the number of defendants held in custody by the police has declined in 
recent years in England (Ministry of Justice, 2017b) following budget cuts put in 
place beginning with the coalition government in 2010 (Garside & Ford, 2016). 
This disjuncture is significant as previous research suggests that policies 
guiding police detention practices can influence differences in broader bail 
decision-making processes across jurisdictions (King et al., 2009). 
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Perceptions of court actors on police use of custody 
 
In line with the aforementioned research, court actors were more likely to agree 
with the police detention decision in England than in Canada. Indeed, all eight 
defence/duty counsel interviewed in Canada suggested that the police should 
be releasing more defendants into the community following arrest rather than 
holding them in custody to appear in bail court. The findings support research 
that suggests police are perceived to overuse custody in Canada (Canadian 
Civil Liberties Association, 2014; John Howard Society, 2013; Webster et al., 
2009). Many counsel believed that, although police had the power under the law 
to release defendants, they were constrained by police policies that were overly 
cautious in nature. One defence counsel in Canada expressed frustration about 
the difficulties they would often face when trying to negotiate the release of their 
clients from the police station:  
 
The police could be releasing many, many more people. Like, many, 
many more. I do think that a lot of the time it is a policy based thing. I 
think that while by law of course they have a huge amount of discretion, I 
think that there are a lot of policies that constrain them. I hear from 
officers all the time, when I call them up because a client is in their 
custody, I say, “can you not just release them from the station? This is 
not that serious” and you go through the whole thing, and so often you 
get the response “well you know in these cases we have to detain them.” 
Do they really have to? Not by law of course (LN 207, Canada, DEF 
004). 
 
Multiple counsel also pointed to the fact that it was not just repeat offenders or 
those alleged to have committed violent offences that were detained in custody 
by the police. In fact, many claimed that it was not unusual for those with no 
criminal record, who had committed minor offences, to make their first 
appearance in custody. One duty counsel explained this issue: 
 
…we have seen cases where they have a very limited record if any at all 
and they're charged with shoplifting or they may have an outstanding 
unrelated charge, like an assault charge, and they're out on bail and then 
they're caught shoplifting and then they're detained… (LN 454, Canada, 
DC 003). 
 
Not only was this tendency viewed to be contrary to the bail laws – which 
suggest custody should be a final resort in the bail decision-making process – it 
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was also consistently described as a poor use of resources. This is because, as 
the duty counsel argued, minor cases rarely resulted in a remand in custody by 
the court, suggesting that many 39  of these defendants could have been 
released at an earlier stage.  
 
Many counsel also believed that the police were overly cautious as the result of 
extreme circumstances in which a defendant offended on bail. For example, 
one duty counsel in Canada claimed that  
 
Every few years a very extreme incident happens where, for instance, 
somebody will be let out or is, you know, free and somebody gets killed 
or something like that. And those extreme very tragic circumstances lead 
to more blanket policies. (LN 225, Canada, DEF 004).  
 
There was a strongly held perception that defendants were held in custody, 
despite the circumstances of the offence, as a result of previous cases that 
ended in tragedy for the victims. The general sentiment expressed by the 
defence and duty counsel in Canada was consistent with other research in this 
area, which has argued that police in Canada tend to be risk averse and 
prioritise public safety when they are making decisions related to bail (Webster, 
2015). This practice was central to the former Conservative government’s ‘law 
and order’ politics, in which security and imprisonment were highly valued 
(Doob & Webster, 2006). In support of this rhetoric, a significant amount of 
money was invested in the police force, specifically (Di Matteo, 2014), and the 
criminal justice system, more broadly (Office of the Parliamentary Budget 
Officer, 2013).40 Indeed, the 2008 budget saw an investment of 400 million 
dollars into police recruitment (Department of Finance Canada, 2008).  
 
It is notable that – because the prosecution and the court were not interviewed 
– the views discussed in Canada were exclusively those expressed by defence 
counsel. Given their role, these court actors would presumably be those most 
likely to disagree with the police decision to hold defendants in custody. While 
                                            
39 Note that in some of these cases it is conceivable that the police held defendants in order for 
them to obtain an address or so that conditions could be applied that they were unable to 
impose (i.e. sureties, Bail Program) rather than because they were seeking their detention. 
40This appeared to be the continuation of an ongoing trend that emerged before the 
Conservatives came into power, with reports verifying that police expenditures had been 
increasing since the beginning of the 21st century (Nuffield, 1997).  
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one must keep this potential bias in mind when interpreting these results, it is 
also important to acknowledge that other sources suggest this view was 
strongly held and consistently expressed across practitioners from a range of 
different professional backgrounds (Re-inventing Criminal Justice, 2012; 
Steering Committee on Justice Efficiencies, 2006). Further, there were striking 
similarities between the views of all eight counsel, which as the following 
discussion illustrates, was not the case in England.  
 
In England, there were mixed views as to whether police held the appropriate 
defendants in custody. While the actors mostly approved of police decision-
making in this regard, some stated that they disapproved occasionally, and a 
few stated that they held too many defendants in custody. The vast majority of 
the actors held the opinion that the police mostly ‘got it right’ but there were 
nonetheless occasions in which they disagreed with their decision. The 
response provided by the following prosecutor accurately represents the typical 
attitude found in England: 
 
Generally, yes [the police detain the appropriate defendants]. But there 
are some surprising decisions that when they get into court you think, 
why did they remand this person, why have they chosen to bail this 
person or summons them or whatever? But generally speaking you do 
tend to get the right people in custody (LN 138, England, CPS 026).  
 
Unlike in Canada, several defence solicitors also shared this attitude. Indeed, 
two out of five defence solicitors in England indicated that they generally agreed 
with the police decision, one of which responding in the following manner: 
 
They do tend to get it right in terms of who they will bail and who they will 
keep in custody but… I’m not saying it’s perfect but it’s not… it’s not so 
bad that I’ve got major concerns (LN 250, England, DEF 021). 
 
Finally, the other three out of five defence solicitors and one District Judge 
viewed the police to make poor decisions in relation to bail and stated that they 
remanded too many defendants in custody. This was notably a dissenting view, 
with only 4 out of 20 court actors expressing a lack of approval with police 
detention practices. This was the position held by the following defence solicitor 
in England:  
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…my experience is that the police often remand too many people for the 
court, who we know will be given bail in the first instance. So why not 
avoid that and just bail them to a date… (LN 269, England, DEF 019).  
 
While, as this defence solicitor suggested, some viewed police to make poor 
decisions, in the main the court actors tended to view their decision-making to 
be fair.  
 
Many of the more experienced court actors commented that the police use of 
bail in England had changed over time. Multiple court actors pointed to the 
recent rise in the use of summons highlighted in Chapter Two. For example, 
one defence solicitor in England made the following comment: 
 
I mean the fact is these days one of the big things that has changed is 
now people get more summons and postal requisitions for very serious 
offences. They could effectively just attend for more and more voluntary 
interviews, which basically means that more and more people aren’t 
being held in custody, being remanded from custody, from the police 
station to the magistrates and then not getting bail (LN 284, England, 
DEF 022). 
  
 
Postal requisitions are documents that defendants receive through the post that 
require their attendance in court. Unlike summons, they do not require prior 
reference to the court (Bowles & Perry, 2009). The observation made by this 
defence solicitor is consistent with the national statistics (see Chapter Two; 
Ministry of Justice, 2017a), which suggest a growing number of defendants are 
appearing in court through these means as opposed to in custody or on bail. 
Several court actors tied this change to reductions in police expenditure. 
 
The increased use of postal requisitions has been tied to a wider government 
initiative to reduce spending in the criminal justice system (Bowles & Perry, 
2009; Garside & Ford, 2016). At the time of the study the entire criminal justice 
system was operating under the context of austerity (Garside & Ford, 2016). As 
a result, the police made substantial cuts, reducing their spending by 253 billion 
pounds – 20% of their overall expenditure (HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, 
2010). It is conceivable that the decrease in the number of defendants 
appearing in court in-custody was – at least in part – a product of these cuts.  
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Observations on police use of custody 
 
An examination of the cases that entered the English and Canadian courts in 
custody sheds some light on the differences in the court actors’ views on the 
police use of bail. Indeed, police decision-making is directly responsible for the 
‘types’ of cases that appeared in custody. Table 4.3 sets out the characteristics 
of the cases that were observed to start the court process in custody in each 
jurisdiction. These categories were developed based on the court observations 
and thus reflect the information conveyed in open court as opposed to the 
information the court actors would have obtained in the case files. 
 
Table 4.3 - Characteristics of the cases entering the court in custody 
 CANADA ENGLAND 
 % N Total* % N Total** 
Defendant had a 
criminal record 
69%  68 99 88%  144 163 
Defendant was on 
bail 
54% 68 127 56% 95 171 
Case involved 
offence against the 
person 
57% 134 236 46%  93 203 
Case involved a 
breach of bail 
20%  48 236 20%  40 204 
Case involved 
administration of 
justice 
offence/default 
43% 102 236 56%  114 203 
*Although 236 cases entered the court in-custody in Canada, the total column represents the 
number of cases in which each characteristic was known.  
**As with the Canadian cases, only known cases were included in each total. After removing the 
cases that were not detained for the purposes of a bail decision, 204 cases entered in-custody 
in England.  
 
While not all of the cases presented in the table resulted in a court bail decision 
– some were resolved or adjourned – they were all held in custody because the 
police chose to exercise their power to detain the defendant. In other words, all 
of these cases were held for the purposes of a court bail decision even if they 
ultimately did not receive one.41  
                                            
41Note that cases that entered the court in-custody in England as the result of a breach of the 
peace, breach of a community order, or breach of a suspended sentence were not included in 
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The observations presented in Table 4.3 suggest that the cases entering the 
courts in custody in England and Canada were similar, but did contain some 
important differences. In terms of their similarities, a comparable number of 
cases involved defendants who were on bail and who were alleged to have 
breached their bail. Indeed, about half of the defendants detained by the police 
were on bail and a fifth were alleged to have breached their bail in both England 
and Canada. However, the police in England were more likely to detain 
defendants with a criminal record and who were alleged to have committed an 
administration of justice offence/default 42  (e.g. failure to appear, breach of 
bail/sentence) and less likely to detain defendants alleged to have committed an 
offence against the person. Defendants were 20% more likely to have a criminal 
record (88%, n=144) and 13% more likely to be charged with an administration 
of justice offence/default (56%, n=114) in England than they were in Canada 
(69%, n=68 and 43%, n=102, respectively). However, defendants in Canada 
were 11% more likely to be charged with an offence against the person (57%, 
n=134) than they were in England (46%, n=93).  
 
These findings shed some light on the perceptions outlined by the court actors. 
Specifically, cases in England were more likely to involve both a criminal record 
and an administration of justice offence/default allegation. Both of these 
characteristics directly relate to the grounds for refusing bail as they may 
suggest there is a risk the defendant may continue to commit offences or, by 
virtue of disrespecting court orders, may fail to attend court in the future. The 
fact that a higher proportion of cases share these characteristics in England 
may explain why court actors in this jurisdiction were, in the main, more 
satisfied with the detention practices by the police. Indeed, defendants who 
possess characteristics that align with the grounds might be viewed as the 
appropriate candidates to be held in custody whereas those who do not may be 
considered more acceptable for a release on bail.  
 
Both the interviews and observations suggest that differences in the use of 
police detention resulted in disparate in-custody populations in England and 
                                                                                                                                
the analyses as they would never involve a bail decision and were thus not detained for reasons 
related to bail. 
42 These were always considered offences in Canada but were mostly (with the exception of 
failure to surrender) considered defaults in England.  
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Canada. Consistent with previous research (Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association, 2014; John Howard Society, 2013), this is perceived to amount to 
an overuse of custody by the police in Canada, resulting in a caseload made up 
of multiple minor cases and a disproportionate amount of vulnerable 
defendants. By contrast, court actors in England perceive their in-custody 
caseload to be decreasing and, in the main, approved of the detention decisions 
made by the police. The observations support these views, demonstrating that 
defendants held in custody by the police in England were more likely to possess 
characteristics that align with the grounds for refusing bail.  
 
Summary 
 
These findings suggest that, while a police detention decision did not prescribe 
a remand in custody, it did seem to influence the prosecution and the court in 
terms of the risk they ascribed to defendants. Specifically, court actors in both 
England and Canada would be unlikely to suggest a defendant held in custody 
by the police should be released without conditions. This suggests that the 
decision-making of the court actors was, to some extent influenced by that of 
the police. However, the findings also suggest that the decision of the police is 
not considered in isolation. Indeed, the extent to which court actors agreed with 
the police use of custody appears to influence their decision-making, mediating 
how much they use custody themselves.  
  
The differences in the caseloads and the extent to which they were supported 
by the court actors thus set the stage for divergent levels of agreement between 
the prosecution and defence in England and Canada and consequently a 
different attitude towards relying on traditional adversarial roles during their 
initial discussions. This is explored further in the subsequent section.  
 
The prosecution and defence: Informal negotiations and the search for 
common ground 
 
The role of the prosecution and defence in the bail process is to take positions 
on the remand status of defendants and subsequently convey that position to 
the court – albeit in varying levels of detail. Previous research suggests that 
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much of the decision-making process that precedes their representations is 
undertaken during informal discussions outside of open court (Hucklesby, 
1997a, 1997b). These types of negotiations are not unique to the bail process 
(Cole, 1970; Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; McConville, Hodgson, Bridges, & 
Pavlovic, 1994); rather, they are employed during the entirety of the court 
process and involve persuasion and a search for common ground. These 
discussions and the agreements that are undertaken within them are 
particularly important at the bail stage given that the view of the prosecution has 
been shown to have a major influence on the decision of the court (Burrows et 
al., 1994; Hucklesby, 1996, 1997b). As such, the position of the prosecution at 
the conclusion of the negotiation can be expected to have a critical role in 
shaping the bail outcome. 
 
This section will demonstrate that, in line with previous research (Cole, 1970; 
Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; McConville et al., 1994), informal discussions 
typically took place between the prosecution and the defence prior to appearing 
in open court. However, court actors in England and Canada viewed the nature 
of these negotiations considerably differently. While the discussions in Canada 
tended to result in more joint bail positions, they were also perceived to involve 
hostility and minimal cohesion between actors. In comparison, conversations 
between the prosecution and defence in England were described much more 
collegially but also resulted in a lower level of agreement in terms of their 
ultimate position on bail. It is argued that the extent to which the incentives and 
goals of court actors converged affected the extent to which they worked 
together, which ultimately dictated the shape of the negotiations and the level 
and nature of agreement between the court actors. 
 
The nature of the negotiations 
 
The following discussion will demonstrate that negotiations were frequently 
undertaken during the bail process in England and Canada, that these 
negotiations resulted in different outcomes between jurisdictions, and that court 
actors perceived the nature of the negotiations to be shaped by conflict in 
Canada and consensus in England.  
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Presence of the negotiation 
 
In both jurisdictions, the court actors reported that there was almost always a 
discussion between the prosecution and defence in which their positions on bail 
were discussed prior to appearing in front of the court. This is consistent with 
previous research (Cole, 1970; Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977), which has argued 
that negotiations are the most commonly used work technique within the 
courtroom workgroup. It is also in line with previous bail research (Hucklesby, 
1997a, 1997b), which suggests that much of the decision-making during the bail 
process occurs outside of open court. Although the nature of the negotiations 
were perceived to vary between individuals and jurisdictions, court actors 
suggested that they would involve, at minimum, a conversation about each 
court actor’s respective bail positions, and in other cases, more drawn out 
discussions. For instance, one duty counsel in Canada described the 
discussions they had with the prosecution: 
 
So if [the prosecution has] already taken a position and they’re agreeing 
to release the person then I won’t tell them anything because you don’t 
want to give them more information than you have to. If they have 
already taken a position and they’re looking for their detention or they’re 
asking for a residential surety that you don’t have then I would let them 
know that [the defendants is] Aboriginal if they are because sometimes 
that changes some Crowns’ minds. Or if they’ve got issues that they’re 
dealing with and you’re like ‘well some of the context for why they may 
have been arrested is that they’re dealing with X, Y, and Z and here’s 
what I have in place to address those concerns.’ If it’s a surety obviously 
I’ll explain that I have surety. Or if they’re seeking their detention but I 
have a residential surety who’s going to be able to offer a lot of 
supervision then I’ll try and convince them to move from their original 
position to agree to whatever plan I’ve got to address whatever concerns 
they may have. And obviously I’ll ask them what their concerns are and 
then figure out what I have that can address those concerns and see if 
that changes their mind (LN 1102, DC 003, Canada).  
 
This duty counsel explained that the discussion often involved suggesting 
alternatives to custody that would satisfy the concerns of the prosecution. This 
might include bail conditions or, particularly in Canada, securing a surety or 
some other form of social support. Ultimately the objective in both jurisdictions 
was to arrive at an agreement as to the appropriate bail outcome. This was also 
expressed by one defence solicitor in England, who described the discussion 
they had with the prosecution in the following way:	
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The discussion will go, ‘what are you saying on bail? Are you opposing it 
or do you agree conditions?’ If they are already in agreement then you 
will say, ‘how about this, how about that?’ Then that’s it, or they’ll even 
suggest [bail conditions] … it’s always better if they can agree it because 
then they don’t need to go through the whole hullabaloo of making the 
opposition and this, that and the other and just get on with it (LN 839,  
England, DEF 022).  
 
As was the case in Canada, the conversations in England typically involved a 
discussion of each actor’s position on bail and an attempt to alleviate any 
concerns with bail conditions. As this defence solicitor highlighted, it was 
deemed preferable to arrive at an agreement before appearing in court.  
 
Outcome of the negotiations 
 
The outcomes of the informal discussions that took place between the 
prosecution and defence were reflected in the nature of the bail appearances 
observed in each court. This was established by examining to what extent the 
actors appeared before the court in agreement about their positions on bail. The 
observations suggested that a large proportion of the cases involved situations 
in which the prosecution and defence were not in opposition about the 
appropriate bail outcome. This is outlined in Table 4.4, which reveals the types 
of appearances observed in cases in which bail decisions were made.43  
 
For the sake of consistency, the terminology used to describe the appearances 
in both jurisdictions was based on the Canadian terms that were frequently 
employed by court actors. First, cases in which the prosecution explicitly agreed 
to bail were referred to as ‘consent releases’. Second, cases in which the 
defence explicitly agreed to custody were referred to as ‘consent detentions’. In 
both of these instances, the court actors were appearing before the court with a 
joint position on bail. Third, when the defence made a bail application and the 
prosecution offered no position, they were categorised as ‘no prosecution 
decision’. These types of appearances only occurred in England, and typically 
involved the prosecution refraining from providing their view on bail, 
theoretically leaving the decision as a matter for the court. However, given that 
                                            
43 As Chapter Three indicated, at least half of the appearances in both jurisdictions did not 
involve a bail decision and were thus not included in this analysis. 
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the onus was on the prosecution to demonstrate whether a remand in custody 
was necessary, no prosecution position generally proceeded in the same 
fashion as a consent release. As such, consent releases, consent detentions, 
and appearances involving no prosecution decision were all considered 
uncontested appearances.  
 
Table 4.4 – Cases in which a bail decision was made according to the type 
of appearance observed 
 CANADA ENGLAND 
 % N % N  
Consent Release 70% 48 26% 26 
No Prosecution Position 0% 0 23% 23 
Consent Detention 4% 3 13% 13 
Contested Hearing 26% 18 38% 38 
TOTAL 100% 69 100% 100 
 
Finally, in situations in which the defence made a bail application and the 
prosecution applied for a remand in custody, the appearances were referred to 
as ‘contested hearings’. It was only contested hearings that resembled the 
adversarial procedure described earlier in the chapter, as the prosecution and 
defence would present representations related to opposing bail positions in 
these appearances.  
 
Table 4.4 suggests that, while the majority of appearances were uncontested in 
both jurisdictions, the prosecution and defence were more likely to form a joint 
position on bail in Canada than in England. In Canada, 74% (n=51) of 
appearances involved either a consent release or a consent detention, 
suggesting the prosecution and defence came before the court with a joint 
position in the large majority of cases. In comparison, appearances in England 
involved consent releases or contested detentions in 39% (n=39) of cases, thus 
offering joint positions in just over a third of cases. It is notable, though, that in 
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an additional 23% (n=23) of appearances in England, no prosecution position 
was provided. The absence of the prosecution’s view indicates that these 
appearances cannot be considered joint positions. However, since the burden 
rested on the prosecution to demonstrate why a remand in custody was 
necessary, an omission from them was interpreted similarly to a consent 
release. The prosecutors themselves indicated during the interviews that this 
behaviour was often exhibited out of respect for the court rather than because 
they were opposed to bail. This was explained by one prosecutor in England: 
 
You don’t want to undermine the court and try and suggest to them in 
any way that the decision has been taken out of their hands. I know that 
will quite often anger a lot of defence solicitors. Again, in a previous life 
[as a defence solicitor], I think I’d convinced the prosecutor to release 
somebody on bail and I stood up and said ‘oh we’ve agreed bail’ and the 
DJ said ‘I think you’ll find that’s my decision to make.’ And of course, 
that’s what I meant, I meant to say we’ve agreed that the Crown have no 
concerns, and my client got remanded into custody. I think the DJ had a 
bit of a bee in his bonnet when I stood up and said we agreed bail (LN 
480, England, CPS 026).  
 
In order to avoid situations such as the one described, the prosecutor would 
often stay silent or suggest it was ‘a matter for yourselves’ when addressing the 
court. As such, while these appearances were intentionally not presented as 
joint positions, they certainly indicated that the prosecution did not oppose bail. 
When cases in which no prosecution position was taken were included in the 
total, 62% (n=62) of cases involved an uncontested appearance in England.  
 
In sum, the majority of appearances in both England (62%) and Canada (74%) 
were uncontested, albeit to a slightly greater extent in Canada. These 
observations are in line with arguments that negotiations are used more than 
adversarial procedures in courtroom decision-making (Baldwin & McConville, 
1977; Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; Hucklesby, 1996). Indeed, only a minority of 
cases – about a quarter (26%, n=18) in Canada and over a third (38%, n=38) in 
England – resulted in a contested hearing. This also suggests, however, that 
the extent to which the prosecution and defence agreed varied between 
jurisdictions. This finding was both corroborated and put into context by the 
interviews, which are discussed below. 
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Perceptions of the negotiation 
 
In line with Young (2013), the findings suggest that the degree of consensus 
within courtroom workgroups may be overstated in the previous literature (see, 
for example, Cole, 1970; Hucklesby, 1997a; Lipetz, 1980, 1984; Rumgay, 
1995). Indeed, the subsequent discussion will illustrate that negotiations were 
not always characterised by a cooperative culture, and that this characterisation 
was in line with the findings in England, but not in Canada.  
 
The descriptions of the negotiations that were provided in the interviews confirm 
previous research that suggests that much of the power during the process was 
held by the prosecution (Cole, 1970; Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; McIntyre & 
Lippman, 1970). Indeed, the differences in the approach between the 
prosecutors in each jurisdiction were shown to have a major influence on the 
shape of the discussions. It appeared as though there was a disjuncture in the 
‘courtroom influence patterns’ (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977) in that the 
prosecutors would be much more likely to occupy an authority position in 
Canada than in England. This is demonstrated through an examination of the 
negotiations, as perceived by the court actors. 
 
In Canada, the vast majority of the defence counsel described the informal 
discussions with prosecutors to be frequently hostile. Although many of them 
conceded that this was not representative of all their interactions, it was largely 
considered the norm. For instance, one duty counsel in Canada described the 
discussions in the following way: 
 
So I think within the Crown’s office there are some excellent Crowns here 
who are wonderful people, very friendly, very respectful, listen to you, 
take reasonable positions, exercise their discretion properly. I would say 
it’s less than half who would fall into that category ... And there is the 
other extreme. People who are consistently disrespectful, aggressive, 
kind of outrageous in some of the things that they say, how they treat 
duty counsel, how they treat private counsel, how they treat clients, not 
understanding the role of defence counsel, making really inflammatory 
comments undermining, you know, questioning your integrity, that kind of 
thing. Like just completely outrageous. And there’s like, a few, Crowns 
that will do that, where it’s like, people don’t even bother negotiating with 
them anymore (LN 984, Canada, DC 003).  
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The defence counsel believed that these types of interactions took place as a 
result of the prosecutors taking on an authority position during the bail process 
and utilising their power to achieve their own objectives. This led to a pattern of 
influence in which the prosecutor effectively ‘ruled’ the court (Eisenstein & 
Jacob, 1977). One private defence counsel in Canada described this situation: 
 
…the Crown tends to assert its role as though it were the authority figure 
in the courtroom. The niceties are observed but the Crown has 
tremendous power at that stage and uses that power (LN 495, Canada, 
DEF 008).  
 
Previous research has suggested that the prosecutor may control the 
proceedings through their superior access to information about the case 
(Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977). In comparison, these findings suggest that in bail 
negotiations prosecutors exert influence through their ability to offer consent 
releases.  A refusal to agree on a release position represents a ‘unilateral 
decision’ (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977) on the part of the prosecution as it 
eliminates the possibility of appearing in court with a joint position and 
effectively imposes a contested hearing on the defence. In order to avoid a 
contested hearing and demonstrate that their client was suitable for a release, 
the defence counsel would bargain with the prosecution using bail conditions. 
Many of the counsel in Canada described a process in which they were almost 
begging the prosecution to agree to a consent release. The following duty 
counsel described this situation: 
 
…there is definitely a mentality that kind of ‘Crown knows best’ and we 
are often times kind of running around begging for things and kind of 
pleading for things, as opposed to this approach where everybody is 
equal and – they hold so much of the power. Especially at our 
courthouse when we can find we run out of time for bail hearings and 
things like that. And so it’s kind of you either give us what you want or the 
person goes over in jail for another night. So there’s a lot of times where 
we would agree to things that we wouldn’t necessarily agree to because 
of that dynamic (LN 779, Canada, DC 002).  
 
This duty counsel, like the vast majority of the defence counsel, suggested that 
they were under considerable pressure to agree to restrictive bail conditions in 
order to avoid a contested hearing. Defence counsel explained that in many 
instances they would offer increasingly onerous conditions until the prosecution 
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would agree to bail. Since this might involve securing a surety or obtaining an 
agreement from the Bail Program (i.e. a programme that assists with the 
supervision of defendants as an alternative to custody) it was not unusual for 
the bargaining process to span over several days.  
 
The assertion that the prosecution commonly requested these relatively 
onerous restrictions was supported by the observations, in which the 
prosecution requested sureties in 61% (n=41) of cases in which they agreed to 
bail. Of the remaining cases in which sureties were not requested, Bail Program 
supervision was requested in 37% (n=7) of them. This meant that the 
prosecution requested some form of supervision in 80% (n=40) of the cases in 
which they agreed to bail.  
 
Ultimately, the defence counsel in Canada described a negotiation process 
whereby the prosecution would agree to appear in front of the court with a joint 
position on bail in exchange for agreed upon releases involving multiple bail 
conditions, often involving a surety or Bail Program supervision. This frequently 
resulted in a mutually agreed upon, but uneasy consensus in the Canadian bail 
court. 
 
These findings are again influenced by the absence of interviews with 
prosecutors and justices of the peace. One might argue that it is unsurprising 
that the prosecution, who often act as a barrier to the release of the counsels’ 
clients, would be considered unreasonable by the defence. Their perceptions 
are, however, in line with recent research that found prosecutors requested 
overly restrictive releases in bail proceedings (see Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association, 2014) and governmental reports that suggested prosecutors be 
trained to use their discretion to request less onerous bail outcomes (see 
Steering Committee on Justice Efficiencies, 2006). When taken together with 
both the interviews and the observations, this suggests there is merit in the 
characterisation of the prosecution as favouring restrictive bail positions. 
However, given the lack of prosecutorial participation, this analysis is not 
presented with the view of forming definitive conclusions on this matter. Rather, 
it is intended to highlight the significant discord between the prosecution and 
150 
 
defence in the Canadian bail court and thus the culture of conflict that existed 
within the negotiation process.  
 
The court actors in England described a negotiation process much more 
centred on consensus than that in Canada. The dynamic in this court was more 
reflective of the cooperative work environments described in previous research 
examining the bail court process (Doherty & East, 1985; Hucklesby, 1997b). For 
instance, when one defence solicitor was asked to describe the dynamic 
between the prosecution and the defence at the English court, they responded 
in the following way: 
 
I think this is a very good court; everyone is very friendly, very respectful. 
All the… everybody is very professional. But I’ve been fortunate enough 
to work in a couple of courts and I think that’s the same. I think it makes 
for a happier working environment doesn’t it? Because don’t forget 
you’ve probably seen your colleagues at this court more than you see the 
colleagues in your office...So if you don’t get along with the colleagues 
who are sat in court, that doesn’t make for a good environment (LN 834, 
England, DEF 023).  
 
Court actors frequently described the negotiation process in collegial terms, 
emphasising that the court actors would work together to achieve their 
respective objectives. They also described a courtroom influence pattern that 
was more reflective of the traditional adversarial structure. Unlike in Canada, 
the court, or in some cases where magistrates were sitting, a legal adviser, 
were viewed to be the actors that ‘ruled’ the court. This view was consistent 
across all the court actors interviewed. For instance, this was discussed by one 
prosecutor in England:  
 
When I first started at this job I was told ‘you as the prosecutor, you’re 
effectively running the court.’ It’s not the experience I had in [another 
court], I wouldn’t say it’s the experience I’ve had here. I think if it’s a 
District Judge, the District Judge is very much in control of the court. If 
it’s not a District Judge, often it’s the legal adviser. Some legal advisers 
are very good and very assertive and do their job, advise the magistrates 
well. Because they’re legally trained unlike magistrates. I think I’d have to 
say it’s either the District Judge or the Legal Adviser. I wouldn’t say that 
the prosecutor runs the court. Obviously the court can’t go ahead, can’t 
move on without me, but I haven’t felt myself, perceived myself to be in 
that position before (LN 574, England, CPS 024).  
	
151 
 
The defence solicitors agreed with this perspective, never expressing the view 
that the court was prosecution led. Since the court or a legal adviser tended to 
take the authority role in the bail process, the defence was less likely to 
perceive themselves as being on the ‘back foot’ more generally and thus the 
discussion was not described in the same way as the imbalanced bargaining 
process that occurred in Canada.  
 
Despite the seemingly more cooperative negotiations, the observations still 
suggested there were fewer joint positions in England than in Canada (see 
Table 4.4). While this may not seem to align with the collegial atmosphere, 
there are two reasons that this was the case. First, an associate prosecutor or a 
barrister working on contract as an agent commonly appeared for the CPS in 
England. Unlike prosecutors, these actors did not have the authority to change 
their position about bail. As such, they would be unable to negotiate unless they 
had the permission of a CPS lawyer. One assistant prosecutor in England 
explained this situation: 
 
It’s slightly different for me because I – although I do make a decision, I 
have to get authority to do that. So when they come to us they’re already 
in custody. So then it’s are we applying to keep them there and if I look at 
it and I think ‘I don’t think they should’ I can’t make that decision, I’m not 
allowed to as an associate prosecutor, so I have to get authority from a 
lawyer (LN 35, England, AP 025).  
 
Since the remand court could be busy, assistant prosecutors and agents did not 
always have the time to phone the CPS for a review if they held the view that 
the defendant should be released. 
 
Second, it appeared as though the general attitude of the defence was that 
once a prosecutor had established a position, it was not acceptable to continue 
to press them to change their mind. This was explained by one defence solicitor 
in England when they were describing the negotiation process:  
	
So I would say, for example, in a domestic case … ‘You know [the 
victim’s] been in touch, or you know she’s sat outside?’ And they’ll be 
like, ‘no.’ So in those circumstances, I would provide information [to the 
prosecutor] but I wouldn’t engage in trying … in the decision-making 
process with the prosecutor when it’s not for us to decide. I’d just sit and 
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prepare my application as it should be prepared (LN 719, England, DEF 
023).  
	
The typical mentality appeared to be that once prosecutors took a position, the 
actors would proceed to a contested hearing if there were still disagreements. 
As such, court actors in England may have been less inclined to engage in a 
bargaining process than their counterparts in Canada. However, while they 
appeared to form fewer overt agreements in England, the negotiation process 
itself was perceived to be much more cooperative.  
 
This examination of the nature of the negotiations between the prosecution and 
defence in England and Canada suggest that collegial workgroups were not 
necessarily more likely to negotiate or to form joint positions. This is contrary to 
previous research (Gertz, 1980), which assumed that positive relationships and 
negotiation went hand in hand during informal discussions. It may be that, in 
England, actors were less willing to strain positive relationships with attempts at 
persuasion that may be perceived as antagonistic. This was contrary to the 
situation in Canada, where hostility often existed between the actors despite 
more negotiations taking place. Indeed, if strong relationships did not exist at 
the outset, the need to be cordial and cooperative might have been deemed 
unnecessary.  
 
The incentives underlying the negotiation 
 
The approach to the negotiations detailed above can be understood in terms of 
the various incentives motivating the court actors in each jurisdiction. It has 
been argued that the specific incentives that encourage individual actors can 
explain their decision-making during the court process (Church, 1982; Cole, 
1970; Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; Levin, 1975; Ryan & Lipetz, 1982). This is 
because court actors are semi-independent decision-makers with their own 
personal and professional goals. As such, they can be expected to respond to 
certain economic, social, intellectual and professional incentives to do some 
things and not others (Luskin & Luskin, 1986).  These findings support this 
research, suggesting that the approach to negotiations in each jurisdiction was, 
at least in part, a product of the individual incentives held by court actors.  
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There were some incentives that were shared by court actors in both England 
and Canada. For instance, in both jurisdictions the prosecution and defence 
were motivated to reduce the uncertainty of the proceedings. This was 
demonstrated by one private defence counsel in Canada, who explained why 
they preferred to have a consent release rather than run a contested hearing:  
  
Ideally, we do risk management, and lawyers tend to be risk averse. I’m 
getting more risk averse as I go. I would rather have a consent than 
leave it up to a decision-maker. Load the dice (LN 62, Canada, DEF 
007).  
 
This private defence counsel, like many other court actors wanted to increase 
their level of certainty in the bail outcome (i.e. ‘load the dice’) by coming to an 
agreement with the prosecution beforehand. As one defence solicitor in 
England stated: “I mean if, if the Crown have agreed it’s a home run isn’t it? The 
court are just going to sanction what you’ve agreed” (LN 638, England, DEF 
019). This is consistent with research by Eisenstein and Jacob (1977), who 
suggest that one of the primary goals of the courtroom workgroup is to reduce 
uncertainty. This is because unpredictable procedures, such as trials and 
contested bail hearings, have unclear outcomes and require an unknown 
amount of time and resources. The findings suggested that both the prosecution 
and the defence were motivated to avoid such procedures and form 
agreements. 
 
Uncontested appearances were also perceived to enable the court process to 
run more smoothly. This is also consistent with previous research, which has 
highlighted that court actors aim to move through the court list as quickly as 
possible (Lipetz, 1980; Myers, 2015). This was confirmed by one defence 
solicitor in England, who explained the benefits of uncontested appearance 
from an efficiency standpoint: 
 
… the bench even looks to see whether the Crown would agree bail 
because we don’t want to waste the court time with a half an hour bail 
application when it could have been agreed between the parties… (LN 
625, England, DEF 019).  
 
It was recognised across jurisdictions that uncontested appearances were likely 
to take less time than contested hearings. As such, avoiding contested hearings 
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enabled the court actors to move through the court list more quickly. As one 
duty counsel in Canada commented, “there’s just not enough time to have that 
many contested bail hearings” (LN 837, Canada, DC 003). As such, by forming 
agreements beforehand the court actors were able to finish their work 
expeditiously. Clearly, there were mutually beneficial reasons to avoid 
contested hearings across actors and jurisdictions.  
 
While some incentives were common to all members of the courtroom 
workgroup, there were many others that were unique to each actor and each 
jurisdiction. This is because court actors pursue distinctly different interests and 
purposes and may understand their participation in the bail process in entirely 
different ways (Feeley, 1983). Some of this variation could be attributed to the 
fact that many of the court actors were accountable to their respective 
‘sponsoring organisations’. According to Eisenstein and Jacob (1977), each 
sponsoring organisation has their own organisational goals and, to some extent, 
regulate the behaviour of those working for them. 
 
Overall, the fragmented nature of the actors’ goals was shown to contribute to 
the shape of the negotiations in each jurisdiction. Specifically, in Canada the 
findings suggest that the prosecution and defence were more likely to have 
competing objectives, whereas in England they were often driven by mutually 
beneficial goals. These differences mediated the extent to which the mutual 
incentives of reducing uncertainty and moving through the court list impacted 
the decision-making of the court actors in each jurisdiction. This is outlined in an 
evaluation of the incentives underlying the behaviour of the prosecution and 
defence below.  
 
Canada 
 
Defence counsel in Canada were motivated by both economic factors and their 
responsibility to their clients. They reported that both of these goals could be 
achieved by avoiding contested hearings at all costs. In terms of the economic 
factors, many private defence counsel pointed to the financial incentive to 
obtain a consent release. This was in line with previous research, in which the 
economic benefits of getting through a large number of cases in a short amount 
155 
 
of time has been well documented (Church, 1982; Cole, 1970; Eisenstein & 
Jacob, 1977; Levin, 1975). Since many defendants funded their defence 
through legal aid, the private defence counsel in Canada were reliant on funding 
from Legal Aid Ontario. The payment structure was changed in the late 1990s 
so that counsel were paid on a ‘block fee’ basis in which a set amount of money 
was provided for bail regardless of the number of hours invested in the case 
(Law Society of Upper Canada, 1996). As such, many private counsel in 
Canada highlighted that it was not worthwhile financially to run time-consuming 
contested hearings:  
	
Legal aid is funding at a rate now where they’re – I think they’re even 
openly suggesting that private counsel defer to duty counsel to run the 
bail hearings. Duty counsel don’t have the time to put into getting – 
nobody has the time. The time given to private counsel doesn’t begin to 
pay for the cost of a bail hearing, for a contested bail hearing it’s 
problematic (LN 146, Canada, DEF 008). 
 
It was suggested on several occasions that the fee structure encouraged private 
defence counsel have duty counsel run contested hearings for their clients as 
opposed to appearing in court themselves. Unlike private defence counsel, duty 
counsel were employed directly by Legal Aid Ontario, working at individual 
courthouses on a salary. As such, they did not have the same financial 
incentive to handle cases on an ‘assembly-line basis’, managing a large number 
of cases at a small fee each (Cole, 1970). Given this system, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that 75% (n=177) of the cases observed in the Canadian bail court 
were represented by duty counsel.  
 
While duty counsel did not have the same financial incentive to avoid contested 
hearings, they were motivated to ease their considerable workload. The reliance 
on duty counsel put a significant strain on these counsel, who were tasked with 
representing multiple defendants and interviewing them in their cells, 
interviewing prospective sureties, preparing for contested hearings, and 
negotiating with the prosecution. Although they would not be subjected to the 
same financial loss as private defence counsel, one could see why they would 
be eager to reduce their workload by avoiding contested hearings. However, 
generally when duty counsel explained why they preferred uncontested 
appearances, they framed it in terms of the benefits to their client. Specifically, 
156 
 
running shorter uncontested appearances rather than lengthy contested 
hearings meant that more cases could be heard each day. This was explained 
by the following duty counsel: 
 
… my colleague’s trying to prep a bail hearing in a few minutes, and 
there’s so many other demands and you’ve got so many other people ... 
And another lawyer was saying, ‘are you sure you want to spend the time 
getting into this issue when it’s going to mean that somebody else is 
going to spend a night in custody because there’s not enough time to 
have a very lengthy drawn out bail hearing on these issues, because it 
takes up time away from somebody else’ ... But the reality is when you 
have 25 people that you’re dealing with in a day, you’re going to end up 
sacrificing somebody else to spend the time and resources on one 
person (LN 390, Canada, DEF 003). 
 
This duty counsel voiced the same concerns as all of the defence counsel in 
that contested hearings were seen as lengthy, convoluted processes that were 
best avoided when possible. While avoiding a contested hearing often meant 
accepting onerous conditions in exchange for a consent release, this was seen 
as a small price to pay to ensure more cases could be dealt with, thus enabling 
more defendants to be released from custody. Indeed, defence counsel’s 
responsibility to their clients was frequently addressed during the interviews in 
Canada, suggesting this was a priority in their decision-making.  
 
While it may seem as though agreeing to onerous conditions to avoid a 
contested hearing would be contrary to this responsibility, many counsel 
explained that their clients would prefer a restrictive release to remaining in 
custody in the hopes of having time for a contested hearing, ultimately leaving 
the decision to the court. This was explained by one private defence counsel in 
Canada: 
 
...from custody [the clients are] happy as a pig in shit to have a house 
arrest and no food or water and are only allowed to wash once a day, 
anything. But then once they get out, well they don’t quite like it as much. 
So, the Crown wields tremendous power at that point in the proceedings 
because if they want to oppose bail it becomes a very iffy circumstance 
for the accused.... (LN 402, Canada, DEF 008). 
 
This private defence counsel explained that defendants in custody would agree 
to almost any (in this case obviously exaggerated) conditions to avoid remaining 
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in custody and enduring the risk of a contested hearing. Since their desire to 
obtain a consent release was compatible with private defence counsel’s 
financial incentives and duty counsel’s workload incentives, both the client and 
counsel were motivated to avoid contested hearings. While the defendant’s 
liberty was compromised as a result of the onerous conditions required to obtain 
this outcome, defence counsel in Canada still perceived themselves to exercise 
their adversarial roles by attempting to ensure it was not restricted entirely by 
remaining in custody. As such, due process values concerning the rights of the 
defendant were framed almost entirely in terms of the bail outcome as opposed 
to the time defendants spent awaiting this decision (see Feeley, 1992). 
 
While prosecutors in Canada were motivated to avoid contested hearings on 
account of reducing uncertainty and getting through the court list, they did not 
share the same economic incentives and obligation to defendants as the 
defence. The Crown attorneys in Canada were employed by the Ministry of the 
Attorney General, and were stationed at specific courthouses on salaries. As 
such, they did not benefit financially from moving through cases quickly. The 
prosecution was also responsible for representing the state, and as such, was 
accountable to the objectives of the Crown Attorney’s Office. The Crown Policy 
Manual clearly states that the protection of the public is the most important 
consideration when making decisions about bail (Ministry of the Attorney 
General, 2005). In fact, it explicitly states that neither public safety nor the rights 
of the defendant should be compromised on account of efficiency: 
 
Although speed is essential in operating an efficient and effective court 
system, Crown counsel should exercise particular care in conducting bail 
hearings. It is at this early stage of the proceedings that Crown counsel’s 
discretion is of paramount importance. While it is important that efforts be 
made to improve the efficiency of bail courts, this efficiency should not be 
achieved at the expense of public safety or fairness to the accused 
(Ministry of the Attorney General, 2005). 
 
While the Crown Policy Manual recognises the importance of the value of 
efficiency, it clearly advises that both public safety and the rights of the 
defendant should take priority. It was the perception of the defence that the 
focus on public safety, in particular, translated into overcautious decision-
making on the part of the prosecution. This view is consistent with previous bail 
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research in Canada (Canadian Civil Liberties Association, 2014; John Howard 
Society, 2013; Myers, 2009, 2017; Webster, 2015), which has demonstrated 
that the role of the prosecutor in Canada has become one of limiting – to the 
greatest extent possible – threats to public safety.  
 
Half of the defence counsel interviewed believed that the prosecution provided 
restrictive bail positions out of fear for their professional reputation. As previous 
research has highlighted (Cole, 1970; Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977), the work of 
the prosecution receives considerable public attention. As such, there was 
substantial pressure to ensure that defendants were not released only to 
reoffend on bail. One duty counsel in Canada explained their view on this 
matter: 
 
Crowns seems to have a lot of fear that if they release somebody and 
that person goes and kills somebody that everybody blames them and 
their name is splashed across the papers and, you know, that kind of 
thing that -- and you know, obviously nobody wants to be part of that, but 
there has to be an understanding we actually can't predict this (LN 910, 
Canada, DEF 002). 
 
Some counsel attributed this fear to a lack of validation from the Crown 
Attorney’s Office that such an event would not be blamed on individual 
prosecutors. As such, like the defence counsel in Canada describes below, they 
believed that there might be some concern that they will lose their jobs if 
something goes wrong: 
 
Part of the problem as well is Crown’s are people who if they let out 
someone that does something on consent then they can lose their job. 
There was something called the Hadley Inquest which I’m sure you’ve 
heard about in your study. So Crowns can be afraid to do what’s the right 
thing sometimes where they’ll make you run the bail hearing because 
‘they have to’ (LN 99, Canada, DEF 007). 
 
This private defence counsel mentioned the 2003 Hadley Inquest, which 
occurred shortly after the 1998 May/Isles Inquest. A few counsel mentioned 
these events were turning points in the Crown and police approach to bail. In 
both instances, women were murdered by estranged partners who were on bail 
and subject to no contact conditions. The inquest resulted in several 
recommendations which centred around restricting the right to bail for 
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defendants, particularly those facing domestic violence allegations (O’Marra, 
2006). These cases were explicitly mentioned in the Crown Policy Manual: 
 
The May/Iles, Hadley and Yeo Inquests arose out of situations where 
accused persons were released on bail and subsequently committed 
murder/suicide. In the course of these inquests, issues surrounding bail 
hearings, including the conduct of Crown counsel and the exercise of 
Crown discretion, came under careful scrutiny (Ministry of the Attorney 
General, 2005).  
 
It would seem that the implicit message is that prosecutors should be extremely 
cautious when exercising their discretion with respect to bail, specifically in 
relation to victims. The Manual warns prosecutors of the potential repercussions 
of allowing defendants to offend on bail, pointing to the public scrutiny that may 
result. As such, it is perhaps foreseeable that the defence counsel shared such 
a strong perception that they could be unreasonable in their approach. 
Specifically, they appeared to share the view that prosecutors would 
compromise the liberty of defendants by using excessive caution in the name of 
victims and public safety, ultimately aiming to maintain their professional 
reputation. 
 
It is unsurprising that the combination of the goal of avoiding contested hearings 
at all costs on the part of the defence and cautious decision-making on the part 
of the prosecution resulted in the hostile negotiation process described by 
defence counsel in Canada. The natural conclusion to these competing 
objectives was the situation described by the defence whereby the prosecution 
would frequently offer consent releases in exchange for an agreement to abide 
by restrictive conditions. This enabled the prosecution to exercise considerable 
control whilst still enabling the defence to improve their chances of obtaining a 
release. Both parties would be able to accomplish these objectives without 
resorting to a contested hearing, thereby reducing uncertainty and getting 
through the court list quickly. Neither party entirely achieved their objectives, 
however, as there would still be the risk of an offence on bail and the defendant 
would be subjected to onerous bail conditions. However, the motivation to 
ensure the defendant was released on bail (regardless of the nature of the 
conditions) was exacerbated by the defence since, as the previous section 
demonstrates, they perceived many of the defendants appearing in custody to 
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be inappropriately detained by the police at the outset of the process. As such, 
an uneasy consensus was formed between the prosecution and defence in 
Canada.  
 
Importantly, the court actors did not suggest that they undertook the 
negotiations with any urgent regard for the overall efficiency of the wider 
criminal process. This may have been a consequence of salaried duty counsel 
handling most bail cases and the prosecution being explicitly instructed by their 
sponsoring agency, the Crown Attorneys office, not to prioritise efficiency over 
public safety and the defendant. While both parties were motivated to get 
through the court list on a day to day basis, neither the prosecution nor the duty 
counsel (who represented the majority of the defendants) had a major individual 
incentive to move the case forward in the criminal process.  
 
England 
 
The goals and incentives of the court actors in England were found to be more 
compatible than their counterparts in Canada. This was demonstrated through a 
closer examination of the context in which defence solicitors and prosecutors 
worked. First, as was the case in Canada, defence solicitors in England were 
also incentivised by economic factors. This incentive had been exacerbated in 
recent years after a series of legal aid reductions, which spanned multiple 
years, but will be discussed briefly here, when they culminated in 
recommendations for far-reaching cuts in LASPO in 2012. In 2013, the Ministry 
of Justice published the consultation paper Transforming Legal Aid: Delivering a 
More Credible and Efficient System, which set out a number of reforms to civil 
and criminal legal aid aiming to save £220 million per year by 2018/2019. While 
some of these suggestions have since been rescinded, the use of ‘fixed fees’ 
for most work and a cut of 8.75% to criminal legal aid have taken effect 
(Mcguinness, 2016).  
 
These cuts created a financial incentive for private defence solicitors to move 
through cases quickly. This was argued by one defence solicitor in England: 
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…they changed all the fee structure as to how you get paid as a lawyer 
as well, so it didn’t make financial sense to us to drag it out… (LN 871, 
England, DEF 023). 
 
Similarly to the Canadian block fee system, the use of fixed fees meant that a 
set amount of money was provided on the basis of the type of work conducted 
rather than the number of hours taken to complete it. This meant that there was 
more incentive to finish the bail process quickly. However, it did not appear to 
be the norm for defence solicitors in England to bypass bail proceedings by 
deferring to duty solicitors. In fact, only 7% (n=7) of defendants appearing for 
the purposes of a bail decision were represented by the duty solicitor. This may 
be because, unlike in Canada, the negotiation with the prosecution did not 
typically require defence solicitors to spend a lot of time preparing sureties and 
putting social support in place. As such, the limited funds they received might 
still be perceived to be worth the effort. 
 
Importantly, the desire to move through cases quickly did not appear to 
translate into an overzealous attempt to avoid contested hearings in England. 
Since sureties were rarely used, and thus did not have to be prepped to testify, 
the difference between running a contested hearing instead of a consent 
release was not as pronounced in England as it was in Canada. As such, while 
defence solicitors clearly preferred to avoid contested hearings in order to move 
through the court list more efficiently, they were not nearly as reluctant as their 
counterparts in Canada to run one. As one defence solicitor accepted: “If [the 
prosecution is] opposing it, they’re opposing it, right…” (LN 839, England, DEF 
022).  
 
Defence solicitors in England also tended to emphasise their obligation to other 
court actors in the interviews more than their counterparts in Canada. As was 
consistent with previous literature (Carlen, 1976; Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; 
Lipetz, 1980; Rumgay, 1995), they were motivated to uphold these professional 
relationships in order to maintain group cohesion. When one defence solicitor in 
England was asked whether they considered the prosecution to be reasonable, 
they responded in the following way: 
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I think mostly, because we have to see each other another day and there 
will be an occasion where I’ll be of assistance to them. I might know 
more about the case than the advocate who is there because I’ve been 
in the police station and I think, not only do you have a duty to your client 
- which to me is just a horse’s nose above the rest - but you have a duty 
to the court - as you are well aware - but equally a duty to your 
colleagues (LN 585, England, DEF 019). 
 
This defence solicitor argued that prosecutors were reasonable because they 
were aware that the defence could help them at a later date (i.e. providing 
information gained at the police station). This is an example of the use of the 
‘exchange relationships’ described by Cole (1970) in which court actors trade 
favours in order to meet their respective goals. Unlike in Canada, where these 
favours were typically discussed in terms of their benefits to their client, the 
court actors in England tended to stress the ways in which they helped them 
complete their work and ensure the day ran smoothly. This particular defence 
solicitor even suggested that their obligation to their client was only slightly 
greater than their duty to their colleagues and the court.  
 
The level of camaraderie that developed as a result of the exchange 
relationships appeared to impact the way the prosecution and defence 
discussed bail cases. For instance, one prosecutor in England described a 
typical interaction they would have with a defence solicitor: 
 
You can have a friendly chat with a defence solicitor in between cases 
and sort of joke about – a solicitor might say ‘he’s insisting that he’s 
making a bail application even though he’s got no chance of bail’ or 
something, we’ll have a joke about that. He might come in and say ‘you 
don’t really need to say much but I’ve got to make a bail application, he’ll 
get refused, don’t worry about it.’ Yeah, it’s just a friendly, professional 
relationship (LN 384, England, CPS 026). 
 
When defence solicitors are informing the prosecution that their bail application 
should be denied, the extent to which they are exercising their adversarial role 
is called into question. This supports previous studies which have found that the 
defence tended to assume their clients were guilty (McConville et al., 1994) and 
pointed to the ‘outsider’ status of defendants relative to the ‘insider’ status of the 
court actors (Jacobson, Hunter, & Kirby, 2015). It has been argued that this 
strain on the adversarial relationship is derived from the closeness between the 
prosecution and the defence (McConville et al., 1994).  
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The collegiality described between the prosecution and defence can be partially 
attributed to the compatibility of their respective incentives. The findings suggest 
this compatibility has been heightened in recent years as a result of cuts to 
criminal justice expenditure. The austerity policies implemented by the Coalition 
government have resulted in a reduction in funding across the entirety of the 
criminal justices system in England and Wales (Garside & Ford, 2016). The 
CPS is no exception, having their budget cut by over 20% since 2010 (Beard & 
Allen, 2017). This has resulted in an increased focus on efficiency within the 
CPS. One prosecutor explained why they felt that there was a focus on speedy 
case processing: 
 
It’s budgets, it’s money. The court’s budget, our budget. At least that’s 
what I’ve been told. I don’t have personal access to figures. I mean we’ve 
practically been told that we need to be more efficient and save money 
otherwise our very existence could be in jeopardy. And I mean, I don’t 
know if you know this, but originally, years and years ago, in the early 
80s I think, up to the mid 80s, the CPS didn’t exist, it was the police that 
prosecuted and then the CPS was brought in. Well that sort of spectre 
has been raised, of fundamental changes might be waiting if we don’t 
become more efficient. And the courts have been told the same sort of 
thing. They need to be more efficient … I think it’s all about money (LN 
273, England, CPS 024).  
	
This prosecutor, like several others, argued that the current mentality 
surrounding efficiency had put pressure on the prosecution to get through cases 
quickly. There appeared to be a general perception that failing to meet this goal 
on a wider basis could be detrimental for the future of the CPS. As such, there 
was considerable professional pressure to move cases forward. This coincided 
with the financial incentive of the defence to complete as many cases as 
possible in a short amount of time. This seems to have increased the motivation 
to form professional relationships that was already shown to exist within the 
courtroom workgroup (Cole, 1970; Doherty & East, 1985; Eisenstein & Jacob, 
1977). As one defence solicitor in England stated: “I just think that the state of 
the system is so crap that people have actually realised we kind of have to work 
together or you scream (LN 401, England, DEF 020).”  
 
As was the case with the prosecution in Canada, the prosecutors in England 
also prioritised the interests of victims in their decision-making. This may be a 
result of CPS legal guidance, which clearly states: “The fundamental role of the 
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Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is to protect the public, support victims and 
witnesses and deliver justice” (The Crown Prosecution Service, n.d.). One 
prosecutor argued that, in addition to the presumption of innocence, they “would 
probably also be mainly focused on the interests of the victim in the case and 
prioritising that over anything else really” (LN 38, England, CPS 026). Although 
one might expect this CPS priority to translate into the same overcautious 
decision-making observed in Canada, it this does not appear to be the 
perception in the English court. Rather, the prosecution was viewed to have 
become increasingly more ‘reasonable’ following the introduction of LASPO in 
2012 (see Chapter One). This act provided that, with the exception of domestic 
violence offences, there must be a reasonable prospect of custody in order for 
defendants to be remanded in custody. Many court actors believed that 
prosecutors had become increasingly pragmatic in their decision-making 
following the new legislation. For instance, one legal adviser made the following 
comment: 
 
I think as far as the prosecution are concerned, I think they’re being more 
pragmatic, more realistic, in applying for remands, and equally, more 
realistic in considering bail. I dare say, myself, the prosecution and the 
defence would question why somebody has been detained by the police 
when their record, on the face of it, doesn’t warrant a production before 
the court in custody… (LN 95, England, LA 009). 
 
This echoed many positive comments surrounding the introduction of LASPO in 
relation to non-domestic violence offences (see Chapter Five for a discussion of 
domestic violence offences). The prosecutors explained that the introduction of 
the legislation had signalled to them that fewer defendants should be remanded 
in custody. For instance, one prosecutor in England made the following 
comment: 
 
There is a broader policy that fewer people should be locked up. And 
that’s evident from LASPO. So the government has said and parliament 
has said, ‘there are too many people going to prison. This legislation is 
here to change that’ (LN 327, England, CPS 027).  
 
It appeared as though this message had been received by prosecutors and 
noted by the other court actors. The general consensus was that the legislation, 
in the main, increased the extent to which the appropriate defendants faced 
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remands in custody. This perception was reflective in the more general sense of 
cooperation and collegiality that framed the interactions in the English court. 
 
The objectives of the prosecution and defence in England were much more 
compatible than their counterparts in Canada. Since duty solicitors rarely 
represented defendants, both the private defence solicitors and the prosecutors 
that typically appeared had either a financial or professional incentive to handle 
cases as efficiently as possible. The well documented mutual incentive to move 
through the court list (Lipetz, 1980; Myers, 2015) was thus enhanced by a drive 
for efficiency caused by recent funding cuts to both legal aid and the CPS. This 
appears to have given the court actors a common goal to work towards, 
enhancing the level of camaraderie between them. Indeed, defence solicitors in 
this jurisdiction consistently highlighted the importance of their professional 
relationships in terms of the benefits it had for maintaining group cohesion 
rather than the advantages it provided for the clients.  
 
This does not, however, imply that they the defence had no regard for their 
clients during the bail process. It is likely that the perception of the prosecution 
as ‘reasonable’, partially as a result of the mentality accompanying the LASPO 
reforms, reduced the need for excessive bargaining. In addition, as the previous 
section argued, court actors in England viewed the police decision-making to be 
mostly appropriate, suggesting that many cases were viewed to warrant a 
remand in custody. This implies that when the prosecution took custody 
positions, they would not necessarily be perceived as ‘unreasonable’ in the 
same way they were in Canada. In the event that there was disagreement, 
however, the impetus to avoid contested hearings does not appear to be nearly 
as strong in England as it was in Canada. This is perhaps because the 
procedure itself was not described or observed to be as long or convoluted. 
This reduced the need for the hostile bargaining process that often took place in 
search of a consent release in Canada, as court actors would more easily resort 
to contested hearings in the event of a disagreement.   
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Summary 
 
In sum, these findings are consistent with previous research (Cole, 1970; 
Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; McConville et al., 1994) which suggests informal 
negotiations are central to decision-making of court actors. Indeed, the 
prosecution and defence in both jurisdictions relied heavily on informal 
discussion and negotiation during the bail decision-making process. Further, in 
the main, these informal discussions tended to result in uncontested bail 
appearances across both courts. The level of agreement did, however, vary 
between jurisdictions. While court actors in Canada tended to engage in more 
hostile discussions, they ultimately agreed in more cases than in England, 
where the conversations were much more collegial. This can be explained by 
the extent to which the incentives converged and diverged in each jurisdiction. 
The lack of incentive to progress cases through the system in Canada 
combined with both a disjuncture in attitudes as to whether defendants should 
be released and a strong desire on the part of the defence to avoid contested 
hearings resulted in an uneasy consensus in which the prosecution and 
defence agreed to a bail position with accompanying onerous conditions. On 
the other hand, both the prosecution and the defence in England were 
motivated to move cases forward, providing them with a mutual goal and thus 
increasing group cohesion. Further, the combination of defence heavily 
prioritising professional relationships and prosecutors taking bail positions 
perceived to be reasonable meant that they tended to agree on bail outcomes, 
but when they did not, their willingness to run contested hearings meant they 
were slightly more likely to disagree relative to their counterparts in Canada.  
 
Ultimately, while there was more overt agreement in Canada in terms of their 
higher rate of uncontested appearances, this was rooted in considerable 
underlying disagreement during the negotiations. Similarly, the higher rate of 
contested hearings in England masked considerable collegiality between the 
court actors. This demonstrates, contrary to previous research (Gertz, 1980), 
court workgroups do not necessarily have to be collegial to negotiate nor do 
they need to be hostile to act in opposition. Rather, there are many complex 
interactions that take place in relation to the incentives of court actors that will 
dictate how discussions are balanced and operate in practice. Many of these 
incentives were dependent on the environment in which the court actors worked 
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and, in particular, the objectives of their overarching sponsoring organisations. 
Ultimately, the court actors in Canada were found to maintain their adversarial 
roles within an uneasy consensus to a greater extent than their counterparts in 
England despite the latter being more likely to proceed to overtly adversarial 
contested hearings. This is consistent with Church (1985), as it demonstrates 
that adversarialism does not have to take its traditional form to influence court 
decision-making. This is further demonstrated in the subsequent section, which 
examines the extent to which the court agreed with the prosecution and 
defence.  
 
Court decision-making: An exercise in rubber-stamping? 
 
The court makes the final decision44 in the bail process as to whether the 
defendant should be remanded on bail or in custody. It is thus their decision that 
ultimately dictates the bail outcome. While the traditional adversarial structure 
emphasises judicial authority during this process, previous research has 
suggested that this role is merely presentational and that the effective decision-
makers are other criminal justice actors, such as the police, prosecution, and 
defence (Burrows et al., 1994; Hucklesby, 1996, 1997b). As such, the role of 
the court has been argued to involve mostly ‘rubber stamping’ prior decisions 
(Hucklesby, 1996, 1997b) in that they simply approve prior decisions made by 
the prosecution and defence.  
 
In support of previous research, this section will demonstrate that the decisions 
of other criminal justice actors heavily influenced that of the court (Burrows et 
al., 1994; Hucklesby, 1996, 1997b). In particular, the court was extremely 
unlikely to oppose agreed upon positions between the prosecution and defence 
in both England and Canada. This finding supports previous research that 
highlights the paramount importance of informal agreements on court outcomes 
(Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; Hucklesby, 1996). The findings also suggest, 
however, that the idea that the court merely ‘rubber stamps’ prior decisions may 
not apply in all contexts. This characterisation masks the more complex 
                                            
44 This may not be the last bail decision in the entirety of the criminal process given defendants 
have the right to second hearings both in magistrates court and Crown court in England and 
may request a bail review in Canada.  
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decision-making process that occurs during contested hearings. While these 
appearances occupy only a minority of the bail appearances across 
jurisdictions, it is argued that they are reflective of the divergent applications of 
adversarialism, ultimately having a major impact on the bail outcome in these 
cases. 
 
The extent of rubber-stamping 
 
The findings support the assertion that the informal agreements between the 
prosecution and defence have an impact on the bail outcome (Bamford, King, & 
Sarre, 1999; Hucklesby, 1997a, 1997b). Indeed, the outcomes of the 
negotiation between these court actors (see previous section) were shown to 
have a major influence on the decision of the court. The results are illustrated in 
Table 4.5, which presents the decision of the court in England and Canada 
according to the outcome of the negotiation between the prosecution and 
defence.  
 
The findings suggest that the concordance between the decision-making of the 
prosecution and defence and the court was strongest during uncontested 
appearances. In other words, unless there was overt opposition between the 
parties (i.e. contested hearings) it was extremely unlikely for the court to 
disagree with a recommendation about the remand decision. Indeed, in every 
appearance that involved a joint position (i.e. consent releases and consent 
detentions) across both jurisdictions, the court ultimately maintained the 
previous decision. Furthermore, in England when the prosecution provided no 
position and thus bail was uncontested, the court only remanded defendants in 
custody in 2 out of 23 occasions (9%). This supports the argument made in the 
previous section, which suggests cases with no prosecution position are 
handled similarly to consent releases since they signal a lack of prosecution 
opposition to bail.  
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Table 4.5 - Court decision according to the outcome of the negotiation 
a) Canada 
 
  NEGOTIATION OUTCOME 
 
  Consent 
Release 
No Pros. 
Position 
Consent 
Detention 
Contested 
Hearing 
COURT 
DECISION 
Release 48 
100% 
0 
-- 
0 
-- 
13 
72% 
 Custody 0 0 
-- 
3 
100% 
5 
28% 
TOTAL  48 
100% 
0 
-- 
3 
100% 
18 
100% 
 
b) England 
 
  NEGOTIATION OUTCOME 
 
  Consent 
Release 
No Pros. 
Position 
Consent 
Detention 
Contested 
Hearing 
COURT 
DECISION 
Release 26 
100% 
21 
91% 
0 
-- 
13 
34% 
 Custody 0 
 
2 
9% 
13 
100% 
25 
66% 
TOTAL  26 
100% 
23 
100% 
13 
100% 
38 
100% 
 
While uncontested appearances were handled similarly across jurisdictions, the 
findings suggest a clear difference in approach between the Canadian and 
English court in relation to contested hearings. Specifically, Table 4.5 shows 
that the court was more likely to side with the prosecution in England whereas it 
was more likely to side with the defence in Canada. In England, the court 
agreed with the prosecution in two-thirds of appearances (66%; n=25) while, in 
contrast, the court only agreed with the prosecution in a quarter of cases in 
Canada (28%; n=5).45 In other words, the court was more likely to remand 
defendants in custody following a contested hearing in England than in Canada. 
When these results were taken together with the consent detentions, which 
                                            
45 Although the sample size was particularly small in this study, the low rate of detention is in 
line with previous research in Canada that used larger samples (see, for example, Canadian 
Civil Liberties Association, 2014; Webster et al., 2009).  
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were always agreed by the court in both jurisdictions, 12% (n=8) of defendants 
were ultimately remanded in custody in Canada compared to 40% (n=40) in 
England.  
 
Court decision-making in uncontested appearances 
 
The findings in relation to uncontested appearances are consistent with 
Hucklesby (1997b), who demonstrated that when the prosecution is satisfied 
the defendant should be granted bail (i.e. consent releases) or when the 
defence does not submit a bail application (i.e. consent detentions), the court 
rarely disagreed with their decisions. However, this study took a slightly different 
approach than this research, which discussed the influence of the prosecution 
and the defence individually, and instead focused on their combined impact on 
the court’s decision-making. This approach examined the agreement between 
court actors rather than their separate positions. It is argued that it is this 
agreement (or lack of opposition in the cases with no prosecution position) that 
facilitated the court’s approval. 
 
This argument was supported by the interviews, in which both District Judges 
and magistrates in England argued they would rarely dispute a position that was 
agreed between the prosecution and defence. For instance, one magistrate in 
England stated: 
 
So providing both parties are happy and content with bail, with 
conditions, or whatever they’ve discussed, they would have to be well off 
the mark for us to [remand the defendant in custody], they would have to 
have issued something fairly drastic - and occasionally they do, of course 
(LN 456, England, MAG 015).  
 
The views of the court substantiated the assertion that it is the lack of opposition 
between the parties (i.e. both are ‘content with bail’) that encouraged their 
agreement. Their tendency to release defendants in which no prosecution 
position was offered further suggests it is their lack of opposition rather than 
their recommendations that influenced their decision. As such, it may not 
always be that the court is more influenced by the position of prosecution (and 
indirectly the police) as previous research has suggested (see Burrows et al., 
1994; Hucklesby, 1997b) but rather that it is their lack of opposition with the 
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defence that ultimately impacts their approval. It is notable however, that like 
this magistrate, all judicial officials interviewed argued that they would intervene 
in the event they believed a joint position was inappropriate. The observations 
suggest that this was a rare occurrence. 
 
It may be that this concordance is simply the result of the court making a 
practical assessment. Specifically, if the court actors representing both the state 
and the defendant are satisfied, there is minimal reason to intervene. It may 
also be that, consistent with previous research (Myers, 2009; Webster et al., 
2009), this is part of a more generalised strategy to avoid blame. While it is 
technically the court’s decision to remand a defendant in custody or on bail, the 
fact that they were simply adhering to the wishes of the prosecution and 
defence could lessen their personal responsibility in the event something ‘went 
wrong’. In other words, it would provide other individuals with whom to share the 
blame in the event the defendant returned to court as a result of a breach or 
further offence. This would not, however, be possible in contested hearings, in 
which the prosecution and defence directly opposed each other and the court 
was obligated to side with one or the other. The subsequent section examines 
why these cases were handled differently.  
 
Court decision-making in contested appearances 
 
The role of the court was much more pronounced in appearances involving 
contested hearings. Unlike in uncontested appearances, they were obligated to 
choose one side over another and were therefore unable to simply ‘rubber 
stamp’ previously agreed upon positions. It was thus these appearances in 
which the decision-making of the court was most visible. Indeed, as Table 4.5 
illustrates, the court in England tended to be much more ‘prosecution minded’ 
than the court in Canada, which was more ‘defence minded’.  
 
The findings suggest that the high rate of bail in Canada may partially be 
explained by a traditionally adversarial approach to contested hearings. The 
defence counsel in Canada suggested that the hostile culture described in 
relation to the negotiations carried over into these procedures. Many defence 
counsel were observed to take assertive approaches to the hearings, 
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contributing to this environment. For instance, one private defence counsel in 
Canada explained how they would approach contested hearings: 
 
You really want to neutralise the Crown and sometimes, it’s unfortunate, 
but I’m a showman and I want to make the Crown look stupid (LN 195, 
Canada, DEF 007).  
 
This particular defence counsel argued that forcefully opposing the position of 
the prosecutor was part of their strategy in obtaining bail for their client. While 
this might not have been the tactic of all the defence counsel, it is certainly 
indicative of the more general oppositional approach that was seen during the 
observations. Many defence counsel argued that this was necessary as a result 
of an equally strong position on the part of the prosecution. For instance, one 
duty counsel in Canada described the proceedings in the following way: 
 
It’s very adversarial, in court and it really affects the culture. They’re 
always asking for residential sureties, seeking everybody’s detention (LN 
984, Canada, DC 003).  
	
Many defence counsel perceived the prosecution to seek remands in custody 
when it was clear the defendant would most likely be released. For instance, 
one private defence counsel in Canada explained: 
 
…see this is part of the problem, is they’re asking for detention on cases 
where the person should be getting bail, will get bail, but we’ve now 
clogged up the system for asking for a detention order because now we 
have to run that bail hearing. So that discretion in the Crown’s office 
seems to have gone completely out the window… (LN 184, Canada, 
DEF 005).  
 
This custody-oriented approach certainly aligned with the mentality described 
by the defence in relation to the negotiations and was reflected in the Crown 
Manual discussed in the previous section. The warnings contained in the Crown 
Manual regarding offences committed on bail may also explain why prosecutors 
in Canada might believe that taking bail positions might jeopardise their careers. 
This was highlighted by one private defence counsel in Canada: 
 
There are people that want a job in the future, that they’re maybe per 
diem, or maybe they’re on contract, so they’re afraid of their own 
shadows. Especially the young baby Crowns. It really takes a special 
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Crown to be able to have judgment out of the gate, to be able to do the 
right thing. Because frankly it’s a brave decision for a Crown to agree to 
a bail, especially someone with a sheet. The easier decision for any 
Crown is to say no, and defer the decision to somebody else (LN 334, 
Canada, DEF 007).  
 
While it was unclear whether the prosecution were aware that some cases they 
took custody positions on would result in bail, this strategy of ‘passing the buck’ 
in Canadian bail courts is well documented in the literature (see, for example, 
Myers, 2009; Webster, 2015; Webster et al., 2009). It has been argued that 
decision-makers in Canada take custody positions in order to avoid the 
‘reputational risks’ that may result in the event a defendant commits an offence 
on bail (Doob, 2012). As such, maintaining one’s professional reputation is akin 
to making conservative decisions in the Canadian bail process.  
 
Although one might expect a high rate of remands in custody in Canada as a 
result of this mentality, the observations suggested that the opposite was the 
case. This can be explained by taking into account the adversarial approach of 
the defence, who as was argued previously took an equally oppositional stance 
in contested hearings, as well as the approach of the court, who had the final 
say on the bail outcome. Many of the defence counsel suggested that justices 
of the peace, who presided over the vast majority of bail proceedings, had 
become increasingly ‘reasonable’ in recent years. Take, for instance, the view 
of one private defence counsel: 
 
However, what I've noticed, is over the last couple of years they're 
starting to hire more JPs [justices of the peace] that are lawyers, so they 
tend to get it. They're also getting more continuing legal education and 
the people who are educating them are pretty reasonably minded 
defence lawyers, pretty reasonably minded Crowns. So as a result what 
we're beginning to see is the new guard is replacing the old guard and 
even the JPs sometimes where we're agreeing, and sometimes I've been 
guilty of this, as a risk averse person, that my client just wants a bail now, 
where we're agreeing to conditions that may be a little bit too restrictive. 
So sometimes the JPs are saying wait a minute, I know you're both 
telling us that this is what it should be but I think this is too restrictive and 
I'm not doing it (LN 253, Canada, DEF 007).  
 
Multiple defence counsel believed that there were an increasing number of 
justices of the peace that were willing to regularly release defendants on bail. 
This is not to say, however, that all justices of the peace were perceived to be 
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likely to release defendants. Many of the defence counsel claimed that when 
they were faced with a more custody-oriented justice of the peace, they simply 
adjourned the proceedings to another day. For example, one duty counsel in 
Canada made the following statement: 
 
As far as justices of the peace go, it’s just a lot of variety. We have a few 
that are excellent that I have no problem running bail hearings in front of. 
I’m sure, I have every confidence I’ll get a fair hearing. And then there’s a 
few justices of the peace that I will never run a bail hearing in front of and 
neither will any of my colleagues or any private counsel that knows their 
reputation ... There’s a couple justices of the peace that are just 
unpleasant to appear in front of and a few that will always detain. They 
always do what the Crown asks so you just know not to run bail hearings 
in front of them. But for the most part they’re fine, I’d say (LN 1004, 
Canada, DC 003).  
 
Most defence counsel in Canada claimed to take this ‘judge-shopping’ approach 
in order to obtain a better chance of bail with another justice of the peace. Since 
adjournments were common practice in the Canadian court (see Chapter Six), 
this was not seen as a difficult practice to undertake.  
 
When the adversarial approach to bail on the part of the defence is taken 
together with both the mostly release-oriented court and the practice of ‘judge-
shopping’, it seems unsurprising that the majority of contested hearings resulted 
in bail in Canada. This appeared to occur in spite of what was perceived to be a 
custody-oriented approach within the Crown Attorney’s office. In line with 
Church (1985), these findings suggest that there are still some instances in 
which court actors take on their adversarial roles, even if (in the case of judge-
shopping) this might not appear in its traditional form.  
 
The situation in Canada stood in contrast to that in England. The findings 
suggested that the high rate of remands in custody in England might, in part, be 
a result of subtle cues offered by the defence. In some instances, defence 
solicitors applied for bail on the directions of their client despite believing they 
were unlikely to be released. One legal adviser explained how they might 
conduct these contested hearings:  
 
…so even though defendants are telling the defence solicitors a tale 
which is unbelievable, the defence will often address the magistrates and 
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say, “I’m instructed to make a bail application and these are my 
instructions,” because they have their credibility, defence solicitors, and 
they can’t be advancing everything that the defendant says and they 
have to be professional (LN 621, England, LA 009).  
 
The legal adviser provided an example of how defence solicitors may change 
their behaviour so the court would know they did not agree with the information 
their client was putting forward. This technique, which blatantly disadvantaged 
the defendant, was deemed ‘professional’. The use of these subtle cues cannot, 
however, explain the results of all contested hearings as a third of them still 
resulted in bail (n=13; 34%). This can partially be explained by the behaviour of 
the prosecution, who occasionally used the same type of subtle cues, but in the 
opposite direction. One prosecutor in England described how this might be 
accomplished: 
 
It might be that you may feel that it’s appropriate to give them bail but 
with appropriate conditions, so you’d still make some representations. 
You might not put in the strongest application for remand but you would 
certainly make representations that they ought to be granted it with 
suitable conditions (LN 220, England, CPS 026). 
 
This prosecutor explained that they would sometimes technically apply for a 
remand in custody, but in reality focus on bail conditions in their 
representations. In other cases, assistant prosecutors or agents suggested they 
might submit a ‘half-hearted’ application in the event they disagreed with the 
CPS directions but did not have the authority to question their directions.  
 
The situations described by the prosecution and defence were consistently 
viewed during the court observations in England. Consistent with previous 
research, they are examples of ‘signalling’ (Hucklesby, 1997b) or ‘sell-out 
strategies’ (McConville et al., 1994) and demonstrated that the lawyers were 
acting in an attempt to maintain or enhance their credibility. Interestingly, 
lawyers in England appeared to attempt to maintain credibility by acting in 
opposition to their traditional adversarial roles while those in Canada took a 
contrasting approach. As such, the lawyers in England would subtly suggest the 
bail outcomes they felt were appropriate even if directions from their clients or 
sponsoring organisations were contrary to what they perceived to be a realistic 
outcome.  
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Although not all contested hearings involved the use of signalling, this did not 
necessarily mean that they included a robust defence. It is argued that this can, 
in part, be explained by the presence of District Judges in the English court. 
This stood in contrast to Canada, where judges only presided over bail 
proceedings when they were assisting another court. In 48% (n=48) of the bail 
appearances observed in England, the court was presided over by a District 
Judge while the other 52% (n=52) were presided over by a panel of 
magistrates. It is argued that the presence of District Judges impacted the bail 
outcome in two ways. First, since the District Judges were able to see the case 
file before court, many court actors believed that they had a good idea as to 
how to proceed prior to the appearance. For instance, one defence solicitor in 
England explained how they would deal with District Judges and magistrates 
differently:  
	
…because you don’t need to maybe … to say as much to a District 
Judge, they could have made up their minds most of the time anyway. 
But you need to just help them, hopefully just tell them what they don’t 
know to help them make their mind up (LN 762, England, DEF 022).  
 
As this defence solicitor highlighted, District Judges were viewed as less likely 
to require assistance and more difficult to persuade. The second way the 
District Judges appeared to influence the outcome is through the perceived 
‘leaning’ of the District Judges. Both the prosecutors and the defence solicitors 
believed that they were particularly ‘prosecution minded’ in their decision-
making relative to magistrates. For instance, one defence solicitor in England 
commented: “I would say all our judges are Pros [prosecution] minded but I 
would say that was not necessarily the case [in all courts] all the time” (LN 434, 
England, DEF 020). The observations supported this view as defendants were 
remanded in custody on 46% (n=22) of occasions by District Judges compared 
to 35% (n=18) of occasions by magistrates. These findings are consistent with 
previous research which found that District Judges tend to impose harsher case 
outcomes, using remands in custody and custodial sentences more often than 
magistrates (Morgan & Russell, 2000). 
 
It is unlikely that the leaning of the District Judges fully accounted for the 
differences in the use of custody, however, given that court actors may change 
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their behaviour based on their own perceptions of the court (Hucklesby, 1997a). 
As the defence solicitor argued above, many of them would provide less 
information to District Judges as they perceived them to have ‘already made up 
their mind’. Indeed, defence solicitors presented information in accordance to 
their expectations about the court’s response. This is consistent with previous 
research (Hucklesby, 1997a), which found that court actors would make 
decisions related to bail based on the reputation of the court. This practice 
would mean that District Judges would not be privy to the full perspective of the 
defence and would base most of their decision on the information provided in 
the case file, which was constructed by the police and the prosecution. It is 
perhaps unsurprising that in many of these cases they might then end up 
remanding defendants in custody.  
 
When one considers that most appearances in the English court were 
uncontested, and many that were contested did not involve genuine or robust 
opposition, it appears as though very few bail appearances involved legitimate 
or comprehensive disagreement between the prosecution and defence. This 
was confirmed by one magistrate in England:  
 
… occasionally we get into things which are called bail thrashers, which 
is the prosecution is adamant that they want this individual to go to 
custody, and the defence is adamant that he’s going to dig his heels in to 
keep this person out, and then you really have got to look at every detail 
and make a decision. They don’t crop up that often, to be quite honest 
with you, but when they do, you’ve got to spend an awful lot of time 
looking at the points that I’ve just mentioned to then come up with a 
decision. Because at the end of the day, you’re taking somebody’s liberty 
away (LN 165, England, MAG 015).  
 
The uncommon situation described by this magistrate is reflective of the way in 
which one might conceptualise all bail appearances according to the traditional 
adversarial structure. However, as was stated here and evidenced above, in 
reality ‘bail thrashers’ in which the prosecution and defence legitimately and 
actively disagreed were rare occurrences in the English bail court.  
 
These findings suggest that the ‘prosecution minded’ court was reflective of a 
broader deficit in adversarialism in this jurisdiction. Specifically, when the 
prosecution applied for remands in custody it appeared as though defence 
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solicitors would often subtly signal that they agreed with this outcome or refrain 
from providing a robust defence in the event they were appearing before a 
District Judge. This explains why the findings point towards the English court 
being ‘prosecution minded’ and provides support for previous research 
(Hucklesby, 1997b), which has highlighted that the English bail process does 
not appear as the adversarial process the ‘law in books’ suggests.  
 
Summary 
 
In sum, the tendency of the court to agree with the position of the prosecution 
and defence in uncontested appearances provides support for the argument 
that they simply ‘rubber-stamp’ prior decisions (Hucklesby, 1996, 1997b). 
However, rather than simply adhering to the recommendations of the 
prosecution and the defence’s decision not to submit a bail application, the 
findings suggest it was the agreement between the two parties that influenced 
the decision of the court. The results pointed to a more nuanced form of 
decision-making in relation to contested hearings. While the court continued to 
uphold prior decisions in these cases in England – albeit subtly – they were 
more likely to act in their traditional authority position in Canada. The 
differences in the approach can largely be attributed to the behaviour of the 
prosecution and defence, who frequently signalled desired outcomes contrary to 
their adversarial roles or presented incomprehensive representations in 
England and who operated in an adversarial fashion, although not always in the 
traditional sense in Canada.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the role of the police, prosecution, defence, and 
court on the bail outcomes in the English and Canadian court. In particular, it 
explored to what extent these actors agreed with each other and whether their 
discussions were framed by consensus or conflict. It was found that, while much 
of the decision-making took place informally and through a process of 
negotiation, this did not necessarily translate into a cooperative culture in both 
courts.  
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In line with previous research, the vast majority of decision-making across both 
jurisdictions was informal (Baldwin & McConville, 1977; Hucklesby, 1996) and 
resulted in some form of compromise (Alschuler, 1968; Blumberg, 1967a; 
Hucklesby, 1997b). Restrictions in the form of conditions or a remand in custody 
were almost always imposed upon defendants who were detained by the police. 
Furthermore, the prosecution and the defence almost always discussed their 
positions prior to appearing in open court and either formed joint positions or did 
not oppose other positions in most cases. Finally, the court virtually never 
challenged positions that were uncontested. This suggests a clear preference to 
settle the issue of bail with minimal formal adversarial procedures across all 
court actors in both England and Canada.  
 
Relatively speaking, however, court actors were much more likely to agree with 
each other in England than in Canada. This was evidenced by the level of 
attrition in each jurisdiction, which demonstrated that defendants that started the 
process in police detention in England were much more likely to have bail 
opposed by the prosecution and to be remanded in custody by the court. This 
was reflective of differences in the extent to which court actors worked together 
cooperatively across the jurisdictions.  
 
Contrary to previous research (Gertz, 1980), informal discussions did not 
always result in a culture of cooperation. These findings suggest that in some 
cases, particularly in Canada, compromise could be strained and adversarial 
attitudes could be invoked within informal negotiations. The court actors in 
Canada were mostly disapproving of the police practice of detaining 
defendants, described a negotiation process between the prosecution and 
defence that - despite typically ending in an ‘uneasy consensus’ - was 
characterised by much hostility and opposition, and were more likely to engage 
in both traditional and untraditional adversarial behaviours in contested 
hearings. Court actors in England were more likely to engage in the cooperative 
behaviour that characterises much of the previous research on court culture 
(see, for example, Cole, 1970; Lipetz, 1980, 1984; Rumgay, 1995). These 
actors typically agreed with the police decision to detain, described a collegial 
negotiation process between the prosecution and defence, and engaged in 
‘signalling’ during contested hearings, prioritising their prof
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over those of their clients and sponsoring organisation. This supports previous 
research which suggests that court actors can adhere to their adversarial roles 
within negotiations (Church, 1985) and that previous studies may 
overemphasise the consensus nature of the courtroom workgroup (Young, 
2013).  
 
Some of these differences were explained by formal factors related to law, 
policy and the cases entering the system. For instance, the nature of the cases 
that started the court process in detention influenced the extent to which the 
court actors agreed with the police decision-making. Without taking this into 
account, one might mistake the higher rate of remands in custody in England to 
signify a ‘harsher’ approach to bail, when in reality it may simply reflect 
differences in the types of cases appearing before the court. Further, the 
changes put in place by LASPO in England as well as the Crown guidelines in 
Canada were both reflected in the behaviour of the court actors during the 
negotiation process. Finally, while the justices of the peace would need to be 
consulted for a full understanding of its impact, there appears to be some 
evidence that training they undertook in recent years had an impact on their 
decision-making in Canada.  
 
The influence of these formal factors was, however, mediated through court 
cultures and the behaviour of the workgroup in the respective courts. This is in 
line with previous studies that have highlighted the importance of court culture 
in examining differences in bail decision-making between courts (Canadian Civil 
Liberties Association, 2014; Hucklesby, 1997a; Myers, 2009). In accordance 
with Eisenstein and Jacob (1977), court actors in both jurisdictions aimed to 
fulfil shared goals of the courtroom workgroup, such as reducing uncertainty 
through avoiding contested hearings and moving through the court list 
expeditiously. Furthermore, as Church (1982) has argued, their individual goals 
and incentives – particularly those related to finance, efficiency, and the 
objectives of their sponsoring organisations – shaped their behaviour 
throughout the negotiations. Finally, informal practices developed in each court 
that defined how negotiations would take place and how both uncontested and 
contested appearances were undertaken. 
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This court culture was, however, also shaped by contextual factors related to 
views about the broader criminal process in each jurisdiction. Specifically, the 
influence of different aspects of managerialism was evidenced in both 
jurisdictions. In Canada, the ‘risk averse’ decision-making of the prosecutions 
was consistent with wider attempts to manage risk and prevent crime in the 
Canadian criminal justice system (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997; Hannah-Moffat, 
1999) while, in England, the attempts to move through the process as quickly as 
possible reflected growing concerns with efficiency (Raine & Willson, 1993, 
1997). This suggests that the court culture shaping the decision-making of court 
actors cannot be completely divorced from the context in which it emerged. 
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Chapter Five: 
 
Examining the Framing and Discussion of Defendant and Case 
Characteristics by Court Actors 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that bail outcomes are partially influenced 
by the negotiations undertaken by court actors and the extent to which they 
agree with one another. This chapter turns to the cases themselves in seeking 
to explain the factors that influence the bail decision-making process. 
Specifically, it examines the characteristics of the defendants entering the court 
process in custody and the cases in which they are involved. However, since 
court actors decide which information should be considered and presented in 
court, they still play a critical role in shaping how these characteristics are used 
to construct the case during the bail process (Kellough & Wortley, 2002; 
McBarnet, 1981; McConville et al., 1991). Court actors have a considerable 
amount of control over this process as a result of the discretion afforded to them 
in their respective bail laws. This suggests that, while decisions may appear to 
depend on traditional factors such as the nature of the charges or the criminal 
record, in actuality they exert their influence through the context of the 
courtroom workgroup (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977). Defendant and cases 
characteristics are thus examined in terms of the way they are framed, 
discussed, and considered by the court actors. 
 
While previous research has examined the statistical relationship between 
various defendant and case characteristics and the bail outcome (see Doherty 
& East, 1985; Hucklesby, 1996; Kellough & Wortley, 2002), this chapter is more 
concerned with the context in which these characteristics are presented and 
how they are applied by court actors. As such, the exceptions raised and the 
characteristics discussed by court actors are examined in turn. For the 
purposes of this research, defendant characteristics include the personal 
circumstances of the defendant and their history with the criminal justice system 
while case characteristics include details surrounding the allegations or breach 
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and any ‘bail plan’ proposed as an alternative to custody. This examination is 
accomplished through an analysis of the court observations and put into context 
with explanations provided by the court actors in the interviews. The objective of 
this analysis is to examine which defendant and case characteristics the court 
actors consider most important and how this shapes their decision-making. 
 
This chapter will argue that, consistent with previous research (Brown, 2013; 
Hucklesby, 1996; Morgan & Henderson, 1998), bail decision-making prioritised 
defendant and case characteristics related to offending. However, while the 
aggravating features of offending-related behaviour were characterised similarly 
in England and Canada, the manner in which these behaviours were mitigated 
differed considerably between jurisdictions. In Canada, court actors tended to 
minimise these concerns with personal circumstances and detailed bail plans 
involving heavy supervisory components whereas, in England, court actors 
largely used alternative versions of the allegations and formulaic bail plans as 
tools of mitigation.  
 
The importance of the defendant and case characteristics was, in part, 
determined by the broader context in each jurisdiction. Specifically, they were 
reflective of a more general focus on crime prevention in the wider criminal 
process in both England and Canada (Ashworth & Redmayne, 2010; Goff, 
2017; Hucklesby, 1996; Sanders et al., 2010; Webster, 2015). They were also 
indicative of some diverging elements of each jurisdiction’s criminal justice 
context, such as the movement toward early case resolution in England 
(Hucklesby, 2009) and the emphasis on therapeutic justice in Canada (Hannah-
Moffat & Maurutto, 2012). These environmental features were shown to shape 
the decision-making of the court actors which was then normalised and 
perpetuated by the routines that developed in each court (Lipetz, 1984).  
 
The chapter first revisits the law guiding the presentation of information and 
describes the discretion it provides to court actors with the aim of providing a 
framework for the discussion that follows. Second, the application of the 
exceptions to bail is examined in both jurisdictions in order to demonstrate how 
defendant and case characteristics were framed by court actors. Third, the 
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discussion of the defendant and case characteristics by court actors is analysed 
through an examination of how bail risk was both aggravated and mitigated.  
 
The construction of a bail case 
 
The laws guiding how defendant and case characteristics should be framed and 
presented during bail proceedings are encompassed in the bail legislation in 
each jurisdiction. While these laws are discussed in detail in Chapter One, they 
will be revisited briefly here as they frame the subsequent discussion.  This 
section will demonstrate that while the laws provide guidance, they still afford 
the court actors a considerable amount of discretion in their decision-making.  
 
The presentation of defendant and case characteristics is typically framed using 
the grounds for refusing bail in Canada and the exceptions to the right to bail in 
England.46 In Canada, Section 515(10) of the Criminal Code provides that the 
detention of the defendant is justified if it is necessary to ensure their 
attendance in court, if it is necessary for the protection of the public (having 
regard for the substantial likelihood of further offences or interference with the 
administration of justice), or if it is necessary to maintain confidence in the 
administration of justice. In England, Paragraphs 2 of Part 1, Schedule 1 of the 
Bail Act 1976 specify that the main exceptions to the right to bail are substantial 
grounds for believing the defendant would fail to surrender to custody, commit 
further offences, or interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of 
justice. Additional exceptions in England include, but are not limited to, 
situations in which defendants were on bail at the time of the alleged offence, 
held for their own protection, already serving sentences, or when a release 
would be likely to cause physical or mental injury or fear of the same to an 
associated person (informally known as the domestic violence or ‘DV’ 
exception). The DV exception targets defendants charged with domestic 
violence, expanding the prospect of a remand in custody to cases where there 
would otherwise be no possibility of such an outcome by virtue of the ‘no real 
prospect test’. As Chapter One explained, the no real prospect test directs that 
                                            
46 What are referred to as ‘grounds for refusing bail’ in Canada are referred to as ‘exceptions to 
the right to bail’ in England. For ease hereafter, the English term will be used when referring to 
both. 
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defendants (in non-domestic violence circumstances) should not be denied bail 
if they are unlikely to receive a custodial sentence. In order to lawfully remand a 
defendant in custody in either jurisdiction, only one (or more) of these 
exceptions must be demonstrated to the court on a ‘balance of probabilities’. 
This standard of proof is lower than what is expected at trial (i.e. beyond a 
reasonable doubt), partly reflecting that the bail decision is an assessment of 
risk based on past behaviour, a somewhat crude method of prediction 
(Hucklesby, 1994a). 
 
The court can consider a variety of factors to demonstrate (or refute) the 
exceptions to bail. In Canada, relevant considerations are not outlined in the 
legislation although many are encompassed in case law. Some of the key 
decisions are summarised by Trotter (2010), who specifies that the nature of the 
offence, strength of the evidence, community ties, stability of the defendant, 
criminal record of the defendant (in terms of previous convictions and 
adherence to court orders), and whether the defendant was on bail can all be 
taken into account. However, the court is not restricted to a specific list of 
considerations. In England, relevant considerations are outlined in Paragraph 9, 
Schedule 1, of the Bail Act 1976. Namely, the nature and seriousness of the 
offence; the character, antecedents, associations, and community ties of the 
defendant; the defendant’s record under previous bails; and the strength of the 
evidence may all be considered. However, like in Canada, they are not confined 
to this list and are also able to have regard for any other considerations which 
‘appear to be relevant.’  
 
These laws provide guidelines but ultimately afford court actors a substantial 
amount of discretion as to which exceptions can be applied, which defendant 
and case characteristics can be discussed, and how much importance each is 
afforded during bail proceedings. This is especially the case given that the strict 
rules of evidence that apply in trials are not in place during bail proceedings 
and, as such, limited restrictions are in place as to what information can be 
presented. Court actors are thus left with substantial leeway in determining what 
risk, if any, is posed by the defendants in relation to bail. More broadly, they are 
afforded discretion as to how they construct the case in this particular portion of 
the criminal process.  
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It has been argued that criminal justice actors are able to construct cases 
through the decisions they make within the wide confines of the law (McBarnet, 
1981; McConville et al., 1991). Indeed, bail is one of multiple stages in the 
criminal process in which they are able to define ‘what happened’ through much 
interpretation, addition, subtraction, selection and reformulation, ultimately 
establishing the meaning and status of how a ‘case’ comes to be understood 
(McConville et al., 1991). The views of the court actors are thus critical in 
shaping the nature and extent of the risk posed by the defendant during the bail 
stage. As McConville and his colleagues (1991) argue: 
 
Case construction implicates the actors in a discourse with legal rules 
and interpreting rules. It involves not simply the selection and 
interpretation of evidence but its creation. Understanding the selections 
made and the decisions taken requires, therefore, analysis of the 
motivations of the actors, their value systems and ideologies (p. 12).  
 
Accordingly, defendant and case characteristics should not be understood as 
objective facts in examining their impact on bail decision-making. Rather, they 
should be defined by the way they are framed and discussed by court actors. 
This process will, in part, depend on the values and motivations of the court 
actors (McBarnet, 1981; McConville et al., 1991). Indeed, the way in which 
defendant and case characteristics are framed and discussed can be expected 
to be highly dependent on the court actors themselves.  
 
In constructing each case, court actors use various defendant and case 
characteristics to form a narrative that explains who the defendant is and what 
happened to cause them to enter the criminal process. However, this narrative 
must be translated into ‘legal code’ given the legal system is normatively closed 
and must convert alternative discourses into that which applies to the court 
context (Cammiss, 2006a). In other words, the characteristics must be framed 
in terms of the laws they are intended to support when they are conveyed to the 
court. During the bail process, this involves translating defendant and case 
characteristics into information that either aggravates or mitigates bail risk and 
framing that information using the exceptions to bail. The characteristics are 
then discussed within this structure. Court actors can be expected to reject 
narratives that do not conform to pre-conceived ideas and reject culturally 
different interpretations of the information underlying the case. As such, the 
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reconstruction process is not value neutral and rather reflects the worldviews of 
the court actors (Cammiss, 2006a). Since the narratives provided in court reflect 
the values of the actors, examining them offers insight as to what these values 
are and how they have influenced their decision-making. This chapter seeks to 
do so through an examination of the defendant and case characteristics 
discussed during bail proceedings. The subsequent section will begin this 
examination through a discussion of how the characteristics are framed.  
 
Framing defendant and case characteristics: The exceptions to the right 
to bail 
 
The defendant and case characteristics discussed in court are largely shaped 
by the exceptions to bail since most representations are provided with the aim 
of demonstrating or refuting these exceptions. As such, an analysis of the 
exceptions applied by court actors sheds light on how the information they 
provide is framed and the context in which it is presented. Many court actors in 
England and Canada noted the relationship between the defendant and case 
characteristics considered and the exceptions to bail. Specifically, they 
highlighted that the exceptions formed the basis of their decision-making when 
prioritising these characteristics. For instance, a District Judge in England 
explained the significance of the exceptions when considering which defence 
and case characteristics were most important to their decision-making:  
 
…I think at that stage, you’re looking at the exceptions to the right to bail 
and seeing how those can be met (LN 116, England, DJ 013). 
 
This District Judge, perhaps unsurprisingly, argued that the exceptions were 
central to their decision-making process. The same assertions were made in 
Canada, where, for example, a defence counsel argued that they assessed the 
information available to them with the exceptions in the forefront of their mind: 
 
All of the questions that I ask the accused and any individual involved 
with the bail plan, like a surety, all relate to the grounds [i.e. exceptions]. 
All of them (LN 328, Canada, DEF 006). 
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Consequently, an understanding of the application of the exceptions is essential 
to understanding why and how court actors discussed specific defendant and 
case characteristics.  
 
Although neither the English nor Canadian bail legislation ranks one exception 
over another in terms of their importance, the observations indicated that they 
were not applied in equal measure. Most notably, the exception concerned with 
the risk of committing further offences (hereafter referred to as the ‘offending 
exception’) was used much more frequently than any other exception in both 
jurisdictions. This finding is consistent with previous research in England and 
Canada (Hucklesby, 1996; Webster, 2015). It is important to note, however, 
that, as was illustrated in Chapter One, there are some differences between 
jurisdictions in the formulation of this exception. First, the Canadian exception 
specifies that there must be a risk to public safety in assessing whether the 
defendant could commit further offences, whereas in England the exception 
refers to any type of further offending. Second, the Canadian exception also 
includes interfering with witnesses whereas this is encompassed in a separate 
exception in England. As such, the scope of the exception is different between 
the two jurisdictions. Broadly speaking, however, it can be understood to target 
concerns surrounding potential further offending in both jurisdictions.  
 
Table 5.1 outlines the number of times that each exception was applied in 
England and Canada. This reflects the number of cases witnessed during the 
court observations in which either the prosecution or the court specified that 
they had concerns based on each of the exceptions. The analysis included both 
cases in which bail decisions were made and cases that were adjourned or 
traversed into other courtrooms (if court actors specified their concerns prior to 
the adjournment or traversal). In all other cases the exceptions were either not 
applicable (as the case was resolved and bail was no longer an issue) or 
beyond the scope of the study (as a conviction was entered and the bail 
decision was not included in the sample). 
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Table 5.1 - Percentage of cases in which the prosecution and the court applied each exception to the right to bail  
 
 
 CANADA ENGLAND 
Prosecution (n=64) Court (n=15) Prosecution (n=42) Court (n=41) 
     
Absconding  
 
28% (18) 7% (1) 36% (15) 27% (11) 
Commit offences/public 
safety 
100% (64) 100% (15) 83% (35) 68% (28) 
Confidence in administration 
of justice (Canada) 
 
2% (1) 0 -- -- 
Interfere with witnesses 
(England) 
 
-- -- 38% (16) 15% (6) 
Injury or fear to associated 
person (England) 
 
-- -- 24% (10) 12% (5) 
On bail (England) 
 
 
-- -- 14% (6) 15% (6) 
Serving prisoner (England) 
 
 
-- -- 0 27% (11) 
Own safety (England) 
 
-- -- 5% (2) 0 
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As such, out of a potential 231 cases in Canada,47 the prosecution specified the 
exceptions shaping their concerns in 64 cases and the court specified them in 
15 cases. Out of 101 potential cases in England, 48  the exceptions were 
specified in 42 cases by the prosecution and 41 cases by the court.49 The two 
exceptions that, broadly speaking, are included in the bail laws in both 
jurisdictions are presented the first two rows of Table 5.1 (i.e. absconding and 
committing further offences) while the subsequent exceptions are each unique 
to only one of the jurisdictions and are labelled accordingly.  
 
The findings show that the offending exception was used substantially more 
often than any of the other exceptions for refusing bail. In Canada, it was 
applied in every case in which the exceptions were specified by both the 
prosecution and the court50 while in England it was applied in 83% (n=35) of the 
cases by the prosecution and 68% (n=28) of cases by the court. This was more 
than twice as often as any other exception. Furthermore, unlike the other 
exceptions, it was regularly applied alone.51 Although the exception concerned 
with absconding – the historical justification for refusing bail - was applied 
occasionally in both jurisdictions, it was applied alongside the offending 
exception in every case in Canada and most cases in England (14/15 by the 
prosecution and 7/11 by the court). The same trend was observed for the other 
exceptions, which were used alongside the offending exception in most of the 
cases in which they were applied.52 As such, when other exceptions were used 
they were rarely applied alone and were mostly used in conjunction with the 
                                            
47 This included 69 cases in which a bail decision was made, 130 adjournments, and 32 
traversals. 
48 This included 100 cases in which a bail decision was made and one adjournment. 
49 All cases in which this information was provided were included in the analyses. In Canada, 
this included adjournments and cases traversed to other courtrooms since the exceptions of 
concern were often specified in these appearances. All other cases in both jurisdictions involved 
appearances in which bail decisions were made.    
50 Since the number of occasions in which the court specified the exceptions in Canada was low 
(n=15), the findings pertaining to this group should be interpreted with some caution. 
51 In Canada, the exception related to committing further offences was applied alone in 45/65 
cases by the prosecution and 14/15 cases by the court and no other exceptions were applied 
alone. In England, it was applied alone in 7/42 cases by the prosecution whereas none of the 
other exceptions were applied alone on more than 2 occasions. Similarly, the court applied this 
exception alone in 10/31 occasions in England and with the exception of the ‘serving prisoner’ 
exception (which was applied alone on 6 occasions) none of the other exceptions were applied 
alone on more than 3 occasions.  
52 The interfering with witnesses exception was applied with the offending exception in 13/16 
cases by the prosecution and 5/6 cases by the court, the DV exception in 7/10 cases by the 
prosecution and 2/5 cases by the court, the on bail exception in 5/6 cases by the prosecution 
and the own protection exception in all 2 cases by the prosecution.  
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offending exception. The only exception to this pattern was the ‘serving 
prisoner’ exception in England, which was applied alone in about half of the 
occasions in which it was used (n=6). However, since unlike the other 
exceptions, it left no room for discretion and did not require any arguments on 
the part of the court actors beyond relaying the fact that the defendant was in 
custody or being recalled, the fact that this exception was applied alone was 
unsurprising. What is perhaps more surprising is that in almost half of the cases 
in which it was used (n=5) the court applied it alongside the offending exception 
despite being able to justify the need for detention independently. Ultimately, 
these findings suggest that, while the other exceptions were applied regularly, 
they were rarely the sole focus of the objections raised by the prosecution or the 
court.  
 
The prioritisation of the offending exception reflects a combination of 
environmental and cultural factors discussed in Chapter One. First, the political 
environment in both jurisdictions has increasingly been characterised by 
concerns surrounding potential offending on bail (Hucklesby, 2009; Hucklesby & 
Marshall, 2000; Webster, 2015). In England this is at least in part explained by a 
number of events beginning in the late 1980s, including police reports of 
dangerous ‘bail bandits’ (i.e. offenders who were routinely granted bail and 
subsequently reoffended) and high profile crimes committed on bail reported by 
the media (Hucklesby, 2009; Hucklesby & Marshall, 2000). In Canada, Crown 
attorneys and police officers voiced concerns that they were having difficulty 
keeping dangerous people in custody following the implementation of the Bail 
Reform Act 1972. This resulted in the formation of pressure groups seeking 
tougher bail laws (Friedland, 2012). In both jurisdictions, this occurred within a 
broader context of growing concerns for victims’ rights, the protection of the 
public, and risk management (Hucklesby, 2009; Webster, 2015).  
 
The political environment in which the court actors work can be thought of as 
part of their ‘task environment’, referring to the external forces that shape the 
courtroom workgroup (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977). As was suggested in Chapter 
Two, research suggests that these forces have a generalised effect on the 
decision-making of the court actors (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977) and, over time, 
can contribute towards the development of courtroom norms (Church, 1985). In 
192 
 
this case, it would seem that rather than attempting to ensure defendants 
appear for court - the historical focus of bail decision-making - court actors were 
primarily concerned with reducing further offending (Hucklesby & Sarre, 2009; 
Webster, 2015).  
 
This mentality appears to have influenced the local functioning of the court by 
permeating the routine of the courtroom workgroup. Indeed, the consistent use 
of the offending exception was understood as a reflection of the behaviour that 
the prosecution and court deemed to most warrant custody. This sent a 
message to all court actors that the offending exception was likely to be a 
central focus of the bail proceedings. This was recognised by many court actors 
during the interviews. For example, a defence counsel in Canada claimed that:  
 
…usually there’s detentions based on secondary grounds [i.e. the 
offending exception], in my experience (LN 183, Canada, DEF 007). 
 
This suggests that the more often the prosecution used this exception to justify 
their position and the court used it to justify remanding defendants in custody, 
the more likely the defence was to build their case around this exception 
(Hucklesby, 1996).  As such, actors were likely to use information to either 
support or refute the claim that the defendant will commit further offences on 
bail because they believed that this is the exception regarded to be the most 
important to the court. Consequently, the prioritisation of this exception shaped 
the information that was presented in court and was considered the most 
important by court actors. This was reflected in the defendant and case 
characteristics presented in court, which is discussed in the subsequent section. 
 
The defendant and case characteristics discussed by court actors 
 
The following examination of the defendant and case characteristics discussed 
during the bail proceedings also suggests that court actors tend to prioritise 
offending-related behaviour in their decision-making process. This is consistent 
with previous research that has examined the information taken into account by 
court actors during the bail process in England (Hucklesby, 1996; Morgan & 
Henderson, 1998). No research is known to directly assess the information 
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considered by court actors in Canada.53 The findings also suggest, however, 
that the manner in which bail risks are mitigated in each jurisdiction differ 
considerably. This was determined by examining which defendant and case 
characteristics were discussed by court actors in the cases viewed during the 
court observations. The defendant and case characteristics discussed verbally 
that related to the bail decision-making process were recorded and then divided 
into 15 categories which covered information under five broad headings: 
criminal history, bail history, allegations, personal circumstances and bail plan. 
This information was both counted and analysed qualitatively. In the 
subsequent discussion the quantitative analyses are presented and put into 
context using both the interviews and the qualitative observations. 
 
The characteristics discussed  
 
Before examining the context in which the information was discussed, the type 
of defendant and case characteristics presented as well as their range and 
quantity will be outlined. This analysis aims to identify which characteristics 
were important to the bail decision-making process. Table 5.2 sets out the 
percentage of cases in which each characteristic was discussed in England and 
Canada. Only cases in which bail decisions were made54 and discussed were 
included in the analysis. There were also notably 8 cases in Canada and 11 
cases in England in which a bail decision was made but no discussion about the 
decision-making process took place.55 This meant that 61 out of 69 cases 
involving a bail decision were examined in Canada and 89 out of 100 such 
cases were examined in England. 
 
 While the findings are presented in terms of the percentage of cases in which 
each characteristic was mentioned individually, in reality they were discussed in 
                                            
53 While Kellough and Wortley (2002) have examined the information taken into account by 
court actors, they did so through a statistical analysis of the relationship between the 
characteristics of the case and the bail outcome. As such, only the judicial decision was 
examined while the  context in which they were considered and discussed was not examined. 
54 Since, in Canada, discussions during adjournments and traversals to other courts were 
limited to, in some cases, the prosecution’s bail position and, more typically, details about the 
adjournment itself, they were excluded from the analysis. This is because they offered little 
insight as to why the court actors believed the defendants should be remanded in custody or on 
bail beyond the exceptions applied, which were already discussed in the previous section. 
55 In these cases the outcome was provided but no context was provided as to how they arrived 
at their decision.   
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Table 5.2  - Percentage of cases in which defendant and case characteristics were discussed by court actors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CANADA  ENGLAND 
Contested 
(n=18) 
Uncontested 
(n=43)  
Total  
(n=61) 
Contested  
(n=38) 
Uncontested 
(n=51) 
Total  
(n=89) 
 
CRIMINAL 
HISTORY 
 
 
100% (18) 
 
67% (29) 
 
77% (47) 
 
90% (34) 
 
 
51% (26) 
 
 
67% (60) 
BAIL HISTORY 
 
 
94% (17) 35% (15) 52% (32) 90% (34) 
 
39% (20) 
 
61% (54) 
ALLEGATIONS 
 
 
89% (16) 30% (13) 48% (29) 100% (38) 
 
69% (35) 
 
82% (73) 
PERSONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
100% (18) 49% (21) 64% (39) 74% (28) 
 
20% (10) 
 
43% (38) 
BAIL PLAN 100% (18) 77% (33) 84% (51) 95% (36) 
 
33% (17) 
 
60% (53) 
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various combinations. However, disaggregating them here provides a clearer 
picture of how many times they were mentioned and thus the extent to which 
each characteristic’s inclusion was the norm in each court. The findings 
revealed that in both England and Canada, the defendant and case 
characteristics discussed included the defendant’s criminal history, their bail 
history, the allegations with which they were charged and their personal 
circumstances. They also included any ‘bail plan’ proposed as an alternative to 
custody.  
 
The range of characteristics discussed was both similar across the two 
jurisdictions and consistent with their respective bail laws. With the exception of 
personal circumstances – which encompasses several narrower considerations 
contained in the bail laws (e.g. community ties, defendant stability) – these 
categories directly correspond to the aforementioned considerations provided in 
Paragraph 9, Schedule 1, of the Bail Act 1976 in England and the case law 
summarised by Trotter (2010) in Canada. Although it is perhaps unsurprising 
that the considerations discussed would correspond to those outlined in the law 
related to bail, it is nonetheless notable that court actors did not use the 
discretion they were afforded to discuss additional factors that may have been 
relevant. This is consistent with Lipetz (1984), who has suggested that court 
actors tend to establish a widely accepted and predictable routine that 
operationalises wider expectations (e.g. justifying the bail decision) into 
manageable tasks and routines. These routines are agreed upon by all of the 
court actors so that everyone knows what constitutes the work of the court and 
the appropriate ways to complete it.  
 
In this case, by limiting the discussion to a narrow range of defendant and case 
characteristics the court actors were able to develop an understanding of what 
information might be addressed and were thus better prepared to respond when 
it was presented. This was evidenced in the interviews in which every court 
actor was able to list the ‘typical’ characteristics they would draw on when each 
exception was applicable. In no cases did this information extend beyond the 
range of characteristics specified in the law. Indeed, the narrow range of 
characteristics discussed may be partially explained by the court actors’ 
adherence to their recognised routines. 
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The extent to which the characteristics were mentioned changed considerably 
according to whether the appearance was contested or uncontested (see Table 
5.2). In contested hearings, court actors discussed each characteristic in almost 
every case whereas in uncontested appearances they were discussed 
considerably less often. In Canada, an average of 2.2 characteristics were 
discussed during uncontested appearances whereas in England this average 
was 1.9 characteristics. This compared to 4.4 characteristics in Canada and 4.3 
characteristics in England during contested hearings. Furthermore, every case 
that was not included in Table 5.2, in which a bail decision was made but no 
discussion took place (n=8 in Canada, n=11 in England), was an uncontested 
appearance. 
 
 These findings demonstrate that a wider range of characteristics was 
discussed in contested hearings compared to uncontested appearances. This is 
consistent with previous research (Bottomley, 1970; Doherty & East, 1985; 
Hucklesby, 1997b) which demonstrated that very little information is presented 
in cases in which the prosecutor and defence had previously agreed on a 
proposed outcome. This was conceivably because, as was discussed in 
Chapter Four, much of the discussion took place before court during informal 
negotiations between the prosecution and defence. As such, the uncontested 
appearances generally consisted of one party explaining to the court why bail 
was (or was not) appropriate. Consequently, it can be expected that the 
information perceived to be the most important (and thus more likely to assure 
the court the agreed outcome was appropriate) would be relayed in these 
cases. This stands in stark contrast to contested hearings, where each party 
made a case for bail or custody, presenting multiple pieces of information in 
order to strengthen their argument. 
 
Although the range of characteristics presented and the extent to which they 
were addressed in contested versus uncontested appearances was similar in 
England and Canada, the frequency with which each characteristic was 
discussed differed considerably between the two jurisdictions. Table 5.2 
demonstrates that, in Canada, court actors discussed the bail plan (84%; n=51), 
the defendant’s criminal history (77%, n=47), and their personal circumstances 
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(64%, n=39) most often. In comparison, the allegations (82%, n=73) and 
criminal history (67%, n=60) were discussed most often in England.  
 
When these findings are compared with the information obtained in the 
interviews, some clear patterns emerge in relation to the characteristics deemed 
most important by the court actors. While the number of interviews was small in 
Canada, there was some indication that criminal history, personal 
circumstances, and bail plans were prioritised by the court actors. Indeed, these 
characteristics were listed as important more often than bail history and 
allegations. Similarly, court actors in England cited criminal history and 
allegations to be important three times more often than bail history, personal 
circumstances, and bail plan. These numbers should be interpreted with 
caution, however, given the small sample sizes. This is especially the case in 
Canada, where only seven court actors responded to this question. While no 
firm conclusions can be ascertained through an examination of the quantitative 
data alone, the qualitative explanations provided during the interviews provide 
further support that court actors considered these characteristics the most 
important. These findings are put into context below, in which they are 
discussed in terms of their aggravating and mitigating impact on the bail 
decision-making process.  
 
Aggravating the bail risk 
 
The characteristics that were used by court actors to aggravate the bail risk 
posed by defendants mirrored the exceptions employed. Specifically, they 
primarily, but not exclusively, focused on offending-related behaviour and, in 
particular, the harm this offending might cause. In both jurisdictions, this 
involved discussions surrounding criminal history, allegations and, particularly in 
England, bail history.  
 
Criminal History 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that the defendant’s criminal history was found to be 
one of the most important characteristics in the bail decision-making process 
across both jurisdictions. Given that material can be sparse and incomplete at 
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the bail stage, this is often the most concrete information available with which to 
demonstrate a defendant’s level of risk. This is because, in the main, it centres 
on formal records as opposed to the unproven allegations and subjective 
personality assessments that make up much of the additional information. For 
the purposes of this research, criminal history describes the previous record of 
substantive offending. This includes the volume, recency, and nature of 
previous convictions as well as contact with the criminal justice system that did 
not result in formal charges or conviction (e.g. cautions, peace bonds, ‘callouts’ 
to the police). It does not address administration of justice offences/defaults (i.e. 
breach of bail conditions, failure to attend court) nor does it discuss offending on 
bail since these are discussed in relation to the defendant’s bail history. 
 
Criminal history was the characteristic discussed second most often in England 
and Canada (see Table 5.2) and court actors in both jurisdictions confirmed that 
it was central to their decision-making. This was the most widely cited factor 
across both jurisdictions in the interviews.56 For instance, when a duty counsel 
in Canada described what factors were most important to their decision-making 
process, they remarked: 
 
Well the most important thing is whether they have any previous 
convictions. I would say that’s always the first thing (LN 532, Canada, DC 
003).   
 
Many court actors in England formed the same opinion, frequently citing 
criminal history to be the most important factor they considered. A defence 
solicitor in England suggested that this was because the presence of a criminal 
record was often the deciding factor as to whether or not a defendant was 
released on bail: 
 
…the big thing that does spring to my mind is basically… it’s their record, 
that’s got to be the biggest thing. Everything else is window-dressing, 
right. Because if you say all the nice things about someone with a record, 
and you say all the nice things about someone else who doesn’t have a 
record, it could be the exact same things that you say; job, family ties, 
stability, the same mitigation, the same defence, the same everything 
else… but if you say those same nice things for the person with that 
record, the chances are they won’t get the bail. So it really comes down 
                                            
56 Note that criminal history was tied with allegations in England. 
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to the record. Or you could say… you could think of all the horrible 
things, you know, a person could have no record at all, they could have 
absolutely nothing going for themselves and they will still get bail 
because they haven’t got a record, which is… wholly justifiable (LN 450, 
England, DEF 022). 
 
These views are in line with previous research that has investigated the 
importance of different factors on the bail decision-making process, which 
showed that criminal history was one of the most important characteristics in 
making a remand decision (Morgan & Henderson, 1998), was frequently used 
as a justification for detention (Doherty & East, 1985), and (in terms of the 
number of previous convictions) was positively related to obtaining a remand in 
custody (Kellough & Wortley, 2002). This is because the criminal record 
provides an indication of the likelihood that a defendant will reoffend on bail if 
they are released (Kellough & Wortley, 2002; Morgan & Henderson, 1998). 
Given that the offending exception was applied more often than any other 
exception in both jurisdictions, it is perhaps unsurprising that the defendant’s 
criminal history would carry a great deal of weight during their considerations. 
 
As the aforementioned defence counsel in England suggested, criminal history 
was also viewed as important because court actors believed that it was this 
characteristic that the court would focus on most in making their decisions. This 
was mentioned by several court actors, including a legal adviser in England, 
who commented: 
 
…it’s primarily the record and the defendant’s history, that’s primarily 
what they’ll look at for all bail decisions (LN 288, England, LA 010). 
 
As Church (1982) argued, the court actors developed expectations through their 
experiences working in each court. In this case, court actors would expect the 
court to heavily weight criminal history when they were assessing the 
information.  As a result of this expectation, the prosecution appeared to adopt 
routine approaches to aggravate the impact of criminal history such as citing the 
number of previous convictions, emphasising their seriousness, and highlighting 
their similarity to the current allegations.  
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There were, however, some differences in the way that the bail risks associated 
with criminal history were conceptualised between jurisdictions. Specifically, the 
court actors in Canada reported that they would discuss whether the defendant 
had a propensity for violence and was thus a danger to the victim or the public 
while this approach was not reported in the interviews in England. A defendant 
with a criminal history that lacked violence was therefore considered less of a 
bail risk than one who had a history of committing harmful offences. For 
instance, a defence counsel in Canada made the following statement:  
 
If [the criminal record is] unrelated, if they’ve got three convictions but 
they’re all for shoplifting and he’s charged with an impaired driving, 
you’re going to say, “well this guy is not a violent offender. He’s been 
charged with shoplifting, big deal” (LN 324, Canada, DEF 004). 
 
In comparison, court actors in England discussed the importance of criminal 
history more broadly in the interviews. For instance, an associate prosecutor 
described how they would look at the defendant’s criminal history: 
 
So I always look at the record and see what the history is. If they’ve got a 
history, a pattern of committing these sorts of offences then how often, 
when? If they’re quite old you’ve got not as much of an argument to say 
that they’re likely to commit it again. So yes, the record is important, you 
know, for your argument (LN 152, England, AP 028).  
 
This disparity is likely to be rooted in the differences between the offending 
exceptions in England and Canada. As was discussed previously, the law in 
Canada requires court actors to demonstrate that the defendant would be a risk 
to public safety not just that they might commit another offence. The court 
commonly noted this during the proceedings. For instance, in a contested 
hearing involving break and enter allegations, the court stated that they must 
consider whether detention is necessary for the protection of public as it is not 
just about reoffending. The defendant is entitled to reasonable bail (Contested 
Hearing 42, Canada).  
 
This does not suggest that court actors in England failed to consider the degree 
of harm caused by previous convictions on the record, but rather that, unlike in 
Canada, they did not have to address it in order to satisfy the requirements of 
the exception. In practice, prosecutors were consistently observed to discuss 
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the presence of violence in the defendant’s record in order to further aggravate 
its impact. For example, in a contested hearing involving allegations of an 
unprovoked attack on a stranger, the prosecutor argued that the defendant had 
a previous conviction for an offence of violence (Contested Hearing 330, 
England). This information was used both to highlight the similarities in their 
record with the current allegations and to demonstrate the defendant’s 
propensity for violence and thus their threat to public safety. This finding is 
consistent with Morgan and Henderson (1998), who found that, in practice, the 
court considers how much harm the offending would cause when applying the 
offending exception in England. However, given it was not necessary to 
demonstrate potential harm when framing the bail risk, this was unsurprisingly 
less of a focus of both the interviews and the observations in England.  
 
In sum, discussions surrounding criminal history in both jurisdictions were found 
to centre on whether the defendants were likely to commit further offences 
should they be released on bail, with, particularly in Canada, an emphasis on 
potential threats to public safety.    
 
Bail History 
 
While criminal history often occupied a central part of the discussion in England 
and Canada, bail history tended to be discussed less often (see Table 5.2). For 
the purposes of this research, a defendant’s bail history is defined as their 
compliance with current and previous bail orders – both in terms of refraining 
from further substantive offending while on bail and adhering with criminal 
justice obligations such as appearing for court and complying with conditions. 
Bail history was never mentioned independently from other characteristics in 
Canada (out of 61 cases) and was only mentioned independently twice in 
England (out of 89 cases). This was less than any other characteristic with the 
exception of personal circumstances. In addition, it was listed as the ‘most 
important factor’ infrequently during the interviews in both jurisdictions. This 
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suggests it was rarely the sole focus of discussions surrounding bail, but rather 
was used to supplement other characteristics.57  
 
While bail history was not the primary focus of discussion in either jurisdiction, it 
was addressed slightly more often in England than in Canada (see Table 5.2). 
This may be because, despite political incentives in both jurisdictions to limit 
offending on bail (Hucklesby & Marshall, 2000; Webster, 2015), these attempts 
resulted in more material attempts at reform in England, where committing an 
offence on bail was added as a exception for refusing bail (Bail Act 1976, 
Schedule 1, Part 1). While previous research suggests that it was the 
underlying political and media attention predating this issue that influenced the 
decision-making of court actors rather than the legal reform itself (Hucklesby & 
Marshall, 2000), this increased focus sheds some light on why this issue may 
have been discussed more by court actors in England than in Canada. It also 
explains why court actors may have discussed criminal history less often in 
England than in Canada. Indeed, the observations suggested court actors in 
England would often discuss the defendant’s record of offending on bail rather 
than their convictions more broadly, which was not the case in Canada. For 
instance, one prosecutor in England claimed they would look for asterisks on 
the record, which were used to indicate offences on bail in this jurisdiction: 
 
Literally you go through the record and look down for asterisks, hoping 
that there’s going to be asterisks against recent offences because 
obviously that’s a more persuasive argument, if they’ve recently 
committed offences on bail, whether the present offence is committed on 
bail (LN 386, England, CPS 024). 
 
When bail histories were discussed, concerns surrounding further substantive 
offending were the primary focus of the discussions in both England and 
Canada. Substantive offences are distinct from offences against the 
administration of justice in that they do not relate to offending that is exclusively 
tied to a failure to comply with court orders. For instance, while failing to 
                                            
57 It is notable that this finding is inconsistent with previous research exploring the English bail 
process (Hucklesby, 1996), which found bail history to be prioritised by court actors. While it is 
possible that when court actors discussed the ‘record’ broadly in court and during the interviews 
it may have been that they were referring to bail history rather than criminal history and simply 
did not make the distinction, it is also possible that practices have changed in the last few 
decades. Future research should explore this gap more thoroughly. 
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surrender at court or the police station is technically an offence in England, it is 
a ‘secondary’ administration of justice offence in that it relates to obligations to 
the criminal justice system as opposed to ‘primary’ substantive offences such 
as, for example, theft or assault. An analysis of the discussions observed in 
court suggested that, when bail history was discussed, court actors were more 
likely to focus on alleged or demonstrated substantive offences committed on 
bail than failures to adhere to criminal justice obligations.  
 
The court observations revealed that there were a total of 40 instances in which 
bail history was mentioned in Canada (in 61 cases) and 93 such instances in 
England (in 89 cases).58 Of these 40 instances in Canada, 60% (n=24) related 
to discussions surrounding alleged or substantive offending on bail while in only 
40% (n=16) of cases did these discussions surround the failure of the defendant 
to comply with conditions or attend court. Similarly, of the 93 instances in which 
bail history was mentioned in England, 59% (n=55) related to alleged or 
demonstrated offending on bail while only 41% (n=38) related to failures to 
comply with conditions or attend court. Taken together with the frequency with 
which court actors discussed previous convictions more broadly, this suggests 
the focus of discussions surrounding their records related to offending more 
than compliance. 
 
In England, the prioritisation of offences committed on bail was also 
substantiated by the interviews, in which many court actors claimed that 
defendants who reoffended on bail were treated more harshly than those that 
failed to comply with conditions or attend court. For example, a District Judge in 
England made the following comment: 
 
… [defendants] are more likely to come back [to court in custody] just as 
an isolated breach rather than new offence as well, and so in those 
situations, where it is purely a breach of their bail conditions, I think most 
judges tend to give people a second chance. I don’t like it when 
advocates say, “this is their first breach,” as if, automatically, they’re 
entitled to one breach, but the reality is that usually you give people a 
second chance, and if you didn’t the prisons would just be absolutely 
overflowing (LN 333, England, DJ 13).  
 
                                            
58 Note that there could be more than one instance of bail history being mentioned in one case.  
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This District Judge suggested that a defendant’s bail history is sometimes 
considered alongside institutional concerns, such as prison overcrowding. It 
would seem that when considering the size of the prison remand population, 
defendants accused of failing to comply with conditions are generally 
considered better candidates to divert from custody than those who allegedly 
reoffended on bail.  
 
When failures to comply with bail conditions did raise concerns, the primary 
focus appeared to be on the potential for harm as opposed to the failure to 
respect court orders. Indeed, the interviews suggested that court actors were 
more likely to have concerns in relation to breaches that compromised the 
safety or security of victims, witnesses and the public than those that indicated 
a lack of adherence with criminal justice obligations. While most magistrates 
and judges suggested all breaches were taken seriously, they did concede that 
the circumstances surrounding it would influence their decision. For instance, a 
magistrate in England said: 
 
I think a breach is a breach, because what we do in magistrates’ is take 
all bail conditions as serious. Now don’t get me wrong, on a practical 
level, if somebody’s breach is they’ve interfered with a witness and 
intimidated the witness, then the severity of that would outweigh 
somebody’s who’s meant to report to the police station at 10 AM and 
reports at 10.30, but it’s a breach, and I do tend to take it seriously 
because a bail condition is there for a reason, and if you’re given bail 
then you have to comply with the conditions (LN 176, England, MAG 
014). 
 
Like this magistrate, most judicial officials that were interviewed regarded some 
breaches to be more serious than others. For instance, one District Judge in 
England suggested that they conceptualised breaches on a continuum: 
 
Yeah, because you can have breaches from turning up half an hour late 
to sign on at the police station, to going round and knocking on 
someone’s door and shouting through the letter box, so those there’s a 
whole continuum of breaches really (LN 140, England, DJ 11).  
 
Clearly, harm is a major factor in court actors’ assessments of seriousness 
when they are making decisions surrounding breaches. This may be because 
interference with victims and witnesses are more likely to compromise public 
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safety, a priority central to both the Canadian and English criminal justice 
rhetoric (Sanders et al., 2010; Webster, 2015). 
 
Following the same pattern as criminal history, the findings suggest that 
concerns surrounding bail history primarily focus on the risk of further offending, 
and in particular harm. Despite the relationship between bail history and 
absconding (i.e. failing to adhere to court orders), which also encompasses an 
exception to bail in both jurisdictions, offending and harm were still the primary 
focus of these concerns.  
 
Constructing case ‘types’  
 
While each characteristic was ascribed some degree of individualised 
importance, in practice the bail risk was established by evaluating the 
intersection of a number of these factors (Hucklesby, 1996; Morgan & 
Henderson, 1998). The findings suggest that, across both jurisdictions, the court 
actors relied heavily on a combination of the defendant’s history of previous 
offending and the current allegations. The allegations consist of information 
related to the alleged offence or breach, including its perceived seriousness and 
the strength of the evidence. Unlike the vast majority of the criminal and bail 
history, the allegations are not yet proven. As such, while the law provides for 
them to be considered in both England and Canada, they cannot be used, in of 
themselves, to refuse bail. As such, court actors in both jurisdictions reported 
that much of their decision-making process in relation to aggravating the bail 
risk involved balancing the allegations with criminal history, and occasionally, 
bail history. The importance of this balancing act was voiced by a District Judge 
in England: 
 
So I suppose one could say that if somebody appears before the court 
with no previous convictions, never been in trouble before, that’s a 
significant factor to take into account. But if they’re charged with a 
particularly serious offence with strong evidence against them, then that 
balance would shift (LN 058, England, DJ 11).  
 
The balancing of these characteristics led to court actors in both England and 
Canada forming an informal categorisation system for the cases entering the 
court. This suggests that, as Sudnow (1965) has argued, the court actors had a 
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tendency to categorise cases based on what they perceived to be ‘normal.’ As 
such, they viewed cases according to what they believed were their typical 
features. In the same way that court actors develop ‘going rates’ for particular 
types of cases during sentencing (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977), the potential bail 
outcome of different categories of cases would be decided based on their 
perceived ‘type.’ These shared ideas of case classifications were generally a 
product of a number of factors in addition to the allegations, including the 
criminal history and personal circumstances. An example of how these 
categories were established is illustrated by examining the statement of one 
duty counsel in Canada: 
 
I guess people just sort of tend to fall into a couple different 
categories…There’s the case where people have a lot of underlying 
issues that are bringing them into conflict with the criminal justice system. 
So whether they’re guilty of this particular offence or not, that would be 
like drug addictions, other mental health issues, homelessness, for all 
property related and sort of violence related offences, usually drug and 
alcohol for violence offences ... And then there’s the people where it’s 
just like this is their first time coming before the court and it’s not really 
that there’s like compound factors that are bringing them into conflict with 
the law, but it’s just like one thing... (LN 535, Canada, DC 003).  
 
This duty counsel described two ‘types’ of cases that were common to the court 
in Canada. They were defendants with long records who committed a series of 
minor offences and those who have no records but committed a serious 
offence.  
 
This categorisation dictated not only how cases meeting the criteria were 
viewed, it was also used to assess their level of risk. For instance, one 
prosecutor in England described the risk that specific types of defendants would 
continue to commit offences: 
 
So, dealing with the typical sort of things, for example, burglars, they’ve 
got a history of burglary, very often – I don’t want to make it sound like 
it’s a generalisation – but very often there are problems with addiction in 
the background and there is a high risk that they will continue to commit 
that sort of offence, especially if they are on – and the police can often 
say – his intention is linking to this, this, and this, even if they can’t 
provide the evidence of it yet, especially if there’s indication they were on 
a spree of some sort (LN 377, England, CPS 27).  
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This categorisation of defendant based largely on the offences they were 
charged led to perceptions that certain ‘types’ of defendants would receive 
specific bail outcomes. This was explained by one duty counsel in Canada: 
 
I actually don’t think the [Criminal] Code itself sets out that people should 
be detained at length or that they should be detained for the kind of 
things that we detain people for. I don’t actually think that’s what the 
Code says. But I think we’ve just got into the habit of kind of like ‘well we 
regularly detain people for that so I guess we will.’ It’s hard to kind of 
change out of your habits (LN 159, Canada, DC 002).  
 
 As this duty counsel argued, the tendency to categorise cases according to 
their typical features is potentially problematic. This is because it could lead to 
blanket characterisations of certain groups. Since the law dictates that the 
allegations should not be relied on alone, this categorisation system was 
particularly problematic when the categories were based exclusively on the 
allegations. This was acknowledged by several court actors. For instance, a 
defence counsel in Canada suggested that allegations were assessed 
independently on some occasions: 
 
…you know what’s interesting, is you have a really, really serious charge, 
but the guy doesn’t have a criminal record. Then how do you have any 
basis to assume that he’s going to breach any of his bail conditions, 
right? And too many Crowns will actually say ‘oh these are very serious 
charges, etc.’… (LN 162, Canada, DEF 005). 
 
This assessment was supported by the observations, where it was found that 
allegations were the only characteristic mentioned in four cases in Canada (out 
of 61 cases) and six cases in England (out of 89 cases). This suggests that, 
although it was infrequent, there were instances in which discussions were 
taking place based on unproven allegations alone. One area in which this was 
reported to be especially prevalent was in relation to allegations involving 
domestic violence. This reflects increasing concerns surrounding this type of 
offending in both England and Canada.  
 
Domestic violence allegations. Domestic violence has gained increased 
political attention in the last three decades in both England and Canada (Ellison, 
2003; Hoyle & Sanders, 2000; Johnson, 2006; Johnson & Fraser, 2011; 
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Sanders et al., 2010). Indeed, there have been increased attempts to better 
deal with what is now viewed as a pressing social issue.  
 
In England, circulars went out in the early 1990s and early 2000s that first, 
urged police to take more of an interventionist approach (Home Office, 1990), 
and second, adopted a near-mandatory arrest policy for domestic violence 
cases (Hoyle & Sanders, 2000). More recently, the Domestic Violence, Crime 
and Victims Act 2004 sent a signal to police that they should take domestic 
violence more seriously. Pro-charge policies have also developed alongside 
pro-arrest policies. The CPS was first encouraged to proceed with all cases in 
the event they passed an evidential test and later developed a strategy based 
more on female empowerment, providing support for victims and reducing the 
extent to which they had to choose between violence and difficult social and 
financial circumstances (Hoyle & Sanders, 2000). More recently, strategies 
have developed to enable evidence to be provided in less stressful 
circumstances – albeit, perhaps problematically, while continuing to rely on 
victim testimony (Ellison, 2003).  
 
In Canada, pro-charging policies in the 1980s removed the burden of the 
decision to lay a charge from the victim and laid it on the police and prosecution 
(Johnson, 2006). In addition, no-drop prosecution policies have been 
implemented and specialised domestic violence courts were created to target 
the issues that were unique to these cases. The province of Ontario had the 
largest roll-out of specialised court processes, with a ‘Domestic Violence Court’ 
that attempts to better facilitate domestic violence cases, provide early 
intervention, increase offender accountability, an provide increased support for 
victims (Johnson & Fraser, 2011). These interventions primarily attempt to deal 
with the issue of domestic violence through strategies surrounding arrest and 
prosecution. Ultimately, across both jurisdictions the increased focus on 
domestic violence reflects a broader focus on victims and public safety during 
the criminal justice process.   
 
The findings suggest that the increased focus on domestic violence has had a 
significant impact on the bail decision-making process in both jurisdictions. 
Court actors would often describe how these cases were given special attention 
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and handled differently than other matters. This is not unique to the bail 
process, as differential treatment of domestic violence has also been found in 
relation to other summary procedures, such as mode of trial (Cammiss, 2006b). 
In England, a specific court was set up to deal exclusively with domestic 
violence bail cases once a week in order to deal with the high volume of these 
cases. A prosecutor in England described how they would remind the court 
about the unique characteristics of these cases and the new exception under 
LASPO relating to them: 
 
So reminding benches of that particular power interplay and reminding 
them that domestic abuse is very different to any other sort of offending 
they deal with and then talking to them about the [LASPO] domestic 
violence exception, as I said, it suddenly has led to this sea change 
where people were being remanded where they would never have been 
remanded before. And assuming that the account that the complainant 
gives in her account is true, and isn’t the work of fiction, I would say 
rightly so. Because they pose a risk, a substantial risk, to the person that 
they are in that relationship with (LN 138, England, CPS 027). 
 
This prosecutor explained that the LASPO provisions have increased the extent 
to which courts could remand defendants in custody who were charged with 
domestic violence offences. This change tended to be viewed positively by 
prosecutors and judicial officials in England since, like this prosecutor 
mentioned, defendants charged with domestic violence offences were seen to 
be a bail risk in terms of the potential harm they might cause. This sentiment 
was in line with several of the other prosecutors and even a few defence 
solicitors, who consistently argued that these cases should be treated with 
caution on account of the potential risks to the victim.  
 
Some defence solicitors, however, felt as though domestic violence cases were 
treated with excessive caution and were handled according to their ‘domestic’ 
characterisation rather than on the merits of the case. For instance, one 
defence solicitor in England argued: 
 
I think there’s a hard line view in sexual and domestic violence cases; 
they, I think the sea change has been a very negative one in the sense 
that regardless of the background, whether there is antecedent history or 
not, [the CPS] tend to go for remand. And I think that’s policy; it’s just 
something we’re seeing more and more of (LN 500, England, DEF 019). 
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This was also largely the opinion expressed towards the handling of violence  
cases in Canada. For instance, once defence counsel in Canada made the 
following statement: 
 
Ten years ago police officers could walk into a domestic situation, 
separate the husband and wife, tell them to cool down, and everybody 
could go home. Bob's your uncle. Now the police have no discretion. 
They have to make an arrest and then they have no discretion to release 
from the station. They have to put that person through a show cause 
hearing because the Crowns are mandating that that person no longer 
be released on an own recognizance, but on a surety bail, and the only 
place you can do that is in court. So that's clogged the courts up (LN 214, 
Canada, DEF 005).	
 
Unfortunately, it was unclear how the prosecution viewed domestic violence 
cases in Canada given they were not interviewed. However, the court 
observations suggested they held a view similar to the prosecution in England, 
as general comments were commonly made about the domestic nature of the 
case. For instance, in one case the prosecution claimed that the case involved 
a domestic assault, not an isolated assault where parties cool down. He 
suggested that domestics were emotional and involved family issues and that 
by their very nature they create higher secondary  [i.e. the offending exception] 
concerns (Contested Hearing 125, Canada). This suggests that the risk of 
further offending was also seen to be associated with domestic violence cases 
in Canada. 
 
The two jurisdictions both appear to have developed routines with regards to 
the way in which they handled specific types of allegations. While they may not 
discuss the allegations to the same extent (see Table 5.2), they both developed 
standard ways of dealing with ‘normal’ cases. As evidenced by the focus on 
domestic violence cases, the ‘types’ of defendants that were thought to be more 
likely to continue to commit offences and, in particular, those who were thought 
to be likely to cause harm, were often viewed to be the biggest bail risks. In 
domestic violence cases, these general attitudes appear to have intersected 
with the recent legal changes brought about by LASPO and the current political 
and social climate to produce a particularly cautious approach. 
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Mitigating the bail risk 
 
While the way in which bail risks were aggravated was broadly similar in 
England and Canada, the tools used to mitigate these risks were found to be 
considerably different. It will be demonstrated that it is these differences that 
largely accounted for the varying frequencies with which the characteristics 
were discussed between jurisdictions. This was particularly the case in relation 
to personal circumstances, allegations, and the bail plan. While both groups of 
court actors sought to minimise concerns surrounding the offending-related 
behaviour discussed above, they generally undertook divergent strategies to do 
so.  
 
It is not suggested, however, that there were no similarities in the way that risk 
was mitigated across the two jurisdictions. For instance, one common, and 
perhaps unsurprising, approach that was used in both England and Canada 
was simply to highlight the absence of any aggravating factors. For example, if 
the defendant did not have a record, was not on bail, or was charged with a 
minor offence, this was often something the prosecution or defence might 
highlight in the event they were arguing that bail was appropriate. This was 
especially the case in Canada, where as Chapter Four discussed, a 
considerable proportion of the defendants entering the court in custody did not 
have a criminal record.  
 
In the main, however, court actors in Canada tended to take an individualised 
approach to mitigating risk, discussing the personal circumstances of the 
defendant and using detailed bail plans to alleviate concerns surrounding the 
bail risk. In comparison, court actors in England offered alternative narratives 
about the offence itself, applied more formulaic bail plans, and uncommonly 
discussed the personal circumstances of the defendants.  
 
Alternative narratives 
 
A common approach of the defence in both England and Canada was to 
present an alternative narrative from that which the prosecution put forward. As 
Cammiss (2006a) explained, in reference to mode of trial, this would involve 
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offering alternate explanations as to why the alleged events took place. The 
findings suggested, however, that the court actors took different approaches to 
this strategy across the two jurisdictions. Specifically, in Canada they tended to 
offer an alternative view of the defendants, and thus their personal 
circumstances, whereas in England they primarily focused on the case, 
addressing the allegations. This is illustrated, first, by examining the extent to  
which both of these characteristics were discussed in each jurisdiction.  
 
The findings suggest that court actors in Canada ascribed more importance to 
personal circumstances than their counterparts in England whereas court actors 
in England ascribed more importance to allegations (see Table 5.2). This is 
consistent with previous research (Hucklesby, 1996), which found that personal 
circumstances were discussed infrequently in England. In comparison, the 
allegations were discussed more often than any other characteristic in England, 
and they were named as the ‘most important’ characteristic in the decision-
making of court actors the most often in interviews, tied with criminal history for 
the most commonly cited factor. This is consistent with previous findings, which 
argue that the nature and seriousness of the offence was an important influence 
on the remand decision in England (Hucklesby, 1996). This was not the case in 
Canada, where allegations were the least mentioned characteristic and were 
infrequently cited as the ‘most important’ characteristic for consideration by 
court actors in the interviews.  
 
In offering an alternative narrative related to personal circumstances, the court 
actors would discuss information surrounding the defendant’s life outside of the 
criminal justice system including mental health or addiction issues, engagement 
with employment or education, ties to the community, and miscellaneous other 
issues related to personal lifestyle. The defence often included them in order to 
present the defendant in either a favourable or sympathetic light.  
 
It was the norm in Canada for defence solicitors to mention personal 
circumstances in order to mitigate concerns associated with the criminal history, 
bail history or allegations during contested hearings. They might point to strong 
community ties, a willingness to attend rehabilitation, or stable employment. 
This approach was consistent with a broader individualised approach to bail in 
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this jurisdiction. Kellough and Wortley (2002) found such an approach to exist in 
their examination of the factors that impacted bail outcomes in Canadian courts. 
Specifically, they found that assessments of the character of the defendants 
were related to their likelihood of custody even when case characteristics were 
controlled for in the analyses. The current findings suggest this approach is also 
applicable to court actors’ discussion of defendant and case characteristics. The 
objective of the defence was to direct the court away from factors considered to 
be high risk, such as extensive criminal records or serious allegations, and offer 
an alternative view of the defendant. One defence counsel in Canada described 
how they might use personal information to strengthen their arguments: 
 
The person’s ties with the community, right. Their family life, their age, if 
they work. All very important stuff. If you can paint the person, right, if 
you can paint a picture for the court that the person is generally a family 
guy that has never been in trouble, you know, even if they’re serious 
charges, I think it goes a long way (LN 252, Canada, DEF 004). 
 
This approach was also observed to take place in England, although to a much 
lesser extent. When personal circumstances were discussed, they almost 
exclusively pertained to community ties or mental health and addiction issues. 
While some defence solicitors claimed to put this information forward, others 
expressed some reservations with this approach. Although they accepted it was 
taken by some of their colleagues, they presented an alternative viewpoint: 
 
…there’s only so many times you can give the sad excuses for their 
conduct because ultimately he is someone who has repeatedly had court 
orders that he has breached, repeatedly failed to surrender, repeatedly 
committed offences and offences on bail; you know, I think even the 
courts begin to recognise the reoffenders when it’s in that position (LN 
459, England, DEF 019).  
 
This defence solicitor suggested that trying to portray the defendant in a 
sympathetic light was not appropriate in all circumstances, highlighting that this 
approach would likely be ineffective if the defendant was a regular offender. 
Furthermore, several District Judges claimed that they did not heavily weight 
personal circumstances. Two out of the three District Judges expressed that 
they did not highly value this factor. For instance, one District Judge in England 
made the following statement: 
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I would be very disappointed with myself if I allowed a person’s personal 
circumstances to influence, are they in employment or not, that sort of 
thing, but that shouldn’t influence a bail decision unless it has some 
relevance to the offence charged (LN 140, England, DJ 013). 
 
The minimal influence of personal circumstances during the bail process is in 
line with previous research (Hucklesby, 1996). It is likely that defence solicitors 
working in the English court would come to expect personal circumstances to 
have a limited impact on the bail outcome if District Judges were not receptive 
to discussions surrounding this issue. Since, as Church (1985) suggested, court 
actors adapt their working practices to fit with the expectations of the court, it 
would be unlikely to emphasise a factor that they knew would not carry much 
weight. In addition, as Chapter Four indicated, defence solicitors in England 
were shown to be cognizant of their credibility during bail proceedings. 
Presenting information that was known to be considered superfluous by District 
Judges would likely be perceived to compromise such credibility.  
 
Rather than focusing on the defendant’s personal circumstances, defence 
solicitors in England were much more likely to offer an alternative narrative of 
the allegations themselves. The fact that defence solicitors were using 
allegations to mitigate bail risks in addition to prosecutors using them to 
aggravate it can perhaps explain why they were the most frequently discussed 
characteristic in England (see Table 5.2). Defence solicitors reported that this 
was thought to improve the chance that the court would release their clients. 
For example, a defence solicitor explained:  
 
If it looks like they’ve got an alibi, if it’s all sounding very reasonable, very 
plausible, not a waste of time like it’s all just a fantasy, then that will 
increase your chance of getting bail. And likewise obviously if it just 
sounds like it’s made up and it’s going nowhere and the evidence against 
them is stark and strong, then that’s going to affect their prospects of 
getting bail (LN 344, England, DEF 022).  
	
These findings departed from those reported in previous bail research in 
conducted in England in the 1990s, which found the defence was unlikely to 
present a competing narrative from that of the prosecution (Hucklesby, 1996). It 
may be that this shift occurred as a result of the increased pressure to reduce 
case processing times. As Chapter Two discussed, measures were put in place 
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in England following the Narey Report (1997) and subsequent initiatives that 
were intended to enable court actors to deal with cases as quickly as possible. 
Defence solicitors explained that the current expectation was for them to outline 
their case in the first appearance. For instance, one defence solicitor in England 
reported: 
 
So don’t forget, we never used to have to nail our defence to the mast 
either in a written document at the first hearing, which we do now (LN 
274, England, DEF 023).  
 
As Chapter Six will discuss in more detail, bail in England was often discussed 
at the same time as other matters related to the case, such as the plea or the 
venue of the next appearance. This meant that, as the defence solicitor 
reported, the defence frequently presented an alternative version of the 
allegations in contexts unrelated to bail. Since this information was revealed to 
the court in any event, it could easily achieve a dual purpose and be used to 
refute the synopsis put forth by the prosecution in an effort to question the 
strength of the evidence for the purposes of bail.  
 
This was not the case in Canada, however, where the details of the allegations 
were uncommonly made a central part of the discussion by the defence. In fact, 
in many cases defendants or sureties attempting to speak about their version of 
events were actively stopped by the defence or the court and reminded that was 
a ‘matter for another court.’ For instance, in one contested hearing the court 
commented that these are allegations, they have not been proven in court. This 
is not a trial but a bail hearing. My job is to decide whether the accused can be 
released into community (Contested Hearing 125, Canada). As such, although 
they were discussed by the prosecution in order to aggravate risk, and by the 
defence in terms of the seriousness or strength of the synopsis, the defence’s 
version of events was mostly considered inappropriate to address at the bail 
stage. Their limited discussion of the allegations can perhaps explain why 
allegations were discussed much more often in England compared to Canada. 
 
Ultimately, the presentation of both personal circumstances and allegations was 
an opportunity for the defence to ‘even the score’ in terms of the portrayal of 
their client and bail cases. In particular, it enabled them to offer competing 
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narratives that suggested the defendant was not violent or likely to reoffend. 
However, while the same objective was shared across both jurisdictions, the 
means by which it was sought diverged in accordance with the norms that had 
established in each court. 
 
Bail Plans 
 
The other way in which bail risk was mitigated in England and Canada was 
through a potential plan of release or ‘bail plan’. In order to account for 
differences between jurisdictions, a wide definition of the bail plan was 
employed. This included proposals for where the defendant would reside, bail 
conditions they were to be subjected to, and whether they were to be 
supervised in some capacity in the community. Taken together, they 
represented proposed alternatives to custody that were intended to alleviate the 
concerns of the prosecution and the court. A strong bail plan was thought to 
alleviate the risk of releasing the defendant into the community and was thus 
critical to a remand on bail in the event the court had concerns that were not 
mitigated by the other factors. Although the general concept of a plan of release 
was found to be common to both the Canadian and English court, this section 
will demonstrate that the nature of those plans and the extent to which they 
were discussed differed drastically.  
 
In Canada, the bail plan was discussed more than any other factor during bail 
appearances (see Table 5.2) and was also cited as the ‘most important’ 
consideration often in the interviews. Bail plans in Canada generally involved 
sureties and large numbers of conditions were commonplace. In addition, 
agencies offering counselling, mental health services, or bail support were 
frequently included. In contrast, the bail plan was the factor discussed the 
second least frequently during bail appearances in England (see Table 5.2) and 
was cited as the ‘most important’ consideration infrequently during interviews. 
When bail plans were mentioned in England the discussions rarely included 
more than a suggestion of an address and the appropriate conditions.  
 
An explanation for the disparities in the discussion of bail plans in England and 
Canada primarily rests on the norms that had developed surrounding them. 
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While, broadly speaking, they were both employed to mitigate risks associated 
with other factors, the purpose of the plan had evolved much further than this in 
Canada. In this jurisdiction the plan took a therapeutic role, aiming to - as some 
defence counsel claimed - ‘fix the lives’ of defendants who had not yet been 
convicted. This approach was argued to alleviate the offending exception as it 
targeted the underlying causes for offending. Given the extent to which these 
plans were tailored to each defendant, this further contributed to the 
individualised approach to bail in Canada. This would be accomplished by using 
a large variety of conditions as part of the plan. One duty counsel explained 
how they might use a detailed bail plan to address the offending exception: 
 
Sureties are usually how the Crown wants to see secondary grounds 
addressed [i.e offending exception]. You know, somebody’s out there 
watching them to make sure they don’t do any further offences and to 
make sure that the public is safe. That’s kind of the, the easy go to. 
Addressing any underlying issues is the next, you know, the big one. So, 
you know, bail program is going to help make sure that they’re, you 
know, following on the right track. They’re going to have regular 
appointments, they’re going to get counselling of some variety, they have 
a mental health court worker in the community now who will be helping 
them with issues that may have led them to offend in the first place. 
Those kind of things. You know, so their circumstances are different than 
when they were alleged to have committed this (LN 455, Canada, DC 
002).  
 
The approach the duty counsel described has been called ‘therapeutic 
conditioning’ (Hannah-Moffat & Maurutto, 2012). It has been argued that, while 
these conditions are ostensibly imposed for the benefit of the accused person, 
in reality this also represents the exertion of a repressive form of power on 
behalf of the courts. As such, defendants were being ‘helped’ and controlled by 
the criminal justice system at the same time. This approach is likely a product of 
the intersection between risk management and the historical focus on 
rehabilitation in the broader Canadian criminal justice system (see Chapter 
One). Indeed, Hannah-Moffat and Maurutto (2012) suggest that such strategies 
represent both an extension of the punitive state through the use of therapeutic 
forms of coercion and innovations that challenge forms of penal excess and the 
use of custody as a crime-control solution.  
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As the duty counsel suggested, sureties were also central to bail plans in 
Canada. The imposition of a surety also took on a therapeutic role as it was 
thought to alleviate the offending exception. This is because sureties were 
expected to stabilise the defendants. Defence counsel argued that the 
expectation of a surety had become so commonplace that securing them was a 
standard part of their preparations. This was explained by one defence counsel 
in Canada: 
 
I really do think it’s just evolved that way because the Crowns take 
certain positions and when the Crowns start taking positions for 
detention, rather than having a guy detained you’re going to say ‘well I’ll 
have a surety.' Even if you want to argue, even if it would be appropriate 
- like if I think there’s a case where the guy really should be let out on his 
own recognizance - I’m still probably going to set up that surety as a 
failsafe … I think defence counsel across the [area] just come prepared 
with sureties now because that’s the way the positions have evolved. 
And so it’s just become the standard practice now, sureties (LN 400, 
Canada, DEF 004).  
 
Just as sureties had become the norm in Canada, so had the imposition of 
multiple conditions. As Chapter Four demonstrated, the defence would 
commonly propose conditions during negotiations as a means of securing a 
consent release. As was the case with sureties, the defence explained that they 
had simply gotten used to this practice. One duty counsel in Canada discussed 
this: 
 
…you get used to just doing certain things, like you almost feel like 
you’ve – sometimes the Crown will kind of say write up what you’re 
suggesting for conditions and I’ll be looking at it and I’m like the only 
condition I can really think of is, maybe don’t go to that particular store or 
something like that. But I almost feel compelled to add extra conditions 
because I feel if they just looked at it with just one condition they’d be like 
‘well that’s not going to be enough.’ So it’s very like, you almost feel like 
you have to throw something else in there to make it look like there’s 
more (LN 711, Canada, DC 002,). 
 
In both of these scenarios, defence counsel would add increased restrictions to 
their proposed plan with the hope of obtaining a release. They explained that 
they would do this not as a result of a request on the part of the prosecution but 
because it was the normal thing to do. They expected sureties and multiple 
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conditions would be necessary so they pre-emptively proposed them to make 
the process run smoother.  
 
Establishing a good plan was viewed as central to the decision-making process 
in Canada as it was the factor court actors viewed to be the most important to 
the court in securing a release. One duty counsel in Canada explained that they 
perceived these expectations to be more important to the court than the bail 
legislation: 
 
So I don’t think they’re really relying that much here on … the Criminal 
Code towards release and release without conditions. I just don’t think 
practically speaking that’s what they’re, that’s what’s swaying them. I 
think what’s swaying them is a good plan (LN 202, Canada, DC 003). 
 
This view was shared my many of the defence counsel in Canada, agreeing 
that a good bail plan was often the factor that dictated the bail outcome. 
Importantly, the view was not that the law was being violated through this 
practice but that, consistent with previous research (Feeley, 1973), it was being 
applied alongside other considerations. As such, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
the entire workgroup behaved in a way that prioritised the bail plan.  
 
In England, bail plans were conceived very differently than they were in 
Canada. In contrast to the aforementioned detailed, individualised plans, court 
actors in England tended to focus on a more predictable range of factors. 
Specifically, they tended to focus on the availability of accommodation and a 
narrow range of conditions.  
 
The findings suggested that the main focus of the plan in this jurisdiction was 
the residence in which the defendant would live when they were released. This 
was because a residence was considered to be critical to the release of the 
defendant as it implied stability and increased the chances the defendant would 
return to court. One defence solicitor highlighted the importance of this factor: 
 
Well the first thing I look for is an address because if we haven’t got an 
address and they’re no fixed abode then bail is not an issue (LN 339, 
England, DEF 019). 
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They suggested that it was unlikely that a defendant would be released on bail 
without an acceptable address. Several court actors suggested that the 
residences considered most appropriate were those that were far from the 
homes of any victims or witnesses. For instance, a court associate in England 
described how court actors took the proximity between the defendant and 
victim’s residences into account: 
 
…if it’s a case where the defendants knows the complainant, it’s often 
the proximity between them, the fact that there’s a risk of committing 
further offences or interfering with witnesses when they’re either 
geographically close or physically close, to the extent that they believe 
there will be contact no matter what (LN 153, England, CA 012).  
 
 As this court associate indicated, this was seen to be especially critical in 
domestic violence cases. Clearly, the safety of the victims was also afforded 
importance when the court was approving a residence.  
 
The other aspect of the bail plan that was frequently mentioned in England was 
bail conditions. Unlike in Canada, there was broad agreement among the court 
actors that the conditions were generally narrowly focused and successful in 
targeting the appropriate risk factors. This may be a result of caution on the part 
of District Judges and magistrates in imposing conditions that were relevant to 
the case. For instance, one magistrate in England stated: 
 
Conditions of bail are set for a reason and you don’t just pluck them out 
of the sky. To say, “you must not see this individual or contact them in 
any way, shape or form,” there’s a reason for that, and similarly, keeping 
away from a particular address, and so providing there’s an adequate 
reason to put that as a bail condition (LN 256, England, MAG 015). 
 
This sentiment was also expressed by most prosecutors, who claimed they 
made efforts to suggest conditions that were directly related to the 
circumstances of the case. This stood in stark contrast with the aforementioned 
practice in Canada, where numerous conditions were suggested, often of an 
individualised or therapeutic nature.  
 
Perhaps the most striking difference between the use of bail plans in England 
and Canada was the opposing attitudes towards sureties. In England, sureties 
were viewed to be useful in only exceptional situations, usually those involving 
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serious crimes. When court actors asked why this was the case, their answers 
tended to revolve around the means of the defendants. When one District 
Judge was asked about the imposition of sureties they responded in the 
following way:  
 
I can’t say I’ve never seen [a surety], I have but I’ve certainly, sitting as a 
Judge I’ve never had to consider it, it’s never been offered as a bail 
condition and I think probably it’s to do with the means of the defendants 
and their associates (LN 367, England, DJ 018). 
 
The attitude this District Judge took towards sureties is one that has evolved in 
England over time. While sureties were traditionally the norm, their use declined 
since those with limited means were unable to find sureties with sufficient 
resources (Bottomley, 1968). Although sureties can still be imposed by law, this 
was certainly not viewed as standard practice. Another explanation for the 
limited use of sureties in England may reside in their purpose as stated in the 
English bail laws. As Chapter One discussed, the role of the surety is narrower 
in England, where their role is exclusively related to ensuring the defendant’s 
attendance in court (Bail Act 1976, s. 3(4)). In comparison, their role in Canada 
extends to monitoring their actions and ensuring they abide by their conditions 
(Myers, 2009). As such, sureties are not associated with the offending 
exception in England, which the findings have suggested is the primary concern 
of the court actors.  
 
In sum, the approach to the bail plan was shown to be much more formulaic in 
England than it was in Canada. The court actors in England concentrated on 
the residence of the defendant and targeted conditions that applied to the 
details surrounding the offence. In comparison, court actors in Canada created 
detailed, individualised plans for the release of the defendant, relying on 
sureties and large numbers of conditions in accordance with the norms of the 
court. 
 
Summary 
 
The way in which court actors discussed criminal history, bail history, and the 
allegations in England and Canada suggests that bail risk was conceptualised 
similarly across the two jurisdictions. While the court actors prioritised each of 
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these characteristics slightly differently, their primary concerns appeared to 
centre on the defendants’ propensity for offending and the potential harm they 
could cause. As such, bail risk was primarily aggravated using offending-related 
behaviour. The way in which this risk was mitigated, however, differed 
considerably between jurisdictions. The separate routines that developed in 
England and Canada in relation to mitigating bail risks reflected the overarching 
context in each jurisdiction as well as the expectations and norms unique to the 
courts. Specifically, broader concerns surrounding early case processing in 
England and therapeutic justice in Canada contributed to their use of allegations 
and bail plans, respectively, as tools of mitigation. Further, court actors adapted 
their behaviour based on what they perceived to be the accepted norms. 
Ultimately, these differences led to an individualised approach to bail plans in 
Canada and a more formulaic approach in England. 
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the defendant and case characteristics 
considered the most important to the bail decision-making process were those 
related to offending related behaviour. This is consistent with previous research 
that has emphasised the importance of such factors in the bail process on an 
international scale (Brown, 2013; Hucklesby, 1996; Morgan & Henderson, 
1998), while this is the first known research to report these findings in Canada. 
The findings showed that the offending exception was applied more often than 
any other exception across both jurisdictions and that criminal history and bail 
history related to offending was prioritised by court actors. Furthermore, case 
‘types’ that were thought to indicate a propensity for offending, in particular 
those involving domestic violence, were considered significant bail risks. 
Despite the parallels in the way that bail risk was aggravated, they were found 
to be mitigated dissimilarly in England and Canada. Court actors in Canada 
tended to take an individualised approach to minimising risk, prioritising 
personal circumstances and proposing detailed bail plans involving numerous 
conditions and the imposition of sureties. In contrast, alternative versions of the 
allegations and formulaic bail plans were generally applied in England.  
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The importance afforded to defendant and case characteristics was, in part, 
related to court culture. Specifically, the characteristics influenced court actors 
in accordance with the expectations and routines unique to each court. Court 
actors framed and presented information in accordance with the weight they 
perceived it would be given by the court and because it was in line with 
accepted norms (Church, 1985). As a result, they developed specific agreed 
upon routines which were perpetuated by the normalised behaviour of the 
workgroup (Lipetz, 1984). Court actors were found, for instance, to prioritise 
particular exceptions to bail, provide information about criminal history, and 
suggest specific components of bail plans because it was in line with what they 
perceived to be the standard practice in their court.  
 
These norms did not, however, develop in isolation. The behaviour of court 
actors reflected values associated with the broader criminal process in each 
jurisdiction. For instance, the prioritisation of offending related behaviour 
reflected an increased focus on public safety and victims’ interests, part of a 
shift in the criminal justice rhetoric towards ‘tough on crime’ politics and crime 
control values in both jurisdictions (Ashworth & Redmayne, 2010; Goff, 2017; 
Hucklesby, 1996; Sanders et al., 2010; Webster, 2015). There were, however, 
other values that diverged between jurisdictions. For instance, the tendency to 
use allegations as a tool of mitigation and to prioritise offending on bail in 
England coincided with managerialist early resolution initiatives (Narey Report, 
1997) and crime control concerns surrounding ‘bail bandits’ (Hucklesby & 
Marshall, 2000). Furthermore, the individualised nature of the bail plans in 
Canada was characteristic of their use of ‘therapeutic justice’ initiatives 
(Hannah-Moffat & Maurutto, 2012), in line with a historical focus on 
rehabilitation and identifying the social causes of crime (O’Malley & Meyer, 
2005; Webster & Doob, 2007).  
 
Finally, the defendant and case characteristics considered and discussed were, 
in the main, in line with the bail laws in each jurisdiction. While there were a few 
occasions in which allegations were discussed in isolation despite the fact that 
the law did not provide for them to be the sole reason for a decision, the 
findings suggest that most of the decisions surrounding defendant and case 
characteristics were made within the wide confines of the law. Indeed, the 
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information discussed directly related to the considerations provided in the law 
and were framed by the exceptions to the right to bail in each jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, differences in the formulation of the offending exception and the 
purpose of sureties did appear to point to slightly different decision-making 
between jurisdictions, suggesting court actors took these laws into account. 
This points to the likelihood that different approaches are a reflection of the 
flexibility of the laws (McBarnet, 1981; McConville et al., 1991) rather than a 
signal that court actors are not following them.   
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Chapter Six: 
 
Justice Delayed is Justice Denied? Examining Attitudes Surrounding 
Case Processing Time 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The preceding analysis has examined the bail process in terms of the decision 
to remand defendants in custody or on bail and the defendant and case 
characteristics used to make these decisions. This chapter takes a different 
approach, moving away from decisions that directly determine the liberty of the 
defendants and instead focusing on those that establish the length of case 
processing time. It asserts that bail decision-making is influenced not only by its 
content but also the speed with which it is perceived to take place. This is 
because attitudes surrounding the appropriate case processing speed shape 
the informal practices in each court (Church, 1982, 1985), dictating the volume 
of information discussed, the nature of the procedures used to acquire 
information, and the number of appearances considered appropriate to 
complete the process. Ultimately, these factors will determine the time required 
to complete the bail process and thus how long defendants spend in custody 
awaiting a determination of bail.  
 
Previous research has demonstrated that court culture has a substantial impact 
on the efficiency with which courts operate (Church, 1978; Klemm, 1986; 
Mahoney, 1988). This is because, although it was traditionally assumed that the 
efficiency of a court was shaped by resources and formal rules and procedures 
(Church, 1982), empirical research has cast doubt on this assumption, revealing 
that case processing times vary considerably across courts with almost identical 
structures, caseloads, and resources (Church, 1982; Messick, 1999). Given 
these findings, studies began to focus on less formal aspects of court 
procedures in attempts to explain case processing times (Church, 1978; 
Klemm, 1986; Mahoney, 1988). Although their conclusions do not suggest 
explanations based on resources and formal rules are unimportant, they do 
indicate that these factors ‘operate through a comprehensive system of informal 
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relationships, norms and practices of court practitioners’ (Church, 1982, p. 398). 
These findings relate not only to court efficiency generally, but also to the bail 
process specifically as the speed with which cases move through the bail 
process has been shown to associate with informal practices associated with 
the culture of the court (Myers, 2015; Webster, 2009). However, while previous 
research focuses primarily on the impact of culture on court efficiency, the 
current research views the issue more as a feedback loop. This perspective 
concedes that culture impacts case processing times but argues that the extent 
to which these practices are accepted by court actors in turn influences their 
decision-making process and reinforces court culture (see Church, 1985; 
Hucklesby, 1997a). As such, attitudes towards case processing will be 
examined in terms of their impact on the bail decision-making of the court 
actors.  
 
It is argued that the attitudes court actors develop in relation to court efficiency 
have a major impact on the bail decision-making process. Specifically, shared 
ideas as to how fast cases should move through the bail process shape the 
behaviour of court actors. The analysis will reveal that the conceptualisation of 
the bail process as a summary procedure in England stands in contrast to the 
mentality in Canada, where bail was viewed as a longer, more drawn-out 
process. These opposing attitudes shaped the informal practices in each court 
and ultimately the nature of the decision-making in each jurisdiction.  
 
This chapter begins by outlining the relevant laws in England and Canada that 
relate to bail case processing, demonstrating the similarities between the two 
jurisdictions and calling into question the extent to which they are effective. It 
will then examine the way in which the bail process is conceptualised in both 
jurisdictions, discussing views on appropriate case processing times and the 
extent to which bail is considered an insular or integrated process. These views 
will then be examined in relation to informal practices in each court. Specifically, 
the information required to complete the process, the procedures undertaken, 
and the use of adjournments will be discussed.  
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Bail laws governing case processing time  
 
The bail laws related to case processing time in England and Canada are 
broadly similar both in substance and scope, although they do diverge in terms 
of their use of time limits. While both jurisdictions have put guidelines in place to 
restrict the time defendants spend in pre-trial custody, the following discussion 
calls into question the extent to which these laws are effective in doing so on a 
consistent basis. 
 
First, both jurisdictions indicate how much time can elapse between the 
detention of the defendant by the police and their first appearance in court. In 
Canada, Section 83.3 of the Criminal Code states that following the detention of 
a defendant by the police, they must be brought before the court within 24 
hours, unless a judicial official is not available, in which case as soon as 
feasible. Section 516(1) further specifies that a prosecutor can apply to adjourn 
bail proceedings, but for no more than three days unless the consent of the 
defendant is obtained.  
 
Similarly, in England, the defendant is not to be kept in police detention for more 
than 24 hours without being charged (Section 41, PACE)59 and if a defendant is 
detained following charge they must be brought before a court as soon as 
practicable, and in most cases, no later than the first sitting after charge 
(Section 46, PACE 1984). Schedule 1, Part 1, Section 7 of the Bail Act 1976 
also allows for a subsequent adjournment, indicating that a case can be 
adjourned for inquiries or a report if it appears to the court as though it is 
impracticable to complete the inquiries or report without keeping the defendant 
in custody. However, unlike in Canada, no number of days is specified. In the 
event that the defendant is brought before the court for a breach of bail in 
England, case law arising from R v Culley [2007] indicates that the breach must 
be dealt with within a 24-hour period, arguing that simply bringing the defendant 
before the court in this time period is not sufficient. 
 
                                            
59 This can be extended to 36 hours by a police superintendent and up to a maximum of 96 
hours by the magistrates’ court. 
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The jurisdictions diverge substantially in terms of the amount of time defendants 
are able to spend in custody during the court proceedings. In England, custody 
time limits were introduced in the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 that 
restricted the amount of time defendants could spend in custody from their first 
court appearance until either trial or committal. In magistrates’ court, summary 
offences and either way offences both typically warrant 56 days in custody 
between first appearance and summary trial.60 In Crown Court, both either-way 
offences and indictable offences warrant 182 days from the day the case was 
sent to trial until the beginning of said trial, less any time spent in magistrates’ 
court. Unless the CPS successfully requests to extend these limits, the 
defendant must be released on bail at the conclusion of the specified time 
period (Part 14, Rule 4.18, The Criminal Procedure Rules). Samuels (1997) has 
argued that actors have striven to conform with the limits but that extensions are 
typically granted when they are requested and warned that the maximum time 
limit might become the norm, thereby lengthening the time taken to complete 
some cases. Further, audits conducted in the last decade have indicated that, 
while the situation is improving, the CPS compliance to the custody time limit 
standards varies across locations and there are numerous ‘failures’ in their 
effective monitoring (HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, 2010, 2013).  
 
In contrast, Canadian courts have historically been reluctant to impose any strict 
limitations on the time available to process cases. Although the Supreme Court 
of Canada addressed the issue of time limits in R. v Askov [1990] and R v Morin 
[1992], these cases were largely considered to be ineffective in addressing the 
issue of unreasonable delay in Canada (Standing Senate Committee on Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs, 2017). It was only recently, in R v Jordan [2016], that 
stricter limitations were put in place. In this case the court asserted that bail and 
custody cases must be processed in 18 months (from charge to resolution) in 
provincial court and 30 months in superior court. When the case processing 
time exceeds these guidelines, the case should be stayed (i.e. the proceedings 
halted). However, there are several exceptions to those guidelines, including 
cases in which the defence caused the delay or if the circumstances were 
                                            
60In the case of either-way offences, if the court does not move to trial in the first 56 days the 
time limit is extended to 70 days. Thus, 70 days could also elapse between first appearance 
and committal if the case is sent to Crown court.  
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particularly complex. Unlike in England, however, there are no specific 
guidelines related to defendants in custody. 
 
Given that the bail decision is typically made at the outset of the court process it 
would be unlikely that the time limits in either jurisdiction would elapse before an 
initial determination of bail is made. As such, these time limits are unlikely to 
affect the bail proceedings directly. While it is conceivable that the restrictions 
could shape the court actors’ attitudes towards efficiency more broadly 
throughout the entirety of the court process, the extent of this impact is unclear 
given the issues surrounding custody time limits in England (HM Crown 
Prosecution Service Inspectorate, 2010; Samuels, 1997) and the previous 
ineffective attempts to change attitudes surrounding delay through case law in 
Canada (Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
2017). 
 
While the laws in both jurisdictions provide direction in terms of the length of 
time defendants can spend in pre-trial custody, they still allow for exceptions in 
relation to both the time in which a bail decision must be made (with the 
exception of decisions related to breaches in England) and the length of time 
defendants can spend in custody more generally. Given this flexibility, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that, as Chapter Two demonstrated, actual practices 
surrounding case processing times have been shown to vary between 
jurisdictions. Specifically, while Canada’s bail process has been shown to 
require multiple appearances (Myers, 2015) and lengthy procedures (Canadian 
Civil Liberties Association, 2014; Myers, 2009), the bail process in England is 
often conducted in a short period of time (Dhami & Ayton, 2001; Doherty & 
East, 1985; Zander, 1979), involving what has been called ‘speedy, slipshod 
decision-making’ (Sanders, Young, & Burton, 2010, p. 536). The subsequent 
discussion will demonstrate the extent to which these disparities are reflected in 
the decision-making of the court actors. 
 
Conceptualising bail in England and Canada 
 
Despite the similar laws surrounding case processing in England and Canada, 
the discretion afforded to court actors permitted a very different 
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conceptualisation of the bail process in each jurisdiction. Indeed, the very idea 
of what the bail process entailed differed considerably. The following sections 
will demonstrate how these conceptualisations differed in terms of the amount 
of time expected to complete the bail process and how it fit into the broader 
court process. As such, this section focuses on the perceptions of court actors 
in relation to bail case processing.  
 
Views on case processing time  
 
This discussion will illustrate that bail was viewed as a more lengthy process in 
Canada than it was in England. This perspective encompassed both the length 
of time required to complete bail proceedings and the number of appearances 
required to obtain a bail decision. Indeed, while, in England, the bail process 
was viewed as a summary procedure, intended to determine the liberty of the 
accused in a timely fashion, it was viewed as a much longer process in Canada, 
sometimes referred to as a ‘mini-trial’. 
 
Bail appearances were perceived to take longer in Canada than they were in 
England largely as a result of the amount of time required to complete 
contested hearings. This divergence in view did not, however, extend to 
uncontested appearances. In the latter cases, in which the prosecution and 
defence agreed on the bail outcome, proceedings were typically straightforward 
and quick in both jurisdictions. This is because, as Chapter Four demonstrated, 
there was minimal disagreement on behalf of the court and, as Chapter Five 
demonstrated, very few defendant and case characteristics were discussed. 
Where substantial differences did lie, however, was when the prosecution and 
defence disagreed. Although contested hearings took longer than uncontested 
appearances in both courts, the length of time required to complete them was 
much longer in Canada than it was in England. This was witnessed in the 
observations and substantiated in multiple interviews. For example, a defence 
counsel in Canada described contested hearings in the following manner: 
 
… because [the Crown is] taking [a custody] position, you're not going to 
reach a lot of matters, because every contested bail hearing takes a lot 
of time, right? The last one of the day took an hour and a half and about 
15 or 20 people weren't able to be reached that day because of the one 
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bail hearing and they all got adjourned to the next day, right? Another 
day in custody (LN 810, Canada, DEF 004). 
 
While, as Chapter Four demonstrated, contested hearings occupied a minority 
of the overall appearances in bail court in Canada, court actors explained that 
the length of time required to complete them enabled them to have a substantial 
impact on case processing. This description can be compared to a comment 
made by a legal adviser in England, who described contested hearings (referred 
to here as bail applications) in the following way: 
 
…they come to some agreement beforehand and it makes the 
proceedings quicker rather than having a bail application, which would 
could take 25 minutes (LN 691, England, LA 009). 
 
Both court actors were pointing to the fact that consent releases take less time 
to complete than contested hearings, which in both jurisdictions, were widely 
perceived as an inconvenience – albeit in varying magnitudes. The Canadian 
defence counsel explained that holding contested hearings would often mean 
that many other cases could not be addressed on the same day. This was 
substantiated by the observations, where cases were adjourned on 16 
occasions (7% of the total 236 cases observed) because the court could not 
accommodate them. Although in some instances bail cases would be traversed 
into other courtrooms, this was not always possible if it was late in the day and 
the other courts were closed or if they did not have the capacity to assist. In 
fact, on many occasions, court actors from other courtrooms were observed to 
enter the bail court and request ‘consents only’ indicating they did not have the 
time to assist with a contested hearing.  
 
In comparison, there were no instances in England in which cases were 
adjourned because the court did not have time to conduct the proceedings. 
Furthermore, the time required to complete one particular hearing was 
described as an hour and a half by the Canadian defence counsel, considerably 
longer than the 25 minutes described by the English legal adviser. Although 
these descriptions are not representative of all contested hearings, they do 
represent considerably different perceptions on behalf of the court actors. 
Specifically, in Canada a contested hearing lasting an hour and a half is viewed 
as lengthy compared to 25 minutes in England. This divergence is indicative of 
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the vastly different expectations court actors held in each jurisdiction in terms of 
how long a contested hearing might last.  
 
These perceptions are consistent with the broader literature, which 
substantiates these disparate views of the time required to complete a bail 
appearance. In Canada, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (2014) also 
found evidence of lengthy bail processes in Ontario, largely as a result of the 
time it took to schedule and conduct contested hearings. This study found that 
cases were consistently adjourned because there was not enough time to run a 
hearing and that the defence was ‘doing pretty well’ if the hearing could be 
scheduled within a week. This issue is also regularly recognised in the case 
law, in which the court has highlighted evidence of systemic delays in Ontario 
courts. For example, in R v Jevons [2008], where an individual without a 
criminal record spent eight days in custody without access to medicine, the 
court stated that the defendant’s rights had been violated in a manner that 
represented “an affront to the administration of justice and shocks the 
conscience of the community.” 61 
 
By contrast, bail proceedings in England are consistently found to be short in 
length, often only lasting a few minutes (Cape & Smith, 2016; Dhami & Ayton, 
2001; Doherty & East, 1985; Zander, 1979) and proceeding with limited 
information (Cape & Smith, 2016; Hucklesby, 1996; Morgan & Henderson, 
1998). Even in cases in which bail was denied, Doherty and East (1985) found 
that 38% of them took less than two minutes and 87% took less than 10 
minutes to complete. In addition, Cape and Smith (2016) found that the 
representations of the lawyers were brief, with the defence’s representations 
taking an average of 6 minutes and the prosecution taking 3 minutes. This has 
led some researchers to argue that court in England subscribe to a ‘fast and 
frugal’ model of decision-making in which decisions are made quickly without all 
available information.  
 
                                            
61 R v Jevons, [2008], OJ No 4397, 2008 ONCJ 559 (Ont CJ). See also See R v Villota 
[2002], CanLII 49650  (ON SC) at para 57 and R v Zarinchang [2010], OJ No 1548, 254 
CCC (3d) 133 (ONCA). 
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The disparities in the expectations between jurisdictions extend to the number 
of appearances required to make bail decisions. In Canada, court actors 
expected that bail proceedings would commonly be adjourned while in England 
it was considered the norm for them to be completed in one appearance. For 
example, when one defence counsel in Canada was asked what would need to 
occur for a bail decision to be made in one day he responded simply, “that’s 
never going to happen” (LN 363, Canada, DEF 007). In comparison, when a 
prosecutor in England was asked whether bail decisions were ever adjourned 
he answered in the following way: 
 
Adjourning a bail? I mean it’s 24 hours, isn’t it, from arrest? So you 
wouldn’t normally – you can’t adjourn a bail hearing. (LN 637, England, 
CPS 024). 
 
These answers demonstrate that a practice that was perceived to be the norm, 
and in fact unavoidable, in Canada was considered extremely unusual, and not 
typically possible, in England. While this particular prosecutor seemed 
genuinely perplexed by the very concept of adjourning bail proceedings, it is 
notable that other court actors in England did concede that adjournments did 
occur, albeit rarely. The circumstances of these cases are discussed later in the 
Chapter. This reaction did, however, demonstrate how abnormal these 
circumstances were perceived to be. It is also notable that the English 
prosecutor referred back to the PACE legislation discussed in the previous 
section, which dictates that defendants must appear before a court on its next 
sitting following charge. Although this parallels the Canadian Criminal Code 
legislation, adjournments were nonetheless considered the norm in the 
Canadian court.  
 
These differing perspectives on the number of days required to complete the 
matter of bail are in line with previous studies. Specifically, bail has been 
consistently shown to take multiple appearances in Ontario courts (Doob, 2013; 
Myers, 2015; Webster, 2009; Webster et al., 2009). This has led some 
(Canadian Civil Liberties Association, 2014; Webster, 2009) to question the 
extent to which the practice conforms with the intention of the Section 83.3 of 
the Criminal Code. As mentioned in the previous Section, the legislation directs 
that defendants should appear before the court within 24 hours of arrest. When 
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defendants are appearing in front of the court simply to be adjourned, what one 
might assume is intended to be a quick decision about the defendant’s liberty 
becomes, for all intents and purposes, little more than a formality. The idea that 
cases should be repetitively adjourned is reflective of a more generalised 
relaxed attitude towards delay that has permeated the entirety of the criminal 
process in Canada (Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs, 2017). These findings suggest that, despite multiple managerialist 
attempts to increase efficiency (see Chapter One and Two), the bail process is 
no exception to this overarching trend.  
 
England has not seen the same trend emerge in relation to the consistent 
adjourning of bail appearances. Both recent and historical research indicates 
that, with some exceptions,62 it is not standard practice for bail decisions to be 
put over to another day (Cape & Smith, 2016; Doherty & East, 1985; Hucklesby, 
1997a; Simon & Weatheritt, 1974). As such, while as the subsequent section 
will demonstrate, the overarching theme of managerialist efficiency in England 
(Ashworth & Redmayne, 2010; Gelsthorpe, 2013; Sanders et al., 2010; Ward, 
2015) has extended to the bail process to some extent in England, this cannot 
wholly explain the conceptualisation of the bail process as a quick, summary 
procedure. Rather, the idea that the bail decision should typically be made in 
one appearance appears to be a longstanding feature of the bail process in 
England. Clearly, the court actors in England and Canada had very different 
perceptions as to what constituted appropriate case processing times.  
 
Bail: An insular or integrated process?  
 
The following discussion will illustrate that views related to how bail fits into the 
broader court process also influenced attitudes towards case processing. 
Specifically, bail was largely viewed as an integrated part of a larger process in 
England while it was regarded as an isolated step in a series of stages in 
Canada. In other words, the extent that court actors viewed the court process 
holistically influenced how the process was expected to progress. These 
                                            
62 For instance, an address may need to be secured or additional investigations needed to take 
place.  
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different perspectives determined the amount of focus placed on bail relative to 
other court matters during court appearances.   
 
The perceptions of court actors 
 
Differences in court actors’ views on the way in which bail fits into the court 
process were apparent during the observations. In the Canadian court, only 
matters related to the bail decision were typically discussed in open court. This 
was to some extent predictable since, as Chapter Three discussed, the court 
observed had a courtroom explicitly designated as a ‘bail court’ in which this 
was the exclusive function of the court. If other matters needed to be addressed 
cases were either traversed to other courtrooms or adjourned following the bail 
decision.63 This is not to say, however, that court actors in Canada never 
discussed other matters outside of open court at this point in the process. The 
interviews suggested that the plea was discussed during informal negotiations 
prior to the proceedings. For instance, one defence counsel described how this 
trend had manifested itself in the Canadian court: 
 
Over the last few years what they’ve instituted both at [another court] and 
particularly [this court] is they’re giving you a position if you want to plead 
guilty off the first step, where they’ll give you supposedly what’s their best 
offer to try and induce you not to have a bail hearing and to plead guilty 
(LN 083, Canada, DEF 007). 
 
While several court actors cited this practice during the interviews, the 
observations suggest that it only took place outside of open court and thus did 
not play a role in the actual proceedings. However, the approach is unsurprising 
as previous literature has suggested the bail stage is often used as a platform 
with which to obtain early guilty pleas (Kellough & Wortley, 2002). Despite these 
informal conversations, cases were not observed to move forward from an 
administrative standpoint as, in the main, they remained in bail court64 until a 
bail decision had been made. 
                                            
63 The observations did suggest resolutions happened occasionally, as in 10% of the cases 
observed (n=23) defendants either requested a traversal to guilty plea court or asked to be 
adjourned there on their next appearance. While this suggests they were moving towards a 
guilty plea, this could not be confirmed conclusively as there was no file access. 
64 While it was unclear in this study given the researcher was not given access to case files, 
previous research (Webster et al., 2009) has noted the presence of cases in which no formal 
  
236 
In addition, there were no discussions surrounding future trial dates or case 
management in the Canadian court. This further highlights the extent to which it 
was considered a separate stage of the court process. The extent to which this 
was the case was made clear through an examination of the court list. In cases 
in which bail decisions had been made and cases were proceeding to another 
court on their next appearance, cases were often marked to be heading to their 
‘first appearance’. Indeed, from an administrative perspective, it would seem 
that cases were not considered to ‘start’ until bail had been dealt with. Indeed, 
clearly bail formed an isolated part of the court process in Canada. While this 
meant that bail was focused on exclusively at the first appearance, it also 
limited the extent to which other matters – such as setting trial dates or taking 
pleas - could be addressed.  
 
This stood in stark contrast with the English court, where court actors viewed 
bail to be an integrated part of the court process rather than the first step within 
it. For example, one defence solicitor described bail in the following terms: 
 
I wouldn’t tend to view it as sort of separate bail matters; it’s all part and 
parcel of your client’s case. So bail is a huge issue in client’s cases, both 
at the start if they’re in custody or later on if they either lose it or if they 
are in and trying to get out or if it’s an on-going issue (LN 69, England, 
DEF 22).  
 
The fact that bail was viewed as an on-going process meant that it was not 
perceived to have to ‘finish’ before another process could begin. This attitude 
was reflected during the appearances, where bail was discussed alongside 
other matters relevant to the case. Indeed, it was commonplace for a wide 
range of issues to be discussed in addition to the subject of bail. It appears as 
though this was, at least in part, a product of the changes aimed at reducing 
delays in the court process that were implemented following the Narey Report 
(1997) and, more recently, the Leveson Report (2015). These changes are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter One and Two.  
 
One of the initiatives undertaken by the government that was observed to 
impact the proceedings was the focus on the defendant’s plea. Plea before 
                                                                                                                                
determination is ever made. As such, there are some cases that move through the bail process 
without a formal bail decision in Ontario.  
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Venue requirements were brought in following the Narey Report (1997) and 
require that defendants indicate a plea in magistrates’ courts prior to the 
determination of mode of trial. At about the same time, sentencing discounts for 
guilty pleas were given statutory footing. As Chapter Two detailed, the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 directs the court to take the stage at which the defendant pled 
guilty as well as the circumstances in which it was provided into account during 
sentencing. Further, the Sentencing Guidelines Council (2007) advises that 
sentences be reduced in accordance with the stage at which pleas are entered. 
As such, although it is not mandatory, pleas entered on the first appearance can 
typically be expected to result in a sentence reduction of one third. Given this 
practice, it is perhaps unsurprising that, during the observations, a major part of 
the discussion would relate to whether the defendant was pleading guilty. Both 
the court and the prosecution were responsible for making this clear. One 
prosecutor in England acknowledged that this formed a portion of the 
discussions in remand court: 
 
I mean there will also be discussions in remand court about the actual 
facts of the offence and whether a plea could be obtained in the first 
hearing. That’s what we’re encouraged, to try and resolve cases as much 
as possible (LN 609, England, CPS 024). 
 
The observations confirmed this view, demonstrating an overt push towards 
early guilty pleas on the part of the court. In some instances, the court would 
provide an idea of a potential sentence in open court and request the matter be 
held down and that the defence solicitor discuss it with their client. 
Consequently, many appearances that started as bail decisions ultimately 
ended in guilty pleas. 
 
In the event that a bail decision was made, this would often be one topic of 
discussion among many. Indeed, much of the discussion focused on case 
management rather than bail. This is also consistent with the recent changes in 
the Criminal Procedure Rules that were brought about by the  Leveson Report 
(2015). A major focus of the ‘Better Case Management’ scheme involved more 
robust case management and a reduced number of hearings. The observations 
revealed that in many cases in which the defendant pled not guilty there would 
be a discussion about the number of witnesses, the trial date, and a brief 
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overview of the defence’s case. Take, for example, an associate prosecutor’s 
description of a typical appearance: 
 
…if it’s a not guilty then you just go through the trial process, you know, 
you could say it’s not guilty and then I’ll stand up and say well we’ll fix the 
case for trial, we’ve filled out the case management form, and then I’ll 
mention at that point before we go through the case management form 
that bail conditions are appropriate in this case because of whatever. I 
won’t go into it in too much detail, I’ll just say that the defendant is in 
custody, we’re adjourning for trial, originally it was in custody because 
of… and I think these conditions are likely to suffice. I’ve agreed with the 
defence and if the court are happy with those we can now fix a trial.  So 
then they’ll go through the case management form knowing that they 
haven’t really got to consider bail until the end and just mention the 
conditions. Whereas if obviously you’re remanding somebody or wanting 
someone to be remanded in custody, rather than go through all the case 
management, because they can’t fix a trial until they know if he’s in 
custody or not, because of the custody time limits, you see, they’ve got to 
fix the trial within that time so they need to know (LN 533, England, AP 
028). 
 
As the associate prosecutor suggested, the emphasis on other procedures 
during the first hearing results in the determination of bail being one of many 
issues for the court actors to get through. As Chapter Three outlined, associate 
prosecutors could not make independent decisions and were directed to 
communicate the guidance provided by prosecutors prior to and occasionally, if 
a phone call was made, during the proceedings. In the case of the example 
provided, in which there was a joint position, the issue of bail was addressed 
briefly and routinely at the end of a long list. This is consistent with Chapter 
Four, which suggested that court actors do not expect joint positions to be 
questioned by the court, and Chapter Five, which found limited information was 
provided in open court in these appearances. While the associate prosecutor 
admittedly voiced that this practice changed slightly in cases in which the issue 
of bail was contested, it was still discussed in conjunction with numerous other 
issues, simply in a different order. Consistent with other research, these findings 
call into question the extent to which bail is considered comprehensively in 
England (Cape & Smith, 2016; Dhami & Ayton, 2001; Hucklesby, 1996).  
 
In sum, the findings demonstrate that bail was perceived as an insular process 
in Canada compared to a more integrated part of the process in England.   
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The perceptions of court actors in context 
 
The differences in perceptions on the part of court actors in Canada and 
England can be put into context through an examination of the structure of the 
courts, the make up of the courtroom workgroups, and the attitudes related to 
discussing the case.  
 
Structure of the courts. One reason for the difference in 
conceptualisations between the jurisdictions resides in the physical organisation 
of the courts. As Eisenstein and Jacob (1977) have argued, the functioning of 
the court workgroup is influenced by their physical surroundings and, in 
particular, the structure of the courtrooms and courthouses in which they work.  
 
In this case, defendants entering the Canadian court in custody appeared in a 
specialised ‘bail court’, the courtroom in which the observations took place 
which dealt exclusively with bail matters. The only defendants that were 
assigned to bail court were those who were in custody and awaiting a bail 
decision. In the English court, defendants detained by the police appearing in 
custody were typically assigned to ‘remand court’ alongside other types of court 
work. This court dealt with both in and out of custody defendants and matters 
such as applications by solicitors, pleas, and sentences. Consequently, the 
Canadian workgroups were largely isolated from other court actors responsible 
for different procedures and thus other aspects of the court process. In the 
event a defendant wanted to enter a plea or address an issue other than bail, 
they were traversed to a different courtroom and were no longer the 
responsibility of the bail workgroup. As such, the Canadian workgroups almost 
exclusively focused on bail and were able to devote most of their attention 
towards this issue. In England, however, bail was only one consideration among 
many in the remand court. If a defendant requiring a bail decision wanted to 
discuss another issue, such as a guilty plea, in many cases the court would be 
able to accommodate this change.65 These opposing structures contributed to 
the conceptualisation of bail as an insular process in Canada and a more 
integrated one in England.  
                                            
65 Note that this did not necessarily mean the case could always be resolved. For example, in 
some cases the potential sentence exceeded the powers of the magistrates court or additional 
information could be required prior to sentencing.  
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Make up of the workgroup. This perception was furthered by the make up 
of the work group in each jurisdiction. In Canada, a justice of the peace was 
always assigned to preside over bail court and a Crown attorney, duty counsel, 
and various private defence counsel were responsible for making 
representations. In England, either a District Judge or a panel of magistrates 
presided over the remand court and a CPS representative (typically a 
prosecutor, associate prosecutor, or agent acting on the behalf of the CPS), a 
contracted duty solicitor, and private defence solicitors made representations. A 
legal adviser66 was also present to assist with administrative matters and, in the 
case of magistrates, matters of law. Since justices of the peace were always 
assigned to preside over the bail court in Canada, the function of the court could 
not expand to procedures that were beyond their role. In particular, while the 
Criminal Code empowers justices of the peace to preside over bail proceedings, 
they do not hear pleas, trials, or impose sentences in Ontario (Cameron, 2013). 
This meant that defendants wanting to bypass the bail process and plead guilty 
could not be dealt with in bail court. This presented difficulties when other 
courtrooms were busy or closed for the day. One duty counsel described a 
scenario in which this occurred in the Canadian court: 
 
…so the charge was failing to comply probation because he didn’t pay 
restitution and the Crown’s position if he were to plead to it was a 
suspended sentence, so no more jail time if he pled that day, but plea 
court was closed. So we were trying to get him out on bail… (LN 1147, 
Canada, DC 003,). 
 
This type of situation was observed several times throughout the observations. 
In the event a case could not be traversed to another court, the defendant was 
put into a position whereby they could either spend the night in custody and 
plead the following day or proceed with a bail appearance in the hopes of being 
released, enabling them to appear for a plea out of custody on another 
occasion. This meant that case resolutions were extended, in large part, as a 
result of the limited power of justices of the peace.   
 
                                            
66 In cases where District Judges were sitting, court associate were also sometimes tasked with 
this role. 
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In England, the District Judges and magistrates presiding over remand court 
had much wider powers, in particular they were able to deal with both bail and 
sentencing. It is notable, however, that it was also not possible for all cases to 
be resolved in the magistrates’ court. Under the Magistrates Court Act 1980, 
magistrates cannot deal with indictable offences or either-way offences in which 
the sentence is expected to exceed six months imprisonment (or 12 months in 
total for two or more offences) or a five thousand pound fine. In these cases, as 
well as in either-way offences where the defendant elects to be tried in Crown 
Court, the court is unable to resolve the case in magistrates’ court. However, 
magistrates’ courts still have jurisdiction over the vast majority of criminal 
matters and there has been a longstanding political effort to increase this 
jurisdiction even further (Cammiss, 2007). For example, some either-way 
offences have been reclassified as summary and the aforementioned Plea 
before Venue arrangement enables magistrates’ to hear cases in which, when 
discounts for early guilty pleas are factored in, it reduces the likely sentence to a 
level that is within their jurisdiction. Consequently, the vast majority of cases 
were able to be resolved in the remand court in the event the defendant was 
willing to plead. In fact, of the 222 cases that were observed to start in custody, 
40% (n=90) did not involve a bail decision and were resolved instead. Indeed, 
the difference between jurisdictions in relation to the power of the court further 
contributed to the insular versus integrated approach to bail. 
 
The consistent use of duty counsel instead of private counsel had a further 
isolating effect on the bail process in the Canadian court. As Chapter Four 
indicated, 75% of cases (n=177) involved duty counsel in Canada while only 
11% (n=24) involved duty solicitors in England. Since duty counsel were 
employed directly by Legal Aid Ontario, they were typically assigned to a 
particular court and dealt with defendants on an ad hoc basis rather than 
representing them for the entirety of their case. Since duty counsel could not 
follow through with a case beyond the bail stage in the Canadian court, they 
were unlikely to discuss matters beyond the issue of bail. One duty counsel in 
Canada explained how this could become problematic: 
 
So duty counsel are doing like 90% of the bail hearings, which in most 
cases is totally fine, but there are some cases where it would be helpful if 
the person who was going to run the trial runs the bail hearing for various 
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reasons, like evidence, just their strategic thinking where it seems like 
this would be a good case, where the lawyer should be involved from the 
beginning (LN 282, Canada, DC 003). 
 
The lack of continuity between counsel made it unlikely that matters relating to 
the rest of the criminal process would be discussed. While duty solicitors in 
England faced the same problem in some cases, defendants often had the 
option to hire them privately at the conclusion of the bail decision and thus 
enable them to deal with the entirety of the case. The financial incentive for 
defence solicitors to obtain a large number of clients and to move through these 
cases quickly (Church, 1982; Cole, 1970; Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; Levin, 
1975) was particularly prevalent as a result of the legal aid cuts in England 
discussed in Chapter Four (Mcguinness, 2016). As such, duty solicitors 
assigned to in custody cases would be particularly motivated both to obtain 
these defendants as their own clients and to ensure they moved through the 
process as quickly as possible. This meant that, even in the limited number of 
cases where defendants were represented by duty solicitors in England, the 
discussion often focused on case management to some extent. This was never 
the case in Canada, however, where duty counsel were unable to accept 
private contracts.  
 
Attitudes towards discussing the case. Finally, as Chapter Five 
discussed, there was a general attitude in Canada that you do not ‘show your 
cards’ during the bail stage. Specifically, defence did not discuss the details of 
the case in most circumstances. This was so that the information provided could 
not be used against the defendant in the plea or trial phase in the event there 
were inconsistencies in their narrative. As such, some defence suggested they 
were unlikely to discuss the possibility of a plea or the details surrounding their 
case in bail court. For instance, when one duty counsel in Canada was asked 
what information was most important, they said that while a plea position was 
important, they would avoid asking for one unless it was explicitly brought up by 
the prosecution. They claimed “I wouldn’t ask for [a plea] if they didn’t have it 
already there” (LN 355, Canada, DC 002). As such, the attitude of not ‘showing 
your cards’ would also occasionally work towards preventing broader matters 
from being discussed informally at the bail stage. In this particular case, the 
duty counsel was reluctant to discuss the possibility of a plea in the event the 
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defendant pled not guilty later. Any indication as to what this decision would be 
was seen as detrimental to the case. Taken together, these factors make it 
clear that, unlike in England, bail is very much regarded as a separate part of 
the court process in Canada. 
 
These differing conceptualisations were found to have a considerable impact on 
the court actors’ attitudes towards case processing. The difference between 
viewing the bail stage as an integrated part of the process and as a separate 
entity in and of itself framed the time court actors devote to completing the bail 
decision-making process. Since broader issues were considered in the 
appearances in England, it is perhaps unsurprising that only a limited amount of 
time was devoted to the discussion of bail. Since it occupied the entirety of the 
focus in Canada, a considerable amount of time was spent discussing this 
issue. In fact, in many ways bail in the Canadian court had evolved into a 
separate part of the broader court process that had its own procedures and that 
had to be completed before the remainder of the court process could begin.  
 
Importantly, specialised courts such as the bail court observed in Canada have 
been to shown to be associated with longer case processing times (Zimmer, 
2009). In these courts, the workgroup focuses narrowly on particular issues and 
seeks resolution for broader issues - that the specialised court either would not 
or could not consider - elsewhere. Zimmer (2009) highlights that this practice 
often results in a protracted and costly process that may result in more delay 
than if matters were dealt with in a generalist court, like the remand court 
described in England.  
 
Summary 
 
In sum, these conceptualisations of the bail process – both in terms of how long 
the bail process should take and how it fits into the broader court process – 
contributed to divergent attitudes towards case processing in the English and 
Canadian courts. Specifically, court actors in Canada viewed the process as 
lengthy and insular whereas those in England viewed it as a quick procedure 
that was integrated into the rest of the court process. As previous research 
suggests (Church, 1985; Hucklesby, 1997a), court actors’ expectations about 
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the court norms reinforce behaviour that complies with their perception of how 
things ought to move through the system. As such, a feedback loop was 
created whereby norms surrounding case processing both influenced the 
behaviour of court actors and were shaped by them. Indeed, Church (1985) 
found that the causality between court culture and case handling procedures 
ran in both directions and that – no matter how fast or slow – court actors held a 
firm belief that the pace of litigation in their individual courts was optimal. The 
subsequent section will demonstrate that the conceptualisations of the bail 
process as fast or slow and insular or integrated ultimately shaped the decision-
making of the court actors and influenced the informal practices that developed 
in each jurisdiction.  
 
The relationship between bail conceptualisations and informal practices 
 
This section will demonstrate that the court actors’ perceptions as to how long 
the bail process should take and, in particular, what constitutes efficient 
practices, shaped their behaviour during bail proceedings. It is argued that 
these perceptions interacted with other motivations related to law and culture to 
influence the volume of information considered, the procedures used, and the 
use of adjournments in England and Canada.  
 
Information required to make the bail decision 
 
The following discussion will demonstrate that attitudes surrounding case 
processing time had a major impact on the volume of information viewed as 
necessary to the decision-making process as well as how long it was 
acceptable to wait for this information. In Canada, where there was not as much 
emphasis on fast case processing, it was common to wait for as much 
information as possible if it was believed it might benefit the case. This was not 
the case in England where court actors would often proceed with limited 
information, frequently on the basis that the case needed to progress 
expeditiously.  
 
Receiving the appropriate amount of disclosure from the prosecution’s office 
was viewed to be extremely important to court actors in Canada, particularly in 
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serious cases. In fact, more than half of the defence and duty counsel 
interviewed mentioned the need for more disclosure when they were asked if 
they had the information they needed to make a satisfactory argument. Many 
court actors felt that if they did not have sufficient disclosure it was necessary to 
adjourn proceedings until it could be obtained. For example, one defence 
counsel in Canada explained an occasion in which they undertook this strategy: 
 
Now if I just run a bail hearing on day one without any disclosure, the 
likelihood of him being detained is probably 100% because it’s an 
attempt murder, it’s these four guys, it’s caught on video, they take a 
gun, they shoot the guy, he survives. But that’s what the justice of the 
peace is going to hear. And how do I counter that without any 
disclosure? So I adjourned the case. It took a month to get disclosure. 
Sure enough I get disclosure and I get a photo, a still photo of what was 
on the video, and what can you see? Nothing. You see the guy’s eyes 
and he’s masked everywhere else. So I presented that to the JP and I 
said how do you detain a person when this is what the Crown’s relying 
upon? And he gave him bail. He gave him bail on the basis of the lack of 
strength of the Crown’s case (LN 458, Canada, DEF 006,). 
 
The defence counsel rightly pointed out that the court can consider the strength 
of the evidence when applying the exceptions to the right to bail and thus 
waiting for weak evidence to become available might increase the chances the 
defendant will be remanded on bail. Further, the summary of the allegations 
presented by the prosecution can be especially damaging to the defendant in 
Canada where the do not ‘show your cards’ mentality reduces the chances that 
defence counsel will present an alternative version of the events. When these 
issues are taken together, it is clear why the defence counsel believed waiting 
for disclosure might be in the best interest of the client. However, in the 
aforementioned example, the client waited one month in custody for the 
disclosure to become available. As the following Canadian defence counsel 
notes, this does have an obvious drawback for the defendant:  
 
…for example, the video that they’ve apparently looked at and seen and 
has been the basis for deciding to arrest this guy – if I want to see that 
video, they seem to take forever to get that for me. So getting disclosure 
out of the Crown for show cause purposes can be very time consuming, 
and meanwhile the person languishes in jail (LN 316, Canada, DEF 008). 
 
As the defence counsel illustrated, the client must await the disclosure in 
custody, which can be both difficult individually and damaging to their case 
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(Trotter, 2010). In addition, since the bail decision is typically made before the 
defendant progresses to the next part of the court process in Canada, such a 
strategy would prevent the defendant from moving forward. For instance, the 
defence would be unable to set a trial date, while they were ‘stuck’ in the bail 
phase. Furthermore, as Webster (2011) has highlighted, cases that languish in 
the bail stage contribute to systemic delay as it means cases stay in ‘limbo’ and 
increase both the time and number of appearances required to complete the 
court process. It is notable, however, that this particular defence counsel placed 
the responsibility on the prosecution for failing to provide disclosure in a timely 
fashion rather than acknowledging their role in extending the proceedings. This 
suggests their expectation was more heavily weighted on making well-informed 
decisions than fast decisions. In line with this view, one duty counsel in Canada 
suggested it would be “irresponsible” (LN 497, Canada, DEF 001) to proceed 
with a bail decision in the event they did not have what they perceived to be 
enough information about the case.  
 
The perception that it is necessary to wait for additional information before 
proceeding to a bail decision may be rooted in the nature of the bail review 
procedure in Canada. After the initial bail decision, the defence (or prosecution) 
must appeal to Superior Court in order for the decision to be reviewed by a 
judge under Section 520 of the Criminal Code. Under R v St Cloud [2015] the 
judge can only exercise their power of review if there is new evidence, an error 
of law, or if the decision is clearly inappropriate. As such, the process is 
potentially long and complex. Given the financial pressures faced by defence 
counsel discussed in Chapter Four it is perhaps unsurprising that a defence 
counsel would prefer to adjourn the proceedings in the lower court to await 
evidence rather than run a weak contested hearing and have to subsequently 
proceed to an appeal. This would be more in line with the aforementioned 
defence strategy of overturning numerous cases in a short period of time (see 
Church, 1982; Cole, 1970; Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; Levin, 1975).  
 
In England, a different approach was taken to obtaining information. The 
interviews revealed that – much to the chagrin of the defence and prosecution – 
they often proceeded with bail with limited details about the case and that, 
unlike in Canada, it was not the norm to adjourn the proceedings. Rather, 
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pressure was felt to ‘get on with it’ and move the case forward. This was argued 
by one defence solicitor in England: 
 
…when I started in 2002 you’d have … all the time in the world, to 
prepare your case more or less … but do you know, I think the police 
were more prepared even in those days. You got more information at the 
beginning whereas now you get literally an MG5 [police report] and it’s 
very difficult and unfair sometimes for the courts to decide on bail when 
we’re not privy to all the facts. Because then something may well come 
to light in the section 9 [witness] statements that was not available at the 
first hearing, which may well impact on bail, because obviously the 
magistrates have to take into account at that stage as well, the first stage 
for bail, the strength of the evidence, which can’t always be assessed at 
the beginning (LN 241, England, DEF 023). 
 
The defence solicitor, like several others, felt as though the limited amount of 
information used to make the bail decision was unfair to the defendant. The 
reason it was perceived to be unfair parallels the justification the defence 
counsel in Canada used to delay the proceedings for disclosure. In the event 
information became available that weakened the strength of the case, and thus 
increased the chance a defendant might be remanded on bail, the initial bail 
decision would already have been made. However, most defence counsel 
acknowledged that at the bail stage the prosecution’s case was ‘taken at its 
highest’ and thus the Court would make their decision on this basis. As such, it 
was generally accepted that the bail decision would be made despite the limited 
information available.   
 
Their willingness to continue with the proceedings without adjourning may be 
rooted in the review process in England which, unlike in Canada, can be 
conducted in the same court as the initial decision was made (i.e. the 
magistrates’ court). Under the Magistrates Court Act 1980, the defendant is able 
to have a second hearing within eight days after the initial bail decision 
regardless of whether new evidence had surfaced. Furthermore, under Section 
4(1) of The Bail Act 1976, while the Court “need not hear arguments as to fact 
or law which it has heard previously” it is still to consider the question of bail at 
every hearing thereafter. While, in practice, research suggests it is unlikely that 
defendants will be remanded on bail following an initial custody decision (Cape 
& Smith, 2016; Doherty & East, 1985), this still provides a much less convoluted 
legislative avenue to pursue further bail decisions in the event that, as defence 
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in both jurisdictions suggested is sometimes the case, important new evidence 
emerges that may call the initial remand in custody into question. At this point, 
the defendant may also make an application for bail to the Crown Court, where 
the decision is made by a Judge in chambers (i.e. outside of formal 
proceedings) providing another avenue for review (Sanders et al., 2010). This 
may, in part, explain why defence in England are less likely to pursue their legal 
entitlement under the Bail Act 1976 to wait for additional information prior to 
obtaining a bail decision.  However, as the defence solicitor suggested, it would 
also appear that it is simply the norm to pursue a bail decision with the 
information available at the time.  
 
While defence solicitors in England viewed themselves to be on the ‘back foot’ 
relative to other court actors when it came to receiving information, it was clear 
that the situation was also disagreeable for the prosecution. For instance, one 
associate prosecutor also voiced a feeling of being rushed during bail 
appearances: 
 
I don’t think we have enough time to do them, no. That’s one of the real 
problems I think we’ve got, because it can be – You can have all day 
before to prepare your court and, your overnights, you’re getting them on 
the morning and you don’t know how many you’re going to get. The court 
have some sympathy but ultimately they want to get on. They’ve got 
people in custody, defence want to get on, so you are more rushed and 
you are just going through it very quickly which is not always ideal. 
You’re just summarising, you don’t always have time to look through 
statements and things, which you should do really (LN 227, England, 
CPS 025).  
 
This associate prosecutor also perceived the process to be rushed in a way that 
might compromise fairness. However, unlike the defence solicitor, who was 
concerned about not having information, they were concerned that they were 
unable to go through the information even if it was available. This was largely a 
result of what was perceived to be the nature of bail (‘overnight’) cases. The 
expectation was clearly that the associate prosecutor would receive information 
when the defendants were brought in, receive directions from a prosecutor (as 
associate prosecutors cannot act independently), and be ready to proceed that 
same day. This was considered particularly difficult given the volume of cases 
was unpredictable and the workload heavy at times. While it was noted that 
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there was some level of patience from other court actors, at the end of the day 
the attitude was very much to ‘get on with it’ and complete the matter to the best 
of your ability. It is notable that this attitude persisted in England despite the fact 
that, like their counterparts in Canada, they were legally entitled to adjourn the 
proceedings if it was considered impracticable to make a decision. 
 
The result of this practice was that bail decisions were ultimately made with a 
limited amount of information. Another prosecutor in England described the 
natural consequence of this situation: 
 
So you’ve got the – depending on how busy it is – you’ve got the 
statements to read or if it’s really busy you rely – although it’s not terribly 
good practice – simply on the summary that the police type, which is 
dangerous because sometimes the summary is not really 100% accurate 
against what the evidence actually is (LN 417, England, CPS 27). 
 
Echoing an issue that was raised in Canada, the prosecutor expressed concern 
with relying on the police summary when making arguments. This suggests that 
it is not just the defence who believe that the police summary is not always 
accurate. However, as was mentioned previously, the prosecution’s case was 
expected to be taken at its highest at this stage, and such it was not necessary 
from a legal standpoint to acquire the same volume of information one might 
need for a trial before proceeding. These findings support previous research 
(Burrows et al., 1994; Hucklesby, 1997b; Morgan & Henderson, 1998) that 
suggests, despite the aforementioned reservations, the prosecution relied 
heavily on the information provided by the police at the bail stage. As has been 
noted previously, this practice calls into question to what extent the prosecution 
is independent from the police when they are making decisions surrounding bail 
(Hucklesby, 1997b).  
 
The findings suggest that the English and Canadian courts had a very different 
view as to the volume of information that was necessary to proceed with the bail 
process, both of which were shaped both by the context within which they 
worked and by their attitudes towards case processing more generally. In 
Canada, where there appeared to be limited pressure to move through the bail 
process expeditiously and the bail process was viewed as lengthy process, the 
attitude was that it was better to wait for more information than risk a poorly 
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informed decision. This mentality places the chance of a more accurate bail 
decision above the need for speedy case processing. In England, where there 
was considerable pressure to move the case forward and the bail process was 
viewed as a shorter procedure, the attitude appeared to be to do the best with 
the information that you have. In this jurisdiction it would seem speedy case 
processing is valued over the potential for an initially more accurate bail 
decision.  
 
Ultimately, prioritising either speed or accuracy while neglecting the other could 
be detrimental to the defendant and the administration of justice. On one hand, 
the defendant could be remanded in custody (or potentially released) unfairly 
and on the other, the defendant could remain in custody, preventing the case 
from moving forward. In Canada, where bail has become a process in and of 
itself and the review process is lengthy and complex, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that a high expectation is placed on the volume and quality of information used 
to assess bail. However, in England, where bail is still viewed largely as a quick 
summary process and the review process is less taxing it is conceivable why it 
might be the norm to put less emphasis on the accurate and comprehensive 
examination of information at the bail stage.  
 
Procedures employed during the bail process 
 
These same attitudes towards court efficiency were also reflected in the 
procedures employed during the bail process. In Canada, the use of evidence 
(i.e. testimonies, presentation of physical evidence) was viewed as acceptable 
in the event that it strengthened the goals of the court actor presenting it while, 
in England, this was avoided as they were viewed to stand in opposition to the 
summary nature of the bail process. As was the case with perspectives 
surrounding the appropriate volume of information required to proceed with bail, 
court actors’ views as to whether the delay was acceptable was central to this 
choice. 
 
Importantly, neither jurisdiction legally requires the presentation of evidence 
during bail proceedings, however both nonetheless permit it. In Canada, under 
Section 518 of the Criminal Code, any evidence can be submitted during the 
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bail process which is ‘credible or trustworthy’ and the testimony of the defendant 
is optional. While the case law in England enables court actors to adduce 
evidence, there is no requirement for them to do so67 and the courts have 
rejected the need for formal evidence during bail proceedings.68 As such, the 
court actors in England and Canada enjoy similar legal powers in relation to the 
presentation of evidence. Nonetheless, the actual practices were found to be 
very different. 
 
Canadian court actors widely held that the presentation of evidence was 
required to complete the bail process, particularly in contested hearings. For 
instance, one duty counsel acknowledged that multiple processes were the 
norm during contested hearings in the Canadian court: 
 
…the bail hearings take a long time now and lot of reason I think they 
take a long time is because of all these processes that have developed. 
We have to hear from the surety. Bail hearings back in the day it was all 
submissions, like nobody testified (LN 933, Canada, DC 002). 
 
This duty counsel argued that the amount of processes that were used had 
increased over time until they eventually became the norm. In particular, the 
frequency with which individuals testified was perceived to have increased. 
Although the observations could not confirm a change over time, they did 
suggest the current frequency with which they were used. Of the 2169 contested 
hearings observed, 9 included the testimony of one surety, 5 included the 
testimony of two sureties, and 6 included the testimony of the defendant. This 
meant that that there was only one contested hearing that did not include a 
testimony. These findings are consistent with previous research, which found 
that sureties were used as a matter of course in Ontario bail courts and that 
they were frequently expected to testify (Canadian Civil Liberties Association, 
2014; Myers, 2009). 
 
                                            
67 See Re Moles [1981] and R v Mansfield Justices, ex p. Sharkey [1985] 
68 R (DPP) v Havering Magistrates’ Court [2001]  
69 In three of these 21 hearings the prosecution consented to the release part way through, 
causing them to end as consent releases. Given the process stayed the same, they were 
included in the current totals, but were excluded from the totals in previous chapters related to 
the final decision.  
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Not only did this practice increase the length of time the contested hearings 
took to complete, they also increased the time required to organise them. This 
was the case for several reasons. First, many defence and duty counsel 
discussed the need to prepare sureties for their testimonies in order to increase 
the chances of a release. This process was described by one defence counsel 
in Canada:  
 
So I’m always preparing sureties. And surety preparation, I think, is the 
key to getting a release done. I make my sureties do a full on surety 
affidavit, a questionnaire through my office. We have them get all of their 
banking documents and everything prepared and ready. We do role 
acting, play acting, with the surety so that they understand the types of 
questions. We prepare them for the way to testify (LN 265, Canada, DEF 
005).  
 
 
Although this defence counsel took a particularly elaborate approach to surety 
preparation relative to other counsel, this description illustrates the potential this 
practice has for increasing case processing time. It was not just the defence, 
however, that increased processing time on account of the expectation of a 
testimony. Another reason that contested hearings took some time to organise 
was a new practice on the part of the prosecution that required sureties to have 
criminal record checks: 
 
Well one that’s really provided a change for us is the new policy of 
getting criminal record checks done for every single potential surety 
before a bail hearing starts. The Crown attorneys are requesting those, 
so it’s not even the JPs. Initially we kind of fought it because we’re just 
like matters are actually being held down for the purposes of, well we 
can’t proceed if we don’t have a criminal record check, and we’re like, we 
did for years before, like three months ago. But again, it just becomes, 
once you start doing it that just becomes the norm (LN 178, Canada, DC 
002). 
 
This duty counsel pointed out that the introduction of new procedures had the 
potential to create new expectations and potentially new norms. In this instance, 
the practice of checking the criminal record of sureties was not commonly 
employed in the past but had evolved into a normal procedure in a matter of 
months. Once the procedure became routine it came to be expected and 
formed a normal part of contested hearing preparation.  
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Finally, the time required to complete a contested hearing also increased when 
physical evidence such as doctor’s notes or letters of employment were 
requested by the defence. For example, one defence counsel discussed the 
process of gathering records in Canada: 
 
One of the things I find very difficult, is often times you need to take a few 
days to put together some material to have a have a proper bail hearing 
and if part of that material you want to put together is not simply - stuff 
from outside, for example from a guy’s doctor, from the guy’s treatment 
centre, historic material on the guy, that’s not in the Crown’s position (LN 
310, Canada, DEF 008). 
 
As was mentioned by the defence counsel, the process of gathering this 
material would often take more than one day. However, multiple defence and 
duty counsel suggested this step often strengthened their ability to obtain a 
release for their client as it enhanced the credibility of their representations. 
Using physical evidence to portray the defendant’s character in a positive light 
or demonstrate they are addressing underlying issues is another example of the 
focus on rehabilitation and the social causes of crime (see Chapter One) in the 
Canadian criminal justice bleeding into the bail process. In this case, the idea 
that defendants are targeting underlying issues for their offending, such as 
mental health or addiction, provides a potential reason to release them on bail.    
 
It is easy to see the appeal of many of these procedures from the perspective of 
the defence and the prosecution in the event they strengthened their case. 
However, in order for them to become routine practice they would have to 
prioritise their utility over their impact on case processing times. Ultimately, the 
benefits that each of these procedures yielded in terms of the individual goals of 
the practitioners appeared to eclipse any damage they might inflict cumulatively 
on efficient case processing. Furthermore, a snowball effect appeared to take 
place in which the more they were used the more they became expected, and 
the more difficult it would become to scale back their use.  
 
A very different picture emerged in relation to the use of procedures in English 
bail proceedings. Lengthy procedures were not used nor were they expected 
since adhering to the summary nature of the proceedings was prioritised over 
building a robust bail case. This was because the bail process was not viewed 
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as a lengthy process by English court actors. This was acknowledged by one 
English legal adviser: 
 
Yeah, not the trial, is it? You’re not making a determination of innocence 
or guilt, you’re looking at the risks under the Bail Act and you’re dealing 
with it purely on representations from either party and there’s no hard 
evidence, it’s just representation and it’s entirely up to the magistrates to 
attach what weight they feel appropriate to it (LN 443, England, LA 009).  
 
This legal adviser associated ‘hard evidence’ – which was often used in Canada 
- as extraneous to the bail process. Importantly, this view was based on what 
was considered the norm since, as was previously discussed, court actors are 
legally entitled to enter evidence at the bail stage in England. However, this 
information was more likely to be considered during a trial, where the court 
establishes the guilt of the defendant. In fact, testimonies were regarded as the 
exception rather than the rule by English court actors. This was especially the 
case in England given, as Chapters Four and Five indicated, sureties were very 
rarely used in this jurisdiction. In addition, it was rare to see defendants take the 
stand themselves. In fact, not one testimony was witnessed during the court 
observations in England. This was also the case with physical evidence, such 
as doctor’s notes or information surrounding employment. These findings are 
consistent with previous research. Indeed, Cape and Smith (2016) did not 
observe one case in which documentary evidence was produced or a witness 
was called to give oral evidence.  
 
Defence solicitors asserted that, since there is not generally physical evidence 
to put forward, their representations very much depended on the word of the 
client. For instance, one defence solicitor claimed:  
 
I don’t have the written hard evidence, you know often if it’s, if I need 
some evidence for a job, I’m not going to have that reference am I? You 
know, if they don’t have a fixed accommodation, I’m not going to have 
that either. So it’s usually the word of the client that I’m putting forward. 
(LN 574, England, DEF 022). 
	
Many defence counsel expressed concerns with this issue, particularly in cases 
where they were not familiar with the defendant and could thus not verify the 
information they were receiving. However, the possibility of obtaining a 
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reference instead – which was seen to be commonplace in Canada – was not 
even considered as a possibility in England.  
 
Rather than relying on evidence obtained by the defence, the court actors in 
England could, in some cases, rely on Bail Information Schemes for verified 
information about the defendant. These schemes - which provided verified 
information to courts about the defendants - date back to the 1970s. They were 
initially introduced to increase the quantity and quality of information available to 
the courts in order for them to make accurate bail decisions. The extent and 
nature of their use has varied since this time, but they were most recently 
resurrected in the early 2000s as they were thought to reduce non-appearances 
at court hearings by defendants on bail as well as provide credible information 
to the court and reduce the number of remands in custody (Hucklesby, 2011a). 
While the court actors typically spoke favourably about this information, which 
they received from probation, they also noted, consistent with previous findings 
(Hucklesby, 2009), that this information was not always available. Take, for 
instance, one magistrate’s comment regarding the information available from 
probation: 
 
And probation, of course, but then they’re not usually in court, certainly 
not on a Saturday they’re not, but if they’re there, they often have 
valuable information, if they’ve been previously known to probation (LN 
179, England, MAG 017). 
 
While bail information schemes were reported to be helpful to the decision-
making process, it was unclear to what extent they impacted decisions as – 
unless probation communicated the information verbally – it was difficult to 
know when the court actors were referring to them. As such, their impact 
compared to the ‘hard evidence’ that was primarily used in Canada was 
uncertain. What was clear from the interviews, however, was that Bail 
Information Schemes were not used consistently. As such, relative to the 
procedures typically employed in Canada, it is unlikely this contributed 
significantly to lengthening the proceedings systematically.  
 
The use of complex and lengthy procedures were not necessarily opposed by 
English court actors, they were, for the most part, simply not considered at all. 
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Since the bail process was viewed to be a summary procedure the idea that 
evidence would be entered or several days would elapse in order to employ a 
procedure did not strike most of the court actors as a possibility. Rather, this 
type of behaviour was viewed to associate with more complex parts of the 
criminal process, such as trials or guilty pleas.  
	
This mentality – like the opposing one developed in Canada – seemed to be 
rooted both in an adherence to court norms and reflective of the overarching 
context. In Canada, lengthy procedures were undertaken, in part, because that 
is what was commonly done. These practices were reported to evolve over time 
and have since become routine. They remained largely unquestioned despite 
their time-consuming nature as the bail process was viewed to take as long as 
what was necessary to put an appropriate plan in place. In addition, since the 
court relied on the defence to obtain information about the defendants in the 
absence of a practice comparable to bail information schemes, defence had 
additional tasks to complete before the proceedings, further contributing to 
potential delay. In England, however, these same procedures – despite being 
legally viable – were not considered since they were not the norm in this 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the presence of Bail Information Schemes – although 
not always available – provided a source other than the defence to acquire 
information about the defendant in some cases. Indeed, lengthy procedures 
were associated with longer processes, such as trials, and were not found to be 
the norm at the bail stage in this jurisdiction.  
 
The use of adjournments 
 
The views on efficiency in each court shaped the extent to which adjournments 
were requested during the bail process and why they were used. As the 
previous section demonstrated, adjournments were commonplace in Canada 
and extremely rare in England. This disjuncture centres on disagreement as to 
whether the bail decision must be obtained on the first appearance. Given that 
this view is held by English court actors and not by those in Canada, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the extent and nature of the use of adjournments 
varied considerably between courts. As was consistent with previous research 
(Myers, 2015; Webster, 2009), the findings demonstrated a ‘culture of 
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adjournments’ in Canada whereby adjournments were consistently used and 
rarely contested. This was not the case in England, where court actors seldom 
requested adjournments for the purposes of bail.   
 
In line with previous research, the findings showed that bail cases were 
frequently adjourned in the Canadian court (Myers, 2015; Webster et al., 2009) 
and rarely in England (Cape & Smith, 2016; Doherty & East, 1985; Hucklesby, 
1997a). Indeed, 55% (n=130) of defendants brought into the Canadian bail 
court were adjourned to another day, 83% (n=108) of which were for the 
purposes of a bail decision.70 In England, there was only one instance in which 
a case was adjourned for the purposes of a bail decision. Given the normality of 
adjournments in Canada and the infrequency of them in England, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the court actors viewed them in such opposing manners.  
 
As was previously discussed, Canadian laws state that bail matters cannot be 
adjourned for more than three days unless the defendant consents. However, 
the following findings revealed that defendants often had little choice but to 
accept adjournments if they wanted to strengthen their chances of being 
released. The strategic nature of the adjournments can be illustrated by 
examining the reasons that that they were requested in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1 shows that the most common reason that a bail case resulted in an 
adjournment relates to the bail plan in some capacity. Proceedings were 
adjourned in order to accommodate or find sureties, obtain a decision from the 
Bail Program, or work on the bail plan more generally in 22% (n=29) of the 
adjournments witnessed. In these cases it is unsurprising that the defendant 
consented to the adjournment given the bail plan is generally constructed for 
the purposes of securing a release. Many additional cases were adjourned for 
the purposes of obtaining private counsel or to accommodate the request of one 
that was already involved (18%; n=23). This would also be unlikely to be 
contested by the defendant given they would conceivably want their counsel at 
the hearing in order to proceed. Finally, in some cases more information about 
the case was required (8%; n=10), which would relate to the circumstances 
                                            
70 The remaining adjournments were for the purposes of a guilty plea or to enter the ‘video 
remand’ stream. 
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discussed above, where the defence required more disclosure before making a 
decision as to how to proceed (with bail or otherwise). 
 
Table 6.1 - Reasons provided for adjournments in the Canadian court 
Reason For Adjournment 
N % 
Private counsel related 23 18% 
Surety related 16 12% 
No reason provided 16 12% 
Court cannot accommodate 16 12% 
To attend other court 14 11% 
Need more information 10 8% 
Bail program related 7 5% 
Bail plan related 6 5% 
Contested hearing 5 4% 
Legal aid 4 3% 
Paperwork required 2 2% 
Other 11 9% 
Total 130 100% 
 
A fair proportion of cases, however, were adjourned for reasons that were not 
associated with improving the chances of obtaining bail. This included reasons 
such as the court being unable to accommodate the hearing (12%; n=16), the 
defendant having to attend another type of court (11%; n=14), a delay in 
obtaining legal aid (3%; n=4), or the court had yet to receive the appropriate 
paperwork (2%; n=2). Finally, in 12% (n=16) of adjournments no reason was 
provided to explain their use or the defence simply stated the reason was 
related to holding a contested hearing (4%; n=5) with no additional details. The 
fact that these adjournments were accepted by the court with no explanation 
supports the assertion that adjournments were expected and rarely questioned 
(Myers, 2015; Webster, 2009). 
 
The findings also revealed that when cases in Canada were adjourned for the 
purposes of obtaining a bail decision, they were not necessarily listed to come 
back for an appearance the next day. In fact, only 47% were listed to come 
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back in one day (n=51), while a further 7% (n=8) were listed for two days, 15% 
(n=16) for three days, and 12% (n=13) for four days, and the remaining 19% 
(n=20) for 5 days or more. As such, adjournments not only extended the 
number of appearances required to obtain a bail decision, but in some cases 
they extended the length of time substantially. This is especially problematic 
from a human rights perspective given these defendants would be waiting in 
custody during this period.  
 
This was not the case in the English court, where adjournments were only used 
during the bail process in exceptional circumstances. In fact, only one 
adjournment was witnessed for the purposes of obtaining bail throughout the 
observations. When court actors were asked about potential reasons they might 
request an adjournment for bail, they almost always said it would be to secure 
an address where the defendant could reside. For example, one legal adviser in 
England explained the circumstances in which an adjournment might be 
requested: 
 
They always make a decision on the first appearance. The only way they 
wouldn’t is if it’s impracticable not to make a decision, so you might have 
to adjourn the decision because the court doesn’t have all the information 
before it. For example, the defendant might say, ‘I’ve got an address to 
offer to the court, but that does need clarifying.’ So they might adjourn for 
that reason (LN 601, England, LA 10). 
 
This response mirrored the vast majority of answers to this question, across all 
court actors. Unlike in Canada, the mentality seemed to be that adjournments 
were only necessary if there was a good chance the defendant could be 
released if it were allowed. This was expressed by one associate prosecutor in 
England: 
 
I think if the court is saying ‘well we’ll adjourn it’ then basically they’re 
agreeing that they’re going to bail them because otherwise why would 
they do it? That’s only fair, I can’t object to that (LN 378, England, CPS 
025).  
 
This was clearly not the case in Canada, where adjournments were handed out 
for reasons that were unrelated to strengthening the bail case (i.e. not enough 
time to proceed, legal aid application). In addition, when proceedings were put 
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over in England, it would be unlikely they would take multiple days to return. 
This was highlighted by one magistrate in England: 
 
You wouldn’t want to adjourn, hold somebody in custody for a long 
period of time, so you’d want to get to that decision as quickly as 
possible, based on the individual’s rights, so you’d want to try and do 
that. So you would try as much as possible not to do that, even if it meant 
adjourning, and sometimes I’ve adjourned on the morning to the 
afternoon, in order to make sure that it’s all wrapped up. And again, in 
terms of case management, it’s about dealing with it as quickly as 
possible, but effectively (LN 369, England, MAG 014).  
 
It was the opinion of this magistrate that holding defendants for too long before 
making a bail decision would violate their rights. In other words, due process 
values were prioritised in terms of the defendant being released from custody at 
the earliest possible opportunity. Some court actors explained that it would be 
exceptional for a bail decision to be adjourned more than 24 hours, for instance. 
This mentality was consistent with a broader attitude that prioritised speedy 
case processing in the rest of the court process, as discussed by one District 
Judge in England: 
 
…the impetus is always on dealing with cases as fast as you can, as 
soon as you can, with as few hearings as possible; that’s just the general 
impetus, not just on bail so you would want to [deal with it in one 
appearance]. But obviously bearing in mind you’ve got to do the right 
thing and be fair, so if it wouldn’t be fair to make the decision without 
having more information then obviously you would wait; but those cases 
are exceptional (LN 445, England, DJ 18). 
 
While this District Judge accepted that adjournments were fair in exceptional 
circumstances, when more information was required, they also stated that the 
vast majority of cases would be dealt with in one appearance. Unlike in Canada, 
it was accepted that the material that was available on the first day would be 
sufficient to make a decision in most cases. Although, as was previously 
demonstrated, this caused some concerns from the defence and prosecution, 
the priority of moving through the process quickly was primary in England. 
 
The difference between the two mentalities surrounding adjournments seemed 
to be based in a different application of the respective laws requiring a 
defendant be put before a court within 24 hours (in Canada) or in the next court 
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sitting (in England). In Canada, it appears as though simply making an 
appearance, even if the defendant was subsequently adjourned before a 
decision could be made, was sufficient to adhere to the law. In England, it was 
interpreted to mean that the bail decision itself had to be made at this time, save 
for exceptional circumstances in which the defendant would be likely to be 
released if they were adjourned. This disjuncture again highlights the flexibility 
of the law discussed by McConville and his colleagues (1997). In this case, two 
approaches to bail both adhere to similar laws through markedly different 
means.  
 
Summary 
 
The preceding discussion demonstrated that the conceptualisation of bail 
shaped the information deemed necessary to make bail decisions, the 
procedures undertaken, and the extent and reasons adjournments were 
requested. While additional reasons related to the law and culture motivated 
these decisions to some extent, ultimately they were facilitated by broader 
conceptions as to how fast the proceedings needed to be. What might be 
deemed necessary for a fair bail decision in Canada was considered unfeasible 
by virtue of the time it would take in England. Indeed, the very idea of what 
constitutes ‘efficiency’ differed considerably across courts, ultimately resulting in 
the development of divergent informal practices across the two jurisdictions.  
 
Conclusion 
 
It is clear that two very different attitudes surrounding court efficiency had 
evolved in the English and Canadian bail process. This chapter demonstrated 
that court actors in England were much more conscious of timely case 
processing relative to the actors in Canada. In comparison, Canadian court 
actors viewed case processing time to be secondary to assurances that the 
decision has been made comprehensively. This ultimately shaped the decision-
making of court actors, with those in Canada requiring more information, 
undertaking lengthier procedures, and requesting more adjournments than 
those in England. In England, these practices were only accepted exceptionally, 
with the priority being the speedy nature of the process. Ultimately, these 
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behaviours were facilitated by generalised expectations related to whether the 
bail process was viewed as a summary procedure (like in England) or more of a 
‘mini-trial’ (like in Canada).  
 
Importantly, neither of these approaches came without disadvantages. In 
England, the process has been criticised for being short and the information 
provided to defendants brief and formulaic (Cape & Smith, 2016; Dhami & 
Ayton, 2001; Hucklesby, 1996) while in Canada it has been argued that the 
summary nature of the bail process has become distorted over time (Webster et 
al., 2016).  
 
These findings demonstrate that court culture is central to explaining decision-
making that shapes court processing times. As was the case with the defendant 
and case characteristics presented (see Chapter Five), these practices arose, in 
part, as a result of the norms and expectations that had developed in each 
court. In Canada, adjournments were requested since they were expected and 
proceedings were drawn out through various practices, as that was the norm. 
Conversely, the bail process was fast in England as that is what court actors 
perceived was expected and lengthy practices were simply not standard 
practice. This resulted in mutually reinforcing behaviours that contributed to the 
court culture, and ultimately shaped case processing time in each jurisdiction. 
 
This culture cannot, however, be said to have developed in the absence of 
overarching views about the criminal process more broadly. Perhaps most 
clearly, these behaviours reflected very different conceptions about how fast 
court proceedings should be in a more generalised sense. It is no coincidence 
that in Canada, where the courts are persistently argued to be inefficient and 
managerialist attempts at reform are largely unsuccessful (Standing Senate 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2017), court actors would 
develop the view that bail proceedings could be long and drawn out. Similarly, 
the court actors perceptions as to how fast the process should take coincides 
with relatively recent attempts to decrease case processing time more broadly 
in England (Leveson, 2015; Narey Report, 1997). Indeed, this drive for 
efficiency acted alongside a longstanding cultural practice of completing bail 
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appearances in one day in England (Cape & Smith, 2016; Doherty & East, 
1985; Hucklesby, 1997a; Simon & Weatheritt, 1974).   
 
Ultimately, these criticisms highlight two very different interpretations as to how 
due process should proceed. On one hand, holding defendants in custody for 
long periods of time while trying to secure a release disregards the fact that, as 
Feeley (1992) as pointed out, the process itself is punishment and extending 
this process disregards the rights of the defendant in this sense. However, 
prioritising speed over caution sacrifices what Packer (1968) has explained as a 
series of checks and balances that ensure defendants are given every chance 
to avoid losing their liberty. Nonetheless, like both previous analysis chapters 
have highlighted, even vastly different priorities and practices such as these can 
flow from and adhere to very similar laws. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
This study set out to examine the factors that contribute to the bail decision-
making process in English and Canadian courts. These were ideal jurisdictions 
with which to explore this issue because their similar bail laws and divergent 
practices related to pre-trial custody reflect different patterns of bail decision-
making. The research took place at a time when Canada’s prison remand rates 
had been increasing over several decades, contributing to what was largely 
considered a ‘broken bail system’ (Webster, 2015), and England had one of the 
lowest prison remand rates in the Western world (Walmsley, 2017). Exploring 
the reasons for these differences facilitated a deeper comprehension of bail 
decision-making in each jurisdiction and furthered current knowledge as to how 
to best understand this process. 
 
The objectives of the study can be divided into two broad areas. First, the 
research aimed to identify the factors that contribute to the bail decision-making 
process and to investigate how these factors converged and diverged in each 
jurisdiction. Second, it sought to understand the impact of bail decision-making 
at the local level as well as explore how the findings contributed to an 
understanding of this process in a wider context. 
 
Overall, it was found that court culture is central to understanding bail decision-
making but that it is shaped by broader views that are specific to the criminal 
justice process in England and Canada. These views relate to values that have 
developed in each jurisdiction as a result of the evolution of criminal justice 
ideology and guiding philosophies over time. The influence of these factors on 
the bail decision-making process was facilitated by the discretion afforded to 
court actors in their application of formal laws, which enabled them to balance 
multiple competing principles whilst, in the main, remaining within the 
prescribed legal framework. This suggests that the factors contributing to bail 
decision-making are nuanced, varied and interdependent and should thus be 
understood in terms of their interactive effects.  
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Factors contributing to the bail decision-making process 
 
As discussed elsewhere in the thesis, previous research has illustrated the 
importance of developing a better understanding of the bail decision-making 
process given its impact on individuals, institutions, and human rights. The 
decision to refuse bail has been shown to have a substantial impact on the lives 
of defendants and the trajectory of their cases (Bottomley, 1970; Canadian Civil 
Liberties Association, 2014; Friedland, 1965; HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2012; 
Player et al., 2010; Trotter, 2010), put pressure on the criminal justice 
institutions responsible for housing them (Office of Auditor General of Ontario, 
2008) and strain the central principle of the presumption of innocence (Webster, 
2007).  
 
While this thesis has argued that these implications emphasise the need to 
better explain the factors contributing to this process, it does not seek to claim 
that there that there is a ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ way to make bail decisions. Indeed, 
comparative law principles suggest that such an approach is problematic given 
that the context, as well as the standards and values associated with it, vary 
across jurisdictions (Nelken, 2007). This was demonstrated in this research, in 
which behaviour regarded as questionable by court actors in one jurisdiction 
(e.g. delaying bail compromises defendants’ rights in the English court) was 
often regarded as ideal in the other (e.g. delaying bail ensures the right decision 
will be made in the Canadian court). As such, rather than evaluating whether 
the bail decision-making in each jurisdiction adhered to normative standards, 
this study has illustrated how to examine bail decision-making, thus deepening 
our understanding of how to best engage with this process. The findings 
suggest that the ideal approach is to examine the interaction of multiple 
contributing factors: law and legal principles, court culture, and views 
surrounding the broader criminal justice process.  
 
The findings suggest that law and legal principles influence bail decision-making 
insofar as they afford court actors broad scope for discretion in their application. 
These formal rules did not dictate the actions of court actors, but rather 
provided a loose framework for their bail decision-making, ultimately facilitating 
a wide-range of permissible behaviour. This is consistent with previous research 
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examining other components of the criminal justice process that emphasised 
the importance of the flexibility of the law on the decision-making of criminal 
justice actors (see McBarnet, 1981; McConville et al., 1991).  
 
The extent to which discretion was afforded to court actors by the law was 
illustrated by examining the relationship between the ‘law in books’ and the ‘law 
in action’ across the two jurisdictions. It was found that court actors from 
England and Canada were able to adhere to similar laws and legal principles 
while employing very different bail practices. For instance, Chapter Four 
demonstrates that court actors complied with the principles of adversarialism in 
some capacity in both jurisdictions. While the prosecution and defence in 
Canada appeared to defy these principles based on the extent to which they 
formed joint positions on bail, in reality they applied them informally in their 
negotiations and through the process of ‘judge shopping.’ On the other hand, 
English court actors were more overtly adversarial in that they proceeded to 
more contested hearings, but, informally, did not oppose each other in the same 
way as their counterparts in Canada. Adversarial principles were thus complied 
with, to some extent, in England and Canada despite their practical application 
taking on very different forms.  
 
This pattern is further evidenced in Chapter Five. In both jurisdictions, court 
actors used similar legal considerations when assessing the importance of 
defendant and case characteristics. However, they applied and prioritised these 
characteristics in different ways, mitigating perceived bail risks in disparate 
fashions. While court actors used personal circumstances and elaborate bail 
plans to mitigate risk in Canada, those in England rarely discussed personal 
circumstances, applied more formulaic bail plans and instead relied on 
alternative narratives of the offence. Finally, Chapter Six demonstrates how 
flexible guidelines surrounding case processing in each jurisdiction permitted 
legally viable, but ultimately dissimilar conceptualisations of court efficiency and 
the relationship between bail and the rest of the court process. This permitted 
disparate practices in terms of the time used to move cases through the 
process. A conceptualisation of the bail process as lengthy and insular in 
Canada resulted in longer case processing while the idea that it was quick and 
integrated in England resulted in speedier case processing.   
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The flexibility of the framework surrounding the bail decision-making process 
was also observed in relation to the principles contained in the overarching 
rhetoric. As was the case with the law, criminal justice rhetoric could be 
interpreted widely and thus applied disparately by court actors. This was clearly 
observed in relation to the application of the due process values that provide the 
foundation of both English and Canadian bail legislation and the crime control 
values that have been increasingly prioritised in these jurisdictions over time. In 
Canada, additional checks and balances during the bail process were perceived 
to ensure fairness for the defendant and thus reflect due process principles. 
This is how court actors justified prolonged negotiations, detailed bail plans, and 
taking more time and appearances to get the ‘right’ bail decision. In England, 
however, court actors often argued that lengthy bail proceedings violated the 
rights of the defendants, adhering to Feeley’s (1992) argument that enduring 
the criminal process was in and of itself a punishment. Furthermore, while court 
actors in both jurisdictions sought to repress offending-related behaviour (see 
Chapter Five), ideas as to what constituted crime control differed substantially. 
Court actors in England sought to repress offending on bail through targeted 
bail conditions or remands in custody, while those in Canada believed 
addressing the social causes underlying criminal behaviour and thus reforming 
the alleged offender would reduce crime. While these differing perspectives 
reflect the general consensus in each jurisdiction, even internally there was 
dissent on these interpretations. As such, it is not just the law, but also the 
principles within criminal justice rhetoric that are open to wide interpretation.  
 
Criminal justice rhetoric is also flexible in that it contains competing principles. 
This was illustrated in the current research, whereby court actors were 
expected, among other priorities, to emphasise the liberty of the defendant, 
ensure public safety, protect victims, complete the process efficiently and 
uphold fairness throughout. Depending on the way in which these principles 
were prioritised by court actors, they resulted in vastly different behaviours. 
While a prosecutor in the Canadian court might argue that a highly restrictive 
bail plan would protect the public and secure the liberty of the defendant, their 
counterpart in the English court may suggest that remanding the same 
defendant in custody would be the only way to ensure the safety of the victim. 
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Both court actors would be applying principles contained in the overarching 
rhetoric and neither would be violating their respective bail laws.  
 
While the law was shown to be an important formal factor to examine given the 
scope it provided for discretion, more informal factors related to court culture 
and the views surrounding the broader criminal process were shown to be 
critical in shaping how that discretion was used. As previous research has 
demonstrated, court culture was central to the bail decision-making process 
(Hucklesby, 1997a; Myers, 2009, 2015; Webster, 2009). The shape of this 
process could be partially attributed to the norms, incentives, and informal 
practices that evolved in each court and the manner in which they were 
mediated through the courtroom workgroup. However, this culture was also 
shaped by broader views that developed in each jurisdiction as a result of  
evolving criminal justice ideologies. The way in which these principles were 
balanced influenced the values deemed important in the English and Canadian 
courts.  
 
The values held by the court actors extended beyond the bail process, 
specifically, and encompassed attitudes surrounding the criminal process more 
generally. While other research has pointed to the importance of such 
contextual factors (Church, 1985; Hucklesby, 1997a; Rumgay, 1995) they have 
not fully accounted for how they influence the culture of the court. By stepping 
outside the confines of one jurisdiction, this study was better able to assess how 
the impact of this broader criminal justice context in each jurisdiction manifests 
itself. Ultimately, it was found that court culture, as shaped by this broader 
context, was crucial to determining the nature of the informal negotiations that 
took place between the court actors, the defendant and case characteristics 
they used to construct the case, and the speed with which defendants moved 
through the bail process. 
 
Previous research has suggested that formal bail hearings, in which the 
prosecution and defence present their cases to a judicial official, have largely 
been replaced by informal negotiations that take place outside of open court 
(Hucklesby, 1997b; Myers, 2015). The findings in both jurisdictions support this 
assertion. Court actors in both jurisdictions were incentivised, for a variety of 
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reasons related to court culture, to avoid contested bail hearings and negotiate 
outside of open court. Indeed, court actors were shown to make decisions 
based on financial incentives and to work together, to some extent, to avoid 
uncertainty and search for ways to move through the court list. However, their 
behaviour was also shaped by broader views related to managerialism that 
manifested themselves differently across the two jurisdictions. While 
prosecutors in Canada were preoccupied with broader risk management, and 
consequently ensuring onerous restrictions were placed upon defendants 
released on bail, court actors in England were concerned with moving through 
the bail process quickly and minimising the use of custody to reduce costs 
associated with courts and prisons. This demonstrates that broader values 
surrounding the criminal process were being balanced in a disparate fashion 
across the two jurisdictions. It was also suggested that these values may 
influence the decisions of the police, shaping the nature of the cases that 
entered each bail process and having a formative impact on the perceived role 
of the prosecution and defence at bail. Indeed, detention practices in England 
were largely perceived to be more appropriate than those in Canada, ultimately 
impacting the extent to which court actors agreed with each other in each 
jurisdiction. These factors interacted to produce a culture of consensus in 
England compared to one more centred on conflict in Canada.  
 
The interaction between culture and context was also found in relation to the 
defendant and case characteristics used to construct bail cases. Consistent with 
previous research (Church, 1982; Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; Lipetz, 1984), the 
defence and prosecution were found to present this information in a routine 
fashion in accordance with the perceived expectations of the court. This was 
largely done with a view of reducing the uncertainty of the proceedings 
(Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977). The information that was prioritised, however, 
according to wider expectations about risk. In both jurisdictions, information was 
conveyed and exceptions to bail were applied with the view of preventing further 
offending. However, in Canada, robust bail plans, particularly those involving 
supervision, were deemed to be critical to mitigating risk. In England, the focus 
was primarily on providing alternative narratives of the allegations and formulaic 
bail plans. This resulted in much more individualised approach to the mitigation 
of bail risk in Canada than in England, where there was a greater focus on the 
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allegations themselves. The routine use of ‘therapeutic justice’ (Hannah-Moffat 
& Maurutto, 2012) in Canada was based on the idea that targeting the 
underlying causes of offending would reduce the risk of further offences. It is 
suggested that these differences were rooted in an enhanced focus on 
rehabilitation in the criminal process in Canada relative to that in England. In 
comparison, the focus on early case resolutions in the broader criminal justice 
process in England (Narey Report, 1997) meant that allegations were discussed 
in conjunction with bail and thus also used to mitigate bail risk. This is another 
example of broader views surrounding the criminal process bleeding into the 
way the court actors understand the norms at play in each court. 
 
Court actors sought to move cases through the bail process at a pace that was 
consistent with court norms. In accordance with previous research (Church, 
1982; Heumann, 1978; Hucklesby, 1997a; McConville et al., 1994) standard 
practices related to case processing times were both perpetuated and 
entrenched through the continued adherence of court actors. In Canada, this 
meant that adjournments were routinely approved and bail decisions often took 
more than one appearance, while in England only one appearance was typically 
required and informal practices in bail court conformed to this standard. These 
practices were largely rooted in the conceptualisation of the bail process as a 
summary procedure in England as opposed to the ‘mini-trial’ that has been 
conceived in Canada. This difference mirrors broader norms surrounding case 
processing times in England and Canada. Indeed, while England has largely 
decreased case processing times in the last few decades (Ministry of Justice, 
2008b, 2017a), Canada continues to experience difficulty in doing so (Standing 
Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2017). These findings 
suggest this was, in part, a product of different applications of due process 
values. While time-consuming checks and balances were seen as fundamental 
to ensuring fairness in Canada, ensuring the defendant does not spend an 
unnecessary amount of time in custody was primary in England. Once again, 
we see the broader views surrounding the criminal process prioritising different 
aspects of the criminal justice rhetoric and affecting the way bail courts operate.  
 
In sum, these findings suggest that the factors contributing to bail decision-
making process can be understood using a framework which includes law, 
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culture, and broader views surrounding the criminal justice process. Even 
though the manifestation of these factors may vary between jurisdictions, in 
both Canada and England, these features can collectively explain the decision-
making of court actors. The discretion afforded to court actors by the law 
enabled culture to become central to their decision-making. However, culture 
cannot be separated from the broader criminal justice context. While informal 
practices, incentives and norms developed within each court, ultimately these 
organisational concerns interacted with wider contextual factors that shape 
views surrounding the entirety of the criminal process. Similarly, the influence of 
these broader views cannot be understood apart from culture given that they 
are mediated through the behaviour of the workgroup. As such, a 
comprehensive analysis of the factors that influence bail decision-making must 
involve an understanding of both of these contributing factors and the way in 
which they interact within the framework of the overarching bail laws.  
 
The impact of bail decision-making at the local level 
 
The interaction of law, culture, and broader views surrounding the criminal 
justice process produced a unique pattern of bail decision-making in each 
jurisdiction. In both England and Canada, there was a clear impact on the 
functioning of the court and the shape of the bail process at the local level. The 
models of bail decision-making thus notably diverged between locations and 
had a disparate impact on bail outcomes.  
 
In Canada, the relationship between the defence and prosecution was 
contentious, with prolonged negotiations taking place over cases that were 
often viewed to be inappropriate for police detention. In making bail decisions, 
the court was presented with information primarily centred on the risk of further 
offending, but ultimately the bail plan – and in particular obtaining a surety - was 
critical to mitigating these concerns and securing a release. The vast majority of 
these defendants were ultimately released, but after the defence agreed to 
restrictive bails involving some form of supervision. This process regularly took 
more than one appearance, often requiring a considerable amount of 
information and involving lengthy procedures.  
 
  
272 
In England, on the other hand, there was generally a collegial relationship 
between the prosecution and defence and minimal contention, both in 
negotiations and in open court, in relation to bail. This was related to the 
perception that the police were, in the main, detaining appropriate defendants in 
custody. Representations were also focused on the risk of further offending but 
unlike in Canada, these concerns were primarily mitigated through alternative 
versions of events or formulaic bail plans. More than a third of defendants were 
ultimately remanded in custody but the prosecution was not perceived to be 
unreasonable in imposing conditions on their release. Furthermore, this higher 
percentage of remands in custody may relate to the nature of the cases 
entering the court, which had attributes that were more in line with the 
exceptions to bail compared to their Canadian counterparts. The entire bail 
process was largely viewed as a summary process, involving minimal 
procedures and very rarely taking more than one appearance.  
 
While the intention of this research was not to propose specific policy 
recommendations, it does have important implications for policy-makers who 
are seeking to reform the bail process in these jurisdictions in a more general 
sense. For instance, in attempting to learn from one another, policy-makers in 
England and Canada should be mindful of the differing contexts in which these 
cultures arose. Comparative researchers have argued that it is challenging to 
find ‘solutions’ to domestic problems given that many of the ‘problems’ are 
closely intertwined with otherwise valued features of the society (Nelken, 2007). 
However, this does not mean that attempts at policy transfer are fruitless (Jones 
& Newburn, 2007). For instance, Orucu (2007) has stated that different values 
pursued by different legal systems can and should be investigated and 
acknowledged when making recommendations. Given that one of the major 
findings in this study involved the examination of such values, it is argued that 
the jurisdictions can use this research to learn from another as long as they take 
these different contexts into account. For instance, suggesting that English 
court actors implement the lengthy testimonies that often take place in Canada 
as a means to acquire more information at the bail stage would most likely be 
unsuccessful given the bail process is conceptualised as a summary procedure 
in England. Such an oversight would likely lead to a failed attempt at policy 
transfer. Having a comprehensive understanding of the interaction of the 
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various factors influencing bail decision-making is thus critical for any policy-
maker hoping to affect change in the bail system.  
 
Furthermore, this research suggests that reforms of a piecemeal nature should 
be made with caution (Webster & Doob, 2015). This is, first, because altering 
one problem may have a domino effect on other issues. For instance, 
encouraging the court to refuse adjournments in Canada might increase the 
efficiency of the proceedings but it would also put the defence at a 
disadvantage if they were required to find a surety in order to secure a release 
for their client. Similarly, encouraging the court in England to intervene when 
signalling occurs could extend case processing time if done excessively. As 
such, care must be taken to view the process holistically before reforms are 
implemented. Second, piecemeal changes are problematic since they often do 
not target the underlying values that have created the culture that perpetuates 
the issue. Attempting to encourage court actors in England to take more time 
considering the issue of bail, for instance, would be better addressed by tackling 
the issue of them emphasising collegiality over adversarialism than it would by 
making small changes to individual procedures.  
 
Understanding bail in a wider context 
 
In addition to providing a framework for potential reform in each jurisdiction, the 
study also furthers an understanding of the bail process on a broader level. The 
findings challenge the way we have come to explain bail decision-making and 
provide a guide as to how to further examine this process.  
 
First, this research challenges our understanding of the relationship between 
the law and the behaviour of court actors during the bail process. It echoes 
previous research (see McBarnet, 1981; McConville et al., 1991) that 
emphasises the importance of examining the law in attempts to understand the 
criminal justice process and its components. In line with McConville and his 
colleagues (1991) and McBarnet (1981), the findings suggest that attempts to 
understand the bail process should not be limited to an examination of the 
behaviour of criminal justice actors. Rather, this behaviour should be regarded 
according to its relationship with the overarching law. While previous research, 
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particularly in Canada, has framed issues with the bail process in the context of 
a failure by court actors to adhere to the law (see, for example, John Howard 
Society, 2013; Canadian Civil Liberties Association, 2014), this study suggests 
that this assertion is mistaken. The law is not necessarily ignored by court 
actors during the bail process, but rather used as a tool with which to exercise 
their own discretion. As such, as McConville and his colleagues (1991) and 
McBarnet (1981) have argued in relation to other criminal justice processes, the 
influence of the law should not be dismissed when examining the bail decision-
making of court actors.   
 
Second, the findings answer Young’s (2013) call for a fuller exploration of the 
concept of court culture and suggest additional research of this nature should 
be pursued. Specifically, Young (2013) has argued that the idea that the 
courtroom workgroup generally follows a consensus model of behaviour is 
simplistic. The current study confirms this hypothesis, demonstrating that the 
extent to which court actors are incentivised to get along is very much 
dependent on the context in which they work. While this model describes the 
behaviour of court actors in England, who shared similar incentives, this did not 
describe the Canadian court actors, whose incentives were often inconsistent 
with other members of the workgroup. This suggests that future research should 
continue to explore the nuanced dynamics that exist within the courtroom 
workgroup and the extent to which they change in different contexts.  
 
Finally, this study has highlighted the importance of understanding the context 
in which bail decisions are made and demonstrates the need to take this factor 
into account during future attempts to explain this process. While previous 
research has examined the relationship between the law and the behaviour of 
criminal justice actors (see, for example, Hucklesby, 1996; McBarnet, 1981; 
McConville et al., 1991; Myers, 2009), it has not fully addressed the broader 
context in which the process takes place. The decisions made by court actors 
during the bail process do not exist in a silo but rather are shaped by their views 
surrounding the broader criminal process. For instance, jurisdictions in which 
adversarialism, rehabilitation, or efficiency is viewed as critical to criminal justice 
will likely see this value bleeding into all components of the criminal process. 
Taking these broader views for granted in attempting to understand the bail 
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decision-making will fail to paint a comprehensive picture. As such, reducing 
analyses to ‘culture’ versus ‘law’ can only offer a partial explanation of the bail 
process.  
 
Limitations and future research 
 
Although this research has furthered an understanding of bail decision-making, 
it is limited in terms of its generalisability and scope. First, given that the study 
involved a comparative case study of two court locations, it cannot be 
understood to represent the entirety of either jurisdiction. Research consistently 
shows that court culture is unique to each location (Church, 1985; Hucklesby, 
1997a; Leverick & Duff, 2002). However, while generalisations cannot be made 
in a statistical sense, this does not mean they cannot be made theoretically 
(Yin, 2014). Specifically, the knowledge gained in this study contributes to a 
greater understanding of the bail decision-making process generally even if it 
does not explain how this process operates in the entirety of each jurisdiction. 
 
The study is also limited in terms of its scope. The absence of the views of the 
entire workgroup in Canada has limited the diversity of the perspectives 
obtained in this jurisdiction. As such, the same context was not acquired in 
relation to the decision-making of the prosecution and the court as it was with 
defence and duty counsel. In addition, the number of observations obtained that 
included bail decisions was limited in Canada given that about half of the 
appearances ultimately ended in adjournments. These limitations were partially 
supplemented through the triangulation of other forms of evidence obtained in 
the mixed methods study and by comparing the findings with other sources of 
information (e.g. the Crown Policy Manual). Nonetheless, the breadth of the 
research would have been improved by the addition of this data in Canada.  
  
In light of these limitations it is suggested that additional research be 
undertaken in both jurisdictions to examine the extent to which these 
conclusions apply to other courts in other areas of the jurisdiction. For instance, 
some research suggests decision-making takes on a different form in smaller 
courts as opposed to the larger courts that were examined in this study (Ulmer, 
1997). In addition, the views of both the prosecution and the court should be 
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examined in Canada in order to fully understand their perspective on bail. Given 
that the prosecution, in particular, appears to play a significant role in dictating 
the behaviour of the other court actors, it is critical that additional information is 
gained in relation to their views. 
 
Contributions  
 
Despite its limitations, this research contributes to an increased understanding 
of the practical operation of the bail process in both England and Canada. Bail 
has been referred to as the ‘Cinderella’ of criminal justice in that it has received 
very little academic or political attention (Hucklesby & Sarre, 2009). Indeed, bail 
decision-making has only recently become a prominent subject of research in 
Canada (Canadian Civil Liberties Association, 2014; Myers, 2009, 2015; 
Webster, 2009), and given recent concerns expressed by the government 
(Trudeau, 2015) it remains an area that warrants additional study. In England, 
only a limited amount of research has been conducted on bail decision-making 
since the introduction of legislation that has impacted the bail process, such as 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Hucklesby, 2011a), and LASPO 2012 (Cape & 
Smith, 2016), and much of the research that has been conducted relies on 
hypothetical scenarios. Given the implications that bail decision-making has for 
defendants, criminal justice institutions, and human rights, it is critical that more 
is known about this area of study and how it is best understood. This research 
adds to this knowledge. Although results should not dictate what these 
administrations should and should not do it does provide them a framework with 
which to make such decisions. By providing a more comprehensive, nuanced 
way to understand this process, it facilitates better reform in the future. 
 
The approach of this study offers an original contribution in that it provided a 
comparative perspective to the issue of bail decision-making in an international 
context. Very few studies have undertaken such an endeavour. Zweigert and 
Kotz (1998) suggest that approaches that focus on one jurisdiction only offer 
legal solutions to practical problems ‘on their own terms’ and argue that 
solutions should be freed from the context of their own system in order for 
evaluation to take place. As a result of the comparative component, taken for 
granted assumptions as to the way the bail process works could be identified 
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and new avenues of understanding and potential reform could be examined. 
The findings are more solution-oriented than single jurisdiction studies as issues 
in one court could be compared and contrasted to the other with the view of 
understanding their objective impact.  
 
The comparative aspect of this study was particularly beneficial as it allowed for 
an increased understanding of the influence of broader criminal justice views on 
court culture. Many of the values and attitudes that were found to shape the 
culture of each court could have easily been bypassed without the ability to 
identify what the process might look like in a different context.  This ultimately 
demonstrated that court culture was not, as it is often portrayed, a nebulous 
concept, but rather an explicit product of the environment in which it was 
entrenched. 
 
Concluding reflections 
 
This research suggests that the factors contributing to bail decision-making are 
nuanced and varied. Rather than exerting their influence independently, factors 
related to the law, policy, court culture, and broader views surrounding the 
criminal process work together in an interactive fashion to impact the behaviour 
of court actors during the bail process. Only by taking all of these contributing 
factors into account can the bail decision-making process be understood. 
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